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NAVAL LESSONS 
OF THE GREAT WAR 




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NAVAL LESSONS OF 
THE GREAT WAR 



A REVIEW OF THE SENATE NAVAL INVESTIGATION 
OF THE CRITICISMS BY ADMIRAL SIMS OF THE 
POLICIES AND METHODS OF JOSEPHUS DANIELS 



WITH AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY 

REAR-ADMIRAL B. A. FISKE 

U. S. NAVY 



BY 

TRACY BARRETT KITTREDGE 

M. A. (Calw.) B. a. (Oxford) 

Naval Correspondent of the Providence Journal 

Lieutenant, United States Naval Reserve Force 

On Active Service August, 1917, until the Armistice, Intelligence Section, 
Admiral Sims's Staff, Organizer and Active Director Historical Section, Naval 
Headquarters, London. Late Archivist and Statistician, Naval War College. 
Sometime Member History Department, University of California. Member 
of the American Commission for Relief in Belgium, 1914-1920, and its Repre- 
sentative at the German General Headquarters on the Western Front, 
May, 1916— March, 1917 



GARDEN CITY, N. Y. , AND TORONTO 

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 
1921 






Copyright, 1921, hy 

DOUBLEDAY, PaGE & COMPANY 



AU rights reserved, including that of translation 

into foreign languages, including 

the Scandinavian. 



7^?^, 



XI 







TO 
ADMIRAL WILLIAM SOWDEN SIMS 

UNITED STATES NAVY 

THE INCARNATION OF THE SPIRIT OF THE NAVY 

ITS ^EADEB IN SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AGAINST A 

FOREIGN FOE 

ITS DEFENDER AGAINST INTERNAL DANGERS 

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED 



FOREWORD 

This book is a record of official testimony given to Con- 
gress by navy officers under oath. 

It shows that the principal naval lesson of the war is the 
menace to the national honor and safety that was involved 
in committing the management of its navy to unworthy 
hands. 

The Secretary of the Navy should be a man of the high- 
est order of ability, knowledge and foresight. This book 
shows that Secretary Daniels was so far below this standard 
that the Navy would have been caught wholly unprepared 
when we entered the war, and would have been ineffective dur- 
ing the war, if certain navy officers had not sacrificed or 
endangered their positions, by putting through important 
measures, without his knowledge. 

The Secretary of the Navy should be a man of the highest 
character. This book shows that Secretary Daniels, both 
in writing over his official signature, and in oral official testis 
mony before Congressional Committees, made many state- 
ments about important naval matters within his cognizance, 
that were absolutely false. 

Bradley A. Fiske, 
Rear-Admiral, U. S. N. (Retired). 



PREFACE 

I have endeavored to present in this volume a review of the 
recent naval investigation, and an analysis of the evidence 
relating to the naval lessons of the war. 

With most of the questions involved, I have been personally 
familiar, since those anxious months of 1917 when I became 
a member of Admiral Sims' staff, first as a civilian volunteer, 
later as a reserve officer, in the Intelligence Section of his 
headquarters in London. The lamentable failure of the 
Navy Department to meet the situation in 1917, even with 
the resources then available, has long been so well known 
to almost every man who served abroad in the early months 
of the war, that Admiral Sims' letter and his testimony 
seem a very mild and exceedingly temperate statement of the 
conditions then existing. 

It has been my good fortune not only to have served under 
Admiral Sims abroad, but to have been of some slight as- 
sistance to him during his appearance before the senate 
naval investigating committee. At the request of its chair- 
man, Senator Hale, I was ordered to Washington, by the 
Navy Department, to assist the Admiral. I therefore was 
able to follow the investigation at first hand. 

As a reserve officer, I am naturally keenly interested in 
the welfare and future of the Navy. The lessons of the war 
have been so little understood that it seemed to me that an 
effort should be made to clarify and condense the facts es- 
tablished by the testimony, and by official records, in such 
a way as to give those interested in the Navy a definite 
understanding of the meaning, and the significance to the 
nation, of Admiral Sims' comments on the naval lessons 
of the war. 



X PREFACE 

This book is the result of this feeling. I alone am re- 
sponsible for its conception, contents and conclusions. I 
have made use of my personal knowledge of the facts at issue, 
only to unify and clarify the actual evidence given to the 
Senate committee under oath by the various witnesses. It 
cannot be too strongly emphasized that all testimony was 
sworn testimony and, as a result, that any statements de- 
liberately at variance with truth constitute perjury. Most 
of the testimony was, therefore, unusually conscientious and 
straightforward. 

The greatest care has been exercised to insure accuracy 
of statement. Rather than summarize the testimony I have 
preferred to include a large number of actual quotations, 
that the reader may have evidence of the correctness of the 
conclusions stated. 

The material used is without exception taken from official 
sources ; chiefly from the actual record of the Hearings of 
the Naval Investigation ; partly from other Hearings ; from 
the Reports of the Secretary of the Navy ; and only in some 
few cases, for illustrative purposes, from other books and 
sources. 

I have had the temerity to dedicate this volume to the of- 
ficer who is to-day the outstanding figure in our Navy, the 
Admiral under whom it was my privilege to serve during the 
Great War. I have neither sought nor obtained permission 
from him to do so and make my apologies to him for what 
may seem to him an impertinence. It should be needless 
to add that Admiral Sims had no knowledge of my inten- 
tion to write this book, nor will he have had any knowl- 
edge of its contents until it appears in print. 

I wish to acknowledge my grateful appreciation to Colonel 
Robert M. Thompson of the Navy League for his counsel 
and assistance; to Rear Admiral B. A. Fiske, U. S. N. 
(ret.), for his kindness in consenting to introduce this 



PREFACE xi 

volume to the public ; to Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam, U. S. N. 
(ret.), for his friendly advice; and to the officers who served 
in the Navy Department during the war, for their service to 
the nation in admitting, under cross-examination, the truth 
of every vital point raised by Admiral Sims. 

The countr}' as a whole owes much to the Honourable 
Frederick Hale, United States Senator from Maine, the 
Chairman of the Investigating Sub-Committee of the Senate 
Naval Affairs Committee, for his patient but insistent and 
searching effort to bring to light matters of the most vital 
importance to the navy and to the nation alike. 

This volume is not, of course, anything more than a review 
of the evidence with regard to the lessons of the war, with 
a very brief and exceedingly tentative suggestion as to the 
significance of those lessons. If it serves to make possible a 
better understanding and construction of the present state 
of the Navy, its purpose will have been accomplished. 

Tracy Barrett Kittredge. 

Berkeley, Califoraia, 
December, 1920. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

Foreword — By Rear Admiral B. A. Fiske^ U.S.N. 
(Ret.) vii 

Preface ix 

I Introduction: The State of the Navy . . 3 

II Naval Organization and Preparedness, 1798- 

1917 8 

III The Navy and Mr. Daniels, 1913-1919 ... 26 

IV The Daniels Medal Awards 41 

V Admiral Sims' Letter on " Certain Naval Les- 
sons OF the Great War " 74 

VI The Scope of the Naval Investigation ... 92 

VII The Results of Unpreparedness and Ineffi- 
ciency (Admiral Sims' Testimony, March, 1920) 97 

VIII The Delays and Blunders of 1917 • . . .117 

IX Camouflage and Counter-Barrage Tactics (The 

Cross-Examination of Admiral Sims) . . . 141 

X Pacifism and Procrastination: Evidence from 
Within the Navy Department (The Testi- 
mony of Captains Laning, Palmer and Taussig) 159 

XI Unpreparedness for War ; Evidence from the 
Fleet (The Testimony of Rear- Admirals Plunk- 
ett, Grant, and Mayo) 183 

XII The Fight for Preparedness, 1913-1915 (The 

Testimony of Rear Admiral Fiske) .... 209 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XIII The Causes of Departmental Inefficiency 

(Admiral Fullam's Testimony) 238 

XIV Mr. Daniels' Admirals and Their Smoke Screen 
(The Testimony of Admirals Rodman, Wilson, 
Niblack, Strauss and F. F. Fletcher) . . . 255 

XV Corroboration of Admiral Sims by the Navy 

Department's Witnesses 279 

XVI Victory in Spite of Daniels (The Testimony of 

Admiral Badger and Captain Pratt) . . . 295 

XVII Responsibility and Activities of the Office of 
Naval Operations (The Testimony of Admirals 
McKean and Benson) 317 

XVIII Mr. Daniels' Smoke Screen Tactics .... 346 

XIX Mr. Daniels' Misrepresentations .... 363 

XX The Case for the Defence: An Analysis of 

Mr. Daniels' Own Summary of His Evidence 391 

XXI A Daniels Come to Judgment (The Cross-Ex- 

amination of the Secretary) 407 

XXII The Failure of the Daniels Administration 

(Admiral Sims' Summary of the Evidence) . . 422 

XXIII Conclusion: Naval Lessons of the Great War 450 



NAVAL LESSONS 
OF THE GREAT WAR 



3. 



CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE STATE OF THE NAVY 



THE nation has been amazed and confused, during the 
last year by revelations, of the most sensational and of the 
most conflicting character, with regard to the state of the 
Navy ; its administration by Mr. Josephus Daniels ; and 
the part it played in the Great War. 

Two investigations have been conducted by a subcommittee 
of the Naval Affairs Committee of the United States Senate ; 
one, into the method used by the Secretary in making medal 
awards for war service ; the other, into the condition of the 
Navy from 1913 to 1917 and into the conduct of the war at 
sea by the Navy Department. 

To a public not familiar with naval matters, the signifi- 
cance of the conditions that were revealed in these investiga- 
tions is perhaps not fully appreciated. The great volume 
of testimony, presented during the four months occupied by 
the investigations; the apparent contradiction between the 
t 'stimony of the several witnesses ; the bitter personal rc- 
f ctions on officers of the service and upon the Secretary of 
tJ e Navy ; all have contributed to confusing the mind of the 
country as to the issues at stake. 

The condition of the Navy today is, however, a matter of 
immediate interest and concern to every citizen. The ex- 
planation of the demoralization that now reigns in the naval 
service can be found in the Hearings of the Senate Com- 
mittee. In these is presented the extraordinary spectacle 

of a member of the Cabinet being publicly pilloried by some 

3 



4> NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

of the most distinguished officers in the Navy. In the Navy 
as a whole, nearly every self-respecting officer today ap- 
proves, openly or at heart, the condemnations heaped upon 
the present Secretary, Mr. Josephus Daniels. 

As a result of certain of the policies that have been put 
into force in the Navy Department in the past seven years 
many splendid traditions of the Navy have been discarded, 
the spirit of the service has been greatly impaired, the fight- 
ing efficiency of the fleet has been reduced to almost nothing. 

An officer in the Navy who resigned recently. Commander 
A. D. Turnbull, writing in the North American Review, says : 

" Officers and men grown grey in the service look with 
breaking hearts upon its disintegration. They have watched 
their valiant efforts to save the situation brought to nothing. 
They have seen preferment offered to — and alas ! accepted 
by — a scattered few of their brothers and shipmates, who 
could not keep loyalty to service and countrj'- above something 
that passes as loyalty to an individual. They have seen merit 
and initiative pretty well crushed. . . . 

" Mr. Daniels found the Navy in good material condition, 
manned by a strong, self-respecting personnel, animated from 
end to end by a fine spirit and a high purpose. 

" Mr. Daniels, after seven years of office, will leave the 
Navy a battered hulk, which it will take years of careful 
repairing to make seaworthy." 

The condition of the Navy demands national attention. 
It is the purpose of this volume to present in concise form 
the deeper meaning and importance of the Sims-Daniels con- 
troversy. 

II 

On June 26, 1915, the Secretary of the Navy, in address- 
ing the officers of the Atlantic Fleet, at the Naval War 
College at Newport, R. I., said: 

" The duty of the officers of the navy is to ask themselves 
constantly this searching question : ' Have we a maximum of 



INTRODUCTION: STATE OF THE NAVY 5 

efficiency? ' This question must relate to every element of 
material and personnel that makes the navy ready for the 
call that may be made ujion it. If the navy is not what it 
ought to be, the fault is properly laid at the door of the Sec- 
retary, because some one must be responsible. He cannot evade 
responsibility. . . . The public will and should hold him to ac- 
count." 

This passage can be taken as tlie text of this volume. It 
provides an excellent point of departure for a review of Mr. 
Daniels' administration. 

His long regime is drawing to a close. The navy has been 
through an ordeal, the bitterness of which few, outside of the 
naval service, can even imagine. The founders of our gov- 
ernment, in seeking to prevent the military forces from as- 
sailing the popular liberties, placed them under the direction 
of civilian secretaries. The army and the navy were thus 
made subject to the unrestricted power of a civilian. But, 
in a democratic country, the exercise of power carries with 
it a corresponding responsibility. The time has come when 
this should be made clear to those who administer the forces 
upon which we depend for our national defence. 



Ill 

The United States is entering upon a period of history 
in which the soundness of its institutions and the strength 
of its people will be subjected to crucial tests. The " war 
that was to end war " has thrown the world into confu- 
sion. A new world is emerging with new tendencies, new 
forces, new problems, which indicate all too clearly that, 
in the future as in the past, war will be the ultimate test of 
a nation. We are, it is true, happily situated, with an ocean 
on either side of us separating us from any conceivable ex- 
ternal danger. This very fact, however, gives new signifi- 
cance to the function of the navy as our first line of na- 



6 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

tional defence. Our political integrity, our world-wide in- 
terests, our seaborne commerce depend, in the last analysis, 
I upon naval strength and efficiency. If our navy is adequate, 
I well trained, well manned, ably led, we need have no fears 
j for our security. In any future war, such a navy would 
; serve as an impenetrable shield, behind which we could 
make calmly our military preparations ; as an offensive force 
that could harass, isolate and blockade the enemy, and make 
possible the transport overseas, if necessary, of armies com- 
posed of millions of men. 

We could not have done this in 1917. We could not do it 
to-day. That is the crucial point to be remembered in con- 
sidering our naval problem. All officers who knew the situ- 
ation in 1917, or who know the condition of the Navy to- 
day, including Mr. Daniels' chief naval advisers, have so 
testified. We were not ready for war in 1917. Had we 
then faced a great power singlehanded, we would now, as 
Admiral Plunkett testified, be paying the indemnity. As a 
nation we cannot afford to permit such a situation to occur 
again. We must demand of those responsible for our na- 
tional defence a genuine accounting. 

The naval investigation brought to light the salient 
features of Mr. Daniels' administration. In the pages that 
follow there will be reviewed evidence proving that he re- 
i garded the Navy primarily as a source of political capital for 
i himself and his party ; that he either never understood or 
\ completely ignored the only reason for a navy's existence — 
its readiness for war. 

It will be made clear that he has ruled as a despot, ruth- 
lessly crushing opposition, by czaristic and underhanded 
methods, while publicly parading himself as an ardent dem' 
crat; that from 1913 to 1917, he enforced a policy of 
pacifism upon the Navy ; that, in consequence, he prevented 
' any real preparedness for war ; and that, all the while he 
was deceiving the country and lulling it into a sense of false 



INTRODUCTION: STATE OF THE NAVY 7 

security by declaring in mellifluous phrases that the Navy 
was ready " from stem to stern " for any emergency. 

It will be demonstrated that he repeatedly made false 
statements, — perhaps inspired by lack of understanding 
rather than by intent to deceive, — to the country, to Con- 
gress and to the President, concerning the Navy and its con- 
dition ; that he made incorrect assertions, officially and in 
writing, to the United States Senate; that he gave testimony 
under oath before the Senate Committee which was com- 
pletely at variance with the testimony of other witnesses, 
and with the facts established by the evidence of official 
records. 

As a public official Mr. Daniels has flagrantly violated 
his trust. It would be disastrous to permit him to escape 
his responsibility. " The public will and should hold him 
to account," as Mr. Daniels himself said in 1915. 



CHAPTER II 

NAVAL ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS — 

1798-1917 



WE are often assured that history never repeats itself. 
Yet there are singular coincidences. The following quota- 
tion illustrates the point : 

" As we look back at the history of this period (the first year of 
war), it seems incredible that the Navy Department with the vast 
resources at its command . . . should have been able to show 
only such meagre results during seven months of war. Lest this 
statement be thought too severe, we quote the candid omission (of 
the responsible naval officials) : ' But for some few redeeming 
successes . . . the wliole belligerent operations would have been 
pronounced weak and imbecile failures." 

". . . This was mainly due to the extreme slowness and delib- 
eration with which the Navy Department moved. ... It is safe 
to say that the American people today would not tolerate for a 
week a Secretary of the Navy who conducted the operations of 
the war in the timorous, procrastinating and inefficient fashion in 
which they were conducted in 1861. 

The only surprising feature of this quotation is the 
date, 1861. Otherwise it might be applied to the year 
1917 and to the administration of Secretary Daniels. But 
the last sentence shows the temerity of its writer, Mr. J. R. 
Soley, himself a graduate of Annapolis and once Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, from whose life of Admiral Porter 
the quotation is taken. 

How despairing, indeed, is the task of the historian! 



ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS 9 

Every investigator in the domain of science knows that in 
determining the processes at work in nature he is confer- 
ring a boon on humanity. He realizes that practical appli- 
cation will be made immediately of any discoveries which 
will tend to ameliorate the lot of man or render life in civ- 
ilized societies more secure. In science, as in business or in 
the individual life, wisdom comes from experience ; we learn 
by our mistakes. But the writer of history, if he concerns 
himself at all with the results of his researches, is obliged to 
admit that his work is fruitless. No matter how clearly 
he may show the inevitable sequence of cause and effect, or 
demonstrate the operation of definite processes in human 
affairs, he must perforce resign himself to seeing his con- 
clusions ignored, as well by the people as by the politicians 
to whom they entrust the direction of their common desti- 
nies. He must submit to witnessing, in every period of 
national crisis, the recurrence of the same problems and the 
repetition of the same errors. One has only to read 
Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian wars (432-404? 
B. c.) and his description of the failure of democracy to heed 
the lessons of experience, or consider the consequences of 
disaster, and then reflect for a moment on the performance 
of our government in the Great War, to be disheartened. 

II 

The ultimate test of any state or people is war. Through- 
out history, war has been the agency that has begun and 
terminated political and national existences ; that has al- 
tered racial, language, cultural and religious boundaries ; 
that has determined for good or ill the direction of hun^ari 
social development. We can witness to-day no evidence 
that wars have ceased to play a determining part in the 
shaping of the affairs of man. 

It was bv war that we came into existence as a nation; 



10 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

it was chiefly by warfare, organized or sporadic, that the 
American nation expanded from the Atlantic seaboard to the 
shores of the Pacific. It was war that sealed and cemented 
our national union and led to the freeing of the slaves. It 
was war, again, that made us over from a provincial state 
into a world power. The destruction of the Spanish fleet 
in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, signalized a complete trans- 
formation in our relations with the other nations of the 
world. Nor will our most recent war be without equally 
significant influence on our national destiny, though we are 
still too fresh from the fray to estimate accurately the prob- 
able consequences. 

Success in war has, throughout the ages, been deter- 
mined by certain clearly defined factors and conditions. 
Every schoolboy realizes that our independent existence as a 
nation depends upon our ability and willingness to maintain 
it, when necessary, by war. As a nation we believe and 
expect that our govermnent will take adequate measures 
to ensure our success in war. We assume that the known 
principles of warfare, which alone determine success or 
failure, will be heeded, in peace and in war, by the respon- 
sible departments of our government, to whom we entrust 
the national defence. We take it for granted that the 
Army and the Navy will be so organized and administered 
as to provide us with adequate means for defence. But 
in the light of history, have we any reason for our assump- 
tion? 

If we need any answer to such a question, we can find it 
in the testimony of many distinguished officers of the Navy 
before the investigating committee of the Senate a few 
months ago. In going through the voluminous evidence pre- 
sented by each of more than a dozen officers, who held high 
and responsible positions during the war, one seeks, almost 
in vain, to find a single fundamental military principle that 
was not violated by Mr. Josephus Daniels' department. 



ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS 11 

To those familiar with our mihtary and naval policy in 
the past, however, the revelations of the naval investiga- 
tion sounded strangely familiar. Students of military his- 
tory, who have written for us the unvarnished tale of the 
circumstances under which we have entered upon other wars, 
have revealed similar conditions. In times of peace we have 
complacently assumed, as did Mr. Bryan, that we would never 
have another war; but that, if we did, a million men would 
spring to arms overnight ; though where they would get the 
arms to which to spring was a mystery we never investigated. 
Accustomed from childhood to read of the famous exploits 
at arms, of which our people have shown themselves capable 
when properly armed, trained and led, we have allowed our 
politicians to neglect our national defences ; to waste money, 
intended to provide the country with an efficient army and 
an adequate navy, in maintaining outlying and isolated army 
posts and obsolete and unserviceable navy yards, for purely 
political reasons — "to give jobs to patriots" as the 
Charlotte (N. C.) Observer put it, in dealing with Mr. 
Daniels' probable policies in 1913. 



Ill 

If the Navy, because of w^eakness or unpreparedness, is 
unready for war at the moment the enemy chooses to strike, 
it will be destroyed or bottled up. We will then be open 
to enemy attack, our commerce will be cut off, our coasts 
will be bombarded, our soil invaded. 

Yet we usually fail to realize that the Navy cannot provide 
us with the defence for which it is maintained unless it 
is of sufficient strength and efficiency to meet the possible 
enemy w-ith reasonable prospect of success in battle. The 
Navy cannot win such success in battle unless it has a suf- 
ficient number of all the various types of vessels needed to 
make a well rounded fighting fleet; unless there are adequate 



12 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

and strategically situated repair, docking and supply 
facilities to keep the vessels at all times materially fit for 
battle. The Navy cannot fulfil its mission unless its per- 
sonnel, officers and men, are adequate in numbers, properly 
trained for war and actuated by that conscious pride in its 
efficiency and by that fighting spirit which constitute the 
morale of the service. 

The Navy cannot successfully wage war unless it is led 
by officers well versed in strategy and tactics, and is guided 
in its operations by carefully prepared policies and war 
plans. These conditions cannot be satisfied unless the Navy 
Department is so organized and co-ordinated, that it can 
develop and maintain the highest state of material, person- 
nel and moral preparedness for war. 

Few of these conditions have ever been realized. Not only 
in our latest war, but many times before, the same defects 
and shortcomings have been revealed by the stress of war; 
the same temporary expedients have been devised to meet 
the war emergencies; and the war has come to an end just 
when the Navy, or the Army, as the case may be, was be- 
coming approximately ready to fight with real effectiveness. 
As soon as the war came to an end, the experience gained 
was forgotten ; the lessons to be derived went undiscovered 
and unheeded. 

Admiral Stephen B. Luce, Admiral A. T. Mahan, Admiral 
B. A. Fiske, General Upton, Theodore Roosevelt, and many 
other students of military and naval history have more than 
demonstrated these conditions in past wars. The naval in- 
vestigation has enlightened us as to the extent of their repe- 
tition in the present war. Unless precautionary steps are 
taken the next war will witness the recurrence of exactly 
the same monotonous but highly dangerous phenomena. 



ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS 13 

IV 

The Navy Department was created by the Act of Congress 
of April 30, 1798. Previous to that time the War Depart- 
ment had controlled the few frigates in service, but the 
threat of a war with France compelled recognition of the 
necessity for a separate administration of the Navy. From 
1798 to 1815 the Navy was managed entirely by the civilian 
Secretary, without any assistance or responsible advice from 
naval officers. This exclusion of the military element from 
the control of the Navy made it impossible for the Navy to 
prepare for war or to fight effectively. 

This was illustrated in 1812, when the Navy Depart- 
ment, in a state of panic, demonstrated its incapacity by 
laying up the entire navy lest it should be swept out of 
existence by the British cruisers. Captains Stewart and 
Bainbridge protested successfully against this policy, with 
the result that American frigates were able to strike severe 
blows at British trade, bombard the British shores and win 
several notable victories over single British war vessels. 
But there was no fleet action in the Wjar of 1812. As a 
matter of fact, we had no fleet — if we except the one built 
by Commodore Perry on Lake Eric. The Navy Depart- 
ment was not able to prevent the burning of the Capitol or 
the landing of British troops on our soil. 

As a result of the pitiful incompetency of an exclusively 
civilian direction of a highly technical naval service. Con- 
gress in 1815 provided for the creation of a Board of Navy 
Commissioners, composed of three post captains of the 
Navy (the highest rank then in existence) to assist the Sec- 
retary. The wording of the act was faulty, however, in 
that it made no distinction between the military and civil 
branches of the department. The result was that the three 
commissioners, instead of directing the military activities of 
the Navy, came to be charged chiefly with the administration 



14 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

of the civil branch, with the supply, ordnance and construc- 
tion work. This led inevitably to friction and difficulty. 
In 1842 the Navy Department was therefore reorganized 
and the bureaus were established to take over the adminis- 
tration of the civil branch. At the same time the Board of 
Commissioners, instead of being retained to perform those 
military functions for which it was created, was abolished. 
This left the Secretary in the entirely false position of a 
civilian called upon to administer the affairs of the executive 
department of the government having to do with naval mat- 
ters, without a professional assistant. Writing in 1902, Ad- 
miral Luce said of this reorganization: 

" No provision was made for any direction of naval operations 
save by the action of the Secretary, a civilian. The organization 
was one that could work only while the country was at peace and 
military considerations could be neglected. People generally 
scouted the idea that peace could ever be disturbed. The Civil 
War rudely dispelled this idle dream and proved the falsity of 
the theory on which the organization of the Department was 
based." {Proceedings of the Naval Institute, 1902.) 



The Civil War brought confusion into the Department. 
No provisions or plans had been made for any belligerent 
activities. The bureaus were absorbed in the sudden and 
great demands made upon them by the work of a purely 
civil character. The Secretary was without military assist- 
ance in the administration of the personnel of the Navy 
and in the direction of military operations and " found him- 
self in a complete state of isolation." 

Makeshift arrangements had to be improvised to enable 
the department to meet the sudden and pressing demands 
upon it. The Secretary called on Captain Silas H. String- 
ham to take charge of the Office of Detail, in charge of per- 
sonnel. Then, on April 1, 1861, President Lincoln directed 



ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS 15 

Captain Samuel Barron, who already held a commission as 
captain in the Confederate navy, to take over and organize 
the Bureau of Detail. This order was not carried into 
effect, as the President revoked it when the circumstances 
were explained to him. But it illustrates the chaos that pre- 
vailed. 

The department found itself in 1861, as it did later, in 
1898 and in 1917, witli a war on its hands and no one com- 
petent to direct war oj^erations. There were several efforts 
made to organize the bureau chiefs into a Board of Admir- 
alty, or to provide a board of officers who would exercise the 
military control over operations. But these efforts were re- 
sultless. Finally the position of Assistant Secretary was 
created and a former naval officer. Captain Gustavus V. 
Fox, was appointed to fill it. He practically took over the 
direction of the military side of the department and became, 
by force of circumstances, a kind of chief of naval staff. 
Various boards were organized to handle military matters 
falling outside the scope of the activities of the bureaus. 
This included the " Committee on Conference," which owed 
its existence to a civilian, Professor A. D. Bache, the Super- 
intendent of the Coast Survey. This committee, the mem- 
bership of which included a number of able officers, such as 
Captain S. F. DuPont, U. S. N., and Commander C. H. 
Davis, U. S. N., became in reality the strategy board, or 
plans section, of the improvised war staff. Other emer- 
gency boards were appointed to discharge temporarily the 
otlier military functions of the department, for which no 
previous provision had been made. Taken together, these 
boards ultimately met the issue and became a temporary 
naval general staff. 

For the first two j^ears of tlie war, however, the utmost 
confusion prevailed. Improvised plans of campaign proved 
faulty and led to disastrous failures. The operations off 
Charleston, from 1861 to 1863, demonstrated by their futility 



16 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the consequences of having a military department of the 
government so organized that no provision was made for 
war. Admiral DuPont, in charge of these operations, wrote 
to the department on June 3, 1863: 

" When I left Washington (in October, 1862) there was really 
nothing matured, though I was firmly impressed with the fixed 
determination of the department that Charleston must be at- 
tacked." 

The Navy Department thought Charleston could be taken 
by the monitors alone, without army co-operation, but every 
effort to do this failed. So with many other of the early 
attempts. Yet many very able men were in the department ! 
The failure was not theirs, but was that of the system, or 
lack of system, against which they had to struggle. 

The Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, himself recog- 
nized the condition, in his annual reports, with a frankness 
that stands in refreshing contrast to Mr. Daniels' efforts at 
concealment. In his annual reports for 1861 and later years. 
Secretary Welles pointed out that when war came there had 
been no one in the department to plan or direct military 
operations. " Hence the views of the department were specu- 
lative and uncertain." IMr. Fox and the improvised boards 
ultimately provided a successful war organization for the 
department. But two years had been lost. Many blunders 
were made, and many disastrous delays occurred which could 
have been avoided had the department been organized and 
conducted as a military organization. 

VI 

After the Civil War the machinery that had been devel- 
oped during the war was wiped out. Says Admiral Luce : 

" The lesson of the Civil War was thrown away on us, and the 
department relapsed into a state looking to the early advent of 
the millennium when war should cease." 



ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS 17 

Even the office of Assistant Secretary was abolished. The 
dejiartnicnt reverted to the administration of civil affairs by 
the bureaus, and to the direction of all the military activi- 
ties of the Navy by the civilian Secretary, who was again left 
without responsible military assistants or advisers. 

Repeatedly in the next thirty years " the impotence of 
the Navy Department to deal with questions relating to war 
was made painfully manifest." In 1873, when the Spanish 
seized the Virgi7iius on the high seas, and executed a number 
of the crew, after a farcical court-martial, war seemed im- 
minent. Again there was confusion. The only thing the 
department could not do, apparently, was to go to -war. 
Admiral Porter was called upon for counsel and would prob- 
ably have been entrusted with the direction of military affairs 
had war come. But the panic passed, and nothing was done 
to remedy conditions in the department. 

Secretary W. C. Whitney, in his report for 1885, stated 
that it was doubtful if there was then a single ship in the 
Navy which could fight. He vainly urged a reorganization 
of the department. In 1889 Secretary Tracy again laid bare 
the glaring defects of the organization. Again nothing was 
done. 

In 1892, when sailors from the Baltimore were assaulted 
in Valparaiso, relations with Chile became very strained. 
" Once more," writes Admiral Luce (Naval Institute 1902) 
there was " brought out in a strong light the incapacity 
of the Navy Department to deal with the problems of war." 
Again, aid had to be summoned in from without the depart- 
ment. But the tension soon passed and with it the effort 
to include in the departmental organization a provision for 
dealing with the problems involved in preparation for war 
and in the conduct of war operations. 



18 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

VII 

This situation was well illustrated once again in the 
Spanish War. War with Spain had seemed a probability 
for some years before hostilities began. The Maine was 
blown up on February 18, 1898. The war did not begin un- 
til April 21, 1898. Yet no steps had been taken by the 
Navy Department to provide for possible war activities. It 
is quite true that the vessels of the Navy were in good con- 
dition and that the personnel were efficient and well trained; 
but no official war plans had been prepared, and the Navy 
had no military direction to plan, prepare for, conduct and 
co-ordinate war operations. 

In 1886, however, through the efforts of Admiral Luce 
and other able officers, a naval war college had been estab- 
lished at Newport. For the first time officers of the Navy 
began to study war. Captain A. T. Mahan had been as- 
signed to duty there and had written his masterly analyses of 
sea power and naval warfare. The war college had pre- 
pared tentative, but unofficial, plans for war with Spain. 
It had trained officers who knew something of strategy. This 
was to save the situation in 1898. 

When war broke out on April 21st, the Navy Depart- 
ment, as has been stated, was without a war policy, war 
plans, or a war staff. The confusion and uncertainty of 
1812, of 1861, of 1872, of 1893 again prevailed. Dewey 
with the small Asiatic fleet was at Hong Kong, a neutral 
port, awaiting orders. International law requires the naval 
vessels of belligerents to leave neutral ports within twenty- 
four hours. Yet no orders were sent to Dewey. Three days 
passed. Still Dewey was without news from his government. 
On April 24, the Navy Department received a dispatch from 
him, with the information that the Governor of Hong Kong 
had notified him that he must leave the port with his fleet 
within forty-eight hours. As it was Sunday, the Navy De- 



ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS 19 

partment was practically closed. Appreciating the impor- 
tance of the dispatch, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 
in the absence of the Secretary of the Navy, took it at once 
to the President. 

Admiral Luce thus describes the scene that followed: 

" With the President were the Secretary of State, tlie Attorney 
General and one or two others. The dispatch from Admiral 
Dewey, and the reply to be sent were discussed by those present. 
The President then dictated the dispatch to Dewey to proceed 
to Manila and attack the Spanish naval force assembled there. 
The dispatch was written out by the Chief of the Bureau of 
Navigation and handed to the President, who read it aloud. It 
was approved with the adding of the word * destroy ' so as to 
read, ' capture or destroy.' The dispatch was then taken to the 
Navy Department where it was rendered into cipher. The Sec- 
retary of the Navy was not with the President when the latter 
dictated the message, but he saw it later in the day, signed it and 
it was sent. 

" War had been in the air, so to speak, for six months. The 
order to blockade the Cuban ports was dated April 21. Yet it 
was left for the Governor of Hong Kong, three days later, to 
order an American squadron to sea, with a home port 6,000 miles 
away." (Proceedings of the Naval Institute, 1902, p. 848.) 

The results of such a method of devising Avar plans and 
determining on military operations were clearly revealed 
by the difficult situation in which Dewey found himself after 
the victory of May 1. Although the Spanish fleet was totally 
destroyed, Dewey had to lie off Manila, practically impotent, 
in an isolated and trying position. No arrangements had 
been made to reinforce him, or to reap the fruits of his naval 
victory by prompt action against the Spanish in the Philip- 
pines. If we had had in our military departments any pro- 
vision for war, there would have been well-considered war 
plans. Dewey would have known even before the declaration 
of war what was expected of him. Reinforcements would 
have been started from San Francisco in time to profit im- 



20 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

mediately by his victory. Their timely arrival would in all 
probability have averted the Philippine Insurrection and 
much blood and treasure would have been saved. 

Immediately after the outbreak of war, the Navy Depart- 
ment once more endeavoured, under the stress and amidst 
the confusion of war activities, to^ extemporize a makeshift 
military branch. A Naval War Board, or " Strategy 
Board " as it was generally termed, was organized, Captain 
A. T. IVIahan being one of the members. This board was 
entrusted with the devising of war plans, and the other mili- 
tary functions of a general staff. Resort was had to the 
war plans drawn up at the Naval War College. In the ab- 
sence of any other plans, the operations of Admiral Sampson 
and General Shaffer were based largely on these. Our su- 
periority over the Spanish forces was so soon and so easily 
established that our war organization and effort suffered no 
real test. The story would have been very different had we 
met an enemy of real strength and efficiency. 



VIII 

After the Spanish Wiar, many efforts were made to apply 
the lessons of the war to our military organizations, and to 
remedy their defects. The army was reorganized during 
Mr. Elihu Root's tenure of office as Secretary of War, and it 
was given a general staff. But no similar action was taken 
in the case of the Navy Department. President Roosevelt, 
and several of the Secretaries of the Navy who served in his 
cabinet, urged vainly upon Congress the necessity for the re- 
organization of the department, and the creation of a naval 
staff. 

The Navy League, under the guidance of Col. R. M. 
Thompson, began its compaign on behalf of a sound naval 
policy and for twenty years it has fought valiantly and on 
the whole successfully to improve the efficiency of the Navy. 



ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS 21 

But it was some years before its work began to produce 
results. In 1900, the General Board of the Navy was estab- 
lished by a general order of the Secretary of the Navy, to 
study questions involving policy, and to prepare war plans ; 
but it was not given legislative recognition until 1916. The 
General Board proved extremely useful in providing the suc- 
cessive Secretaries with intelligent advice on military matters. 
But its functions were purely advisory, and it had no au- 
thority to supervise the military activities of the Navy. 
More often than not its advice was disregarded. 

In 1909, a commission was appointed by President Roose- 
velt, composed of two former Secretaries of the Navy, W. H. 
Moody and Paul Morton, with Congressman A. G. Dayton, 
and Rear Admirals Luce, Mahan, Evans, Folger and Cowles, 
to review the organization of the Navy Department. This 
commission made an illuminating report, calling attention 
to the non-existence of any military branch in the depart- 
ment, and recommending that the Secretary be given compe- 
tent naval advisers to co-ordinate, under his direction, all the 
purely military functions of the department, including the 
activities of the bureaus. His chief adviser was to be prac- 
tically a chief of naval staff with the title " Chief of the Divi- 
sion of Naval Operations." Congress failed, however, to 
take any action. 

Secretary Meyer, in 1909, initiated, on his own responsi- 
bility, the " Aide " system. This was a distinct step in 
advance, although it did not provide for a definite co-ordi- 
nation of the military activities of the navy, by a responsible 
naval staff. There Avas an Aide for Operations as the chief 
naval adviser of the Secretary, with Aides for Material, 
Personnel and Inspection, to assist the Secretary in co- 
ordinating the military activities of the Navy. No legisla- 
tive sanction was given to this measure, however, and it was 
left within the power of later Secretaries to continue it or 
not, as they pleased. 



22 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

As a result, when Mr. Josephus Daniels became Secretary 
in 1913, he was able in a short time to vitiate most of Mr. 
Meyer's work, either by allowing the positions of Aides to 
remain unfilled or by failing to ask or follow their advice 
in military matters. 



IX 

We can hardly hope that our good fortune will always 
continue to save us from the consequences of the mal-admin- 
istration of our national defences. Sooner or later the day 
will come when we may have to meet singlehanded a strong 
and well-prepared enemy. As Congressman Gardner re- 
marked in October, 1914, in calling attention to our unpre- 
paredness at that time, " bullets cannot be stopped with 
bombast, nor powder vanquished by platitudes." If we 
neglect our first line of defence or allow it to be misused 
as an eleemosynai-y institution for the support of indigent 
politicians, we should not expect nor hope to escape disaster. 

A review of our naval history will show that our navy 
in every crisis and in every war has laboured under the same 
handicaps in preparing for war and in fighting. There has 
been no provision made in time of peace even for the possi- 
bility of war. The Navy until 1915 had no provision in its 
organization for the handling of military activities or for 
the conduct of war operations. In 1917, there was a mil- 
itary branch of the department, but it had been established 
too short a time and had been so much hampered by the 
action of the Secretary that conditions in 1917 were little 
better than in 1812, 1861, 1873, 1892 or 1898. In each 
of these cases, a naval staff, under one name or another, 
had to be improvised during the crisis, as it was found im- 
possible to conduct a war successfully without it. But the 
lesson of experience was disregarded and the passing of the 



ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS 23 

crisis marked the passing of the machinery indispensable to 
succesiiful naval operations. 

We entered each war, as a result of the lack of a naval 
staff, without any real preparation ; with no war plans, 
with insufficient personnel and without reserves ; with the ves- 
sels of the Navy not in a condition to fight ; with inadequate 
docking and repair facilities ; with a navy built, apparently, 
without regard to war needs and lacking many essential 
types of vessels. All these conditions were due primarily 
to the fact that the decision of the highly technical naval 
problems, and the control of the Navy's operations in peace 
time, has rested exclusively with a civilian, without previous 
knowledge or experience, who was also very often a politician 
more concerned about patronage, about distributing navy 
funds to favored sections, about promoting his own or his 
party's fortunes, than about the possibility of war, or the 
preparation of the navy for war. Many of the Secretaries 
have probably honestly believed, as did Mr. Daniels, that 
there would be no more wars, and have laughed at the warn- 
ings of those who knew something of history. 



X 

When war comes, the officers of the Navy must bear the 
burden and the responsibility and face the dangers of battle. 
But how can we expect them to fight successfully if they 
have not been permitted to determine the kind and number 
of ships necessary, if they have not been permitted to make 
plans for war or train the fleet for war? When war comes, 
we expect them to maintain a glorious tradition of victory. 
In time of peace we permit them to be tyrannized over by a 
North Carolina politician, a convinced pacifist, who con- 
sistently opposed their efforts to make the Navy fit for its 
mission. The experiences of 1917, the delays and unpre- 



24 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

paredness then so painfully evident, should be a sufficient 
warning for the future. 

A glance at recent history reveals significant comparisons. 
In 1904, the Russian fleet at Port Arthur was successfully 
attacked by the Japanese fleet before any formal declaration 
of war had been made. In 1914, the British Navy had 
established a complete control of the North Sea before the 
war was declared. Its command of the surface of the seas 
was never seriously threatened thereafter. Yet the German 
Navy, too, including its submarines, was on a war basis and 
ready for action four hours after the declaration of war. 
The superiority of the British fleet, however, made it impos- 
sible for the Germans to hope to fight a successful battle. 

Sir Julian Corbett, in the first volume of his history of 
British naval operations in the war, makes the following 
comments on the situation in 1914: 

" There is no doubt that the machinery for setting our forces 
in action had reached an ordered completeness in detail that has 
no parallel in history. ... It says much for the skill and com- 
pleteness with which our preparation for war had been elab- 
orated during the past ten years that the general situation was so 
far secured without any recourse to a complete mobilization by 
the time the critical day arrived (August 1, 1914). So far as 
the navy was concerned everything was in order." 

In the future, our only real insurance against defeat 
in war and national humiliation, will be the efficiency of the 
armed strength of the nation. The protection of our shores 
and the prevention of invasion will depend upon the readi- 
ness of our Navy at all times to respond to the call to 
battle. 

Our Navy can afford us this protection if we will permit 
it to have an organization designed for war use, and will 
pay heed to the lessons of experience rather than to the 
empty and resounding phrases of ridiculous politicians. No 
navy in the world has a body of officers as intelligent, as 



ORGANIZATION AND PREPAREDNESS 25 

well trained, as devoted, as our own. No navy has more 
splendid traditions. But these will be of little avail if, 
in the future as in the past, the military activities of the 
Navy are subordinated to petty, personal ambitions and 
idiosyncrasies, or to partisan or sectional interests. 



CHAPTER III 
THE NAVY AND MR. DANIELS— 1913-19 



EVERY war has its aftermath. Every campaign on 
land or sea is refought in the published accounts and dis- 
cussions of the operations. Investigations that often fol- 
low wars very frequently bring to light facts and conditions 
which, for obvious reasons, were suppressed and kept from 
public notice at the time of their occurrence. Such revela- 
tions are often of a nature to be highly disconcerting to the 
country concerned, and equally discreditable to certain of 
the leaders whose acts are called into question. But in the 
whole history of warfare it would be hard to find an example 
of more complete mismanagement of a military or naval 
force, or of grosser incompetency for a position of national 
trust in the administration of a force upon which national 
defence depended, than has been provided by the recent in- 
vestigation of Mr. Daniels' administration of the Navy 
Department. 

In the midst of hostilities any information concerning the 
mistakes of those in command would be of material advantage 
to the enemy. It is therefore the normal tendency to sup- 
press all such unpleasant revelations. It is in the national 
interest to do so when the nation is at war. There is an- 
other kind of suppression, however, which is dangerous and 
which is inspired solely by desires to maintain personal 
reputations, which might be imperiled were the facts made 
known to the public. Mr. Daniels, since the conclusion of 

the war, has endeavoured to accomplish this kind of suppres- 

26 



THE NAVY AND MR. DANIELS — 1913-19 27 

sion of the real history of our naval activities in the war. 
Until Admiral Sims' official comments on the war became 
known, the Secretary of the Navy had succeeded in his 
purpose and the country had been completely deceived. 



II 

Almost from the beginning of liis administration, Mr. 
Daniels had been very severely criticized, both in the public 
press and on the floors of Congress. In 1915, and in 1916, 
the country had been informed, from sources whose reliability 
was beyond question, that all was not well with the Navy un- 
der the Daniels regime. It had been shown that Secretary 
Daniels, while posing as an ardent Democrat and pretending 
to administer the Navy on democratic lines, was, in reality, 
a small minded despot, bigoted and narrow in his views, 
and unrelenting in the misuse of official power to punish 
officers of the Navy who incurred his official disapproval by 
not humbly setting their minds to run along with his. The 
country had looked upon Mr. Daniels at that time with 
tolerant contempt. The American public, with its invari- 
able good humour, laughed at our Pinaforesque Secretary, 
" Sir Josephus, N. C. B.," as Colonel Harvey dubbed him 
in 1915, and failed to appreciate the consequences which 
would result from enforcing upon the Navy the Daniels 
policies. 

Such was the situation which prevailed until the time of 
our entry into the war. The country's insistence upon pre- 
paredness throughout the previous year, had led to Con- 
gressional action. The very able and effective campaign 
of the Navy League, the hearings before the House Commit- 
tee on Naval Affairs, and the testimony of such witnesses as 
Admiral Fiske, Admiral Winslow, and Admiral Sims had 
shown the country that the Navy was not prepared for war 
and that, as Admiral Knight explained in a letter written at 



28 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

this time, the Navy Department had failed to make any 
provision for war in its plans and policies. Congress, in 
1916, had adopted the first constructive building program 
which the navy had ever had, in its endeavour to restore our 
Navy to its relative position of strength as compared with the 
navies of the other chief maritime powers. At the same time, 
Congress had taken steps to remedy the lamentable short- 
ness of men by increasing the authorized personnel strength 
of the Navy. Admiral Fiske had succeeded in 1915, against 
the opposition of the Secretary, in getting Congress to 
create the office of Chief of Naval Operations, and thus to 
provide the Navy with an organization that might be ex- 
pected to function under war conditions. This step was 
made possible largely by the previous activities of the Navy 
League and its insistence on the necessity for an efficient or- 
ganization of the Navy Department. The Navy League as a 
body and its individual members, such as Col. R. M. Thomp- 
son, himself a graduate of Annapolis, and Col. Henry Breck- 
inridge, were able to exert a continually greater influence in 
and out of Congress. The way had therefore been pre- 
pared for the action Congress took at the instance of 
Admiral Fiske. During 1916, then. Congress and the 
country were led to believe, as a result of these measures, that 
the Navy was being made ready for war. 



HI 

Then came the war itself, and automatically the curtain 
was dropped, so far as the public was concerned, over the 
activities of the Navy Department. One of Mr. Daniels' 
first acts, on assuming office in 1913, had been to issue orders 
in the Navy Department that henceforth all public statements 
would be issued by his office. After war began, this order 
was more rigidly enforced than ever before. The country 
knew only what Mr. Daniels wanted it to know of what was 



THE NAVY AND MR. DANIELS — 1913-19 29 

going on, — and surely Mr. Daniels was painting a picture 
roseate enough for even the most belligerent citizen. Day 
after day a flood of notices poured out from the Navy De- 
partment of all the things that the Navy had done, was doing 
and was going to do. From the day that we declared war, 
one would have imagined, from Mr. Daniels' official state- 
ments, that the whole of the Navy at once, ipso facto, was 
transformed to a war basis ; that automatically all vessels 
of the Navy were mobilized; that well-thought out and care- 
fully prepared war plans were immediately put into effect ; 
that the maximum of co-operation was given immediately to 
the Allies. In fact Mr. Daniels publicly stated all this and 
more, not only at the time but in his later official reports 
to the President. In his annual report for 1917, for example, 
Mr. Daniels said, under the heading " We Are Ready Now " : 

" During peaceful years the navy has been quietly but stead- 
ily perfecting itself to meet the time of war. How adequate was 
the preparation, how efficient its personnel, how competent its ma- 
chinery to carry on the multitudinous activities of war time could 
only be surmised and estimated. Now the hour for which it has 
been preparing has arrived. 

" The declaration of war found many naval dispositions al- 
ready made in anticipation of possible developments. No ships 
had been sent abroad, but when we began to arm merchant ships 
a distinguished officer with a small staff was on the other side 
of the Atlantic available for consultation as to general opera- 
tions, and ready to take charge of any force to be sent." 

IV 

In spite of all these optimistic assurances from the Secre- 
tary of the Navy as to what American war vessels were doing, 
the country waited in vain for some visible indication of 
American naval operations ; but a cloud of mystery had de- 
scended over the whole of our war acti^^ties. The public 
assumed that this was only right and proper and that under 



30 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the cloud the great American republic was moving immedi- 
ately, energetically and effectively to throw the weight of its 
might in manpower, in material resources and in military and 
naval strength against the Germans. Weeks passed and 
still no news came. People began to wonder what our mighty 
fleet, of which Mr. Daniels was speaking so vainly and so 
vaguely, was really doing. Then six weeks after war began, 
the country was informed that our destroyers were operating 
in the war zone. It was not known that only six destroyers 
were then overseas. Little was made public as to the disposi- 
tion which had been made of our other forces. News came 
from time to time of additional naval vessels operating in 
different parts of the war zone. In July, 1917, the country 
was informed that American troops had been successfully 
landed in Europe under the escort of the American Navy. 
The newspapers related blood-curdling and official tales of 
desperate battles with flocks of submarines, through which 
the transports and the destroyers plowed on their way to 
France. Our people thrilled with pride when Mr. Daniels 
told them how hopelessly ineffective were all the German sub- 
marines against the American naval forces. 

The months passed. The losses of merchant ships through 
submarine attacks diminished. The German U-boats seemed 
impotent in their efforts to interfere with the transport of 
American troops abroad. The German naval effort seemed 
to have been completely checkmated. The spring of 1918 
came and with it the serious hours of crisis following the 
German offensive, when the Allied cause seemed to tremble 
in the balance. Then the country heard more and more of 
the magnificent effectiveness of the Navy abroad. Soon 
300,000 men a month were being transported to France, a 
large percentage of these on vessels manned and operated by 
the Navy, and convoyed in the war zone by American naval 
vessels. The country heard of American battleships form- 
ing a part of the Grand Fleet, ready to engage the German 



THE NAVY AND MR. DANIELS — 1913-19 31 

High Seas Fleet if it should ever again attempt to challenge 
the Allied command of the seas. There came also news of a 
tremendous new feat in naval warfare — of the closing of 
the whole of the North Sea by a gigantic mine barrier con- 
ceived and carried out largely by the American Navy. One 
read of the Navy's 14-inch guns, mounted on railway car- 
riages, bombarding the German lines of communication at a 
range of 30 miles. More and more was heard of the success 
of the convoy system and of the work of our submarines 
overseas, of our naval aviation and of its enormous increase. 
The story was one calculated to fill every citizen with pride 
in the achievements of the Navy. 

In the first year of the war, disconcerting stories had 
come out as to conditions in the War Department. There 
had been a Senate investigation which had brought out many 
facts extremely damaging to the War Department and its 
methods ; but the House Naval Committee, which reviewed 
the activities of the Navy at the end of 1917, gave the Navy a 
clean bill of health ; everything was perfect with Mr. Daniels' 
fleet, so went the report. 



As the country heard these stories of the navy's achieve- 
ments, they remembered with amazement the stories they had 
heard before the war of the incompetence of the Navy's head, 
of his failure to take any steps looking to preparedness 
and of his general incapacity for an office requiring adminis- 
trative ability, sincerity of purpose, and real understanding. 
The record of the navy in the war was looked upon as a 
complete vindication of Mr, Josephus Daniels. Everybody 
said to everybody else that Mr. Daniels had done very splen- 
didly indeed. Amid all of the scandals that accompanied 
our war effort, hardly a whisper was attached to the Navy 
Department. It seemed to have stood out as a model of 
efficiency and readiness. Prominent and well-informed 



32 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

papers throughout the country published editorials comment- 
ing approvingly upon the magnificent way in which Mr. 
Daniels and his Navy Department had stood the acid-test 
of warfare. The Creel Bureau released many glowing stories 
of the complete success and awe-inspiring efficiency which 
attended the war activities of Mr. Daniels. The public did 
not remember at the moment that the Public Information 
Committee, of which Mr. Creel was the voice, had as its mem- 
bers Mr. Josephus Daniels and Mr. Newton Baker, or other- 
wise some mild suspicion might have arisen, even then, as 
to the credibility of the stories that were being officially 
disseminated. 

VI 

In 1918, Mr. Daniels' secretary, Mr. J. W. Jenkins, in 
writing an introduction to the Secretary's volume of war 
speeches, gave a description of the great Josephus that reads 
like a burlesque when viewed in the light of what really hap- 
pened. Witness, for example, the following expressions : 

" ' Full speed ahead ! ' has been the signal of the Navy from 
the moment we entered the war. When the call came, it was 
ready. The plans had all been prepared in advance, and it re- 
quired only an order to mobilize the fleet. No change whatever 
was required in the organization. . . . During this momentous 
period Secretary Daniels has been fortunate in having loyal and 
capable counsellors ... of his own selection. Mr. Daniels 
trusts them, he has every confidence in them, but, at the same 
time, he has his own ideas and sees that they are carried out. 
And he insists on knowing all that is being done. This involves 
a vast amount of detail . . . but it enables him to know every- 
thing that is going on. . . . 

" In the rush of war work . , . some seeming impossibilities 
were accomplished. . . . The whole establishment set out to 
break records in every line . . . and the Secretary was in the 
midst of it all, commending the leaders, stirring up the laggards, 
and keeping all moving like the coach at a foot-ball game. . . . 



THE NAVY AND MR. DANIELS — 1913-19 33 

It was a strenuous striving . . . but Mr. Daniels enjoyed it and 
thrived under the strain. , . . 

" From the moment hostilities appeared inevitable, Mr. Dan- 
iels threw all his energies into preparation. . . . Naval vessels 
had been put in readiness^ munitions stored, supply ships were 
ready to sail. When a state of war with Germany was pro- 
claimed on April 6th, the Fleet was mobilized without an hour's 
delay. ... A vigorous aggressive policy was adopted. The 
American Navy decided not to wait for the submarines but to 
' go after ' them. Orders were immediately issued to equip a 
flotilla (sic!) of destroyers for foreign service. . . . This force in 
European waters was constantly increased, every type of boat 
. . . being sent over. A division of American battleships was 
sent to operate with the British Grand Fleet (N. B. in December, 
1917); submarines were dispatched (N. B. in January, 1918); 
subchasers were sent over in a steady stream (N. B. after June 1, 
1918). . . ." 

". . . This was characteristic of Mr. Daniels' policy in prose- 
cuting the war. He never wavered for an instant in the main 
objects. Adopting the President's policy of ' Force, force to the 
utmost ' (N. B. this policy was not announced until April, 1918), 
he protested against fixing any definite number of men we should 
send to France. ... In October, 1918, he refused ... to dis- 
cuss arrangements for peace, saying ' It is not my business to talk 
peace or think of peace, until the Central Powers are defeated 
and have laid down their arms. It is my business and the busi- 
ness of the Navy to devote every thought and energy to winning 
the war.' " 

Comment is superfluous. 

Yet, in 1918, the American people were so little informed 
of conditions in the Navy that they could read such hyper- 
bolic praise of Mr. Daniels without derisive laughter! 

VII 

It seemed only natural that anything American should be 
efficient and well-done. The people were, therefore, more 
than willing to accept the stories of the efficiency of the Navy 



34 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Department, especially as they had so many convincing and 
indisputable proofs of the splendid efficiency of the Navy 
personnel. They knew that our destroyers had shown them- 
selves the equal, if not the superior, of those of any of the 
Allies. They knew that our battleships had very quickly 
taken their positions at the wing of the Grand Fleet's battle 
line and had shown an efficiency which British officers freely 
and frankly commented upon. They knew that our naval 
aviators abroad were showing an aptitude for their duty, a 
courage and an endurance, of which any nation might well 
be proud. They knew that in the Northern Mine Barrage a 
project of naval warfare was being carried out that stood 
without precedent in naval annals. Knowing these things of 
the Navy, and of the achievements of its personnel overseas, 
they were quite willing to accept Mr. Daniels' own estimate 
of his own services, and to believe his statements as to the 
degree of preparedness with which the Navy had entered the 
war; and as to the effectiveness of the organization by which 
it was administered throughout the war. 



VIII 

Then came the armistice — the complete victory of the 
Allies over an utterly crushed and humiliated Germany. 
Without firing a shot, the German High Seas Fleet sur- 
rendered. The German submarineiS likewise were surrendered. 
No more complete naval victory is on record. Such a happy 
outcome of the war naturally disposed everybody to regard 
with complacency the whole of our war activities. Mistakes, 
costly delays, were forgotten before the outstanding fact of 
victory. The country was proud to know that its Navy 
had upheld its country's laurels abroad and that, in its com- 
mander overseas. Admiral William S. Sims, it possessed a 
man to whom all of the Allied navies had looked, with respect 
and admiration, for counsel and criticism. 



THE NAVY AND MR. DANIELS — 1913-19 35 

This feeling was confirmed by tlic victory speeches of Mr. 
Daniels. With bland complacency, he told the country of 
the great deeds which he and his Navy had performed. On 
December 1, 1918, in his official report to the President of 
the United States, he said: 

" Before the President went before Congress on the 2d day 
of April, 1917, and delivered his epoch-making message, which 
stirred the hearts of all patriots, and in the climax said, ' America 
is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles 
that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has 
treasured ; God helping her, she can do no other,' the Navy from 
stem to stern had been made ready to the fullest extent possible 
for any eventuality." 

In this same report the Secretary went on to describe the 
work done by the Navy in the war, in words which are espe- 
cially significant in view of recent developments : 

Teamwork at Home and Abroad 

" Teamwork has been the Navy's slogan for five years, and 
its perfect operation has given proof of the wisdom of the in- 
sistence upon the whole organization working in harmony and 
with a common spirit. Thoroughly imbued with this principle 
in time of peace, the Navy, during the great war, has given a 
shining demonstration of its capacity for the teamwork so es- 
sential to victory. 

" Throughout its enormous expansion since the beginning of 
the war, the enlarged naval force has kept this vital factor always 
in mind. The Navy at home has shown its capacity for team- 
work in co-operating with the Army, the War Industries Board, 
and the many other governmental activities already established 
and the new ones wisely created for the successful prosecution 
of the war. Abroad, the American Navy has given a demon- 
stration, which can be characterized only as wonderful, of its 
readiness to join with our associates in teamwork for the com- 
mon end and the common good. In the Mediterranean, the At- 
lantic, the Pacific, and the Adriatic; with England, with France, 



36 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

with Japan, with Italy, and all allied nations, the United States 
Navy has co-operated without friction, looking always to the end 
to be attained, and has won the warmest encomiums and appre- 
ciation from our associates. 

" The American officers and men on our battleships on first 
joining the Grand Fleet of Great Britain were welcomed so cor- 
dially and worked so unceasingly that, becoming a part of a 
great homogeneous fleet, they have given the best illustration of 
the same teamwork between nations which had been established 
between diflferent agencies in our Navy. American destroyers 
and American submarines and other American craft have operated 
side by side and interchangeably with similar vessels of the na- 
tions with whom we are associated in this war. Three thousand 
miles from home, sea patrol and air forces of the United States 
Navy have done much coast defence and anti-submarine work 
in England and France and Italy, on the Mediterranean and in 
the Azores, in the closest co-operation with the allied forces. 

" Much of the above could not have been accomplished at all, 
and none of it could have been accomplished so well, had not 
the American Navy, from top to bottom, fully appreciated the 
fact that in war teamwork is absolutely necessary, and individual 
prejudices and ambitions, if they exist, must be sacrificed and 
subordinated for a common end in a common cause. 

Every Vestige of Friction Removed 

" Going back in the past, we find that apparently there have 
been times when a Secretary of the Navy seemed to find friction 
and lack of co-operation among the officers around him. If that 
spirit ever existed in the United States Navy, I can state with 
confidence and pride that there is now no vestige of it, and I 
firmly believe, from my experience, not only during the last year 
but during the five years preceding, it will never return. The 
present admirable organization of the Navy, proven in the months 
of trial, is one which peculiarly requires teamwork, and, given 
this, is particularly capable of producing results. The team- 
work has been there and results have been produced. 

" Of course as time goes on changes in any organization become 
desirable and should be made. Examination of reports of vari- 



THE NAVY AND MR. DANIELS — 1913-19 37 

ous Secretaries of the Navy, extending back to the dim past, 
shows nearly every year complaints of the organization they 
were compelled to operate and more or less radical recommenda- 
tions for change. 

" The present departmental organization has stood the great- 
est strain to which the Navy Department has ever been exposed 
and is essentially sound. It can and will be improved in detail 
as necessity arises. 

A Truly American Organization 

" For years there was a persistent and insistent demand on the 
part of a small element of the Navy and some well-meaning citi- 
zens interesting themselves in naval matters for a naval organiza- 
tion labeled " General Staff " of the " made in Germany " pat- 
tern. This pattern has not worn well, and it is observed that 
the " made in America " pattern of the United States Navy seems 
to be appreciated now not only in America but in some of the na- 
tions associated with us." 



IX 

Such then was Mr. Daniels' official account of the services 
of his department in the war. Of course, every naval officer, 
and many other well-informed people, realized how totally 
false was the impression which Mr. Daniels had given. They 
knew that, intentionally or otherwise, he was deceiving the 
people of the country as to what had been happening during 
the war, just as completely as he had deceived them previous 
to the war, with regard to the Navy's preparedness. They 
knew of the many and grievous mistakes, and of the fatal 
delays, that had characterized the early months of our par- 
ticipation in the war. They knew that the achievements 
which our Navy had won were largely accomplished in spite 
of Mr. Daniels and not because of him. Nevertheless there 
was no disposition to criticize so long as it was felt that the 
Navy's interests were not being damaged by the misrepre- 
sentations of its official head. 



38 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

But almost immediately after the armistice the Navy began 
to disintegrate. Its personnel was demobilized so rapidly 
that within a year not half a dozen vessels of the fleets re- 
tained a vestige of their war efficiency. Soon the Navy 
learned that Mr. Daniels was continuing the same policies and 
methods which he had inflicted upon the Navy since 1913. 
The morale of the Navy rapidly declined. By the end of 
1919 the officers realized that the Navy was helpless as a 
fighting force ; that neither one of its great fleets could go 
to sea and fire a complete salvo from its big guns without 
disastrous consequences. The number of trained enlisted 
men competent to perform their duties, who remained in the 
Navy, was so small as to render the condition of the Navy 
more than pitiable. Yet Mr. Daniels, in his report for 1919 
to the President, gave a completely inaccurate account. 
This new manifestation of Mr. Daniels' apparently inherent 
tendency to misrepresentation seemed the last straw. The 
following quotation will illustrate the kind of misrepresenta- 
tion which made the Navy believe that the situation was 
hopeless : 

" In the present year, demobilization has claimed attention ; 
but the task has been not merely to demobilize but to do this 
without disorganizing. It was not a question of untying a knot 
that has been successfully tied, or of undoing what has been vic- 
toriously done. It was rather a question of reshaping, rebuild- 
ing, realigning, and without the sacrifice of national spirit, unity, 
or force. Many new lessons have been learned, and these have 
been embodied in the new Navy. Experience, intelligently in- 
terpreted, is always the best teacher, and this is especially true 
when the experience has been spread over so great a stretch of 
time and space as was the case in the World War. 

" Two fundamental principles have been constantly borne in 
mind: 

" (1) There must be and there has been no loss of adaptabil- 
ity to new and unexpected issues. The readiness to hit and to 
hit hard, which won the plaudits of our Allies at the very outset. 



THE NAVY AND MR. DANIELS — 1913-19 39 

has been preserved in every detail of change and readjustment. 
The Navy is returning to a peace basis, but it is conserving the 
power that enabled it and will again enable it to meet with 
unweakened sinews any crisis that may arise. Security for the 
future, though an uncertain future, has not for a moment been 
lost sight of. 

" (2) There must be and there has been no loss of symmetry 
or wholeness in the naval organization. A reduced personnel has 
not been allowed to mean fragmentariness or disproportion in 
whole or in part. As a vast machine, as a national organism, as 
a complex of interacting agencies, the Navy is in form and spirit 
a unit, not a fraction. 

" Though demobilization has returned over 400,000 men from 
military to civilian pursuits, there are now in the Navy more 
than twice as many enlisted men as there were on January 1, 
1917. Both the Navy and Marine Corps are at present below 
their authorized strength, but an active and successful recruit- 
ing campaign has been launched, and the time is not far distant 
when the attractions of Navy life will secure the full comple- 
ments desired. Those in training and afloat are sufficient to man 
all dreadnaughts and modern destroyers, and the 400,000 men 
given naval training in war provide a naval reserve of fit and ex- 
perienced men upon which the country can call in any emer- 
gency. This is an asset not before possessed in this decade and 
one which gives assurance until the youths coming into the service 
are skilled in all the callings that make up good seamen. 

" The United States Navy emerged from the war incomparably 
stronger and more powerful than ever before — second only to 
that of Great Britain and far in advance of any other foreign 
navy, in ships, in men, and every element of strength. The or- 
ganization of the fleet in two great divisions gives us ample de- 
fence in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. With battleships in 
service equal to or superior to any now in commission, 6 huge 
battle cruisers and 12 battleships under construction, a number 
of them larger than any now in commission, to be armed with 16- 
inch guns, more powerful than any now afloat, the Navy is press- 
ing forward to greater things, justifying, in peace as in war, the 
country's firm confidence in its ' first line of defence.' The great 



40 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

fleets, one in the Pacific and one in the Atlantic, are powerful, 
well officered and manned, and give guaranty of protection and 
of readiness to serve our country and the world." 

Every officer in the service knew that the " great fleets " 
in the Pacific and the Atlantic, of wliich Mr. Daniels spoke 
so complacently, were a source of weakness rather than of 
strength, for the reason that this division of our main force, 
contrary to all sound naval principles, reduced our total 
strength by at least fifty per cent. These two fleets in their 
condition of inefficiency and unpreparedness, due to lack 
of trained men, give us a false sense of security, at a time 
when our national policies and the attitude taken by our 
government towards foreign countries may involve the United 
States in new and even greater complications than those that 
resulted in our intervention in the Great War. 

The officers of the Navy knew that in suppressing the true 
story of the activities of the Navy Department during the 
war, and in concealing the mistakes, Mr. Daniels was doing 
great harm both to the service and to the country. It was 
realized that, if the conditions existent in 1917 should be 
repeated in a future war — in which we should be immedi- 
ately attacked by a powerful enemy, without Allies to protect 
us while we prepared — a great national disaster would in- 
evitably result. Yet the Navy Department — far from en- 
deavouring to profit by the lessons of the war, as the Secre- 
tary claimed he was doing — was, in reality, suppressing the 
facts, concealing the mistakes and pretending they never 
happened. Nothing contributed more to the feeling of hope- 
lessness among naval oflficers familiar with the conditions than 
this attitude of Mr. Daniels. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 



IN the year following the armistice, the Navy had found, 
to its consternation, that no real change had occurred in the 
spirit and methods of the Secretary. During the war, at 
least after the first distressing months, he had been rendered 
almost innocuous. Wliatever was necessary, naval officers 
had done, if possible with the approval and consent of the 
Secretary', otherwise without his knowledge or against his 
express orders. So the war was won. The coming of peace 
was followed by a reassertion of the Secretary's tendencies to 
meddle in details, to impose his personal ideas and likings on 
the Navy, and to suppress the facts concerning the condition 
and needs of the Navy. 

The inevitable result was the rapid disintegration of the 
morale of the Navy. In a service like the navy, morale is 
of paramount importance. The attitude and the actions of 
the head of the Navy react immediately on the spirit and 
mind of the whole service. In any military organization, 
morale, and its corollary, discipline, depend upon relations 
of mutual confidence and respect between all ranks. The 
maintenance of morale and discipline are impossible unless 
the service feels that it is being administered with absolute 
justice and impartiality, especially in the selection of men 
for high positions, in the infliction of punishments and in the 
distribution of rewards. 

The officers of the Navy had, previous to the war, lost 

all confidence in the Navy Department, as administered by 

41 



42 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Mr. Daniels. They knew the condition of the Navy, and 
they realized the enormity, and the possible consequences, of 
the misrepresentations of the Secretary, of his political par- 
tisanship and of his favoritism. The recurrence of these 
conditions in 1919 made them almost lose hope. 

Captain W. V. Pratt, the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions during the war, wrote Senator Hale on May 17th, 1920, 
that " there can always be found a naval adviser who will 
advocate a plan, be it good or bad." Also, " the result of 
the present system is not necessarily to choose the best men, 
but such men as will lend themselves most readily to the views 
of the civilian head, be they sound or unsound." These are 
exactly the things that have happened in the Navy Depart- 
ment since 1913. The service has realized that honours and 
preferment went, not to the most capable or most deserving, 
but to the most pliant, and the most subservient, among the 
officers of the Navy. Nothing more destructive of morale 
can be imagined. 

II 

Such was the situation when the naval service was treated 
to a new and aggravated illustration of the Daniels methods. 
On December 1, 1919, in his annual report, Mr. Daniels 
published his list of " Medals of Honour, Distinguished Serv- 
ice Medals and Navy Crosses Awarded." The officers of 
the Navy studied the list with incredulity, amazement and 
consternation. It was found that recommendations of com- 
manding officers had rarely been followed ; that some officers 
recommended for lesser awards had received higher ones ; that 
officers recommended for the highest awards had received 
lesser ones or none at all. Officers whose ships had been 
torpedoed were given the Distinguished Service Medal, while 
officers who had successfully attacked submarines, or who had 
so skilfully mancBuvred their ships as to escape damage re- 
ceived only the Navy Cross or no award at all. 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 43 

Such a policy in awarding honours for war service neces- 
sarily had the most serious effect on the already depressed 
morale of the Navy. As Admiral Sims later told the Senate 
Committee, " it was the last straw." These awards are so 
typical of the Daniels regime and illustrate so well the char- 
acter of his activities as ruler of the Navy that they merit 
especial attention. 

Ill 

To understand the situation one must bear in mind the 
reasons for giving medals or distinctions of any kind for 
heroic conduct or distinguished service in war. The chief 
reason had always been, until Mr. Daniels' astonishing list 
was published, to improve the fighting spirit and the morale 
of the service, by recognizing success in action against the 
enemy and by singling out for special recognition acts of 
valour and heroism in battle, or service of unusual distinction. 
Such recognition serves, not only as an award to the indi- 
viduals concerned, but also as a great stimulus to morale. 
It is only human that officers and men should take satis- 
faction in receiving recognition for their achievements, and 
in knowing that any heroic or distinguished service will be 
justly rewarded. If the awards are made impartially, they 
can take a natural and legitimate pride in such distinctions. 
Their fellows regard them with kindly envy and are stimulated 
in their own efforts by ambition to receive similar dis- 
tinction. It is not the decoration itself — a bit of metal 
hung on a varicoloured ribbon — that is important. It is 
only a symbol. The important factor is the official recogni- 
tion of heroic or distinguished service and the according to 
certain individuals of the right to special esteem and respect 
from the service. 

Unless the method of awarding medals insures prompt 
and just recognition of meritorious acts or service, the resxilt 
is disastrous to morale. When distinctions are conferred 



44 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

upon individuals not fairly entitled to them, and are withheld 
from those whose services were known to have been more 
worthy of distinction, the purpose of the awards is not only 
defeated, but is perverted. The confidence of the service in 
the impartiality and fairness of its chief is shattered. Bitter 
feeling develops and morale is shaken. The medals and 
awards are cheapened, and come to be regarded as proofs, 
not of creditable service, but of favouritism. The receivers 
are suspected of obsequiousness to authority ; the bestowers, 
of nepotism and discrimination. 



IV 

When we entered the war, there was no provision for any 
award save the Congressional Medal of Honour, reserved to 
award acts of unusual bravery, beyond the limits required by 
duty. When our forces went to Europe, they found that 
medals and honours were promptly awarded by the Allies for 
acts of heroism or for distinguished service. The Allied 
powers had appropriate distinctions with which to recognize 
every kind and degree of military acliievement. Our men 
saw Allied officers and men alongside of them, performing 
service no more creditable than their own, receiving these 
decorations while they themselves received no recognition of 
any kind. 

In 1917, the Allied governments proposed the award of such 
decorations, to officers and men of the American service, as 
would go to members of the Allied units serving with them, 
often in the same forces, as in the case of our destroyer 
forces based on Queenstown. 

This could not be done without the consent of Congress. 
Admiral Sims, therefore, recommended on December 30, 1917, 
that 

" steps be taken to obtain legislation which will permit United 
States naval personnel to accept decorations of foreign govern- 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 45 

ments. Experience in this force demonstrates clearly that such 
recognition is prized as highly by our personnel as it is by the 
personnel of foreign services. Its effect upon morale and effi- 
ciency is marked. The mere fact that the British government 
has expressed a desire to award decorations to certain of our 
ships became known and its effect was pronounced." 

Secretary Daniels, however, rejected this recommendation, 
and opposed any recognition by the Allies of the services of 
American personnel in the war zone. On September 22, 1917, 
he wrote the chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval 
Affairs " that it is the view of this department that only 
medals issued by our own Government should be worn by our 
officers and enlisted men." He opposed a joint resolution 
then before Congress to permit the acceptance of such medals. 
Again, on February 26, 1918, the Secretary wrote the chair- 
man of the House Naval Committee that " the department 
wishes to inform you that it is opposed to the object of this 
act, i. e., the acceptance and wearing of decorations and 
medals presented by our Allies, and desires to express its dis- 
approval thereof." In spite of the Secretary's opposition, 
such permission was granted by Congress in July, 1918. 
But it was not until February, 1919, that the Department 
recognized the action of Congress and officially permitted 
members of the naval service to accept such decorations. 



V 

No action had been taken by the Navy Department, dur- 
ing the war, to provide any medals or decorations for the 
recognition of heroism or distinguished service. It was not 
until February 4, 1919, three months after the armistice, 
that Congress passed the act providing for the award of 
medals in the naval service. 

On JNIarch 6, 1919, the Secretary appointed a Board to 
review all recommendations of commanding officers and to 



46 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

submit a uniform set of recommendations for awards. This 
board was composed of Rear Admiral Knight, who had com- 
manded the Asiatic Fleet during the war, and of eight 
retired officers, none of whom had been abroad during the 
war or had any personal familiarity with conditions in the 
war zone or of the war services of the personnel of the Navy. 
Two of these were rear admirals of the line of the Navy, 
retired in 1915 and 1918; one was a rear admiral of the 
Civil Engineer Corps, retired in 1906 ; one was a captain of 
the Medical Corps, retired in 1911 ; one was a captain of 
the Chaplain Corps, retired in 1910; one was a captain of 
the Construction Corps, retired in 1910; one was a captain 
of the Supply Corps, retired in 1915, and the ninth was a 
colonel of Marines, retired in 1910. 

Thus the majority of the Board were retired officers of the 
non-combatant branch of the Navy, who had been on the 
retired list for an average of nine years. Such was the 
board selected by Mr. Daniels to pass on the recommenda- 
tions of the commanders of the fleets and forces of the Navy 
in the war, and to determine the awards to be given for dis- 
tinguished service and for heroic acts in the war under 
circumstances of which the board knew nothing! Such a 
board was obviously in no position to revise the recommenda- 
tions of the various commanders as to awards to the officers 
and men of their commands. It could perhaps reconcile 
the various lists submitted and establish a uniform standard 
for the award of the different medals. It had no information 
or experience qualifying it to alter the order of relative 
merit, indicated by the recommendations received from com- 
manding officers. 

VI 

Instructions were sent out to the naval service early in 
1919 to submit all recommendations for awards to this 
board. The service was not informed of any policy to be fol- 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 47 

lowed in making recommendations. The board received no 
instructions from the Secretary, and no indication of his 
pohcy other than that contained in the letter appointing the 
board. In this he said : 

" 1. The language of the act will be strictly construed so that 
recognition will be awarded only for exceptional merit. 

" 2. The board will consider the cases of only such members 
of the Marine Corps as were not detached for service with the 
army." 

According to the wording of the law, the medals of honour 
could be presented " to any person, who, while in the naval 
service of the United States, shall, in action involving actual 
conflict with the enemy, distinguish himself conspicuously 
by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and 
beyond the call of duty and without detriment to the mission 
of his command or the command to which attached." 

The distinguished service medal could be awarded to any 
person, " who, while in the naval service of the United States 
since the sixth day of April, 1917, has distinguished, or who 
hereafter shall distinguish, himself by exceptionally meritori- 
ous service to the government in a duty of great responsi- 
bility." 

The navy cross could be awarded for " extraordinary 
heroism or distinguished service in the line of his profession, 
such heroism or service not being sufficient to justify the 
award of a medal of honour or a distinguished service medal." 

The general distinction between the various rewards was 
thus specifically determined by the Act of Congress. 

VII 

The board began its labours on March 17, 1919, and was 
in session until October 31, 1919, when it was suddenly dis- 
solved by the Secretary before it had completed its work. 
Many of the most important recommendations were not re- 



48 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

ceived until September and October, and, in many cases, not 
until after the board had been dissolved. The board re- 
viewed a total of over 4,000 recommendations of command- 
ing officers, and submitted three reports to the Secretary, 
on September 23rd, October 19th and October 31st, 1919. 

It was established during the senate investigation that 
Mr. Daniels took the reports of the board and ruthlessly 
revised them, according to his own fancy, in making up the 
list published in his annual report for 1919. 

The list as drawn up by the Secretary provided for the 
award of 13 Medals of Honor, 156 Distinguished Service 
Medals and 1,451 Navy Crosses, or a total of 1,620 medals. 
When the records of the Board of Awards were reviewed 
by the Senate Committee, it was found that only 677, or 
or 41.5 per cent., of the Secretary's medal awards were in 
accord with the recommendations of commanding officers and 
the Board of Awards. Three hundred and one of the awards, 
or 18.5 per cent., were reductions from the awards recom- 
mended; 81, or 2 per cent., were higher than those recom- 
mended; and 611, or 38 per cent., were given to officers and 
men who had not been recommended at all for any award, 
either by their commanding officers or by the Board of 
Awards. Three-fifths of the medals awarded, therefore, rep- 
resented only the personal judgment of Mr. Daniels. It is a 
curious illustration of his attitude toward the navy that he 
should have so completely disregarded the recommendations 
of the commanding officers, and should have paid so little 
heed to the board which he had himself appointed to make 
recommendations after a careful study of the records. Some 
names on their lists he struck off altogether; to some he 
gave higher awards than were recommended ; to others lower 
awards. Then, to complete the picture, he proceeded to add 
to the list 611 names of his own choosing! 

No official action more in the spirit of the First Lord in 
Gilbert and Sullivan's comic opera " H. M. S. PInafore " 



iiSi, 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 49 

can be imagined. " Sir Josephus, N. C. B.," intended to 
leave no doubt as to who was the ruler of the American 

Navee ! 

VIII 

Small wonder, then, that when the list was published, there 
was an outburst of indignation among the officers of the 
navy ! Many wrote to the Secretary declining to accept 
the medals awarded them ; others went to him personally to 
point out the grave injustice inflicted upon the service by 
his awards. Most conspicuous among these protests was 
that of Admiral William S. Sims, long one of the ardent 
champions of the navy's best interests and our naval com- 
mander in European waters during the war. Admiral Sims 
wrote the Secretary of the Navy on December 17th, de- 
clining to accept the Distinguished Service Medal awarded 
him. 

In his letter. Admiral Sims invited attention to certain 
features of the awards : 

First: "This list contains a number of instances of injus- 
tice to distinguished officers, the effect of which upon the morale 
of the service cannot fail to be detrimental. The injustice lies 
not in the number of awards made, but in the fact that the awards 
. . . are not in accord with the relative merit of the services per- 
formed by them as indicated in my recommendations. Officers 
who were recommended for the highest awards appear on the list 
as having been accorded lower awards and vice-versa ... it must 
always be impossible for a board, or any outside authority so to 
modify the estimate of relative merit of the services of officers 
. . . made by the immediate and active superior in command 
. . . without inflicting actual injustice. This necessarily defeats 
the whole object of instituting a system of awards of merit in time 
of war." 

Second: "An example of the injustice ... is shown by the 
action upon the citations for awards to the officers of my staff 
abroad . . . not only were the recommendations not complied 



50 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

with in 13 of these 19 cases, but a number of officers in the com- 
mand whose services were relatively of less importance and 
much less in responsibility were accorded higher awards. . . . 
This seems to be due to an erroneous opinion as to the relative 
value of services at sea and in certain vitally important positions 
ashore, an opinion that duty in the latter positions must neces- 
sarily be the least distinguished. 

" This is so serious a misapprehension that the action of the 
Department in awarding distinctions should be such as to have 
the effect of clearly impressing upon the service . . . that the 
most important duty in time of war is that of planning and direct- 
ing the military operations of the whole force. . . . The vital 
importance of successful leadership and the recognitions which 
should follow have no logical relation to the positions, ashore or 
afloat, from which such leadership must be exercised. . . . This 
is strikingly illustrated by the award of the Distinguished Service 
Medal to a considerable number of officers in positions of very 
little responsibility, while four of the nine rear admirals under 
my command . . . were accorded only the lower award of the 
Navy Cross." 

Third: " I feel impelled to invite attention to a special class 
of awards which are the subject of such service condemnation 
and ridicule that the effect upon the present and future morale of 
the service must necessarily be deplorable to the last degree — 
namely, the Distinguished Service Medals awarded to many, if 
not all, of the officers who were defeated in action, or whose ships 
were sunk or seriously damaged by enemy submarines. . . . 
These are typical not only of unsuccessful actions, but of failure 
to injure the enemy. The victors in these cases were the Ger- 
man submarines. . . . No blame necessarily attaches to the com- 
manding officers of these vessels for their failures, but on no 
account should they receive a special award for this lack of suc- 
cess. . . . The commanding officer of a vessel that is sunk by a 
submarine should not receive the same award as the commanding 
officer of a vessel which sinks a submarine. Yet it is precisely 
this which has been done in a number of instances." 

Admiral Sims expressed the hope that the department 
would modify the list by recognizing properly the more de- 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 51 

serving officers. The Secretary replied on December 20th, 
that " No action taken by tJie Department has been final and 
the list is not complete." 

IX 

The publication of the letters from these officers created 
a public sensation. The Secretary's list of awards was con- 
demned and ridiculed in all quarters. Congress began to 
evince an active interest. 

Meanwhile, Mr. Daniels, on December 26th, 1919, appar- 
ently much concerned by the storm aroused by his action, 
hastily ordered the reconvening of the Board of Awards and 
the reconsideration of the award lists. In his order he 
stated : 

" While approving in the main the recommendations of the 
Board of Awards, my examination into the subject has con- 
vinced me that there are a number of cases requiring further ex- 
amination, and there have been additional recommendations. . . . 
I felt in going over the list that the board had been too liberal 
particularly as regards officers whose duty during the war was 
mainly or altogether on shore. I felt that reports . . . particu- 
larly as to men who had served and suffered in the war zone jus- 
tified additional rewards. 

" No official approval of any list has been made. All lists 
published were tentative. Last week I ordered changes made in 
the list as printed awarding the Distinguished Service Medal 
among others to Admiral Knight, Admiral Caperton and Vice 
Admiral Jones. I had also decided that like awards should be 
given to certain other officers who had rendered long and arduous 
service in convoys and other service afloat in the war zone. . . ," 

In his annual report for 1919, the Secretary had s-aid, 
under the heading " Disti/nguished Service Recognized ": 

" In pursuance of an act of Congress, the Navy Department 
was authorized to award Distinguished Service Medals and Navy 



52 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Crosses to officers and men who had rendered distinguished or 
conspicuous service." 

Then, after quoting the act, the Secretary said: 

" The full list of the medals and crosses awarded appears in 
Appendix I. A board, headed by Rear Admiral Knight, has 
given much time to the study of records, with an earnest desire to 
give recognition of courage and distinguished service. . . . To 
select those who embraced opportunity for conspicuous service 
and valor has been no easy task. The duty has been conscien- 
tiously performed." 

Appendix I was headed: 

" Medals of Honor, Distinguished Service Medals and Navy 
Crosses Awarded." 

It is rather curious that after such statements in his 
annual report, Secretary Daniels should have discovered, 
when popular attention was directed to his favouritism, that 
" no official approval of any list has been made " and that 
" all lists puhlislied were tentative." It was at least a most 
unusual act to publish broadcast in his official annual re- 
port to the President a tentative list, thereby subjecting all 
officers and men concerned to a most embarrassing ordeal. 



A very few days after the list of medal awards was pub- 
lished, as an appendix to the annual report of the Secretary 
of the Navy, the attention of the Senate Committee on Naval 
Affairs had been called to the peculiarities of this list. On 
December 16th, the day before Admiral Sims wrote his letter 
declining the Distinguished Service Medal conferred upon 
him. Senator C. S. Page, the chairman of the Senate Com- 
mittee, had written the Secretary of the Navy requesting 
copies of the report of the Knight board. The Secretary 
replied in a letter of December 19th (received by Senator 
Page December 24th), stating that the report was being 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 53 

submitted and explaining his reasons for departing from the 
recommendations in making up his list of awards. 

Members of both houses of Congress were greatly con- 
cerned by the action of Secretary Daniels and the indigna- 
tion aroused by his list. The Senate Committee on Naval 
Affairs on January 5th, 1920, decided to appoint a subcom- 
mittee " to investigate the awarding of medals in the naval 
service." The Senate subcommittee was composed of Sen- 
ators Hale, Chairman (Maine), McCormick (Illinois), New- 
berry (Michigan), replaced in January by Senator Poin- 
dexter (of Washington), Pittman (Nevada) and Trammell 
(Florida). 

Hearings were begun on January 16, 1920, Admiral Sims 
being the first witness. The other witnesses called to testify, 
in the order of their appearance, were : Admiral Mayo, Gen- 
eral Barnett (U. S. Marine Corps), Admiral Grant, Ad- 
mirals Knight, CofFman and Badger of the Board of Awards, 
and Secretary Daniels. At the conclusion of the Secretary's 
testimony Admiral Sims was recalled to make a statement in 
reply to assertions and attacks of Mr. Daniels. The hear- 
ings on the question of medal awards were concluded on Feb- 
ruary 10, 1920, and the report of the subcommittee was 
published on March 7, 1920. 

XI 

It was apparent from the first that opinion in the naval 
service and in the country condcm-ned the action of Mr. 
Daniels. Senator Hale, in opening the investigation, said: 

" The purpose and intent of the statute was to award medals to 
officers and men of the navy for heroism in action and for dis- 
tinguished service, and for such purposes alone. ... It was 
clearly intended that the list should be beyond the reach of pat- 
ronage or of political or private influence of any kind. . . . 

" Following the publication of this list (of the Secretary) many 
protests were made about the awards and a feeling has arisen in 



54 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the country that the purpose of the act has not been followed out 
and that political and private influence and patronage have 
crept in. 

" As a result the value of the medals to the recipients has been 
greatly diminished and the morale of the navy has to a great 
extent been injured." 

Senator Pittman, senior Democratic member of the com- 
mittee, recognized the nature of the investigation fully when 
he said: 

" Say what you want to about the matter here, it is in the 
nature of a trial of the acts of the Secretary of Navy." 

The great majority of naval officers agreed whole-heart- 
edly with the criticisms of Admiral Sims. Captain R. D. 
Hasbrouck, one of the officers who had been awarded a medal 
by Mr. Daniels for circumstances connected with the loss of 
a ship, wrote the Secretary as follows : 

" In view of my strong personal conviction of the fitness and 
justice of Admiral Sims' summing up of the underlying reason for 
the award of naval honours. ... I request that my name be 
stricken from the list of awards. . . . 

" I have a higher regard for Admiral Sims' views on matters 
affecting the morale of the naval service than those of any other 
officer. Concurring so unreservedly •in his views I cannot, con- 
sistently and with honesty to myself, accept an honour which I 
personally feel is undeserved." 

The Army and Navy Journal in its issue of January 3rd, 
1920, said: 

" Navy officers in Washington . , . expressed keen regrets that 
the controversy had been fanned into the proportions of a sen- 
sation . . . there was no question that the Secretary had only 
himself to blame for antagonizing the entire commissioned per- 
sonnel of the navy, in the opinion of these officers, and that the 
effect upon navy morale would not be overcome for a long time." 

An officer of over fifteen years' service in the navy in a 
letter published in the same issue of the Army o/ud Navy 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 55 

Journal expressed sentiments that were quoted as being 
typical of the opinion of the navy : 

" Never before, during my time in the service, has anything 
caused more discontent and dissatisfaction among tlie officer per- 
sonnel than the publication of the ' Navy Awards ' as released by 
Secretary Daniels, ... I think it is an honour not to be in the 
Secretary's list, as our highly thought of and much beloved Ad- 
miral Sims has so clearly sliown and demonstrated. We stand 
back of liim. — every officer who knows him or who has ever 
served with him. He is the greatest naval officer in the world to- 
day and knows full well what he is doing. Admiral Sims is 
saving the morale and the esprit de corps of our navy." 

The attitude of the press, apart from the purely partisan 
administration papers that blindly endorse any act of the 
administration, is well represented by an editorial in the 
New York Herald, from which the following quotation is 
taken : 

" It is difficult to understand what INIr. Daniels means by de- 
claring that no official approval of any honour list has been made 
when an appendix to his own annual report to the President car- 
ries an unqualified roster of the officers rewarded and this has the 
force of a guaranteed notification to the public. . . . The atti- 
tude of Rear Admiral Sims is eminently correct and accords with 
the best traditions of the navy. It deserves the unstinted sup- 
port of the country and will receive it despite the blandishments 
and attempted bcguilcments that are sure to follow. Had it not 
been for the actions of Rear Admiral Sims, Rear Admiral Hilary 
Jones, and Captain Raymond Hasbrouck the emasculated list 
might have been slipped over and, as. has happened so often be- 
fore, the rights and wrongs of it never have been revealed to the 
public. The time had fortunately come to put a stop to this 
practice, and let us hope it has been stopped," 

XII 

The naval officers who testified before the committee 
brought out clearly the injustice of Mr. Daniels' list of 



66 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

awards. Furthermore, the reports of the Board of Awards, 
and the documents furnished the committee showing the 
recommendations of commanding officers and of the Board 
and the final action by the Secretary, more than confirmed 
all the criticisms of the naval witnesses. 

The chief characteristics of Mr. Daniels' awards, as estab- 
lished by the investigation, were: 

First: The relative order of merit in the lists of com- 
manding officers had been arbitrarily changed by JNIr. Daniels. 
In this way the officers who performed the most distinguished 
services received lesser awards than many officers favoured by 
Mr. Daniels, whose services had been much less meritorious. 

Second: The most aggravated instance of this change in the 
relative merit of awards occurred in the case of flag officers com- 
manding stations or forces, in positions of the greatest responsi- 
bility, and of officers on the staffs of the commanding admirals. 
Mr. Daniels ruthlessly reduced nearly all awards to staff officers. 
These staff officers, on whom fell the responsibility for the plan- 
ning and direction of all operations, received lower awards than 
many commanders of single ships, given the Distinguished Serv- 
ice Medal by Mr. Daniels because they conducted themselves as 
every naval officer should after their ships had been torpedoed. 

Third: Mr. Daniels followed the stated policy of awarding 
the Distinguished Service Medal to commanding officers of ships 
torpedoed by the enemy. Thus he definitely established the pol- 
icy of awarding failure and honouring defeat at the hands of the 
enemy. 

Fourth: Mr. Daniels failed to award the Distinguished Serv- 
ice Medal to commanding officers of ships who had met the enemy 
successfully, and either inflicted damage on the U-boats, or saved 
transports or convoys from attacks by their skill. Success 
against the enemy thus received a lesser award than failure. 

Fifth: In accordance with his definite policy of posing as the 
champion of enlisted men, Mr. Daniels, of his own initiative and 
without any recommendations from commanding officers, awarded 
15 Distinguished Service Medals and many Navy Crosses to en^ 
listed men, whose services were much less meritorious than those 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 57 

of many of the officers to whom he refused awards or gave a 
lesser award than lie did to these enlisted men. 

Sij'th: Mr. Daniels violated the act of Congress by award- 
ing the Distinguished Service Medal in at least 30 cases, or about 
20 per cent, of his whole list of 156 Distinguished Service Medals, 
for acts of heroism. The Board of Awards clearly pointed out in 
the reports submitted to Mr. Daniels in 1919, that acts of hero- 
ism, however notable, could be awarded only with the Medal of 
Honour and the Navy Cross. Mr. Daniels altered the recom- 
mendations, regardless of the law, and picked out 30 cases, of his 
own choosing, of heroic conduct not in a duty of great responsi- 
bility, for the Distinguished Service Medal. 

Seventh: In awarding medals to the Marine Corps, Mr. Dan- 
iels disregarded his own instructions that medals should be 
awarded only to those marines not serving with the army. He re- 
jected practically all recommendations from the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps and the Board of Awards, and awarded navy 
medals to the marines already given awards by the army, thus 
giving them duplicate awards. His duplication of awards in- 
cluded 4 Medals of Honour, 12 Distinguished Service Medals and 
309 Navy Crosses, or 325 awards out of a grand total of 1620 on 
his list. 

Eighth: In making his changes in the list of awards, Mr. 
Daniels was plainly actuated more by favouritism than by a de- 
sire to accord impartial justice. He singled out for the highest 
distinctions a number of officers closely associated with his ad- 
ministration. One of the medals he gave to commanding officers 
whose ships had been sunk by the enemy, went to his brother-in- 
law, another to the officer who was his personal aide. On the 
other hand, he had eliminated from the lists many officers whom 
he personally disliked because they had not been subservient to 
him and had fought for the best interests of the navy even against 
his opposition. 

The reasons Mr. Daniels gave for making his changes 
absurdly fail to explain his list. He enunciated a number 
of quite sound principles. On examination of the evidence, 
it was shown that he himself had disregarded these prin- 



58 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

ciples most flagranti}'. In fact, these reasons seemed to have 
been uniformly formulated, after the event, in order to 
placate public sentiment. In endeavouring to defend his ac- 
tion, Mr. Daniels also made desperate efforts to becloud the 
issue by dragging in irrelevant charges against Admiral 
Sims and by trying to align other high officers of the navy 
against him. 



XIII 

A statistical analysis of the awards recommended by com- 
manding officers and by the Board of Awards gives a rough 
indication of the general character of the changes and 
modifications made by Mr. Daniels from these recommenda- 
tions. 

Sixty-four and five-tenths per cent., or about two-thirds, 
of all awards to navy personnel represented only the per- 
sonal judgment of the Secretary, while no less than 35 per 
cent, were added by himself to the list. At the same time 
half of the recommendations of the commanding officers were 
totally rejected and an additional 20 per cent, were changed. 
Only 26 per cent, of the recommendations of the commanding 
officers were approved and accepted. 

In the case of the recommendations made by Admiral Sims 
for awards to the officers who served under his command 
in the war zone, only 37.5 per cent., or three-eighths of the 
total, were accepted ; 37.5 per cent., or another three-eighths, 
were reduced; and 20 per cent, were rejected altogether and 
no awards made. At the same time the Secretary, on 5 per 
cent, of the cases, gave higher awards than those recom- 
mended by Admiral Sims. The order of relative merit, which 
the commanding officer at the front could alone determine, 
was thus disregarded. 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 



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60 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 





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THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 



61 



ACTION OF SECRETARY ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF BOARD 



Board's Recommenda- 
tions 


Secretary's Awards 




Num- 
ber 


M.H. 


D.S.M. 


N.C. 


C.L. 


Noth- 
ing 


Total 


Medal of Honour 

D. S. M 

Navy Cross 

Commendatory 

Letter 

Nothing 

Total 


10 
220 
930 

260 
761 

2181 


7 
1 
1 


4 

13 


86 
24 

4 
36 

152 


1 
108 
659 

10 
571 

lSt9 






624 
150 

374 




25 

246 

22 
293 


10 
220 
930 

260 
761 

2181 







AWARDS BY SECRETARY OF NAVY INDEPENDENTLY AND 
ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE 





M. 
H. 


D.S.M 


N.C. 


C.L. 


No 
Award 


Total 


Total 
Cases 


Enlisted Men 
(Navy) 

Officers (Navy). 

Marines (with 
Army) 


4 
4 

13 


12 
12 

12 


154 

108 

309 


100 
50 




266 
170 

325 

761 




Total 


36 


571 


150 






Total Awards 
by Secty. of 
Navy 


156 


1,451 


374 


1,209 


1,994 


3,208 



62 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 



The following percentage tables may serve to make these rather com- 
plicated figures more intelligible: 

I. ANALYSIS OF AWARDS MADE BY SECRETARY 





Per 
Cent. 


Number of 
Medals 


Number of 
Awards 


Per 
Cent. 


As recommended by ofB- 
cers and by Board 

Reduced Awards 

Increased Awards 

Mr. Daniels' independent 
action 


41.5 
18.5 

2. 

38. 


677 

301 

31 

611 


707 

495 

31 

761 


35.5 
25. 
1.5 

38. 


Total 


100. 


1,620 


1,994 


100. 


Made or modified by Mr. 
Daniels 


58.5 


943 


1,287 


64.5 



II. 



ACTION TAKEN ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
COMMANDING OFFICERS 





Action by Boaed 
OF Awards 


Action by 
Secretaey 




Number 


Percentage 


Number 


Percentage 


Accepted 

Reduced 

Increased 

Decided 

Rejected totally... 


789 

487 

48 

96 

1022 


32. 

20. 

2. 
4. 

42. 


637 

495 

31 

70 

1209 


26. 
20.25 

1.25 

3. 
49.5 


Totals 


2442 


100. 


2442 


100. 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 63 

III. ACTION ON ADMIRAL SIMS' RECOMMENDATIONS 





Board's 
Recommendations 


Secretary's 
Action 




Number 


Percentage 


Number 


Percentage 


Accepted 

Reduced 

Increased 

Rejected — No 
Award 


136 
96 
13 

23 


51. 
36. 
4.5 

8.5 


102 

102 

14 

54 


37.5 

37.5 

5. 

20. 


Totals 


268 


100. 


268 


100. 



IV. SECRETARY'S ACTION ON BOARD'S REPORT 





D.S.M. 


Navy Crosses 


Total Awards 




Num- 
ber 


Per- 
centage 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
centage 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
centage 


Accepted 

Reduced 

Increased 

Rejected 


86 

108 

1 

25 


39. 
49. 
0.5 
11.5 


659 

24 

247 


70.5 

2.5 

27. 


969 

112 

26 

313 

1,420 


68. 
8. 
2. 

22. 


Total 


220 


100. 


930 


100. 


100 







XIV 

The protests of distinguished officers of the Navy against 
Mr. Daniels' medal awards, and the evidence brought out in 
the Senate investigation, did much to check the process 
of demoralization in the naval service. Public attention 
was called in an emphatic way to conditions in the Navy 
and to the characteristics of its Secretary. INIr. Daniels' 
methods were publicly exposed and condemned in no uncer- 
tain terms by some of the men most honoured and esteemed 
in the service. It gave cheer to the Navy to realize that it 
still had champions, willing to defend its interests even 



64 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

against the political omnipotence and unscrupulous injus- 
tice of the departmental head. 

Mr. Daniels stood convicted before the public, after the 
medal awards investigation, not only of injustice and favour- 
itism, but of ridiculous incapacity. Almost at once the 
promising boom of the Secretary for the presidential nomina- 
tion exploded. As late as November, 1919, he had been re- 
garded even by well-informed people, and by leading news- 
papers as one of the bright spots of the administration. 
In January, he had again become the object of ridicule 
and contempt which he had been in 1915 and 1916. 

Mr. Daniels evidently recognized how damaging his ac- 
tions would seem, if full information were given to the public. 
He used every available means to escape the onus and to 
dodge the responsibility of his actions. He hurriedly dis- 
claimed the list of awards, published in his annual report as 
officially approved, with the statement that it was only a 
tentative list. He sought to allay public irritation by sum- 
moning into session again the Knight Board of Awards, 
and by instructing it to reconsider all recommendations, 
including the 611 he had himself added to the list. 

In explaining his reasons for ruthlessly changing or re- 
jecting two-thirds of the recommendations made to him, he 
endeavoured to find the most plausible excuses. The only 
fault to be found with these, as has already been indicated, 
is that they do not apply, in most cases, to his own actions. 
In fact, his list of awards was usually at variance with the 
" policies " he improvised after the storm had descended upon 
him. 

It was obvious very early in the investigation that Mr. 
Daniels could not really meet the issues. Every naval of- 
ficer of any standing condemned his medal awards as unjust 
and harmful to the Navy. The only justification for his ac- 
tion seemed to be the unquestioned fact that he had had the 
power to grant all medals, and that he had exercised this 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 65 

power to suit himself. He wrote Senator Page on December 
19, 1919, that: 

" The award of medals is a function of the executive branch 
of the Government and is at the discretion of the President. 

" Furthermore, I desire to emphasize the fact that this Board 
of Awards was established by my order and its recommendations 
were only for the information of the Secretary of the Navy. 
This Board, therefore, did not have any statutory authority, its 
recommendations were not final, and the executive was authorized 
to act as if no board had been constituted. There is nothing to 
prevent the Secretary of the Navy departing from the recom- 
mendations of this board, when in his opinion this should be done." 

Mr. Daniels' attitude savours strongly of the old notion 
of royal prerogative, expressed in such phrases as " I'etat, 
c'est moi " and " the King can do no wrong." He had 
power. He had exercised it. What right had any one to 
criticize.'' 

He has never realized that in a democratic community 
the exercise of power implies responsibility. He, upon whom 
we confer authority, does not become thereby our master, 
but our servant. If he misuses his power he violates a public 
trust. This Mr. Daniels has done, grossly and flagrantly 
for over seven years. 

He has kept the public, during that time, in ignorance 
of his tyranny because the Navy may not address the na- 
tion save through its Secretary. He has not only all power 
over the Navy, but his is its only official voice. That voice 
for over seven years has misrepresented conditions in the 
Navy, has deceived the country and Congress and, by its 
influence on the press and public opinion, has concealed 
from public notice the nightmare which his regime has in- 
flicted upon the Navy. 



66 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

XV 

In accordance with his usual habits, the Secretary, on 
finding himself confronted with the public disclosure of his 
own action, endeavoured to becloud the issues by attacking his 
critics. With ruthless disregard of truth, and shameless 
misuse of confidential and personal reports and letters, he 
sought to discredit Admiral Sims. His interjection of such 
attacks and insinuations was not intended in any way to 
meet the criticisms of his official actions ; but was designed 
purely and simply to damage the officers of the Navy who 
opposed him and to stir up feuds within the Navy itself, 
under cover of which he might hope to escape. 

Mr. Daniels, in his testimony, attempted to create feel- 
ing against Admiral Sims by making public confidential 
papers. Admiral Sims, in a personal letter to the Secretary 
on January 12th, 1919, had strongly advised against the ap- 
pointment of Wilson to the command of the Atlantic Fleet. 
Wilson was not a War College graduate, he had not been 
a loyal subordinate to Sims in his duty abroad and Admiral 
Sims felt that his temper and character made his choice 
inadvisable. The Secretary read this personal letter into 
his testimony. In the letter Sims had named eight officers 
whom he thought better fitted to command the fleet than 
Wilson. Not content with publishing the letter, Mr. Daniels 
had it sent out by navy radio to all ships of the fleet. It 
was posted on bulletin boards and thus every officer and 
man in the fleet could read Admiral Sims' frank, personal 
and unfavourable opinion of their Commander-in-Chief, Ad- 
miral Wilson. 

Admiral Sims in commenting on this action of the Secre- 
tary on March 9th, before the Senate Committee said : 

" In this connection, I would invite attention to what appears 
to be a campaign of deliberate propaganda (at least, so it is be- 
lieved to be by the naval service) aimed at prejudicing this case 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 67 

by wholly irrelevant subjects prior to its investigation by this 
committee. 

" To take but one example. In the testimony before this com- 
mittee on awards, it was seen fit to introduce personal correspond- 
ence of mine on a subject quite remote from that issue, and, fur- 
ther, with a full knowledge of the publicity which would attend 
it. Its introduction was, of course, camouflaged under the impli- 
cation that thereby my recommendations on awards were to be 
in some way invalidated. 

" My views as to who should have been the commander of the 
Atlantic fleet at that time or, in fact, my diff'erences with Ad- 
miral Wilson, regardless of their individual merit, had the most 
remote, if any, bearing on that case or this. 

"If the methods of making awards did not affect the morale of 
the Navy this instance certainly was calculated to do so. Not 
content with the publicity which was sure to follow in the press 
and to make the case infinitely worse, it was also broadcasted by 
the Navy Radio Press through high powered wireless to every 
ship and every naval station in the service. 

" Imagine the effect upon the discipline of the fleet when this 
Government wireless announcement was posted on every bulletin 
board for the information of every man, from officers to the last 
apprentice boy, giving information — whether true or not — cast- 
ing reflections on the ability of their leader, the commander-in- 
chief of the fleet; information, which through its method of dis- 
semination, actually made invidious comparisons between many 
higher officers of the Navy. 

" This was a manifest outrage against the eflSciency of the fleet, 
against Admiral Wilson himself, as well as against the proper 
investigation of the important issues of national safety before this 
committee." 

Mr. Daniels further violated the canons of confidence, 
decency and good taste in making public confidential " fitness 
reports " on Admiral Wilson. Every six months, such a re- 
port is made out for every oflRcer in the Navy by his im- 
mediate superior. These are intended only for the records 
of the Department, for use in connection with selections for 



68 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

promotion and for commands ; containing as they do, the 
most confidential reports on the officers of the Navy, their 
secrecy is carefully guarded in the naval service. Yet Mr. 
Daniels read to the committee, and thus made public, a series 
of these reports on Admiral Wilson, submitted in 1917 and 
1918 by Admirals Sims and Mayo. 

He not only did gross injustice to Admiral Wilson, to 
Admiral Sims and to the Navy by this publication of ex- 
tremely confidential official reports, but also tried to misrep- 
resent the character of the reports, as the following testi- 
mony will show : 

"The Chairman: Are these reports in connection with the 
awards ? 

" Secretary Daniels: Absolutely, of course. 

" The Chairman: Or are they just reports to the depart- 
ment ? 

" Secretary Daniels: These reports are in connection with the 
fact that Admiral Sims recommended every other admiral who 
was on the other side. . . . 

" The Chairman: I understand that, I mean, were these re- 
ports made to you so that you could make up your awards or were 
they in connection with the details of the routine of the depart- 
ment .'' 

" Secretary Daniels: They were made for my information as 
to awards and everything else. 

" The Chairman: And especially the assigning of officers to 
duty.? 

"Secretary Daniels: Everything: any condition, as to awards 
tliey have an important bearing. . . . 

" The Chairman: They were not in response to a request for 
information especially as to awards.? 

"Secretary Daniels: Not in response to that but as essential 
for making the awards." (Hearings on Awards, p. 502.) 

This dialogue is an excellent illustration of the method of 
quibbling evasion and misrepresentation in which Mr. Daniels 
has become so adept through long practice. 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 69 

It should be unnecessary to add that these fitness reports 
had no possible connection with the medal awards. They 
were not consulted by the Board of Awards in making up 
its recommendations. Nor did Mr. Daniels himself refer 
to them except when he wanted to use them to damage his 
critics. 

XVI 

The other attacks by Mr. Daniels on Admiral Sims were 
of a similar character. He said, for example, that " the 
position of Rear Admiral Sims in placing shore duty above 
sea duty in the danger zone is no doubt influenced by his 
own record. During the last 25 years he has served about 
16 years on shore duty and about 9 years on sea duty." 
(" Hearings on Awards," p. 504.) 

The Secretary tried to make it appear that Sims was a 
" shore-going admiral," by selecting for comment the last 
25 years of Admiral Sims' naval career, when, by the action 
of his superiors, he was employed on shore on many im- 
portant assignments ; such as Naval Attache at Paris, dur- 
ing the Spanish War, when he rendered very important serv- 
ice; and as Inspector of Target Practice in the Navy De- 
partment, in which position he was responsible for introduc- 
ing revolutionary improvements in naval gunnery. A false 
impression was intentionally conveyed by the Secretary's 
statement, as it was headlined by the press ; for it was made 
to appear that these 25 years were the total of Sims' naval 
experience, and that he served comparatively little at sea. 
As a matter of fact in the 18 years of his service prior 
to 1895, the point where the Secretary's figures began, prac- 
tically all of his service had been at sea. 

The facts were quite different from the Secretary's rep- 
resentation of them; on February 10, 1920, the Army and 
Navy Journal called attention to this in the following ar- 
ticle : 



70 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" This (the Secretary's statement) is a very incomplete state- 
ment of Admiral Sims' sea and shore service. The official Navy 
Register for January 1, 1917, which is the last register which 
specifies the ' total sea service and other duty ' of officers in all 
grades since they entered the service, gives the total sea service 
of Rear Admiral Sims on the above date as 22 years and 9 
months and for shore and other duty 15 years and 10 months. 

" Of the thirty rear admirals on the list, the Navy Register 
shows that all but one performed more duty ashore than Admiral 
Sims. His total sea service on January 1, 1917, was exceeded by 
only ten rear admirals among the thirty on the list, and only 4 of 
the 10 rear admirals had more than one year's service in excess of 
Rear Admiral Sims." 

The Navy Register of January 1, 1920, shows that Ad- 
miral Sims had had 24 years and 8 months sea duty and 18 
years and 10 months shore duty in a total service of 43 
years and 6 months. Of the 69 admirals on the list only 5 
had had more sea service than Sims ; and of the 32 admirals 
appointed prior to 1918 all but six had had more shore serv- 
ice than he. 

XVII 

The sub-committee of the Senate made its reports on the 
medal awards hearings on March 7, 1920. The two Demo- 
cratic members each submitted a minority report per- 
functorily whitewashing Mr. Daniels. The three Republican 
members signed the majority report. 

This majority report reviewed the circumstances under 
which the awards were made and strongly condemned the 
action of the Secretary of the Navy. 

It was pointed out : 

First: That the Secretary failed to announce any policy de- 
fining the character of services to be awarded by each of the 
awards authorized. The officers thus had no interpretation of the 
act to guide them in making recommendations. " It is the belief 
of the sub-committee that had such a policy been announced fewer 



M 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 71 

changes would have been necessitated in making up the list of 
awards." 

Second: " The sub-committee finds that in making the awards 
no attempt was made to ascertain from the officers making the 
recommendations the relative merit of the cases recommended, 
and that the question of relative merit was not considered as it 
should have been. This the sub-committee regards as most un- 
fortunate. It is of the opinion that the commanding officer of a 
ship is best qualified to pronounce upon the relative merits of the 
officers and men on liis ship; that the admiral of a fleet is best 
qualified to judge of the relative merits of the ship commanders 
under him and also of the members of his staff . . . and that the 
same principle applies . . . throughout the navy. Had such a 
policy prevailed in the granting of awards ... the men most en- 
titled to awards would have received them, and if it had been 
found necessary to cut down the number to receive awards the 
least deserving men would have been the ones left out." 

Third: " The sub-committee is of the opinion that the fail- 
ure to employ some such system in making awards has been hurt- 
ful to the morale of the navy and has to a certain extent depreci- 
ated the value of the awards made." 

Fourth: "The sub-committee cannot too strongly condemn 
the practice of giving awards to commanding officers in the navy 
who have lost their ships unless in such cases they shall have 
shown such marked heroism, or such signally distinguished service 
as shall have made them eligible for awards in spite of the loss 
of their ships. . . . Instead of the loss of their ships being taken 
as an opportunity where an award may be given, it is an ob- 
stacle, though not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle in the 
way of an award. . . . The sub-committee . . . does not be- 
lieve that the Secretary did require of these men (who lost 
their ships) a sufficient degree of distinguished service or of hero- 
ism to warrant the awards given them in some of the cases con- 
tained in his report for the year 1910, and it further believes 
that the Secretary has been more zealous in furthering the in- 
terests of commanders who have lost their ships than of other 
commanders who, instead of losing their ships, have destroyed 
or damaged the ships of the enemy. 



72 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" The sub-committee is therefore firmly of the opinion that the 
policy laid down by the Secretary of the Navy in regard to 
awards to commanders who have lost their ships . . . will be det- 
rimental to the United States Navy." 

Fifth: "The sub-committee further believes that in making 
final awards . , . the best interests of the navy will be con- 
sulted by the Secretary of the Navy if he follows the recommen- 
dations of the Board of Awards. ... It hopes the Board of 
Awards will be given full discretion to change or continue any of 
its former recommendations according to the latest evidence . . . 
and that the Board will not be bound by the findings published in 
the report of the Secretary of the Navy for the year 1919." 



XVIII 

Until two years after the Armistice, the only officer or 
man of the United States Navy who had received any recog- 
nition from the Navy Department for heroism or distin- 
guished service during the war was Admiral W. S. Benson, 
Mr. Daniels' Chief of Naval Operations. 

The Knight Board of Awards was in session for its second 
review of the recommendation for awards, from January 
to June 30, 1920. In accordance with instructions it went 
over all new evidence and submitted its report at the end of 
April. 

The Board ignored Mr. Daniels' awards and changes and 
adhered to its former recommendations, with some few modi- 
fications and many additions based on later information. 
The Board's last report is a further condemnation of Mr. 
Daniels' awards. It serves to explain why the report is held 
back and why no action was taken on it until after the Presi- 
dential election. 

The list of awards finally announced by the Secretary, 
for distribution on Armistice Day, 1920, reveals a total 
disregard by the Secretary of the report of the Senate Com- 
mittee, of the practically luianimous opinion of the Naval 



THE DANIELS MEDAL AWARDS 73 

Service, and of the best interests of the Navy. He has again 
changed the Board's report and awarded Distinguished Serv- 
ice Medals to the Commanders of ships sunk by German sub- 
marines while awarding only a Navy Cross to officers who 
fought successful actions. He has reduced awards recom- 
mended, in a number of cases, to officers not in his good 
graces. In fact only a score of changes were made in the 
list published in 1919, although some hundreds of new names 
were added to the list. It is not surprising that he waited 
until after the election to perpetrate this further offence 
against the traditions and morale of the United States Navy. 
The medal awards investigation has thrown exceedingly 
illuminating light on Mr. Daniels' administration. It re- 
veals his tendencies, and exposes his methods in a concrete 
and definite way. 



CHAPTER V 

ADMIRAL SIMS' LETTER ON "CERTAIN 
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR " 



THE medal awards investigation had hardly begun when 
a new and much more significant issue arose. The whole 
of the war activities of the Navy Department, and the 
policies and methods put into force by Mr. Daniels since 
1913, were called into question. Information of a most 
startling character was made public. 

Until January, 1920, Mr. Daniels, and the Navy De- 
partment, had made no effort to review the operations of the 
war with the purpose of ascertaining such errors and mis- 
takes as might have been committed, and of taking into ac- 
count the lessons of the war. That the errors had been 
many and grievous was generally recognized and admitted 
in the naval service. Mr. Daniels, however, had ignored or 
denied the possibility of such errors. The country had been 
led to believe that his activities had been 100 per cent, per- 
fect. So thoroughly had the officers of the Navy been 
muzzled that it seemed likely, not only that the disastrous 
failures of Daniels would escape notice, but that his policies 
and methods would actually be considered by the public as 
responsible for the undoubted success of the Navy in the 
final period of the war. 

During the war, and on several later occasions. Admiral 
Sims had invited the attention of the department to strategi- 
cal and administrative mistakes that had seriously hampered 

the war operations of the Navy. His position as commander 

74 



ADMIRAL SIMS' LETTER 75 

of our naval forces abroad made him the officer best equipped 
to review dispassionately the results of our naval activities. 

The military errors of the early months of the war in 
1917 were not pleasant things to remember. It was only 
natural that officers in the department, and Mr. Daniels 
himself, should prefer to think of the successful operations 
of 1918. It was only human, too, that these later successes 
should have largely effaced from their memories the dis- 
heartening experiences of 1917. Consequently, the tendency 
on the part of those at home, after the armistice, had been 
to think and talk only of the later period — to ignore and 
forget the earlier one. 

Admiral Sims, however, realized that it would be fatal to 
neglect or fail to eradicate the causes of errors, the repeti- 
tion of which on a future occasion would invite disaster. 

On January 7, 1920, therefore, a week before the Senate 
investigation of the medal awards began. Admiral Sims 
sent to the Secretary of the Navy, through official channels, 
a letter dealing with " Certain Naval Lessons of the Great 
War." 

This letter was received in the Navy Department two 
or three days later. It was referred to Mr. Daniels, who put 
it in his desk without reading it through. Ordinarily the 
letter would have died there — as has been the case with so 
many other official communications during the Daniels ad- 
ministration. Now, however, a leak occurred. Public in- 
terest had been attracted to the Navy by the controversy 
over medal awards. Admiral Sims' courageous defence of 
naval tradition had caught the public eye. Any information 
concerning his relations with the Secretary had, therefore, a 
decided news value. 

It was not ascertained in the Senate investigation, exactly 
how the news of the existence of the letter became public. 
Only one file copy of it had been made. This had never 
left Admiral Sims' possession. Only half a dozen of his im- 



76 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

mediate staff and only one man outside of the naval service 
knew of its existence. All these were pledged to secrecy. 
Such a letter on entering the Navy Department passes 
through many hands — a clerk opens the mail, another re- 
cords it, a third carries it to the Secretary. In recording 
the entry of the letter, its contents must be noted. The 
character of its contents was undoubtedly such as to attract 
notice and arouse comment and curiosity. It seems, there- 
fore, very probable that the news of the receipt of the letter 
travelled rapidly through the whispering galleries of Wash- 
ington. 

II 

It is at least certain that on January 14, 1920, the Wash- 
ington Post published a story by Mr. Albert W. Fox, headed 
" Sims Attacks Daniels' Policies," in which Mr. Fox said : 

" Secretary Daniels has received another letter from Admiral 
Wm. S. Sims, which will prove of great interest to the service and 
the country if the Secretary does not succeed in suppressing it. 
It is a frank and fearless expose of the hopeless story of mal- 
administration, mistakes and blunders into which the American 
Navy has fallen as a result of Mr. Daniels' policies, and it tells 
the Secretary things that became evident to the Admiral during 
the war, and are even more evident now. . . . 

"If this officer, who is generally regarded here and abroad as 
one of the most competent naval authorities in the world, finds it 
necessary to expose Mr. Daniels' management of naval affairs 
and frankly and fearlessly undertakes the task, it is not probable 
that Senators will show lack of interest. 

" Every one admits that there is something vitally important 
to the nation involved in naval efficiency, and the big, broad ques- 
tion at issue is how Mr. Daniels' policies are affecting the 
service." 

Admiral Sims was at Newport when this item was pub- 
lished by the Washington Post, and knew nothing of it until 



ADMIRAL SIMS' LETTER 77 

his arrival in Washington on January 16th. Mr. Fox later 
stated that he had not obtained the information from any 
one connected in any way with Admiral Sims. 

The publication of this item aroused great interest and on 
January 14th, a number of correspondents asked Mr. Daniels 
about Admiral Sims' letter. The Washington Post on Janu- 
ary 15th, in reporting the interview, said: 

" Secretary Daniels admitted yesterday that he had received 
a ' critical ' or ' controversial ' letter from Admiral Sims, but 
said he had not yet read all of it. He stopped reading it just as 
it was becoming critical, he explained^ and therefore could not 
comment on the charges against his management of naval affairs 
made by the Admiral ! . . . Besides getting Admiral Sims' views 
on the actions of Secretary Daniels in the matter of naval awards, 
which the admiral has described as bringing condemnation and 
ridicule upon Mr. Daniels and the service and lowering the 
morale to the last degree, it may be that the committee will de- 
velop points having an important bearing on the present condi- 
tion of confusion and chaos in the Navy." 

Ill 

On Friday, January 16th, Admiral Sims appeared before 
the Senate investigating committee to give testimony with 
regard to the medal awards. During his testimony on Janu- 
ary 17th, he was asked about his letter of January 7th by 
Chairman Hale. 

" The Chairman: Admiral Sims, I think, in connection with 
this matter, if you have had any further correspondence with the 
Secretary of the Navy about the question of awards and their 
effect on the morale of the service, it would be well for you to 
give that correspondence to us at the present time. 

" Admiral Sims: It does not bear particularly upon the ques- 
tion of the aM'ards, but it does bear upon the question of the mo- 
rale of the service. 

" The Chairman: Then I think it is decidedly germane to the 
issue. 



78 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

"Admiral Sims: As I said before, the action of the Board on 
the Awards is only the last straw in this whole business. 

" Senator Pittman: May I finish this line of examination with 
regard to this joarticular subject? 

" The Chairman: If the Admiral has expressed himself in 
regard to this matter in any letter that will throw light on the 
subject we should have it. 

"Senator McCormick: My sentiment is that we should give 
the Admiral an opportunity to furnish us these letters before we 
get too far away from the subject to which they refer." 

Senator Pittman continued his questioning of Admiral 
Sims, obviously with the object of preventing the Chairman 
of the committee from insisting that Admiral Sims produce 
his letter. Senator Hale, however, several times interrupted 
Senator Pittman's questions to insist that the letter be read. 
Finally, when Pittman had concluded his questions. Senator 
Hale said: 

" The Chairman: Now, Senator Pittman, with your permis- 
sion, we will go ahead with the question I put to the Admiral. 

"Admiral Sims: As I said in the preliminary statement I 
made yesterday, this business of the award of medals fell on the 
service when it was in a very critical condition of morale, which 
goes back a long way and has quite a good deal to do with the 
way in which the war was managed from a naval point of view; 
and it is this question of morale as well as the question of awards 
that is being investigated. It seems to me that it is quite proper 
that anything that bears on the morale should be taken into con- 
sideration, . . . 

" It is the duty of an officer who has been in a responsible 
position of command during a considerable war, by the regula- 
tions of the Navy Department, to state any criticism that he may 
have which, in his best judgment, will be useful in avoiding mis- 
takes in future wars, and it is the mistake we want to avoid, and 
not camouflage in any respect." 

Admiral Sims then read his letter to the committee. 






ADMIRAL SIMS' LETTER 79 

IV 

This letter is too long to quote in full. In it, Admiral 
Sims, after describing the circumstances under which he 
had been sent abroad in March, 1917, outlined the recom- 
mendations made to the Navy Department, connnented on 
the long delays in getting into the war and in co-operating 
with the Allies, and cited specific cases of violations of mili- 
tary principles by the Navy Department. 

In the opening paragraphs of the letter. Admiral Sims out- 
lined the reasons which led him to submit it. 

Naval War College 
Newport, Rhode Island 

7 January, 1920. 
" From: Rear Admiral William S. Sims. U. S. Navy. 
" To: Secretary of the Navy. 

" Subject: Certain Naval Lessons of the Great War. 

" 1. Upon the conclusion of a war in which large naval forces 
have been engaged, and after a sufficient time has elapsed to 
permit of a careful estimate of the manner in which the war was 
conducted, it is of the first importance that the lessons to be 
derived from this experience be recorded in order that they may 
serve as a guide in future wars. 

" 2. This is especially true of a naval war of such a peculiar 
character that the experience of former wars was of little assist- 
ance in determining the proper policy and in developing the un- 
usual tactics tliat were rendered necessary by the number, geo- 
graphical position and resources of the countries involved, and 
by the enemy's method of submarine attack upon merchant ship- 
ping in disregard of the tenets of international law and the laws 
of humanity. 

" 3. In this respect it is particularly important that a just esti- 
mate be made of the errors of policy, tactics, strategy, and ad- 
ministration that were committed by our Navy. 

"4. It is to this end that I submit tlie following account of 
what appear to me to be the most serious of these errors, and 



80 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the circumstances that led up to them^ followed by a brief sum- 
mary of the lessons to be derived therefrom. 

" 5. This is not presented solely from the viewpoint of the 
commander of our relatively small naval forces in Europe, but 
specifically as a result of the experience necessarily gained in the 
unusual and very responsible position of the Navy Department's 
representative in the Naval Council of the Allies, where only all 
Allied plans and policies could be continuously discussed, and 
where only all essential information, both current and general, 
was at all times available." 



It is to be noted that Admiral Sims especially emphasized 
the point that he was not attacking or condemning anybody 
or anything. His letter was intended to be, not a full state- 
ment of our naval part in the war, but " a just estimate " of 
" the errors of policy, tactics, strategy and administration 
that were committed by our Navy." Far from being a de- 
preciation of the services of our Navy in the war, the letter 
was an analysis of the handicaps and difficulties, imposed by 
our unpreparedness and by the blunders of the Navy Depart- 
ment upon our operating naval forces. 

In the final paragraph of the letter. Admiral Sims made 
eleven specific criticisms: 

" 78. The above brief account, of the manner in which our 
naval operations were conducted, clearly shows that the follow- 
ing grave errors were committed, in violation of fundamental 
military principles ; and it is manifestly desirable that such vio- 
lations should be avoided in future: 

" 1. Although war with Germany had been imminent for 
many months prior to its declaration, there were nevertheless 
no mature plans developed or naval policy adopted in prepara- 
tion for war, in so far as its commander in Europe was informed. 

" 2. The Navy Department did not enter wholeheartedly 
into the campaign for many months after we declared war. 



ADMIRAL SIMS' LETTER 81 

thus putting a great strain upon the morale of the fighting 
forces in the war area by decreasing their confidence in their 
leaders. 

"3. The outbreak of hostilities found many important naval 
units widely dispersed, and in need of repairs before they 
could be sent to the critical area. 

" 4. Destroyers arriving in the war zone had been cruising 
extensively off our seaboard and in the Caribbean, and, when 
war was declared, were rushed through a brief and inadequate 
preparation for distant service. 

" 5. During the most critical months of the enemy subma- 
rine campaign against tlie allied lines of communication, the 
Department violated the fundamental strategical principle of 
concentration of maximum force in the critical area of the con- 
flict. 

" 6. The Department's representative with the allied ad- 
miralties was not supported, during the most critical months 
of the war, either by the adequate personnel or by the ade- 
quate forces that could have been supplied. 

" 7. The Department's commander in the critical area of 
hostilities was never allowed to select his principal subordi- 
nates, and was not even consulted as to their assignment. A 
fundamental principle of the art of command is here involved. 

" 8. The Navy Department made, and acted upon, decisions, 
concerning operations that were being conducted 3.000 miles 
away, when the conditions were such that full information 
could not have been in its possession, thus violating an essen- 
tial precept of warfare that sound decisions necessarily depend 
upon complete information. 

" 9. Instead of relying upon the judgment of those who had 
had actual war experience in this peculiar warfare, the Navy 
Department, though lacking not only this experience, but also 
lacking adequate information concerning it, insisted upon a 
number of plans that could not be carried out. 

" 10. Many of the Department's actions so strongly implied 
a conviction that it was tlie most competent to make decisions, 
concerning ojicrations in the war zone, that the result was an 
impression that it lacked confidence in the judgment of its rep- 



82 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

resentative on the Council of the Allies and its responsible com- 
mander in the 'field.' 

"11. It is a fundamental principle that every action on the 
part of superior authorities should indicate confidence in sub- 
ordinates. If such confidence is lacking, it should immediately 
be restored by ruthlessly changing the subordinate. 

" ' To interfere with the commander in the field or afloat is 
one of the most common temptations to the government — and 
is generally disastrous.' (" The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History." Mahan.) 

The Navy Department did not resist this temptation, and its 
frequent violation of this principle was the most dangerous 
error committed during the naval war." 



VI 

In the body of the letter, many instances were cited to il- 
lustrate the points of this concluding paragraph. 

As an indication of the attitude of the chief officials in the 
Department in April, 1917, and as an illustration of the lack 
of plans or even vague ideas as to what our naval activities 
in the war would be, Admiral Sims referred to the instruc- 
tions given him before his departure for Europe in March, 
1917: 

"6. In the latter part of March, 1917, in response to a re- 
quest from the American Ambassador in London, expressing the 
desire of the British Government that a naval officer of high 
rank be sent to secure the closer co-operation which our Navy 
Department had suggested, I was ordered abroad on barely 48 
hours' notice. 

" 7. Brief orders were delivered to me verbally in Washington. 
No formal instructions or statement of the Navy Department's 
plans or policy were received at that time, though I received the 
following explicit admonition: 'Don't let the British pull the 
wool over your eyes. It is none of our business pulling their 
chestnuts out of the fire. We would as soon fight the British as 
the Germans.' 



ADMIRAL SIMS' LETTER 83 

" 8. I assumed that my mission was to confer with the heads 
of the allied navies to learn the actual situation and to discuss 
means for naval co-operation in case the United States declared 
war against the Central Powers. A lieutenant commander accom- 
panied me as Aide. We were directed not to take uniform and to 
travel under assumed names. 1 expected to return and supple- 
ment my cables by reporting the situation in person, I had no 
idea that I would be designated to command the naval forces in 
Europe in case of war." 



VII 

The Department not only had no war plans and lacked 
enthusiasm, in entering the war, but it was also completely 
ignorant of the naval situation and of the critical nature of 
the submarine campaign. 

" 9. I arrived in Liverpool on April 9th, and in London on 
April 10th. 1917, and went immediately to the Admiralty, where 
the naval situation was fully explained by the responsible offi- 
cials. This explanation showed that the Navy Department did 
not understand the seriousness of the submarine situation; that 
its information was very incomplete and inaccurate. This was 
due to the insufficient scope of its intelligence service, very few 
naval officers having been sent to Europe for information before 
we entered the war. 

"10. A review of the cables sent to the Department in April, 
1917, shows that the situation was very serious and that the 
enemy was rapidly winning the war by the destruction of mer- 
chant shipping. Throughout the following year numerous cables 
and letters of the most urgent possible character were sent with 
the object of impressing upon the Department the vital necessity 
of our maximum eiFort being exerted in the European waters 
with the least possible delay, but without producing the desired 
results. 

"11. Attention was frequently invited to the fact tliat ship- 
ping was being sunk much faster than it was being built, and 
that it was a matter of simple arithmetical calculation to de- 



84 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

termine when the Allies would have to sue for peace if the rate of 
loss continued." 

VIII 

After consultation with the Allies, Admiral Sims recom- 
mended the sending of all available anti-submarine craft 
to the war zone. But for months, scores of craft were 
kept on the Atlantic coast, while the allied appeals went un- 
heeded. The Department was informed that information 
was available concerning submarine movements which would 
make it unnecessary to hold vessels on the American coast 
for defensive purposes, but for many months the principles 
of sound strategy were violated by withholding forces from 
the critical area. 

"21. There was great delay and reluctance in accepting the 
indisputable fact, which should have been apparent to any one, 
that the critical sea area was in the Eastern Atlantic in the so- 
called submarine war zone ; that the submarine campaign could be 
critical and could eiFect the ultimate decision of the war only in 
that area. 

" 42. It was repeatedly explained that if we could actually 
entice the enemy into shifting his submarines to our coast it 
would be greatly to the advantage of the common cause, even 
granting that our shipping would suffer somewhat more severely; 
that the chances of the enemy shifting any of his operations to 
the United States coast without our having advance knowledge, 
while remote, was a fully justifiable risk; and therefore that such 
considerations should not deter us in any way from throwing 
every possible bit of naval strength into the fight on the actual 
' front,' that is, in the ' war zone ' in European waters. More- 
over, that the risk was slight, as vessels could be sent back, if 
necessary, before submarines could reach our coast, or could do 
much damage. In making long passages, submarines necessarily 
steam at slow speed — from 5 to 6 knots. 

" 40. War is always a dangerous game. Military operations 
conducted by several allied powers should never be based upon a 
policy of ' safety first ' as regards the interests of any particular 



ADMIRAL SIMS' LETTER 85 

ally. This is especially true where success depends upon the 
maximum possible protection being given to the allied commerce 
as a whole." 

IX 

In dealing specifically with the delays of the Department 
in sending forces abroad, Admiral Sims stated: 

" 32. In sjjite of the numerous messages sent in April, the 
only information received up to April 27, 1917, was that six 
destroyers only would be sent. The situation was then so very 
critical that I appealed to the American Ambassador in London, 
who sent a most urgent message to the President, and on May 3, 
1917, tlie first definite information was received of the Depart- 
ment's intention to send more than six destroyers, that ultimately 
36 and two repair ships would be sent." 

Tugs were urgently requested in April, 1917, but none 
were sent until February, 1918. Submarines were requested, 
to operate on the Irish coast, in July, 1917, but were not 
sent until January, 1918. A division of dreadnaughts was 
requested in July, 1917, but the Department refused to 
send them until Admiral Benson went abroad in November, 
1917. After only a few hours in England, he approved / 
the request made four months before. 

Admiral Sims' comment was : 

19. This is but one of a number of examples of a similar 
kind, and strikingly illustrates the nature of the delays caused by 
the Department's insistence upon trying to understand the intri- 
cate details of rapidly changing conditions 3,000 miles away. 
As it was of course a physical impossibility to keep the Depart- 
ment fully and accurately informed, and as tlie Department in- 
sisted upon making decisions concerning both the disposition and 
the actual operations of the European forces, the inevitable re- 
sult was unsound decisions, and, in some cases, long delays before 
the Department was induced to accept the original recommenda- 
tions that were based upon exhaustive discussions of the actual 
conditions with the heads of the allied navies." 



86 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

X 

Admiral Sims was kept in ignorance of the Department's 
plans and was often greatly embarrassed to find that the 
Allied officials were receiving information about the plans 
and operations of the American Navy of which he knew 
nothing: 

" 60. The Department frequently omitted to keep its naval 
representative abroad informed of its plans, intentions, and some- 
times even the movements of forces in the European area, and 
there was at times embarrassment caused by lack of general in- 
formation concerning the navy's activities in other areas, such as 
the South Atlantic, Pacific, etc. As foreign forces and shipping 
were also operating in those areas, it was embarrassing not to be 
able to answer, in conferences with the Allies, all questions con- 
cerning our actual naval activities as well as prospective plans, 
the carrying out of which would necessarily influence allied plans. 

"61. It requires httle imagination to understand the great em- 
barrassment of my position. It was of course impossible even to 
attempt any explanation of the evident fact that the Allies were 
not receiving the easily possible naval support in ships, and that I 
was not receiving adequate assistance in personnel. 

" 62. Apart from the resulting lack of co-ordination, it was 
very difficult — I fear sometimes impossible — to avoid the im- 
pression conveyed thereby to the heads of the allied navies that 
I was not being supported or was not in the confidence of the 
Department." 

XI 

A notable illustration of the Department's methods was 
their failure to announce any policy for the first three months 
in the war, and their subsequent failure to put the policy, 
when announced, into effect. 

" 14. The Headquarters in Europe was not infrequently left in 
ignorance of the Department's policies, plans for operation of 
United States forces, and its intended action upon my many dis- 



ADMIRAL SIMS' LETTER 87 

patches. Not until July 10, 1917, did the Navy Department out- 
line a policy as regards naval co-operation with the Allies — in a 
cable quoting a letter to the State Department. 

" 15. As usual in such cases, the policy thus set forth was aca- 
demically sound, but that it was not carried out, or was not under- 
stood by the Department, is shown by the fact that for ten 
months after its receipt I was still urgently recommending an in- 
crease of forces — still trying to convince the Department that 
the war was in the Eastern Atlantic; that the United States naval 
' Front ' was off the European coast and not off the United States 
coast; that it was tliere only that the naval enemy was operating; 
that it was there only that United States shipping, let alone allied 
shipping, could be protected with the maximum efficiency. 

" 13. For some reason which has never been explained, the 
Navy Department, during at least the first six months of the war, 
failed to put into actual practice a wholehearted policy of co-op- 
eration with the Allies — a policy required for winning the war 
with the least possible delay. 

" 28. For example, in the above-mentioned statement of pol- 
icy, from the Navy to the State Department, a copy of which was 
sent me, it is clearly set forth that readiness to co-operate com- 
pletely, by sending our liglit forces abroad, was dependent upon 
the condition that the Allies should keep the Department fully 
informed, through me, of their plans and intentions. 

" 29. In other words, while the Department's first statement 
of policy (which was dated July, 1917. or three months after 
we entered the war) was what I had recommended since the be- 
ginning, it nevertheless withheld putting it into effect, appa- 
rently because of a conviction that the Allies were not keeping it 
fully informed of their plans. 

" 30. The truth of the matter was that nothing was being with- 
held, and that all policies and plans which were in writing, which 
were actually of an official nature, and which in any way affected 
United States naval co-operation had been transmitted to the 
Department as completely as long distance communication — 
coded messages — permitted. 



88 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

XII 

During the most critical months of the war, Admiral Sims 
was denied any assistance in accomplishing his mission and 
for five months had only one officer to assist him. This 
situation made it physically impossible for him to get all the 
information available or to provide the Navy Department 
with the results of Allied war experience. 

" 46. Perhaps the most remarkable situation disclosed by the 
correspondence with the Department is that during the most 
critical period — the first four months after we entered the war 

I had but one Aide, and that for more than the first year I had 

a wholly inadequate staff. 

" 47. With all the insistence possible, it was explained in 
numerous cables and letters, for four weary and anxious months, 
the absolute necessity of further assistance in order to handle the 
situation effectively, but only to receive always the same answer, 
namely, that officers were ' not available.' 

" 50. It needs little explanation to understand what I and my 
single Aide were up against. For the efficient handling of such a 
difficult and complicated situation I should have had a staff ca- 
pable of: 

" Obtaining complete information of the various phases of 

the naval campaign which had been in operation for over two 

years. 

" Keeping up-to-date with the developments which were 
rapidly changing, almost from day to day. 

" Efficiently administering, supplying and operating the en- 
tire force. 

" Co-ordinating our work with that of the Allies. 
"51. The work of such a staff not only involved attempting 
to survey the disposition of all enemy forces, but also of all allied 
forces operating in the North Sea, Atlantic and Mediterranean. 
It was also necessary to keep track of the results of the naval 
campaign in all its details both from the side of the Allies and 
from that of the enemy, and to solve the problems of supply, re- 
pairs, etc., which would affect any United States naval forces that 



ADMIRAL SIMS' LETTER 89 

might be sent abroad. The above, to say nothing of having to 
solve problems relating to the entirely new forces introduced 
into this war. such as aviation — a tremendous problem in it- 
self. 

" 24. As a matter of fact, this was a physical impossibility dur- 
ing all of that most critical period. The work of collecting tlie 
necessary information, or even the purely mechanical work of 
transcribing it, would have been away beyond the physical ca- 
pacity of one man assisted by the one Aide I was allowed during 
that time. The best that could possibly be done was to keep the 
Department informed by cable in a general way of the conclusions 
reached by the various discussions with the Allied commanders at 
the ' front,' and of the decisions based thereon." 



XIII 

Not only had the Department failed to send the necessary 
assistance to Admiral Sims, but the attempt was made to 
decide all questions, even of detail, in Washington. The 
necessary information was not to be had there, and many 
mistakes resulted. The Department concentrated its efforts, 
not on meeting the situation as it existed, but in trying to 
devise some panacea. 

" 69. There was insistence by the Department upon finding 
new naval plans — a royal road to victory — such as blocking 
the enemy in his ports. The objection to radically new plans was 
that the situation was critical and their preparation would delay 
striking quickh^ with all available forces. This insistence as- 
sumed that the Department, incompletely informed as it neces- 
sarily was, and without previous experience in the war, was more 
competent to decide upon practicable plans than their own repre- 
sentative, in continuous conference with the leaders of the allied 
navies who had had nearly three years' experience. This atti- 
tude was maintained until after the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Atlantic Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations had visited 
Europe and learned something of the situation. 



90 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

XIV 

The failure of the Department to realize the situation ; 
the state of unpreparedness in which we entered the war; 
and the errors and delays after war began, necessarily re- 
duced the effectiveness of our naval intervention and thus 
prolonged the war. 

" 26. If the Department had promptly accepted the recom- 
mendations made, beginning four days after my arrival abroad, 
and continuing for some months, and had sent at once all the de- 
stroyers and other craft which were finally sent in the next four 
or five months, it follows that the United States naval interven- 
tion would have been much more efficient. 

" 35. The Department caused serious embarrassment and de- 
lays in putting into eff"ect the convoy system which was the most 
important of all the measures used in defeating the submarine war 
against allied shipping, 

" 22. This attitude in Washington greatly slowed the sending 
of the necessary assistance, and necessarily resulted in prolong- 
ing the war." 

XV 

After Admiral Sims had read his letter, the Chairman said: 

" As there are, apparently, certain matters contained in this 
letter which Admiral Sims has read at my request (and with the 
contents of which I was not familiar), I shall ask the chairman of 
the full Naval Aff"airs Committee to determine what action the 
committee desires to take and whether it wishes to give this sub- 
committee further authority or whether it wishes to appoint an- 
other committee to take up the investigation of the matters herein 
contained." 

On Monday, January 19, 1920, the Senate Naval Affairs 
Committee voted: 

" that the sub-committee heretofore appointed to investigate the 
matter of awards made by the Navy Department for distinguished 



ADMIRAL SIMS' LETTER 91 

and heroic service, be, and it hereby is, authorized and directed, 
on making its reports on the matter referred to, to investigate 
and report on the matters referred to in the letter of Admiral 
Sims to the Navy Department in criticism of its action touching 
operations during the war, introduced before the said sub-com- 
mittee." 

The report of the sub-committee on the medal awards in- 
vestigation was made on March 7, 1920. 

On March 9, 1920, the sub-committee began its investi- 
gation of the conduct of the war by the Navy Department. 
Admiral Sims was asked to appear as the first witness, to 
furnish proof of his criticisms. 

So began the investigation that was to make available, 
for the first time, the whole disheartening story of the mal- 
administration of the Navy by Josephus Daniels. 



CHAPTER VI 
THE SCOPE OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATION 



FROM March 9, 1920, to May 28, 1920, the sub-com- 
mittee of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs held daily 
sessions. A score of witnesses were examined and voluminous 
testimony was received. Literally thousands of official 
papers were introduced in substantiation of the statements 
of the witnesses. The testimony when printed amounted to 
over 3,500 pages. 

Although the sub-committee was the same that had con- 
ducted the medal awards investigation, two of the members 
were changed. Senators Poindextcr and McCormick were re- 
placed by Senators Keyes (New Hampshire) and Ball (Dela- 
ware). 

II 

The scope of the investigation widened, as, in the course 
of the hearings, the full extent of the mal-administration 
of the Navy, in the years immediately before the war, was 
established. After Admiral Sims had concluded his testi- 
mony and presented full documentary substantiation of his 
criticisms, the sub-committee turned its attention to the 
Navy Department itself, in the endeavour to learn why such 
conditions as those described by Admiral Sims existed. 

A number of officers who had held responsible positions 
in the Department since 1913 were therefore called. Rear 
Admiral B. A. Fiske, the Aide for Operations from 1913 
to 1915, and Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam, Aide for Per- 

92 



SCOPE OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATION 93 

sonnel in 1913-14, described the conditions in the first period 
of Mr. Daniels' administration. They told of the unavail- 
ing efforts of naval officers to secure the adoption of sound 
policies and methods or to prepare the Navy for war. 

The sub-committee also called a number of officers who 
had served in the Department during the war : Captain Har- 
ris Laning, who had been assistant for materiel and later 
Assistant Chief (and for a time Acting Chief) of the Bureau 
of Navigation; Captain J. K. Taussig, who had been head 
of the enlisted personnel section in the Bureau of Naviga- 
tion and who had commanded the first division of destroyers 
to be sent abroad in 1917; Captain L. C. Palmer, Chief of 
the Bureau of Navigation and in charge of the personnel 
of the Navy during the war; Rear Admiral A. W. Grant, 
who had been the head of the Submarine Service from 1915 
to 1917 and who commanded the reserve battleship fleet 
during the greater part of the war ; Rear Admiral C. P. 
Plunkett, who had been Inspector of Target Practice in the 
Department and who had commanded the 14-inch naval rail- 
way batteries in France. 

The committee also called Admiral Mayo, commander-in- 
cliief of the Atlantic Fleet during the war. 

All of these witnesses gave testimony substantially con- 
firming every criticism of Admiral Sims. They also went 
much further than he and, in their description of the condi- 
tions prevailing in the Navy Department, revealed a state 
of chaos, indecision, unpreparedncss and lack of direction, 
wliich, as Admiral Sims stated in his rebuttal testimony, 
was infinitely worse than anything he had imagined. The 
responsibility for these conditions was laid squarely upon the 
Secretary himself. 

Ill 

The Secretary of the Navy, obviously alarmed and 
chagrined at the damaging revelations of these witnesses, 



94 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

spared no effort to counteract the effect of their testimony. 
He made use of all the official influence of his position, and 
of all of his undoubted talent for evasion and misrepresenta- 
tion, to distract public attention from the facts established 
during the investigation. 

His tactics were soon made manifest. He endeavoured 
to defend his administration before the court of public 
opinion, realizing that he could not controvert the facts 
presented to the committee. He requested Senator Hale 
to call as witnesses the naval officers whom he had selected 
for positions of honour and authority and thus exacted from 
them a return for favours, past and future. These wit- 
nesses were asked to make a general defence of the Navy, 
by denying in ambiguous terms the criticisms of the earlier 
witnesses, and by emphasizing the undoubted successes that 
the Navy achieved in the latter part of the war, after the 
period of nearly a year of delay and of grievous blunders, 
covered by Admiral Sims^ criticisms. 

At the same time, the Secretary endeavoured to discredit 
his critics by the introduction of irrelevant issues which he 
thought might be damaging to them in the public mind. 

He attempted to make it appear that Admiral Sims and 
other officers were men with grievances — that they were 
actuated chiefly by wounded vanity. 

He supplied the senior Democratic member of the commit- 
tee, Senator Key Pittman of Nevada, a staunch administra- 
tion supporter, with many confidential and personal papers, 
by the use of which sensational but irrelevant and false im- 
pressions could be conveyed. 



IV 

Mr. Daniels, through his knowledge of the press, and 
through the misuse of his official power, was able to influence 
many of the press reports of the hearings. There are over 



SCOPE OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATION 95 

sixty press bureaus in Washington, which collect daily the 
news of the doings of the government from all departments. 
These press bureaus are completely dependent upon the good 
will of the government departments. If they offend, their 
news sources can be automatically cut off. Self interest, 
therefore, often compels them to yield to official pressure. 

As a result, the reports of the testimony of the various 
witnesses were often garbled and inaccurate. This was 
especially true when the witnesses called at Mr. Daniels' re- 
quest were testifying. Each of these witnesses had pre- 
pared a statement (or had had one prepared for him in the 
Department) praising the Navy and its achievements and 
denying, in general and ambiguous terms, the truth of the 
criticisms directed against the Navy Department. These 
statements were given to the press in advance and the news 
stories of their testimony sent out were based almost en- 
tirely on them. It was thus made to appear that many 
officers of high rank were giving the lie to Admiral Sims. 

Yet, in practically every case, these witnesses, under the 
able and searching cross-examination of Senator Hale, were 
forced to admit the truth of practically every one of Admiral 
Sims' criticisms which they had denied or attempted to ex- 
plain away in their direct statements. They admitted that 
the Navy was pitifully unprepared in 1917, that the Secre- 
tary himself was responsible, that the Navy Department's 
organization had to be remade under the stress of war, and 
that many serious blunders had unavoidably occurred. 

This cross-examination was hardly reported at all. A 
statement like Admiral Rodman's that " there are three 
kinds of lies ; lies, damn lies, and statistics," and that Admiral 
Sims' testimony belonged in the third category, was head- 
lined by nearly every newspaper in the country. Admiral 
Rodman's admission that he knew nothing of the facts at 
issue, that his own ships were sent abroad with inadequately 
trained crews, and that he sailed without definite orders, in- 



96 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAK 

structions or plans, went unnoticed. Admiral McKean's 
statement that Sims' testimony was the kind to be expected 
of an insane patient at St. Elizabeth's was similarly head- 
lined. His admissions under cross-examination, that the 
Navy entered the war without plans ; that the ships were 
unready for war service, and had inadequate crews ; that the 
Secretary delayed important decisions for many months, 
were either not reported at all or were passed over very 
lightly. 

Even the local representatives of some of the great news 
associations were not free from Daniels' influence. On the 
day when Mr. Daniels was confronted with documents which 
showed conclusively that he had made misstatements officially 
and in writing to the United States Senate in April, 1916, 
for the purpose of concealing his own mistakes and omis- 
sions, the Associated Press sent out a story which hardly 
mentioned the incident. 

The following day, when Mr. Daniels had concluded his 
testimony, a Washington correspondent of the Associated 
Press, approached him in the sight of many people and ef- 
fusively congratulated him on " getting out of so many 
pretty tight holes." Mr. Daniels clapped his hands on the 
reporter's shoulders affectionately and said, " Yes, and I 
can't tell you how much I appreciate all you have done for 
me." 

The political power of an unscrupulous Secretary in 
Washington is very great. The newspaper men live by news, 
and often can get it only by playing up to those who con- 
trol news sources. 

The playing up of vicious attacks and insinuations against 
Admiral Sims and other hostile witnesses, the " soft pedal- 
ling " of damaging testimony, did much to divert the public 
mind from the real issues and to leave it with an incorrect 
and inadequate conception of what the testimony had 
actually demonstrated. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE RESULTS OF UNPREPAREDNESS AND 
INEFFICIENCY 

(Admiral, Sims' Testimony: March, 1920) 
I 

THE country had waited impatiently for Admiral Sims' 
testimony before the Senate Committee. The publication of 
his letter in January had shattered the legend built up by 
Mr. Daniels. It had raised many questions concerning our 
naval intervention in the war, upon which more information 
was desired. The letter of January 7th had been widely 
commented ujaon in the press. The Secretary, immediately 
after its publication, had publicly condemned Admiral Sims' 
criticism and had declared that that officer would be required 
to furnish proofs of all his criticisms ; that a naval court 
of inquiry would investigate them, if the Senate committee 
failed to bring out full proofs. 

In the interval between January 17th, when the letter was 
read, and March 9th, when Admiral Sims began his testi- 
mony, Mr. Daniels had spared no effort to discredit the 
Admiral and his criticisms, and to divert the attack from 
himself to the naval officers who had served in the depart- 
ment or afloat during the war. 

In a statement of January 19, 1920, the Secretary said 
that Admiral Sims had not held an independent command 
abroad, but had been only a liaison officer to obtain infor- 
mation from the Allies ; and that he had been subordinate to 

Admiral Ma3'o. He claimed that Admiral Sims was ag- 

97 



98 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

grieved because he had not been given " carte blanche " dur- 
ing the war ; that many of Sims' recommendations were un- 
sound; and that the naval officers in the department, and 
Sims' superior, Admiral Mayo, had disagreed with him. 

Mr. Daniels, in his testimony in February, in the medal 
awards investigation, had made a violent attack upon Ad- 
miral Sims. In July, 1919, Mr. Daniels had recommended 
that Sims be made a permanent admiral for life and had 
written a letter giving him superlative praise. In February, 
1920, the Secretary told the Senate committee that he no 
longer believed Sims should be made a permanent admiral 
because he had violated confidences, because he had 
gratuitously attacked the Irish people and because he had 
been unduly pro-British during the war. Mr. Daniels had 
also published personal letters from Admiral Sims and confi- 
dential fitness reports on Admiral Wilson, and had sent them 
out by Navy Radio apparently with the hope of creating 
a rift in naval circles and of aligning many officers against 
Admiral Sims. He accused Sims of opposing and blocking 
the laying of the Northern Mine Barrage, hoping thus to 
utilize the public interest in that operation to Admiral Sims' 
disadvantage. He attempted to make it appear that Sims' 
criticisms had a political motive, and accused the Admiral of 
disloyalty, because he had failed to criticize his superiors 
until after the end of the war. He appealed to the public 
sentiment against official squabbles by declaring that Sims' 
criticisms would only lead to internal dissension in the Navy, 
as had been the case in the Sampson-Schley controversy, 
after the Spanish war. 

The Secretary sought especially to convey the impres- 
sion that Admiral Sims' criticisms were hasty and ill-consid- 
ered ; that they were inspired by temper and were not based 
on fact. 

The public, however, had suspended judgment until Ad- 
miral Sims should have an opportunity to disclose the evi- 



ADMIRAL SIMS' TESTIMONY 99 

dcnce on which his criticisms were based. They recognized 
the fact that an officer of his distinction would not have made 
criticisms of so grave a character without having ample 
evidence to prove his points. 



II 

Admiral Sims had asked the Committee for assistance 
from the chief officers who had served on his staff abroad, 
in presenting his testimony. In preparing his statement, 
he had therefore had the assistance of the officers who had 
been directly responsible for the various phases of our naval 
operations overseas or who had been most familiar with the 
history of the earl3' months of the war. These officers in- 
cluded Rear Admiral N. C. Twining, chief of staff of the 
Pacific Fleet and formerly Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, 
who had been Sims' chief of staff during the war; Captain 
H. I. Cone, commander of the naval aviation forces abroad 
and later Aide for Aviation on Sims' staff, who had been 
Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering from 1909-1913; 
Captain B, A. Long, who had been, as head of the Convoy 
Section of Sims' staff, in charge of all of our convoy opera- 
tions in the danger zone; Captain D. W. Knox, of the Plan- 
ning Section of the overseas forces who is one of the most 
scholarly strategists in the Navy; Commander J. V. Bab- 
cock, who had been Admiral Sims' Personal Aide and Chief 
Intelligence Officer during the war, and who had been his 
only assistant for the first four months ; Lieutenant Com- 
mander W. A. Edwards, Admiral Sims' personal aide at the 
Naval War College, who had been Aide for Aviation on his 
staff abroad; and Lieutenant T. B. Kittrcdge, U. S. N. R. R, 
who had been in the Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims' 
staff and in charge of all secret and confidential records of 
the London Headquarters. A number of other officers had 
also assisted. 



100 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

In his statement, therefore, Admiral Sims was presenting, 
not so much his own personal views, as a careful review of 
our war policy and naval operations, based throughout on 
documentary evidence and on the experience and judgment 
of many of the most capable younger officers of the Navy, 
whose position during the war had given them ample op- 
portunity to know what the facts were. 



Ill 

At no time did Admiral Sims enter into personalities or 
make any statement attacking personally either the Secre- 
tary of the Navy or any officer of the Navy. No one had 
given greater praise than he, in his articles published in the 
World's Work, to the officers and men of the Navy at home 
and abroad for their initiative, courage and achievements. 
In criticizing the department, for the unpreparedness of 
the Navy at the time war began, and for its delays in get- 
ting the Navy into the war. Admiral Sims pointed out that 
he was in no sense belittling the Navy or its achievements 
in the war. 

In his preliminary statement on March 9th, Admiral Sims 
took occasion to refer to the misrepresentations " aimed at 
prejudicing this case by wholly irrelevant subjects, prior to 
its investigation by this committee." He pointed out that 
the Secretary had been carrying on " a campaign of de- 
liberate propaganda " to divert attention from the issue. 

In order that his position might be made quite clear. Ad- 
miral Sims, in his preliminary statement, stated the motives 
that had actuated him in writing his letter of January 7, 
1920, inviting attention to the lessons of the war. He 
said: 

" Let me point out, in the simplest and clearest possible man- 
ner, the paramount motive upon which my letter was based. It 
is this. We entered a great war. The war was won^ thanks to 



ADMIRAL SIMS' TESTIMONY 101 

a combination of circumstances which it would be entirely unsafe 
and unwise to depend upon in the future. From a U. S. naval 
standpoint the prosecution of the war involved numerous viola- 
tions of well recognized and fundamental military principles with 
which every student of naval warfare is familiar. 

" Briefly stated, they were: 

" First. — Unpreparedness in spite of the fact that war had 
been a possibility for at least two years and was, in fact, immi- 
nent for many months before its declaration. 

Second. — That we entered it with no well considered policy or 
plans and witli our forces on the sea not in the highest state of 
readiness. 

Third. — That owing to the above conditions, and to the lack 
of proper organization of our Navy Department, and perhaps to 
other causes with which I am not familiar, we failed for at least 
six months to throw our full weight against the enemy ; that dur- 
ing this period we pursued a policy of vacillation, or in simpler 
words, a hand-to-mouth policy, attempting to formulate our plans 
from day to day, based upon an incorrect appreciation of the 
situation. 

" The Great War lasted 1500 days. 5,000,000 lives were lost. 
About 3,000 daily. This, to say nothing of wealth and resources. 
If my assertions of vacillating policy and unnecessary delays are 
true, I indeed had a compelling motive in taking steps to preclude 
their recurrence in the future. 

" I believed, therefore, in view of the unusual position which I 
held during the war as an integral part of our departmental or- 
ganization, that it was my duty to point out at least some reasons 
for the fundamental errors which were committed. 

" My sole object in submitting my letter to the Department 
was not to demonstrate who was right and who was wrong, but 
rather to insure so thorough an appreciation of our errors before 
time had obscured them that the chances of repeating them would 
be minimized, if not eliminated, in the future. 

" In other words, gentlemen, let me state as forcefully as I can 
tliat in this entire question I have no object other than that of the 
future eflSciency of the naval service and the safety of the 
country. I am at the end of my career, I have everything to lose 



102 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

and nothing to gain. There is no possible question of my having 
a grievance. There is absolutely no question of personalities. I 
have no further ambition whatever. When this inquiry is over I 
return to the simple duties of my profession to finish out the very 
short remaining time before my retirement. 

" Reference to my letter of January 7th. 1920, will indicate 
clearly that its object is first and last constructive. This object 
is impossible of accomplishment without a consideration of such 
mistakes as may have been committed. 

" The subject is one which vitally affects the future efficiency 
of what must always be our first line of national defence — the 
Navy — and the great danger is that because of our ultimate 
success in this war, we may fail to realize that we very narrowly 
escaped defeat on the sea; that our state of preparedness when 
we entered the war was dangerously inadequate; and that our 
administrative methods, especially during the early stages of our 
participation, were seriously at fault. Such defects, in a war in 
which the enemy is not already so seriously occupied at sea as he 
was in this war must inevitably jeopardize gravely our national 
security. 

" Under these circumstances, expressions of opinion concern- 
ing such matters were in no sense an attack, and it is most de- 
plorable that they have been made to appear so. They were, on 
the contrary, impersonal official representations submitted for the 
consideration of the Navy Department in preparation for future 
campaigns. They were actuated by motives of duty; they were 
constructive and I believe them to be entirely in accord with 
the teachings of accepted authorities on the art of war. Should 
this discussion unfortunately assume the character of personal 
recrimination or political controversy, the effect may well be so to 
obscure the issue that no lasting good will result. On the other 
hand, if these opinions are given careful consideration in connec- 
tion with the preparation of plans for future wai-s, by the officers 
detailed to these duties, as was intended and as would ordinarily 
have been done, very great benefit would accrue to the Navy. 

" It is nothing but self-evident camouflage to convey the im- 
pression in these modern days that such an issue as this one raised 
by me is an attack on civilian control of our naval service. A 



ADMIRAL SIMS' TESTIMONY 103 

civilian head of the military branches of a democratic govern- 
ment is essential. There is not the slightest danger of militarism 
in this country. The public rules. We in the Navy are servants 
of the public and aspire to nothing else. The Navy claims to be 
as representative a national organization as the Congress itself. 
It is for this very reason that I have had the temerity to risk my 
personal fortunes at the very end of my career and lay before 
the responsible heads of the Navy such radical criticisms of their 
own conduct of the public's interests. 

" In view of the public presentation of this case, which has 
resulted from no intent on my part, I am perhaps handicapped 
by lack of any connection with the press or experience in manip- 
ulating that important instrument of public opinion. 

" I can only present my case in the simple vocabulary of my 
profession, and trust to the sagacity of this committee to perceive 
the only essential issues at stake, namely a just appraisal of those 
questions which in any way endanger the public interest." 

IV 

Admiral Sims' testimony, the documents introduced by him 
and the reports of the Secretary of the Navy, clearly estab- 
lish his position and responsibilities during the war. In re- 
sponse to a request from Ambassador Page that a naval 
officer of high rank be sent to co-operate with the Allies, in 
view of the probability of the United States entering tlie 
war, Admiral Sims was ordered abroad, on six hours' notice, 
at the end of March, 1917. He was given no instructions 
other than the general statement that he was to co-operate 
with the Allies and obtain such information about war con- 
ditions as might be valuable to the Navy Department. Be- 
fore his departure Admiral Sims received no formal or in- 
formal statement, from any official of the Navy Depart- 
ment, of the policy that would govern the United States 
Navy in the event of a declaration of war against Germany. 
He was not informed as to whether any forces would be 
sent abroad nor as to whether he should command them if 



104 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

they were sent. He was provided with no explicit instruc- 
tions of any character. 

On arriving in England, Admiral Sims had immediately 
proceeded to inform himself of the conditions existing, and 
to send back full and complete reports of the military and 
naval situation. He made recommendations, agreed upon 
after conference with the Allied authorities, as to the measure 
of co-operation to be afforded by the United States Navy. 
In the absence of any definite instructions, policy or plans 
from the Navy Department, he felt it his duty to make such 
recommendations as the situation demanded and to urge 
upon the Department the adoption of a definite policy and 
of an active plan of operations. This he did from the time 
of his first arrival in England, as the scores of telegrams 
he quoted in his testimony show. 

At no time during the war did he receive any definite in- 
structions or delegation of authority from the Navy De- 
partment, such as were given to General Pershing by the 
War Department when the latter went abroad to command 
the American Expeditionary Forces. On April 28th, 1917, 
Admiral Sims was appointed by the Department to com- 
mand the " United States Destroyer Forces operating from 
British bases." Orders issued by the Department to Cap- 
tain W. B, Fletcher on June 1st, 1917, directed him to re- 
port to Admiral Sims, who would be " in general command 
of all forces in European waters." On June 14th, 1917, 
the title of Admiral Sims' position was changed to " Com- 
mander, United States Naval Forces Operating in European 
Waters." In October, 1917, he was given authority by 
the Department to make such disposition and regrouping of 
lorces in European waters as was necessary, such changes 
to be based on agreement with the Allies. 

From the time of his arrival abroad. Admiral Sims had 
been acting, in accordance with his verbal orders, as the 
representative of the Navy Department. In this capacity, 



ADMIRAL SIMS' TESTIMONY 105 

he had attended Allied conferences ; in Paris, May 2nd to 
5th, 1917; in London, May 28th to 30th, 1917; in Paris, 
July 25th to 28th, 1917; and in London, September 3rd to 
7th, 1917. The cables exchanged with the Navy Depart- 
ment during this period show that that Department con- 
sidered him their fully qualified representative with the Allied 
navies. This position was confirmed, after the formal or- 
ganization of the x\llied Naval Council, by his receipt of 
telcgrapliic orders from the Department to act as the Ameri- 
can member of this Council, representing the Secretary of 
the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. 

An examination of the documents submitted in evidence 
also shows that from the beginning the Department looked 
upon Admiral Sims as the Commander of all forces in Euro- 
pean Avaters, regardless of their geographical location or 
of the nature of their operations. The vessels under his 
command were, for the most part, drawn from the Atlantic 
Fleet. Admiral Sims had, therefore, received orders in July, 
1917, assigning his forces to duty with the Atlantic Fleet, 
but these orders provided that the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Atlantic Fleet would assume the actual command over 
tliese forces only in the event of a possible combined opera- 
tion in which the major forces of the fleet would take a part. 
Such a situation never arose. Throughout the w^ar Admiral 
Sims, in accordance with instructions from the Department, 
reported only to the Department and corresponded directly 
with the Department. At no time did he receive any definite 
order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. 
He was responsible, and subordinate, so far as opera- 
tions in Europe were concerned, only to the Navy Depart- 
ment. 

It is therefore clear that from the beginning the major 
mission assigned Admiral Sims was that of acting as the Navy 
Department's representative in the Naval Council of the 
Allies, and that, in addition to this mission, he was also as- 



106 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

signed the command of all United States naval forces, afloat 
and ashore, operating in European waters. 



Admiral Sims, in his testimony, gave a very graphic de- 
scription of the difficulties he had had in the early part of the 
war in getting information from the Navy Department. 
Among other things he said: 

" I will now turn to the subject discussed in paragraphs 60 to 
66 of my letter of January 7th, 1920. In these paragraphs it 
was pointed out that I was left in ignorance of many of the 
departmental plans, of many of the important dispositions and 
movements of forces into the area of my command (as well as 
elsewhere), and of delays and confusion which were caused by 
the department failing to use me for the purpose for which they 
had sent me abroad, and attempting to carry on independent sim- 
ilar negotiations with local representatives of the European 
navies in Washington; also the embarrassment which these con- 
ditions caused me, through the impression naturally created in the 
minds of allied naval authorities that I was not being supported, 
and was not in the confidence of the department. 

" It might be pointed out that the different allied navy depart- 
ments were in a measure responsible for these difficulties, because 
they continued at times to use these independent methods of 
negotiations, that is, through their local representatives in Wash- 
ington. Undoubtedly, at times, such independent negotiations 
resulted in direct conflict with my recommendations. It must be 
remembered that my recommendations did not forward merely the 
exact propositions of the allied admiralties, but they embodied 
as well my conclusions as the representative of the department- 
following discussions with the allied leaders. My first loyalty 
was always to the cause as a whole, but, second, was my direct 
loyalty to my own department at home. My mission was not 
merely to transmit the propositions of the allied leaders. It was 
up to me to act, in every sense of the word, as the representative 
of the Navy Department, and, after having the essential benefit of 



ADMIRAL SIMS' TESTIMONY 107 

conferences with the Allied leaders, to give the department the 
results thereof, together with my own recommendations based on 
all available information and upon the policies of my own service. 
It will be found throughout my despatches that, wherever I was 
giving verbatim recommendations of allied leaders, it was so 
stated. 

" One of the great difficulties of this war, as of all other allied 
wars, was found to be that of securing effective co-operation 
among the forces of the Allies — the difficulty of getting team 
work out of a team made up of different nations — the difficulty 
of different nations subordinating many of their own national 
interests to a common end. 

" As a matter of fact, in the particular case here under discus- 
sion, the Allies carried on negotiations with our Navy Depart- 
ment, through their Washington representatives, partly because 
they found me in ignorance of plans and intentions, concerning 
which their Washington representatives had already informed 
them. They also found that the department was apparently 
ready to deal with these local representatives. 

" It is little wonder that much confusion was created in the 
department through numerous requests and recommendations 
coming in from the different Allies. The grave danger of such 
procedure was that Allied team work would be weakened and 
American interests suffer. 

" I want to stress here, however, that because other navy de- 
partments made errors is no reason whatever for our having done 
the same. This is one of the principal objects I had in view in 
submitting my letter to the department — to invite attention to 
such mistakes in order that they might be avoided in the future. 

" It seems to me that no explanation is required to demonstrate 
the soundness of the proposition that, from our standpoint at 
least, all of this confusion and delay and misunderstanding could 
have been avoided by the simple process of referring all of the 
requests and recommendations, which came from various 
European sources, to the department's own representative abroad. 
He was in a position to bring the matter before the responsible 
Allied naval leaders (and, after the formation of the Allied Naval 
Council, before that body) for a full discussion in all its phases, 



108 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

in the light of the fullest and latest information, and to cable the 
result to the Navy Department for its guidance. This procedure 
insured, so far as was humanly possible, that due consideration 
would be given to the cause of the Allies as a whole, rather than 
to the often conflicting interests of the individual countries con- 
cerned. 

" It was natural, for the Italian Navy Department and the 
French Navy Department, and the British Admiralty, to continue 
to communicate with their attaches in Washington, as they had 
done during the previous three years of the war. In fact, a great 
many such communications were automatic and were made without 
the direct knowledge of the leaders themselves, although actually 
made in their names. For instance, one section of the British 
Admiralty, wanting something in America, would drive through a 
message to the naval attache in Washington in the name of the 
head of the British Admiralty, not taking into account, of course, 
the fact that similar requests might be sent in at the same time 
from the French and Italians." 

VI 

Admiral Sims repeatedly called attention to the fact that 
the Navy was not prepared for war when war began. An 
examination of his testimony shows that this unprepared- 
ness was levealed in many different ways. First, the Navy 
Department either had no well-defined policy at the out- 
break of war, or failed to inform its representative abroad 
of it for at least three months after war began. Second, 
the Department had no war plans adequate to meet the 
situation presented by the submarine campaign, which was 
the critical feature of the war at the time of the entry of 
the United States. Third, the vessels of the Navy were 
not in a condition of material readiness for war when war 
began. Fourth, the shortage of personnel was so great that 
large numbers of untrained men were sent abroad, and the 
sending of forces was greatly delayed. Fifth, the Navy 
Department displayed an astonishing moral unpreparedness 



ADMIRAL SIMS' TESTIMONY 109 

for war, in its attitude toward the Allies and toward the 
recommendations of its representative abroad, at least during 
the first six months of tlie war. 

No indication of our naval policy was given Admiral 
Sims until June 24th. He was then informed, by cable, that 
the Navy Department was ready to co-operate with the 
Allies in putting down the submarine campaign, by sending 
anti-submarine craft in any number " compatible with home 
needs ",• and that the Navy Department was prepared to 
consider requests from the Allies for other forces, provided 
the reason for these requests could be made clear to the 
Navy Department. This statement of policy was enlarged 
upon in a cable received in London on July 10th, 1917, 
quoting a letter transmitted on July 3, 1917, by the Secre- 
tary of the Navy to the Secretary of State. In this mes- 
sage, the co-operation of the United States with the Allies 
was qualified, first, by the requirements of home defence, 
on a coast 3,000 miles from the war zone which was not 
exposed to any attack except, perhaps, from sporadic and 
unimportant submarine raids ; and, secondly, by a con- 
sideration of tlie future needs of the United States, after 
the war. Such a policy was obviously completely inadequate 
to meet the situation created in 1917 by the success of the 
enemy submarine campaign in the war zone and by the 
possibility of a German victory over the Allies before the 
latent power of the United States could be made effec- 
tive. 

The documents submitted by Admiral Sims in his testi- 
mony show that he received from the Department no war 
plans nor no intimation as to possible operations. If such 
plans existed, it seems very strange that the representative, 
sent to co-operate with the Allies and to command the forces 
in European waters, should have been kept in complete 
ignorance of them. The Department's delays in acting upon 
recommendations and their apparent failure to understand 



110 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the critical nature of the submarine campaign, convinced 
Admiral Sims that no sound plan existed in Washington. 

Of the vessels sent to participate in the campaign against 
submarines, during the first twelve months of America's 
intervention in the war, the great majority were in exist- 
ence on April 6th, 1917, and could have been sent immediately 
if they had been ready for war, and if the Department had 
so decided. Many of these vessels had to undergo long re- 
pair periods before sailing for Europe. The sending of 
forces was greatly delayed, by the necessity of getting them 
into fit condition for war service, after war began. 

Similarly, an examination of the cables from the Navy 
Department to Admiral Sims in 1917, reveals a shortage of 
personnel, at the time of our entrance into the war, which 
greatly delayed the intervention of our forces and seriously 
decreased their operating efficiency. 



VII 

The documents introduced by Admiral Sims show that 
the moral unreadiness for war had even more serious con- 
sequences. The lack of any pronounced will to victory 
on the part of the directing heads of the Navy Department, 
their avowed prejudices against certain of the Allies, re- 
sulted in their failing to make eflfective use even of the forces 
that were available and ready in April, 1917. The failure 
of the Navy Department to act upon recommendations made 
to them, based upon full agreement with the Allies, during 
the first six months of the war; the holding back of forces 
on the American coast ; the hesitation and delay in adopt- 
ing the convoy system ; and the insistence on various plans 
designed to protect American shipping alone, regardless of 
what might happen to the Allies ; furaish abundant proof 
of Admiral Sims' charge that the Department did not enter 
whole-heartedly into the war for at least the first six months. 



ADMIRAL SIMS' TESTIMONY 111 

Far from being an exaggeration, this was rather a mild 
statement of the moral unpreparedncss of the responsible 
heads of the Navy Department. The degree to which the 
Navy Department was actuated by considerations other than 
that of defeating the common enemy as quickly as possible, 
and the unifonn policy of postponing action on recommen- 
dation shows clearly, either that victory over Germany was 
not considered the prime mission of the Navy in the war, 
or that the heads of the Navy Department paid no atten- 
tion to the information received from abroad and based 
their plans and operations on an ignorance of the w^ar 
situation, as complete as it is inexcusable. 

The evidence introduced demonstrates beyond a possibility 
of a doubt that the submarine campaign had created in 
April, 1917, a situation which, in the words of Ambassador 
Page in his cable to the State Department of April 27th, 
1917, gave reason for the " greatest alarm " about the issue 
of the war. 

" This seems to me the sharpest crisis of the war and the most 
dangerous situation for the Allies that has arisen or could arise. 
. . . I cannot exaggerate the pressing and increasing danger of 
the situation. . . . There is no time to be lost." 

This situation was fully described by Admiral Sims in 
more than a score of cables sent to the Department in April 
and May, 1917. Though the language used was often ex- 
tremely emphatic, a review of the situation shows that it 
was in no degree exaggerated. 

Mr. Hoover, on returning to America at the end of April, 
1917, submitted a full report to the President and the Coun- 
cil of National Defence, describing the situation. In his 
testimony before the Conimittee on March 13th, 1920, Mr. 
Hoover stated that in April, 1917 : 

" The situation was dangerous almost beyond description and 
the anxiety in the whole of that period was terrific. I cannot 



112 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

overemphasize the critical cliaracter of that position and the 
dangers in which the whole Allied cause rested." 

The Department's ignorance of the situation, if such 
existed, cannot be explained by any lack of information from 
their accredited representative abroad and from the most 
responsible sources of information available to them at that 
time. 

VIII 

Admiral Sims In speaking of his relations with the Navy 
Department in the early months of the war, said: 

" The first part of the testimony is intended to explain the seri- 
ousness of the military situation at the time that this country de- 
clared war; to clearly show that the situation was not only criti- 
cal, but that the Allies were at that time in fact losing the war; 
that the Navy Department was furnished with complete informa- 
tion concerning this critical situation; and that I put forth every 
possible effort to acquaint them with all the facts concerning the 
situation; that, in accordance with the mission assigned to me, 
and based upon constant conference with the heads of the Allied 
naval services, I set forth the specific nature of the part which we 
should have at once taken; that I was wholly unable to get satis- 
factory replies from the department and, further, that if the 
department appreciated and understood the situation, they failed 
to take action commensurate therewith. 

" I wish here to state, that there is no issue whatever as to 
whether the information I sent and the recommendations I made 
were accurate or exaggerated, no issue as to whether I was right 
and every one else in the Navy at home wrong, as will be shown 
later in the testimony. It will be clearly established that by 
the end, say, of six months, the department accepted and adopted 
the policies and recommendations that I had made from the very 
beginning, and hence that there is no disagreement whatever 
between me and other naval officials as to the U. S. naval 
policy in the war, providing the time element is not considered, 
that is, providing we disregard the first 4 to 6 critical months 



ADMIRAL SIMS' TESTIMONY 113 

of war, the occurrences during which are, almost exclusively, the 
issues I Lave seen fit to raise." 



IX 

Admiral Sims, in the early part of his testimony, made 
an estimate of the probable results of the delays of the Navy 
Department in getting our naval forces into the war. This, 
of course, was not intended to be anything more than an 
approximation to show the cost of delays in warfare. 

" I am submitting to the committee an estimate, based upon 
the data available, of the losses caused the Allies and the United 
States by the delays in getting American naval forces into action 
against the enemy submarines. 

" The figures which I have before me show clearly that in 
April, 1917, the Allied cause seemed doomed on account of the 
losses of tonnage. In the first four months of the year there 
had been a net loss of over two million tons, or 7 per cent, of 
the total Allied and neutral shipping; and the rate of losses had 
been increasing every month. In the month of April alone the 
net loss amounted to eight hundred thousand tons, or twice as 
much as in the whole period of the war before January 1, 1917. 
It was apparent that these losses, if continued, would soon re- 
duce the tonnage to such an extent that military requirements, 
and requirements of the populations of the Allied countries, could 
not longer be maintained. The imports had already been reduced 
by 40 per cent, from the pre-war figures. They could not be 
reduced further without starving the armies or the civil popula- 
tions of the Allied countries. Any further reduction at the rate 
then existing would have made it impossible to have transported 
an American army or to maintain it when once abroad. 

" With the adoption of the convoy system and the anti- 
submarine measures put into effect by the Allies with our assist- 
ance in 1917, the losses were gradually reduced until in October, 
1918. they amounted to only 100,000 tons. The period between 
the beginning of the German unrestricted submarine campaign 
and the armistice can be divided into three phases so far as losses 
of merchant tonnage are concerned : 



114< NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

"First. — The period from February 1, 1917, to the end of 
July, 1917, when American aid was lacking and when shipping 
was not being convoyed. Average losses 640,000 tons. 

" Second.— The period of August 1, 1917, to February 1, 1918, 
when there was a partial employment of the convoy system and 
moderate assistance from America. Losses 390,000 tons per 
month. 

" Third. — The period from February 1, 1918, to the armistice, 
when full co-operation was given by America, and consequently 
full use could be made of the convoy system. Losses 250,000 
tons per month. 

" As will be noted, each of these successive phases of the un- 
restricted submarine campaign is marked by the degree of naval 
co-operation received from America. An analysis of the situa- 
tion, therefore, shows that if the United States Navy had been 
prepared for war when war began, and if the wholehearted policy 
of co-operation with the Allies had been followed from the begin- 
ning, the first period mentioned above would probably have come 
to an end within a month after we entered the war, that is, by 
May 1. 1917. The second period would probably have ended by 
August 1, as by that time the full weight of our co-operation 
would probably have been felt. An estimate of the amount of 
tonnage that would have been saved, shows, therefore, that, if the 
first period had ended May 1, and the second period on August 1, 
1917, a million and a half tons of shipping would have been saved 
to the Allies in 1917. Similarly, at least another million tons 
would have been saved in 1918. 

" It can thus be said that the failure of the Navy Department 
to enter the war immediately and whole-heartedly cost the Allied 
cause a whole two and one-half million tons of shipping sunk 
unnecessarily. While this is of course an estimate only, it is 
based upon actual results obtained when our help became effec- 
tive, and there is no reason to doubt that it is a conservative esti- 
mate. 

" The loss of this amount of shipping can also be translated 
into a definite prolongation of the war and an unnecessary sacri- 
fice of blood and treasure in accomplishing the victory. As Gen- 
eral Pershing clearly shows in his report to the Secretary of 



ADMIRAL SIMS' TESTIMONY 115 

War, the primary consideration, limiting the number of American 
troops that could be sent to P'rance, was that of tonnage. The 
tonnage losses of 1917 made it impossible at the time to transport 
any considerable American army and, at the same time, continue 
the absolutely essential military supplies and food for the civil 
populations of the Allied countries. It therefore became neces- 
sary to limit the number of American troops that could be sent 
abroad during the first year to an average of approximately 
25,000 men per month. If the additional million and a half tons 
sunk unnecessarily in 1917 had been saved by the prompt co- 
operation of our Navy, the number of American soldiers sent to 
France could have been doubled or trebled. If the tonnage had 
been available and the additional American troops had been sent 
to France, and the new drafts called more promptly in this coun- 
try, America could have had a million men in France by March, 
1918, instead of 300,000. 

" A review of the various books by military experts and of the 
available information concerning the German campaign of 1918, 
shows that the earlier defeat of the submarine campaign would 
have had the effect of very greatly shortening the war. The 
Germans had hoped, and continued to hope until the beginning 
of 1918, that the submarines would force the Allies to peace. 
The offensive of 1918 on land was only projected and undertaken 
when the German staff realized that the submarine could not 
bring them victory. If, therefore, the tonnage losses had been so 
reduced by August, 1917, that the defeat of the submarine cam- 
paign could have been accomplished, it would, without a doubt, 
have reacted upon the morale of the German population at that 
time as it did actually in 1918. The German high command 
would then have been forced into its desperate military venture 
earlier than March, 1918, when the offensive was actually 
launched against the Allies, or would have been forced to endure 
the victorious assault of the Allies in the early spring of 1918, 
which, as a result of the losses suffered in the first months of the 
German offensive, and because of the delay in getting American 
troops in sufficient number, actually did not begin until the middle 
of July, 1918. In either of these cases, the presence of a million 
Americans in France on March 1, and the arrival of another mil- 



116 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

lion within another three months^ would undoubtedly have brought 
a victory by July, if one may judge from what actually happened 
when these American forces did become available and thus tip the 
military scale in favor of the Allies. 

" The loss unnecessarily of the two and a half million tons of 
shipping, therefore, in all probability, postponed the end of the 
war at least four months. The average loss of life per day 
during the war, was 3,000 men. This prolongation of the war, 
therefore, cost half a million lives. Similarly, as the war cost 
the Allies $100,000,000 a day on the average, this prolongation 
resulted in the unnecessary expenditure of $15,000,000,000, of 
which at least one-third was expended by the United States 
directly or loaned to the Allies. 

" I have made this estimate not because I assume or pretend 
that it is complete, but in order to present to you some concep- 
tion of what such a policy as that of the Navy Department's in the 
first six months of the war. and of such delays and military errors 
as those committed by the department in this same time, cost the 
nation and the Allies. I merely wish to call your attention, as 
vividly as possible, to the fact that the questions under discussion 
are not purely academic, but have the vastest consequences that 
must inevitably be suffered unnecessarily if such mistakes are 
committed in time of war. It is no light matter which cost the 
cause for which we were fighting half a million lives, fifteen bil- 
lions of dollars, and two and a half million tons of shipping." 



CHAPTER VIII 
THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 



DURING the first three months of Admiral Sims' mission 
abroad, his recommendations were not only almost uniformly 
disregarded or disapproved but, at the time, they were not 
even answered. From about the first of July, 1917, the 
messages from the Department indicated that they were at 
least considering Admiral Sims' recommendations, action in 
many cases was accelerated and it was sometimes favourable. 
It was not until after Admiral Mayo had gone abroad in 
August, 1917, and reinforced Admiral Sims' pleas by his 
own insistent recommendations ; and after Admiral Benson 
had gone in November, 1917, and seen for himself the condi- 
tions existing; that the policy outlined by Admiral Sims 
from the time of his first message on April 14th, 1917, and 
the measures long recommended bj^ him were adopted by the 
Navy Department and carried out to the limit and extent, 
which the material and personnel resources of the Navy per- 
mitted. 

A few of the typical cases cited by Admiral Sims fully 
illustrate this situation. In his first message of April 14th, 
1917, and in all his later messages. Admiral Sims pointed 
out that the German submarines, through their sinkings of 
merchant tonnage, were rapidly cutting the Allied lines of 
communication on all fronts. If the tonnage losses con- 
tinued, the length of the war was a matter of arithmetical 
calculation ; the Allies would have been forced to sue for 
peace because of the insufficiency of tonnage to import the 
necessarv supplies for their armies and the food for their 

117 



118 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

populations. All help from the United States which might 
later become available, would be vain unless the Navy, by 
throwing immediately the maximum number of anti-sub- 
marine craft into the war zone, could succeed, in co-operation 
with the Allies, in defeating the submarine campaign. These 
recommendations apparently had but little effect upon the 
Navy Department. It was nearly a month after war began 
before the Navy Department even formulated a plan for 
sending abroad more than one division of destroyers. After 
Ambassador Page's message of April 27, 1917, the Depart- 
ment, in a cable to Admiral Sims of May 3rd, stated that 
ultimately thirty-six destroyers would be sent, but it was not 
stated when they would be sent nor whether any other anti- 
submarine craft would be available. 

In his cable of April 14th, 1917, and in dozens of other 
messages sent in April, May, June and July, 1917, Admiral 
Sims pointed out that any light craft would be of value 
in combating submarines, and urged that the maximum 
number of such craft be sent, stating that the Navy De- 
partment could not send " too soon or too many." 

In May, 1917, the Department, at the request of the 
French Ministry of Marine, decided to send a few yachts 
to the French coast. In June, Admiral Sims was informed 
that a few fishing vessels would be sent in August to the 
French coast, but during April, May and June Admiral 
Sims received no reply to his repeated requests for such 
light forces as tugs, submarines, revenue cutters, gunboats, 
yachts, and light cruisers. 

An examination of the records shows that on July 1st, 
1917, three months after war began, there were actually 
on duty in anti-submarine work in the war zone only twenty- 
eight United States destroyers and no other light craft of any 
sort, although the Navy then had over 100 suitable vessels. 
After Admiral Mayo's visit abroad, and still more after 
Admiral Benson's visit with the House Mission, the Navy 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 119 

Department appears to have realized the importance of send- 
ing anti-submarine craft, and to have decided (six months 
after the war began) upon the policy of sending all avail- 
able light craft to the war zone and of accelerating the con- 
struction of additional anti-submarine craft. There had 
been a delay of at least six months in accepting recom- 
mendations whose soundness should have been apparent from 
the first. 

Although the Department had been, since April, 1917, 
fully informed of the fact that destroyers were the greatest 
enemy of the submarine and the most effective protection to 
shipping, it was not until six months later, in October, 1917, 
that the Department obtained from Congress the funds for 
additional destroyers. Yet war had been imminent for some 
months before April, 1917, and Congress and the country 
had displayed the greatest willingness to provide such funds 
as the emergency required. 



II 

A review of the measures taken against the German sub- 
marines in the war shows that the most effective means used 
of saving shipping and of defeating the submarine campaign 
were the increase of anti-submarine craft in the war zone 
and the adoption of the convoy system. Admiral Sims 
showed by the evidence of official records that the Navy 
Department delayed the adoption of the convoy system, 
in the early and critical months of the war, in exactly the 
same way and apparently with as little justification as in the 
case of the delay in sending anti-submarine craft. The 
Allies had had the convoy system under consideration before 
the United States entered the war. Apart from the objec- 
tion of the ship owners and ship captains, the chief reason 
the Allies had not adopted it was the lack of the necessary 
anti-submarine craft for escorting the convoys in the war 



120 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

zone. Admiral Sims repeatedly pointed out to the Depart- 
ment in May and June, 1917, that the adoption of the convoy 
system would mean the defeat of the submarine, as it would 
protect shipping and compel the submarines to attack anti- 
submarine craft in order to carry out their mission of de- 
stroying commerce. He explained also that the adoption 
of the convoy system depended upon the supplying of 
cruisers for ocean escort by the United States and upon 
the furnishing of additional destroyers and other light craft 
for escort in the submarine zone. This was fully estab- 
lished by a letter from Admiral Jellicoe to Admiral Sims 
of July 11th, 1917, quoted by Admiral Sims in his testimony. 

On May 1st, 1917, Admiral Sims informed the Department 
that the Allies were prepared to adopt the convoy system, 
but that help would be needed from the United States to the 
extent of fourteen cruisers for ocean convoy work and addi- 
tional light forces for escort in the submarine zone. At 
about the same period the British Admiralty submitted, 
through their Attache in Washington, the complete plans 
for the convoy system. On jMay 25th Admiral Sims in- 
formed the Department of the successful arrival of the first 
convoys. No answer was received to his repeated and ex- 
tremely urgent cables recommending the adoption of the 
convoy system until June 20th, and this answer was only a 
casual reference in a cable from the Department, the con- 
cluding sentence of which read : " With regard to convoy I 
consider that American vessels having armed guards are 
safer when sailing independently." 

On July 5th, the Department indicated their willingness 
to assign seven cruisers (instead of the fourteen requested) 
for the protection of convoys, but still resisted the adoption 
of the convoy system and proposed various alternatives, 
designed to protect American shipping alone, rather than 
the indispensable lines of communications upon which de- 
pended the victory of the Allied cause as a whole. Admiral 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 121 

Sims* cables at the end of June and the beginning of July 
pointed this out in the strongest possible terms. 

Even as late as August 10th, a departmental cable to 
Admiral Sims indicated that they had not yet adopted the 
convoy system full}', but had restricted their efforts to " ad- 
vising " American ships to sail in convoy. The convoys from 
America were not inaugurated definitely until September, 
four months after the Department's co-operation had been 
first recommended. The attitude of the Department resulted 
in a minimum delay of at least three months in the estab- 
lishment of the convoy system in the Atlantic. 

The importance of the convoy system in saving tonnage 
was emphasized by Admiral Sims in his testimony. 

" Before leaving the question of this convoy system, I wish to 
clear up a misunderstanding which seems to have gotten abroad, 
to the effect that I was more concerned with the safety of foreign 
shipping than I was for that of our own. What I was after was 
winning the war; and, as I have clearly shown above, during the 
period under discussion^ this question was wholly bound up in 
the saving of shipping. It was not American shipping, or British 
sliipping, or French and Italian shipping, but it was ALLIED 
SHIPPING. It was the vital shipping of the team which was 
lined up against the enemy. 

" As a matter of fact, United States shipping was a very small 
proportion of the whole in those critical days. For example, in 
July, 1917, there were a maximum of about 160 arrivals and 
departures per month, in the war zone, of American owned ships. 
Consider this number against over 3,000 arrivals and departures 
of British vessels alone. Even such a comparison does not 
include the large number of British and French vessels which 
were necessarily moving in the war zone, practically all of their 
time, while our vessels were on the high seas a good share of their 
time, well clear of the submarine zone. The traffic up and down 
the French coast, carrying many supplies upon which the French 
armies were absolutely dependent, was never out of the war zone 
at all. I think it would be a safe estimate that, during those 



122 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

critical months, not more than five per cent, of the arrivals and 
departures in the war zone were American ships. 

" I have before me figures showing that as late as fifteen 
months after we entered the war, American shipping was less 
than twelve per cent, of the total making up the Allied lines of 
communication. 

" It is very difficult for me now to convey to you the atmosphere 
which existed at that time, and the real state of desperation in 
which I found myself almost daily, during those early months of 
the war. It should be noted that the cause of this was not a 
single matter, such as the failure to act upon my convoy recom- 
mendations, but that in a dozen different matters, at the same 
time, I was faced with the same situation, always hoping from 
day to day that the Department would finally realize the situa- 
tion, and either accept the recommendations, or send over some- 
body in whose judgment they could trust. And I again wish to 
reiterate that there is no question as to whether these recom- 
mendations were right. THE FACT REMAINS THAT 
THEY WERE VIRTUALLY ALL ADOPTED IN THE END. 

" I could read you, for the next week, copies of letters and 
cables sent by me in regard to the inauguration and control of the 
convoy system, but that would hardly contribute further to an 
understanding of this matter. I think that enough has been said 
to show that what I wrote in my letter of January 7th, 1920, 
was a very mild statement of the serious embarrassments and de- 
lays in putting into effect the convoy system, which was the most 
important of all the measures used in defeating the submarine 
campaign against Allied shipping." 

Ill 

Delays, caused by the Department's failure to act 
promptly, occurred not only in the case of sending of anti- 
submarine craft to Europe and in the establishment of the 
convoy system, but also in putting into effect a policy of 
thorough and hearty co-operation with the Allies ; in send- 
ing specific reinforcements requested by the Allies ; in estab- 
lishing abroad an advance headquarters of the Navy 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 123 

Department to represent the Department adequately with 
the Allies, to gain all information available concerning war 
experience for the benefit of the Department, and to make 
possible a more effective use of the naval forces in the war 
zone ; and in sending a sufficient number of trained officers 
to assist Admiral Sims in order to permit him to carry out 
eff'ectively the mission assigned him. 

The messages submitted in evidence by Admiral Sims, that 
were exchanged with the Department from April to October, 
1917, show clearly that at that time the Department was 
not co-operating whole-heartedly with the Allies. They 
were being informed almost daily by their representative 
abroad that a very much greater degree of assistance from 
the United States was necessary if the German submarine 
campaign were to be checked. Instead of accepting these 
recommendations, the Department was eagerly grasping at 
any suggestions or requests, made by local Allied authorities 
in Washington, which seemed to demand a lesser measure of 
co-operation. 

Even after the return of Admiral Mayo to the United 
States in October, 1917, a policy of full co-operation was 
not put into eff"ect. It was necessary for Admiral Benson 
to go abroad himself and to confirm with his own eyes and 
ears the recommendations of Admirals Sims and Mayo before 
the Department could be convinced of the necessity of a full 
and hearty co-operation with the Allies. It was only after 
Admiral Benson had himself discussed the naval situation 
with the Allies' leaders that many measures which had been 
recommended for months by Admiral Sims were finally agreed 
to and put into effect by the Navy Department. 



IV 

The Allies had suggested to Admiral Sims in April, 1917, 
that some of the American dreadnaughts be sent abroad in 



124< NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

order to obviate and counter any attacks by German heavy 
forces in the Channel. The Department never even replied 
to this recommendation. 

After a conference with Admiral Beatty and Admiral 
Jellicoe in July, Admiral Sims on July 21st recommended 
that a reinforcement of dreadnaughts be sent by the United 
States to join the Grand Fleet, as conditions in the British 
Navy made it necessary to put out of commission certain of 
their older ships and replace them by a division of dread- 
naughts from the Grand Fleet. Admiral Sims' cable was 
not even answered. A month later, on repeating his recom- 
mendation, the Department disapproved it. Admiral Mayo, 
in his report of October, 1917, recommended that these 
dreadnaughts be sent to the Grand Fleet, but still the recom- 
mendation was disapproved. When Admiral Benson went 
abroad in November, it took him but a few hours in confer- 
ence with the British admirals to convince himself of the 
need of this reinforcement. He immediately recommended 
it and the recommendation was approved by the Depart- 
ment without question. 

Similarly, the Allies had pointed out to Admiral Sims 
in April the great service that tugs would render in towing 
sailing ships through the war zone and in taking into port 
ships that had been torpedoed and damaged. Admiral Sims, 
therefore, asked for tugs in a series of messages, pointing 
out that these tugs would save a great deal of merchant 
shipping and would release anti-submarine craft for other 
more important duties, such as escorting convoys. No an- 
swer was made to Admiral Sims' recommendations until 
August. In August the Navy Department announced that 
twelve tugs would be sent, but in December none of these 
tugs had yet been sent, nor had any information regarding 
them been received in London. In reply to renewed requests 
from Admiral Sims for tugs, the Department in December 
finally took up with the Shipping Board the question of 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 125 

having additional tugs built. It was not until February, 
1918, that the first two tugs finally arrived in European 
waters. Up to the time of the armistice only twelve had 
arrived. 

Admiral Sims had pointed out in his first letter report of 
April 19, 1917, the value of submarines in anti-submarine 
work. In June he had specifically recommended the sending 
of submarines to the Irish coast and in July, to the Azores. 
No action was taken by the Department, or at least Admiral 
Sims was informed of none. In August, Admiral Mayo, 
while abroad, cabled to the Department endorsing Admiral 
Sims' recommendation and in reply to his message the De- 
partment finally agreed, in September, to send submarines. 
The first of these vessels did not arrive at the Azores until 
the end of October, and it was not until January that the 
division assigned to the Irish coast arrived at Berehaven. 

Many other similar cases were referred to in Admiral 
Sims' testimony, fully substantiating the charge in his letter 
of January 7th that the Department delayed sending rein- 
forcements to the Allies for months during the most critical 
period of the war. 



The failure to co-operate heartily with the Allies and the 
delay in getting into action during the first months of the 
war are also strikingly illustrated by the Department's 
failure to send officers to assist Admiral Sims. Inasmuch as 
Washington lay 3,000 miles distant from the submarine 
zone, as the nature of the submarine war had not been fore- 
seen and was not fully understood in Washington, and as 
tlie developments from day to day could not possibly be 
followed fully from Washington, it should have seemed obvi- 
ous to the Department that the only means of effectively co- 
operating with the Allies was to establish abroad an advance 
headquarters which would be in daily personal contact with 



126 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the heads of the various Allied navies, which should make a 
full study of the situation from day to day, and should 
forward recommendations based upon this information to 
Washington. 

From the time of his arrival in England, Admiral Sims 
urged this measure on the Department. For four months 
the Department left his recommendations either altogether 
without answer or with an abrupt disapproval. Cable after 
cable requesting officers were ignored or disapproved. 
Every effort that Admiral Sims made to obtain help was 
checked by the Department. For four months the whole 
burden of studying the three years of Allied war experience, 
of providing for the general co-operation of the United 
States naval forces with those of the Allies, and of making 
a study of the strategical situation, upon which recommenda- 
tions could be based, fell upon Admiral Sims and his one 
aide, Commander Babcock. In July an experienced chief of 
staff was sent him and several other younger officers, not of 
the type nor of the experience required by the task. It 
was not until after Admiral Benson had himself seen the 
situation that the Department finally approved the sending 
of an adequate number of experienced officers to make pos- 
sible the establishment of a real advance headquarters of the 
Navy in Europe. There was thus a delay of eight months 
in sending abroad the officers absolutely indispensable to the 
work there. 

VI 

The results of the failure to follow sound military prin- 
ciples and to profit by the experience and advice of the Allies 
are clearly shown in the mistakes made by the Department 
in attempting to formulate detailed plans and to direct 
actual operations in the war zone from Washington without 
having the complete information upon which such plans and 
operations must necessarily be based. 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 127 

The Department resorted to the use of many different and 
uncertain channels of information of varying degrees of re- 
liability. The Allied naval attaches in Washington were 
consulted about the same matters concerning which Admiral 
Sims was carrying on conferences and negotiations with the 
heads of the Allied navies. 

Young armed guard officers were given orders to collect, 
in the week or ten days of their stay in port in England 
or France, a vast amount of information concerning war 
operations and experience, which was obviously beyond their 
capacity in the limited time at their disposal and with the 
limited opportunities they had of checking and verifying 
information. 

The Department often based their action upon the recom- 
mendations of the Allied attaches or of these armed guard 
officers or of young Allied liaison officers who happened to be 
in Washington, even when the recommendations or informa- 
tion obtained from these sources differed from that submitted 
by Admiral Sims. Admiral Sims was in no case informed as 
to what information the Department was obtaining from these 
other sources, as to whether their recommendations were in 
conflict with his own, nor as to the action which the De- 
partment took upon this information. The result was neces- 
sarily a confusion, which contributed to the process of delay- 
ing the action of the Navy Department in getting effectively 
into the war. 

The documentary evidence submitted directs attention to a 
very grave military mistake committed by the Department, 
that is, their apparent lack of confidence in the representative 
they had sent abroad, their refusal to heed the recommenda- 
tions submitted by him, and their failure to support him with 
the personnel and forces which were available. 

If Admiral Sims was not qualified in the eyes of the De- 
partment for the mission w^hich they had assigned him, if he 
did not adequately carry out his task after he was sent 



128 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

abroad, if Iiis recommendations were considered untrust- 
worthy, there should not have been a moment's delay in 
recalling him from his mission and in replacing him by an 
officer who did have the full confidence of the Department. 
If, on the other hand, the Department regarded Admiral 
Sims as having the qualifications, which the Secretary of the 
Navy has repeatedly attributed to him in his annual reports 
and other public documents, the failure of the Department 
to support him is not capable of explanation or justification 
and can only be considered as a grave military error. 

The adoption, after long months of delay, of Admiral 
Sims' recommendations in every important instance, shows 
that the Department finally recognized their soundness. 
The failure to support adequately Admiral Sims, to give his 
recommendations the " serious and immediate attention " 
which the Secretary of the Navy had promised in his cable- 
gram of April 16th, 1917, and the delays which resulted 
from this failure, were as inexcusable as they are inexplicable. 



VII 

The documents submitted by Admiral Sims show that the 
Department at no time informed him of their plans, if any 
such existed, for operations in the war zone. Agreements 
as to the disposition of forces in European waters were made 
with the Allies without any reference to Admiral Sims. In 
many cases the Department did not even inform him of the 
decisions reached. This happened, for example, in the case 
of the establishment of bases on the French coast. The De- 
partment decided upon such action to meet a request from 
the French Ministry of Marine, but no information as to the 
decision was ever sent to Admiral Sims beyond a mere re- 
quest as to what the character of these bases should be. 
Oflficers were sent to command non-existent bases. The 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 129 

French Government, like Admiral Sims, had no information 
as to the Department's intentions. The greatest confusion 
resulted. 

The decision to send forces to the French coast was simi- 
larly made in Washington, in IMay, 1917, but Admiral Sims 
was not officially informed of the Department's action until 
some da^'s after the forces had actually arrived in French 
waters in Jul3\ 

The first aviation unit sent to France in June, 1917, in 
response to a request from a French representative in 
America, and concerning which the jNIinistry of Marine seems 
not to have been informed, was similarly made without refer- 
ence to Admiral Sims. Neither he nor the French knew of 
it until the unit arrived at Brest. 

The decision to send a patrol force to Gibraltar was 
reached in Washington without the matter having been dis- 
cussed with Admiral Sims. 

Forces were sent to the Azores by the Department and 
arrived there before Admiral Sims had been notified even of 
the intention of the Department, and for two months he was 
not informed as to the mission of the forces, nor of whether 
or not the}' would operate under his command. These forces 
arrived in the Azores in a foreign port without the local 
authorities having received information of their coming or 
without any diplomatic arrangements having been made for 
their reception. 

Admiral Sims was not infomied of the sailing of the first 
troop convoy until after all plans had been made and the 
expedition was nearly ready to sail. 

In many cases he was not informed of the sailing of vessels 
to the war zone to join his command until some days, or, 
in some cases, weeks after they had actually sailed, as in 
the case of several of the destroyer divisions that sailed in 
jMay, the yachts which sailed in June, the Dixie which ar- 



130 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

rived at Queenstown In June, the destroyers sent to the 
Azores in July and many other cases cited in Admiral Sims' 
testimony. 

During May, June and July Admiral Sims had repeatedly 
requested the Department for information as to the Depart- 
ment's plans and intentions. He had repeatedly and specific- 
ally pointed out the necessity of having adequate advance 
information of the sailings of vessels to European waters. 
The Department completely ignored these requests and de- 
nied him information necessary to a proper handling of his 
forces and to an effective co-operation with the Allies, to an 
extent almost beyond belief. 



VIII 

A review of Admiral Sims' testimony thus reveals a num- 
ber of very grave violations of sound and accepted military 
principles by the Navy Department in its conduct of the war. 
Tlie Department failed for many months, as a result of the 
unpreparedness of naval vessels and of the lack of any policy 
or any adequate plans, to exert the naval power of the 
United States offensively against the enemy and thus ignored 
one of the most important of all factors in war, the time 
element. They failed to give their representative abroad 
any definite instructions or to define his responsibilities and 
to delegate to him the necessary and definite authority. 
During the early and most critical months they failed to 
support him by sending the forces or personnel which his 
position required and which were available. They neglected 
to keep him informed of their own decisions and actions 
affecting the operations in the war zone, and thus created 
confusion. 

In addition to the errors just outlined, the Department 
committed other grave mistakes resulting from these errors 
just mentioned. As a result of a lack of adequate informa- 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 131 

tion concerning war operations, the Department violated the 
strategic principle of concentration of forces in the critical 
area, which is the most fundamental principle of military 
strategy. The Navy Department for many months held 
back forces from the war zone and kept them uselessly patrol- 
ling the Atlantic coast, three thousand miles from the nearest 
submarine. The Navy Department was apparently misled 
by enemy propaganda, and carried out that very dispersal 
of forces from the critical area which the enemy desired. 
Nor was this tendency of the Department to disperse forces 
from the critical area limited solely to holding back forces 
on the United States coast. 

The Department was greatly influenced in its decisions 
throughout the war by sporadic enemy diversions in many 
different areas. Thus, in April, May and July, 1917, the 
Department proposed sending destroyers and patrol vessels 
to tlie Arctic coast to meet sporadic enemy operations there, 
called to their attention by the Russian government. In 
Jul}', as a result of a bombardment of a port in the Azores, 
the Department sent a force of destroyers to those islands, 
although they had been informed that in such an area de- 
stroyers would be practically useless. In 1918, enemy sub- 
marine cruises in the Canary Islands, the Madeira Islands 
and off Liberia led the Department to propose to send addi- 
tional forces to these far-flung areas. The decision to send 
a considerable force to Gibraltar was apparently based, not 
upon any complete review of the military situation and on 
the decision to concentrate forces in the critical area re- 
vealed by this review, but on the desire of the Department 
to meet the activity of the submarines in an area distant 
from the most critical area but one through which a certain 
number of American ships were passing. In 1918, when 
submarines finally appeared on the American coast, new de- 
stroyers were held back from the war zone for some months 
in a vain effort to meet these submarine diversions, although 



132 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the futility of the employment of destroyers for such a pur- 
pose in such an area had been clearly demonstrated by all 
Allied military experience. 

This dispersal of forces from the critical area by the De- 
partment was obviously merely a result of an even greater 
error, that is, the tendency of the Department, already 
pointed out, to make all decisions in Washington and to 
direct all military operations, even in details, from Wash- 
ington. Thus, the forces sent to the Azores, were given in- 
structions from Washington, and Admiral Sims was not 
informed of what these instructions were until six weeks after 
their arrival in the Azores. When it was decided to send 
submarines to the Azores in October, Admiral Sims was in- 
formed that they were to operate under instructions drawn up 
in Washington. In the case even of the formation of a 
yacht squadron for a special service on the French coast, 
the Department required a full explanation of how this yacht 
squadron was constituted and what its mission was. In the 
case of the first troop convoy, the Department attempted 
to provide in Washington for all the details of the operations 
of the convoy and its escorts in the war zone, and only 
good fortune saved the convoy from a disaster which such a 
method of directing active military operations from a dis- 
tance of 3,000 miles might easily have produced. Many 
other similar cases were brought out by the documentary 
evidence introduced by Admiral Sims. All show the Depart- 
ment's desire to interfere in the details of military operations 
in the war zone ; and a disregard of principles whose sound- 
ness has been recognized since the beginning of the study of 
warfare. 

IX 

The Department attempted to formulate in Washington 
detailed plans for war operations, although the formulation 
of such detailed plans — as opposed to the formulation of the 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 133 

general basic plan, which they neglected entirely — depended 
upon having full information concerning tlie military situa- 
tion from day to day in Europe and upon having available 
all Allied war experience in the three years previous to the 
entry of the United States into the war. Previous to our 
entry into the war American naval officers in general, and 
the Navy Department in particular, had very insufficient and 
inadequate knowledge of war developments and of the war 
situation as a whole. Admiral Sims had found it necessary 
to revise all of his own opinions concerning the situation, 
because he found that the conditions were utterly different 
than he had anticipated. Yet, in spite of the incompleteness 
of their information, and in spite of their failure to draw 
up the general plans which were needed and which they 
could have formulated, the Department endeavoured to draw 
up detailed plans for operations in the war zone. Failing to 
realize the actual situation abroad, the Department wasted 
months of effort in endeavouring to find the " royal road to 
victory." To this end they proposed a close blockade of 
German ports, on April 17th, 1917, a proposal which they 
themselves declared to be impracticable on October 21st, 
1917, after they had been provided with the full information 
concerning it, which they had lacked at the time they sug- 
gested their plan. 

Similarly, on May 11th, 1917, the Department proposed 
a barrier across the North Sea, to be composed of mines, 
mine nets and patrol craft, which would have required a 
prohibitive amount of material for execution and which, if 
undertaken, at that time when the German submarines were 
still unchecked in their attacks upon shipping, would have 
led to such a diversion of effort, on the part of the Allies, 
from the critical area that the Germans would easily have 
won the war in a few months. 

The Department, in complete and total ignorance of Allied 
experience with regard to troop convoys, drew up the details 



134 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

of the plan of the first troop convoy, with the result that 
the most lamentable confusion occurred when the convoy 
arrived in European waters, a confusion which the Depart- 
ment themselves recognized. They then called upon Ad- 
miral Sims to draw up and submit recommendations for the 
handling of all future troop convoys. These recommenda- 
tions they adopted, and it was upon these plans, formulated 
in London and based upon Allied war experience, that the 
troop transport operations for the remaining period of the 
war were carried on. 

The Department proposed various plans as substitutes for 
the convoy system ; for example, their plan for arming Ameri- 
can merchant ships. This was an effective measure even so 
far as American shipping alone is concerned only so long as 
the submarines attempted to attack with gunfire. It was 
not an adequate answer to the submarine campaign, because, 
even if successfully carried out, it would have protected only 
American ships and not the whole of the Allies lines of com- 
munication. Furthermore, the submarines, by resorting to 
torpedo attack, could and did easily sink armed ships. 

The Department also proposed a new plan for routing 
ships as an alternative to convoy, a plan which Allied war 
experience showed to be unsound. 

In July, 1917, the Department proposed to establish a 
protective steamship lane leading into the focus of shipping 
in the eastern Atlantic with a double row of patrol craft 
cruising ceaselessly back and forth to protect this line, a 
scheme so ridiculous that it need not be discussed. 

Even as late as 1918, the Department still evidenced a 
tendency to draw up plans based on insufficient information, 
and to insist upon carrying them out. This happened in the 
case of the plans drawn up to meet a possible battle-cruiser 
raid against the convoys in the Atlantic. This problem had 
been presented to the Department in the fall of 1917. The 
planning section of the naval headquarters abroad, after a 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 135 

full discussion with the Allied authorities, had submitted a 
plan, in April, 1918, providing for such a contingency. The 
Department in July drew up an entirely different plan, and 
for two months, although this plan was shown to be imprac- 
ticable, insisted upon it. 

These cases, which were fully established by the documents 
introduced, proved the violation by the Department of prin- 
ciples which even ordinary common-sense demonstrates ; that 
is, that plans cannot be drawn up without full and adequate 
information and without full discussion with the responsible 
authorities familiar with war experience. The Department 
itself recognized theoretically the soundness of this principle 
in a cable to Admiral Sims of July, 1917, but, nevertheless, 
failed to act in the manner which such a recognition should 
have required. The plans drawn up were often logical 
enough, but were based upon unsound premises, due to a lack 
of information concerning actual conditions or to ignorance 
of war experience. These two features were inevitable in any 
attempt at Washington to formulate such detailed plans. 

At no time did Admiral Sims question the authority of the 
Department or the necessity of having the ultimate decision 
made by the Navy Department. His recommendations were 
designed merely to provide the Department with an adequate 
machinery by which the available information could be made 
use of in the formulation of plans to be submitted to the De- 
partment for its consideration and approval. 



Admiral Sims did not attribute the responsibility for such 
delays to the Navy itself. On the contrary he pointed out 
that: 

" The Navy's splendid achievements in the war were in spite 
of delays, in-action, and violation of military principles by the 
high command in the first months of war. Of course, when once 



136 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the available naval forces for operations afloat and a sufficient 
number of capable officers to administer these forces, to control 
their operations and to co-ordinate our activities with those of 
the Allies were available, there could be no longer any question 
of the efTectiveness of our help. The Allies themselves have 
repeatedly assured us of the vital services rendered by our Navy 
to the allied cause, and we of the Navy can take pride in the 
record that was achieved. Great as this record was, I think I 
have said enough to convince you that it would have been 
infinitely more effective, if the policies ultimately adopted by the 
Navy, and which can be found set forth in the Secretary of the 
Navy's Annual Report of 1918 had been put into effect from the 
moment when we entered the war instead of after a dangerous 
delay of many months. 

" Furthermore, it seems to me that these achievements of the 
Navy should gain greater imiDortance in the public mind when it 
is realized, as has not been generally realized, outside of the 
service, that they were accomplished not because of an equal 
amount of efficiency in the higher command which directed them, 
but rather in spite of long delays, inaction, and violations of 
fundamental military principles committed by the high command 
in the first months of the war. In other words, the personnel of 
our Navy afloat, in accomplishing the mission assigned them had 
to struggle with the enemy and also endure the handicap of an 
uncertain policy and of misdirection such as I have repeatedly 
pointed out in the cases which I have reviewed before this com- 
mittee." 

XI 

In concluding his testimony before the committee, Admiral 
Sims summarized the points he had made. He also again 
emphasized the fact that he was not " attacking " the Navy 
or any one in the Navy, but was solely concerned with pre- 
venting in the future the repetition of the unpreparedness, 
and of the delays and blunders of 1917. 

" I have now concluded my introduction of testimony and doc- 
umentary evidence in substantiation of the statements made in 



I 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 137 

my letter to the Navy Department, of January 7tli. 1920, regard- 
ing the military errors committed by the Navy Department in 
the initiation and conduct of the war. The official documentary 
evidence incorporated in the hearings establishes the following 
facts : 

" 1. That, in spite of the fact that war had been going on for 
nearly three years, and our entry into it had been imminent at 
least from February 2, 1917, the vessels of the Navy were not 
ready for war service when the United States entered. 

" 2. That the first few months after America entered the war 
were extremely critical ones for the whole allied cause, due to 
the success of enemy submarines. 

" 3. That this critical situation was made clear to the Navy 
Department a few days after America entered the war, and 
repeatedly thereafter by cables and letters, and supported by 
independent advices to the government from the American Am- 
bassador in London and by Mr. Hoover in person. 

" 4. That the Navy Department supplied me with no plans or 
policy covering our participation in the war for three months 
after our entry therein. 

" 5. That, having information as to the critical situation of the 
Allies, the Navy Department did not promptly assist them, and 
thereby prolonged the war by delaying the sending of anti- 
submarine vessels, none reaching Europe for nearly a month 
after war was declared, and three months elapsing before thirty 
vessels arrived. 

" 6. That, the Navy Department failed to appreciate the mili- 
tary value of time. 

" 7. That the Navy Department violated fundamental military 
principles in attempting to formulate war plans of operations 
without having sufficient knowledge of the whole situation. 

" 8. That the Department's representative with the allied ad- 
miralties was not supported, during the most critical months of 
the war. either by the adequate personnel or by the adequate 
forces that could have been supplied. 

" 9. That the Navy Department violated fundamental military 
principles in dispersing forces away from the critical area in 
order to meet diversions of the enemy. 



138 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" 10. That the Navy Department, in the first months of the 
war, attempted the direction of details although three thousand 
miles distant from the scene of active operations, where the situa- 
tion was changing from day to day. 

"11. That the Navy Department, in not clearly defining the 
responsibility and delegating authority to its representative in 
Europe, failed to follow sound principles, common alike to the 
business and military professions. 

" 12. That the Navy Department, by controlling the opera- 
tions and movements of certain forces within the war area, vio- 
lated the fundamental military principle of unity of command. 

" 13. That the Navy Department failed to keep its representa- 
tive abroad completely informed as to its plans affecting dispatch 
and disposition of forces in the war zone, and frequently reached 
decisions in such matters through information gained from sources 
other than its representative in the war zone. 

" In no part of my testimony have I charged the responsibility 
for any of the failures enumerated against any person, but I 
have tried to make it clear that the responsibility for these 
failures rests, in my opinion, upon the Navy Department as an 
organization rather than uj^on any individual. If any individual 
was responsible, wholly or in part, for the failures I have pointed 
out, the fact would necessarily have to be developed by persons 
who were in a position to know the inner workings of the Depart- 
ment during the period in question. My official knowledge ex- 
tends only to the doors of the Department and not beyond them. 
The fact that numerous letters and cable despatches which I have 
submitted in evidence bear the signature of this or that person, is 
not to be taken as an indication that I believe the signer person- 
ally responsible for the action indicated. They merely indicate 
that the letter or despatch was official and written with the 
authority of the Navy Department as an organization. 

" To point out violations of well known and generally accepted 
principles of warfare such as have been shown by my testimony 
is in itself to suggest the remedy, which is obviously to avoid such 
violations in the future. It not having been shown up to this 
stage of the investigation whether these violations of principle 
were due to faulty organization of the Navy Department or to 



THE DELAYS AND BLUNDERS OF 1917 139 

faults of i3ersonnel I am not. at present, able to submit well- 
founded recommendations looking to the adoption of measures to 
insure us against similar violations in the future. 

" My testimony has been devoted almost entirely to pointing out 
defects in the administration of the Navy in the first few months 
of the war. This does not mean that I have been insensible to the 
splendid work done by the Navy at large or by the bureaus and 
other offices of the Navy Department. I have, at different times, 
in letters to the Chiefs of tlie Bureaus of the Navy Department, 
and to other officials, including the Chief of Naval Operations, 
expressed my personal satisfaction at the splendid way in wliich 
many of my requests had been met, particularly during the latter 
part of the war. 

" Taking the service as a whole, I have the most profound 
admiration for the manner in which the officers and men of the 
regular Navy, Naval Militia and Reserve Force carried on their 
duties in this war, and have expressed this admiration in a series 
of articles now being published. Not only from the war zone, 
where events were constantly before me, but from home and 
remote areas, reports reached me which showed, beyond any 
doubt, what a magnificent body of officers and men we had in the 
Navy, You may be sure, gentlemen, that the Navy, if loyally 
and properly supported and directed, may be counted upon to 
maintain the finest traditions of the service. 

" It is a source of the greatest pleasure to testify to the pride 
and gratitude I feel for the manner in which the Naval Militia 
and the Reserves (in many instances at great personal sacrifices) 
came to the aid and support of the regular Navy. Without their 
invaluable help much of the work done by the Navy in this war 
could not have been undertaken. It would require volumes to 
tell the hundreds of ways in which their splendid services made 
success possible. The outstanding feature of their service was 
the cheerful and loyal support which they gave to the regular 
Navy at all times and under all conditions. I cannot commend 
too highly their services to the nation, 

" It is furthermore a great pleasure and satisfaction to me to 
be able to testify to the magnificent way in which the many enter- 
prises were undertaken and pushed to a successful completion by 



140 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the united efforts of the bureaus of the Navy Department, and the 
naval personnel engaged in the operations. I cannot pretend to 
enumerate completely the operations of this nature which con- 
tributed to the winning of the war. I may mention, as typical 
examples, the Northern Barrage, the Railway Batteries, the 
transport of troops, and the training of officers and men in the 
ships of the Atlantic Fleet that remained in home waters. 

" It is, of course, to be expected in connection with an investi- 
gation of this sort, particularly of a war which was won by great 
sacrifices and gallant, patriotic services of the entire nation, that 
the first thought which occurs to mind is that hindsight is better 
than foresight, and that it is always easy, in the light of hindsight, 
to point out errors committed in any undertaking. I submit, 
however, that, as the issue here under investigation is one vitally 
affecting our future national safety, we should not let such 
thoughts carry us away and blind us to dangers which the lessons 
of the past have clearly indicated. Hindsight must not he blind- 
sight. 

" I wish also to repeat- and to emphasize at this time that no 
claim is made that my recommendations or advice should have 
been accepted because they were mine, but they should have been 
heeded and acted upon because of my position in continuous con- 
sultation with the heads of the allied navies. There should be no 
question as to whether I merited the confidence of my superiors. 
If I did not, then an additional violation of a fundamental mili- 
tary and business principle was committed in leaving me at my 
post. I should have been removed as soon as there was the slight- 
est loss of confidence in me. 

" If I have shown that there was a lack of conviction or clear 
understanding on the part of theNavy Department as to where its 
efforts should be directed, — if I have shown that the Navy was 
hampered by a lack of preparedness, by lack of essential plans, 
and by being held back in the beginning, — if I have demon- 
strated that victory was won not because of these errors but in 
spite of them, and that such errors were only nullified by a com- 
bination of circumstances which we would be foolhardy indeed to 
count upon in the future, — then I will feel that I have been fully 
justified in submitting my letter of January 7th, 1920." 



CHAPTER IX 

CAMOUFLAGE AND COUNTER-BARRAGE 
TACTICS 

(The Cross-Examination of Admiral Sims) 

I 

ADMIRAL SIMS finished his direct testimony on March 
18, 1920. On Monday, March 22, 1920, his cross-examina- 
tion began. This was conducted chiefly by the Democratic 
members of the committee, Senators Pittman and TrammelL 
The methods followed by Senator Pittman, who was appar- 
ently acting as unofficial counsel for Secretary Daniels, at 
once revealed both the tactics to be followed by the Secretary 
in meeting the criticisms, and the indisputable accuracy of 
the statements and criticisms of Admiral Sims. 

During the whole of the cross-examination one of Mr. 
Daniels' secretaries sat behind Senator Pittman and re- 
peatedly handed him questions to be asked of Admiral Sims 
that the Secretary apparently thought would be damaging 
to the Admiral. 

It is significant that in the cross-examination no serious 
effort was made to question the truth of Admiral Sims' criti- 
cisms. So fully established were these by the documentary 
evidence that it was impossible, even for Senator Pittman, 
to doubt their correctness. Unable to meet the issues raised, 
Senator Pittman adopted the methods used by INIr. Daniels, 
and endeavoured to distract attention from uncomfortable 
facts by introducing confidential and personal papers of 

Admiral Sims which seemed to afford an opportunity to at- 

141 



142 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

tack him for pro-British sympathies, for alleged criticism 
of the Army, and for his estimate of the results of the un- 
preparedness and vacillation of the Navy Department. 



II 

The only part of Admiral Sims testimony which was ques- 
tioned, in fact, was his assumption that the Navy Depart- 
ment had been responsible for the prolongation of the war. 
The unpreparedness for war, the delays in beginning active 
operations in the war zone, the vacillation and hesitation of 
the Navy Department in 1917, were tacitly admitted, not only 
by Senator Pittman, but by every witness who appeared 
before the Committee, save the Secretary himself. Senator 
Pittman and the Departmental witnesses limited themselves 
to contending that the conditions described by Admiral Sims 
did not have as serious consequences as he believed, that they 
were the inevitable result of our national policy from 1914 
to 1916, that no one was to blame for the mistakes, and that 
every one in the Department did their utmost, after April 6, 
1917, to win the war. 

Senator Pittman, like Mr. Daniels and his naval witnesses, 
attempted, by the emphasizing undoubted successes of the 
Navy itself, to obscure or excuse the activities and lack of 
effective action of the Navy Department. 

Primarily, Senator Pittman's tactics, like those of Mr. 
Daniels, were of the " smoke screen " variety. In the cross- 
examination of Admiral Sims the Senator endeavoured to fix 
upon him responsibility for the publication of the letter of 
January 7th ; to make it appear that he was so pro-British 
during the war as to turn over our naval forces entirely to 
the British and to criticize the American Army ; to discredit 
criticism by attacks on the critic. 



CROSS-EXAAIINATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 143 

III 

Senator Hale began the cross-examination by asking 
Admiral Sims who it was that gave him the " wool pulling " 
instructions quoted in paragraph 7 of the letter of January 
7, 1920. 

In reply Admiral Sims related the circumstances under 
which he was sent abroad in March, 1917. He had received 
orders at Newport to go to Washington. He was not to 
report at the Navy Department, but was to telephone the 
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. He was unable to get 
the telephone connection and so went to Admiral Palmer's 
office. Palmer told him he was " to be sent abroad to confer 
with the Allied admiralties. He said that I was to go se- 
cretly, under an assumed name, and not even to take uniforms 
with me." 

Admiral Sims then had a brief interview with Secretary 
Daniels. " In substance the Secretary said that I was being 
sent abroad to confer with the admiralties on the other side 
and to use the cable freely in advising them (the Navy De- 
partment) as to how they could best co-operate with the 
Allied navies in case we were unfortunately drawn into the 
war. He also told me that the reason I was being sent over 
was because of a request from the then Ambassador in Lon- 
don, Dr. Page, that an officer of high rank should be there. 
... In his testimony on the awards, the Secretary of the 
Navy stated that he had reminded me of the indiscretion 
that I had committed in 1910 in the speech at the Guildhall. 
The Secretary's recollection on that point is thoroughly 
mistaken. No reference whatever was made to the Guildhall 
speech by anybody in the Navy Department on this occa- 
sion." 

After Admiral Sims left the Secretary's office he went to 
Admiral Palmer's office. There in the presence of Admiral 
Palmer he was admonished by a certain official not to " let 



144. NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the Britisli pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our 
business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We would 
as soon fight the British as the Germans." 

Admiral Sims said that he was reluctant to name the 
official. " As I said before, I wanted to avoid all person- 
alities, and I should much prefer now to relate the incident 
and explain why I put it in my letter, without referring to 
the name of the individual." 

The Chairman, however, insisted that " the name of the 
individual should be brought out and the Committee would 
like to have you give it." 

" Admiral Sims: The person who gave me tlie admonition was 
Admiral Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations. . . . The re- 
mark was preceded by nothing and was followed by nothing. It 
was told to me in all seriousness and with bitterness^ and I turned 
around and left the office immediately," 

Admiral Palmer was present and heard Admiral Benson 
give this admonition to Admiral Sims. 

The next day (March 29, 1917) Admiral Sims returned to 
the Navy Department to get some papers. 

" I met Admiral Benson again, and in the presence of a num- 
ber of officers ... he repeated to me exactly the same remark, 
preceded by nothing or followed by nothing . . . About six 
months later in my office in Paris, he made a similar statement, at 
least to the effect that I was not to allow the British to pull the 
wool over my eyes or to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. ... I 
regarded this as a personal idiosyncrasy of the Admiral. I had 
known that he was intensely anti-British, but it did not affect me 
particularly." 

In speaking further of Admiral Benson's attitude, Admiral 
Sims said: 

" I would also like to say that I have always had the best 
possible relations with Admiral Benson. I regard him as an up- 
standing and honest man who has exceedingly strong convictions. 



I 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 145 

and who is very firm in adherence to these convictions. I believe 
everything he has done during the war has been done conscien- 
tiously, and to get along with the war. I believe that it is due to 
Admiral Benson alone that I was given the opportunity to serve 
in this war as the commander of the forces abroad. In fact, he 
told me that his insistence upon my being put in command of 
those forces abroad had brought upon him the enmity of pretty 
much all the senior officers of the Navy, that being due to the fact 
that when I was appointed I was the last name on the list of rear 
admirals in the Naval Register at that time. I state this in order 
to make it clear that there is nothing whatever personal about 
this. 

" Now, my reason for putting it in the letter may not be so 
clear to a civilian as it is to a military man, but the spiritual 
foundation of every war is the will to victory, and if any man, 
no matter how honest, has an invincible prejudice against the 
people that we are fighting alongside of, it is very probable that 
it has an unconscious influence upon him; and that is the reason 
that in submitting this letter for the consideration of the Navy 
Department, I put that in there, as one of the most important 
things in the letter, that if ever we go into a war again we want 
to make sure that the spiritual foundation of our organization, 
the will to victory, is sound." 

In concluding his statement with regard to his instructions, 
Admiral Sims commented upon Secretary Daniels' assertion 
during the Medal Awards investigation that " as a naval 
officer he (Sims) had no business to think who was the 
enemy." " That to me is a perfectly astounding statement. 
I received no instructions, I received no expression of policy. 
Manifestl3', no plan can be based upon anything except the 
knowledge of who your enemy is going to be ; and I had every 
possible reason to think who my enemy was." 

IV 

Senator Pittman in beginning his examination of Admiral 
Sims took up the question of the responsibility for the pub- 



146 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

lication bj the Washington Post on January l-lth of the 
existence and character of the letter of January 7th, 1920. 

Admiral Sims testified that he had kept the only file copy 
of the letter in his personal possession, that only a half dozen 
naval officers of his staff and his wife knew of its existence 
until the Washington Post article was published, and that 
these had all kept the existence of the letter secret. He had 
shown the letter to H, P. Davison, but this was not until the 
evening of January 14th. He had read the letter to the com- 
mittee on January 17th, only after the chairman had insisted 
that he do this. The existence of the letter had probably 
become known in the Department. The correspondent of the 
Washington Post doubtless had channels of information 
through which he got his information. This correspondent 
stated that he had not learned of the letter through Admiral 
Sims or any one connected with him. 

Senator Pittman was unable to fix even a shadow of re- 
sponsibility upon Admiral Sims and finally left the subject. 



The next line of questioning was devoted to an effort to 
make it appear that Admiral Sims had been so pro-British 
as to be disloyal ; that he had opposed the formation of an 
American Army and urged the brigading of American troops 
with the Allied troops ; and finally that he had belittled the 
war effort, both of the American Army and of the Navy, 
even to the point of stating that the armistice had to be 
accepted because- of the breakdown of the communications of 
the American Army in the Argonne. 

Senator Pittman read a paragraph from Admiral Sims' 
letter of July 16, 1917, urging co-operation with the Allies 
and the necessity of unity of command. Then he quoted a 
passage from a letter report of November 15, 1917, in which 
Admiral Sims, in emphasizing the vital necessity of obtaining 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 147 

more shipping, said, " Our military participation must be 
viewed with great anxiety until the rate of production of 
new tonnage commences to exceed the losses. It has even 
been suggested that in view of the present situation a good 
proportion of our National Army could perhaps be more 
effectively utilized ... as labour in American shipyards." 

Then, in the effort to make his point, Senator Pittman read 
part of a personal letter of Admiral Sims to Admiral Sir 
Lewis Bayly, R. N., the commander of the forces based on the 
Irish coast, in wliich Admiral Sims referred to the discussions 
then going on " about the best way to use the man power of 
America on the Western Front," and suggested that it might 
be decided to transport a large part of the American forces 
" to the western ports of the British Isles in order that they 
may be passed through the British camps to the Western 
Front." 

Senator Pittman tried to create the impression that these 
statements in a personal letter indicated that " you (Admiral 
Sims) were in favour of putting our soldiers to work in the 
navy yards as labourers, and that on January 24th (1918) 
you were in favour of brigading our soldiers with other 
troops." 

Admiral Sims made his own position quite clear when he 
said in reply : 

" The tonnage question was the very basis of the whole busi- 
ness, and if that was not solved the war could not possibly be won 
with the assistance of the American Army. Therefore it was 
necessary, not to take all the men who enlisted for the Army and 
put them in the shipyards . . . but, in the case of men who were 
shipwrights ... it was so essential at that time that we have 
ships . . . that these men, instead of going into the Army, should 
have been employed in the shipyards. That is only American 
common sense." 

Admiral Sims, in speaking of the question of the use of 
American troops, said : 



148 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" In no case should it be considered that I, a naval officer, 
attending to my own business, was recommending anything at all. 
I wanted to know what they were going to do because it might 
have a marked influence on how my forces should be handled ; . . . 
so that all those things that I discussed with General Bliss — 
not recommending them, but trying to find out about them — were 
all done exactly as explained in that letter to Admiral Bayly; 
and we, as two sailormen were discussing what would be the dis- 
position of the forces that were escorting the troops." 

VI 

As a trump card, Senator Pittman then read an unsigned 
memorandum, dated January 14, 1918, that had come from 
Admiral Sims' personal file. The writer of this memorandum 
referred to a dinner attended by " Balfour, Cecil, Reading 
and the host, a very important person," at which was dis- 
cussed " the most efficient way to employ America's man 
power on the Western Front, instead of organizing a separate 
army with its own lines of communication and supply." 
The memorandum strongly advocated the brigading of Ameri- 
can forces with the Allies, and stated that " the reasons 
opposed to it are purely sentimental — national and state 
pride and ambition for personal distinction." 

Senator Pittman evidently believed the memorandum to 
have been written by Admiral Sims. He had probably failed 
to notice that the last sentence in it read : " It is up to you 
and the men of your cloth " which made it clear that the 
memorandum must have been sent to Admiral Sims. Admiral 
Sims asked Pittman who wrote it. Pittman admitted he 
didn't know save that it was marked " Admiral Sims' personal 
files." Admiral Sims said: "I did not write that and I do 
not know who did . . . the probability is that it was a memo- 
randum sent me for my information by Dr. Page, the Ambas- 
sador, himself." 

Admiral Sims explained how papers from his personal 
files came to be used when he said : 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 149 

" I should like to say in this connection with reference to 
papers that have been used that are marked ' from Admiral Sims' 
personal file.' Of course, in the position tliat I occupied on the 
other side, there was a swarm of such arriving every day. Those 
letters were handled automatically. The only letters practically 
that I opened were tliose that were always recognized by my sec- 
retary as being in the handwriting of my wife. All other letters 
were opened^ and naturally a good many of them under general 
orders. Tliey were letters from all kinds of cranks, and all kinds 
of inventors. There were opinions and advice given to me by 
everybody from Si)aniards to Sinn Fciners. Those things were 
usually answered by some member of the staff, who would file 
tlie things in my personal files. The great bulk of those things I 
never saw at all. Now, when the Secretary of tlie Navy very late 
in the war, after giving up the idea of an established historical 
section in Washington to write up the history of this war, ordered 
me to establish one on the other side, I did so under the very able 
command of Captain Knox, and I told Captain Knox that he was 
at liberty not only to take out of the division of files anything 
which he found had any bearing on the war, quite independent 
of his opinion as to whether it was correct or not, but that he 
could also go into ray personal files and do the same thing, take 
anything out of the personal files that he thought might throw 
any light on the war. 

" There are a good many things in there that are exceedingly 
confidential, but tliey will be useful to a historian to show the 
atmosphere. There are letters there written to me by foreign 
officers of all the Allies in which they have expressed opinions 
which would be exceedingly embarrassing to those officers to have 
given out now, but the historian would like to see those things as 
giving the general atmosphere at the time. I only make this 
point to show that because a document came out of my personal 
files, it does not mean that I ever saw the document." 



VII 

Senator Pittman made another effort to prove Admiral 
Sims' disloyalty by referring to the statements of tliree 



150 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Democratic Congressmen, based on their recollections of a 
personal conversation^ that Admiral Sims had told them in 
October, 1918, that the United States had only contributed 
3 per cent, of the total number of anti-submarine craft in 
British waters ; and that the Allies would be compelled to 
accept the armistice because of the breakdown of the com- 
nmnications of the American Army. 

Admiral Sims, in his testimony, showed by reference to the 
number of vessels of the various Allies that the statements 
he had made with regard to the proportion of vessels in the 
war zone was a mere statement of fact. He denied abso- 
lutely having said that the American Army had broken down 
and that this breakdown would compel acceptance of the 
armistice ; and quoted letters exchanged with Mr. Martin 
Egan in 1918 and with General Pershing in 1919 contradict- 
ing the assertion that he had not been in sympathy with 
Pershing. There had obviously been a complete misunder- 
standing of his meaning and a confusion between what he 
repeated as gossip and the things which he himself believed. 

VIII 

Nearly all of one day was spent by Senators PIttman and 
Trammell in trying to discredit and break down Admiral 
Sims' estimate of the prolongation of the war and the result- 
ing unnecessary losses attributable to the unpreparedness 
and delays of the Navy Department. Far from shaking 
Admiral Sims' testimony, the Democratic Senators merely 
afforded him opportunity to introduce more confirmatory 
evidence. 

Admiral Sims clearly outlined the basis of his opinion 
when he said in answer to a question put by Senator Tram- 
mell: 

" The tonnage situation, of course, is what influenced it, but the 
trouble is that by our tardiness in entering the war we lost two 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 151 

and one-half million tons of shipping which we should not have 
lost. If we had butted in with all of our force in the very begin- 
ning, instead of coming in whole-heartedly after six months or a 
year, we would have saved that tonnage and that situation would 
not have arisen. I do not know whether you know it or not, but 
up to the first year of the war we did not have much more than 
100 ships of all classes on the other side, and there was not a 
single ship that was not available or could have been available to 
be over there in the first 15 days of the war. Now, there is the 
whole point of all of my statement and all of my criticism. I 
have not got anything to say about anything else particularly, 
except that the Navy Department and the Government did not 
go into the war after they had declared it." 

In support of his contention that our military interven- 
tion in Europe depended absolutely on the tonnage available, 
Admiral Sims quoted many passages from General Pershing's 
final report to the War Department. These made it clearly 
apparent that the delay in getting the Army to France was 
due to lack of tonnage. General Pershing, for example, 
in explaining the slow transport of troops in the first year 
of the war cabled the War Department in December 1917 
that : 

"... While these numbers fell short of my recommendation 
of July 6, 1917, which contemplated at least 1,000,000 men by 
May, 1918, it should be borne in mind that the main factor in the 
problem was the amount of shipping to become available for mil- 
itary purposes, in which must be included tonnage required to 
supply the Allies with steel, coal, and food. 

" A study of transportation facilities shows sufficient American 
tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do so there 
must be a reduction in the tonnage allotted to other than Army 
needs. It is estimated that the shipping needed will have to be 
rapidly increased up to 2,000,000 tons by May in addition to the 
amount already allotted. The use of shipping for commercial 
purposes must be curtailed a-s much as possible. The Allies are 
very weak and we must come to their relief this year, 1918. The 
year after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold 



152 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

on until 1919, unless we give them a lot of support this year. It 
is therefore strongly recommended that a complete readjustment 
of transportation be made and that the needs of the War Depart- 
ment as set forth above be regarded as immediate. 

" It is now^ the middle of December, and the First Corps is still 
incomplete by over two entire divisions and many corps troops. 
It cannot be too emphatically declared that we should be prepared 
to take the field witli at least four corps by June 30 (1918). In 
view of past performances with tonnage heretofore available such 
a project is impossible of fulfilment, but only by most strenuous 
attempts to attain such a result will we be in a position to take a 
proper part in operations in 1918. In view of the fact that as 
the number of our troops here increases a correspondingly greater 
amount of tonnage must be provided for their supply, and also in 
view of the slow rate of shipment with tlie tonnage now available, 
it is of the most urgent importance, that more tonnage should be 
obtained at once, as already recommended in my cables and by 
General Bliss." 

IX 

In further substantiation of his estimate, Admiral Sims 
outlined in greater detail than he had done in his direct state- 
ment the interrelation between the submarine campaign, the 
tonnage situation, the transportation of American troops 
to Europe, the breaking of the German morale and the re- 
sultant Allied victory. In his opinion the American inter- 
vention brought victory in 1918, instead of in 1919, as had 
originally been anticipated. Victory was dependent entirely 
on exerting the strength of America against Germany. This 
could not be done until the defeat of the submarine permitted 
a diversion of tonnage for transport of American troops, 
and ensured the safety of our troop transports. If our 
force had been asserted in 1917, instead of in 1918, the sub- 
marine campaign could have been defeated earlier, American 
intervention could have been made effective earlier, and the 
victory would have been won by July, 1918, at the latest, 
and perhaps even in 1917. 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 153 

Admiral Sims clearly stated the vital point in this esti- 
mate, when, in reply to questions, he said : 

" Now I would like to put that in the form of a perfectly 
simple illustration which can be understood by anybody. It all 
hinges upon this question^ Was our naval eff'ort in the war effec- 
tive? We all know that it was. Those who oppose this argu- 
ment have got to assume that it was not. If it was effective, it 
must have shortened the war. It therefore follows that if there 
was delay in making it effective, this delay prolonged the war. 
If three engines will put out a fire in a certain time, four engines 
will put it out in less time. If there is delay in sending the 
fourth engine, there will be a corresponding loss. I have shown 
by the official records that there was delay; delay in preparing 
for war, even after February 2, 1917, and delay in sending forces 
and personnel after we declared war. Tlierefore those respon- 
sible for this delay are responsible for the appalling sacrifices 
of life and treasure that resulted. That, I think, makes the sit- 
uation entirely clear." 

X 

Senators Trammell and Pittman were apparently greatly, 
distressed that the Navy Department should have been re- 
sponsible for great and unnecessary losses. Senator Tram- 
mell for example said: 

" I want to find out what the facts are, and I want to find out 
whether the United States has been guilty of practically homicide 
in 500,000 cases and the waste of this great treasure, and so on, 
or if the other nations should stand under that indictment; 
whether they are partially responsible for it." 

Senator Pittman similarly felt called upon to defend the 
Navy, as when he said : 

"Senator Pittman: . . . But you must realize, Admiral, tlie 
conditions that existed here at the beginning of the war. As you 
said, we practically had no army in the beginning of the war. I 
do not think that is the Navy's fault. We had no facilities 
for training at the beginning of the war. I do not think that is 



154 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the Navy's fault. The policy decided by the War Department in 
our country, was to train our soldiers on this side. I do not 
think that is the Navy's fault. And, as a matter of fact, until the 
beginning of 1918 it must be evident to you that we had very few 
soldiers to send anywhere; and then they commenced to come on 
all at once ; and when they came on all at once, the combined 
navies of the world and tlie ships of the world got the food there 
to France, they got the amount of troops to France that Pershing 
•said he would need, and won the war in 1918. I do not think 
there is any blame attached to the Army; I do not think there is 
any blame attached to the Navy; and I think that you ought to 
take back the assertion that the Navy is guilty of the murder of 
500,000 people, until you produce some evidence stronger than 
you have produced. 

"Admiral Sims: As I said to Senator Trammell, it all de- 
pends upon whether you assume that the intervention of the Navy 
was effective, or whether it was not. If it was effective, it de- 
creased the length of the war, and if it delayed in making it 
effective, it prolonged the war. When the Navy intervened and 
the convoy system was put in operation, there was a decrease in 
loss of shipping. It began in a certain period. 

"If it had begun earlier, we would have saved just so much 
shipping; and if we had had that shipping we could have sent 
troops faster to France, and we would have done it, there is no 
doubt about that at all, because General Bliss, in his first visit 
over there and on coming back again, said they had to get a mil- 
lion men over there as soon as possible, and they did not have 
the transportation to do it at that time." 

"Senator Pittman: Well, it was effective; and you do not 
have to take the position that it was either effective or not effec- 
tive, at all. It was not as effective as it would have been if Con- 
gress had appropriated money for more ships years before ; but it 
was sufficiently effective to get over to France every soldier that 
we had trained to go to France. 

" Admiral Si7ns : Congress did not appropriate as much money 
as the Navy would have liked to prepare for war, but that is 
not the point, at all. We are not criticizing Congress for that 
at all. It is the fact that the anti-submarine forces we had were 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 155 

on this side, 3,000 miles from where the fighting was going on, 
and that they were not sent over, aetually. We declared war on 
the 6th of April, and there was not a single force on the other 
side until the 4th of May. What do you know about that for 
preparation for war? And I can give you the dates that they 
arrived — another bunch of ships — and I can show you that 
after two months there were only 30 destroyers there. I can 
show you that at the end of a whole year there were approxi- 
mately 120 vessels of all classes, including supply ships. Not 
one of those ships was built since the war. There was no reason 
why they could not have been all sent over immediately upon 
the declaration of war, and if they had been there, we would have 
put the submarine campaign out of operation, and decreased the 
losses. I do not know why they did not send them over there. 
The good Lord only knows why they did not send them over there, 
but they did not send them, at all." 



XI 

Senator Pittman explained, at the end of the cross-exami- 
nation of Admiral Sims, the purpose he had in mind, as coun- 
sel for Mr. Daniels : 

"Admiral Sims: I do not understand just what the idea is. 
Do you want to try to imply that I was recommending that there 
should be no American Army? Now, might I ask this question: 
Suppose it were true that I did recommend no American Army, 
what does it have to do with the convoy system in handling of 
the Navy during the war? 

"Senator Pittman: I think you are entitled to an answer. I 
will tr}'^ to answer it. Admiral, in the first place, there are evi- 
dences before this committee that you relied very greatly upon 
the British Admiralty for all of your opinions. 

"Admiral Sims: There is no such evidence at all. It was 
the Allied Naval Council, consisting of the heads of all those 
navies. Now, how can you conceive an American officer of my 
experience, not to say record, either being so dumb intellectually 
or being so defective morally that he would recommend to his 
Government not what he believed but what the British Govern- 



156 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

ment wanted? For God's sake, how can you imagine an Amel'i- 
can doing that? 

" Senator Pittman: You have asked me a frank question. 

"Admiral Sirns: And I want an answer. 

"Senator Pittman: I am proceeding to answer. There is 
evidence here in your own letter that you favoured the British 
policy or the French policy, certainly not the American policy, of 
sending raw troops over to the other country without training 
here. It is in your letter here that you recommend that some 
of these soldiers be put in the navy yards to work as labour- 
ers. 

" Admiral Sims: Not that they should be worked as labourers, 
but that an experienced shipwright should not be taken out of the 
navy yards and put into a camp wlien we needed ships. 

"Senator Pittman: There is nothing said in your letter as to 
that. 

"Admiral Sims: That- is what it says, to take a man of that 
kind out of the Navy would be asininity, taking him out of the 
navy yard and making a soldier of him. 

" Senator Pittman: There are letters here also which indi- 
cate to my mind — that is the reason I am going along with this 
examination — that you wanted the whole American Navy to be 
turned over to the British; that as far as the protection of the 
coast was concerned, or any American policy that they had, that 
you cared nothing for that. There are letters here indicating 
that your opinions were formulated with Admiral Bayly with 
regard to these matters. 

"Admiral Sims: I was not with Admiral Bayly one one- 
hundredth of the time I was over there. I was in London. 

" Senator Pittman: Your letters were very confidential. 
There is evidence here also that in writing to Admiral Bayly you 
were opposed to the American plan, and were in favour of the 
British plan with regard to the disposition of our soldiers; that 
you were in January opposed to a separate army. There is evi- 
dence here that you discussed with Pershing a separate army on 
October 30. There is evidence that on November 9 you still 
thought . . . 

"Admiral Sims: There is none of that there. 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 157 

" Senator Pittman (continuing) : That Pershing had broken 
down and that you never expected him to get through. 

"Admiral Sims: No. 

"Senator Pittman: That you expected he was broken down, 
by reason of one line of railroad and not sufficient communica- 
tion. 

" Admiral Sims: It was not a railroad at all; a road. 

"Senator Pittman: That communications with the rear were 
so incomplete that they had been compelled to slaughter horses 
for food. 

"Admiral Siins: All the artnies had to do the same thing. 
What General Maurice said . . . 

" Senator Pittman: Wliat I think about the proposition is, we 
are considering whether your advice on these matters was credit- 
able, 

" Admiral Si7ns: All right. 

"Senator Pittman: We are considering as to whether your 
advice was largely followed. 

"Admiral Si7ns : That is the point. 

" Senator Pittman: And I think that this evidence is material, 
in that you were advising from the standpoint of foreign coun- 
tries and not from the policy of your own country. 

"Admiral Sims: I see. Well, Senator Pittman, that is the 
veriest possible kind of rot, for this reason, as I pointed out ex- 
plicitly all througli my statement, that this advice that was given 
to my Government was not only based upon all of the discussions 
that we had with the people over there, but that it was adopted bv 
our own Government. If it were true that the advice I gave 
has proved to be wrong in the case of the convoy, and in the case 
of this, that, and the other, there would be something in what you 
say. But it proved to be right, and was adopted only after those 
long delays that cost us so much blood and treasure." 



XII 

Just before the end of the cross-examination Senator Hale 
again brought out the fact that Admiral Sims had first 
recommended the adoption of the convoy system in May, 



158 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

1917 ; that it was not put into effect by the Department until 
four months later. The Allies had not themselves the avail- 
able vessels to escort convoys. The establishment of the 
convoy system had therefore been delayed at least three 
months while the Navy Department was making up its mind 
whether to co-operate with the Allies or not. 

Senator Hale also called attention to the fact that Senator 
Pittman's questions had been irrelevant to the issues under 
investigation when he said : 

" Admiral Sims, a few minutes ago you began a line of testi- 
mony which Senator Pittman attempted to bring out. In your 
letter of January 7 you criticized the Navy Department for lack 
of co-operation in carrying on the war. This is and will be of 
course the main purpose of this investigation. It is unavoidable 
that some side issues will come in during the course of the hear- 
ings. That will not deflect us, however, from our main purpose, 
which is to find out whether the charges made in your letter are or 
are not true." 

Admiral Sims replied with a final summary of the question 
at issue: 

" I would amend that to say the lack of prompt co-operation. 
Our Navy Department did co-operate with the Allies eventually. 
The great difficulty about the whole business is that they did not 
co-operate promptly. There were all the rest of those delays 
upon recommendations made as the result of the co-operation with 
the Allied Naval Council and the acknowledgment of the sound- 
ness of that by the Navy and the putting of that into operation. 
That is the gist of the letter, and it would have been a very, very 
dangerous situation, in case we had been up against a navy that 
was not interned — or ' contained,' as they called it, — so far as its 
battle fleet was concerned, and helpless to do anything against us 
in our own country, except by submarines which had to come 
over with half the speed of our forces." 



CHAPTER X 

PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION: EVIDENCE 
FROM WITHIN THE NAVY DEPARTMENT 

(The Testimony of Captains Laning, Palmer 
AND Taussig) 



IT will be remembered that in concluding his prepared 
statement before the Senate Committee, Admiral Sims had 
said: 

" In no part of my testimony have I charged the responsibility 
for any of the failures enumerated against any person, but I have 
tried to make it clear that the responsibility for these failures 
rests, in my opinion, upon the Navy Department as an organiza- 
tion rather than upon any individual. If any individual was 
responsible, wholly or in part, for failures I have pointed out, the 
fact would necessarily have to be developed by persons who were 
in a position to know the inner workings of the department 
during the period in question. 

" My official knowledge extends only to the doors of the depart- 
ment and not beyond them. The fact that numerous letters and 
cable despatches which I have submitted in evidence bear the sig- 
nature of this or that person, is not to be taken as an indication 
that I believe the signer personally responsible for the action in- 
dicated. They merely indicate that the letter or despatch was 
official and written with the authority of the Navy Department as 
an organization. 

" To point out violations of well known and generally accepted 
principles of warfare such as have been shown by my testimony 
is in itself to suggest the remedy, which is obviously to avoid 
such violations in the future. It not having been shown up to 

159 



160 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

this stage of the investigation whether these violations of principle 
were due to faulty organization of the Navy Department or to 
faults of personnel I am not, at present, able to submit well- 
founded recommendations looking to the adoption of measures to 
insure us against similar violations in the future." 

When the Sub-Committee had been instructed in January 
to investigate the matters dealt with in Admiral Sims' letter 
of January 7tli, 1920, Chairman Hale had announced his 
intention of calling as witnesses, officers who had served in 
responsible positions abroad and in the Navy Department 
before and during the war. 

When Admiral Sims completed his testimony, his points 
had been so thoroughly established by documentary evidence 
that it was deemed unnecessary to call any further wit- 
nesses to substantiate the statements of Admiral Sims' letter, 
especially as Admiral Sims, in preparing his statement, had 
had the assistance of the officers who had served in the most 
important positions on his staff abroad. 

The Committee therefore decided to call witnesses who 
might be able to throw light on the causes of the unprepared- 
ness of the Navy for war, and on the confusion, hesitation 
and lack of action of the Navy Department after war was 
declared. Of the witnesses called by the committee, all agreed 
that conditions in the Navy were as Admiral Sims had de- 
scribed them. In their review of the activities of the Depart- 
men and of Mr. Daniels, from 1913 to 1917, much light was 
also thrown on the causes of, and the responsibility for, these 
conditions. 

The witnesses called by the Committee, on its own initiative 
were, in the order of their appearance, Captain Harris 
Laning, Captain L. C. Palmer, Captain J. K. Taussig, Rear 
Admiral C. P. Plunkett, Rear Admiral W. L. Grant, Rear 
Admiral H. T. Mayo, Rear Admiral B. A. Fiske (retired), 
and Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam (retired). 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 161 

II 

Captain Laning had been, from October, 1916, to Julj'^, 
1917, assistant for Material in the Office of Naval Operations. 
In July, 1917, he was transferred to the Bureau of Naviga- 
tion and placed in charge of the Officer Personnel Division. 
On September 21, 1918, he became Assistant Chief of the 
Bureau of Navigation and was acting Chief of Bureau from 
November 1, 1918, to January, 1919. 

He had had, therefore, a unique opportunity to acquire 
an intimate personal knowledge, both of the material condi- 
tion of the Navy at the time we entered the war, and of the 
personnel situation during the war. His position had 
brought him into intimate contact with Mr. Daniels. He 
said, in fact, that " not many days passed when I was not in 
personal conference with the Secretary on important subjects 
or placed before him matters and papers requiring his action 
or signature. . . . Officially I came to know the Department 
and its ways very intimately, and ... I feel I had a more 
than usual opportunity to gauge the Department and its 
methods. My statements are therefore not casually made, 
but are based on my personal knowledge both of officials 
and of affairs." 

Captain Laning, in beginning his statement, made the fol- 
lowing summary of the testimony he was in a position to 
offer: 

" From my knowledge of the Navy and from information 
gained through personal contact with the Navy Department, I 
am convinced that since the starting of the World War the De- 
partment has not administered the Navy as it should have, and as 
a result the Navy was not properly ready for war in the early 
days as efficiently as it could and should have been. 

" It has taken many things to bring about my convictions, 
among which I cite the following particulars : — 

" FIRST. That in the years immediately preceding our entry 



162 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

into the war^ the Navy Department did not take an attitude on 
legislation and policies, that would enable the fleet to be made 
properly ready for war, and that the fleet was not properly ready 
when war was declared. 

" SECOND. That even when war was imminent, when it was 
apparent that war could not be avoided, the Department, even 
then, did not do those things that ought to have been done to make 
the Navy ready to carry on the war in its full strength and along 
the right lines. 

" THIRD. That at about the time war was declared, although 
a carefully drawn up plan, outlining what direction the Navy's 
first efforts should take, was submitted by the Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations for the Department's approval, the plan was 
not approved and as a result, at the very time a plan was most 
needed, the Navy did not have any general plan that was based 
on the peculiar conditions imposed by an enemy whose naval 
effort was restricted almost entirely to the use of submarines. 

" FOURTH. That not having a definite plan to work on, the 
various parts of the Navy Department could make no co-ordi- 
nated effort to carry on the war, but, on the contrary, each part 
was obliged to do what that part thought might be best, with the 
result that not only was the effectiveness of the naval effort 
greatly reduced in the early stages of the war, but also the 
cost of the war was probably considerably and unnecessarily 
added to. 

" FIFTH. That during the war it was always difficult and 
frequently impossible to obtain the Department's approval of 
essential plans and policies, that this made it necessary for sub- 
ordinate officers to go far beyond their authority to get things 
done, and that as a result the difficulties of carrying on the war 
were increased while the effectiveness was decreased." 



HI 

Captain Laning testified that the Navy Department, dur- 
ing Mr. Daniels' administration, failed to keep the vessels 
of the Navy in a fit condition for war ; that not enough men 
were provided for the ships; that no plans existed to guide 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 163 

the Navy when war came ; and that the fault lay with the 
Secretary himself. 

The Secretary had advocated and obtained a large build- 
ing program, but his attitude 

" made it impossible to have the Navy ready for war either in 
regard to personnel or materiel. . . . The remarkable feature of 
the Department's attitude was its apparent inability to realize 
the necessity for legislation that would provide adequate per- 
sonnel to man the ships or that would provide for adequate money 
to keep the completed ships fully ready for war. . . . The Sec- 
retary . . . bases our Navy's strength on the total number of 
ships . . . without taking into consideration their actual material 
condition for war, or their being manned for war. . . . To be of 
service a ship must be in a material condition to fight, and it must 
have a crew not only sufficient to fight it but trained to fight it." 

From 1914 to 1916, funds were lacking to keep the ships 
in fighting trim. Even the best manned ship was woefully 
shorthanded and many vessels were laid up and so made use- 
less for war purposes, by the lack of officers and men. Cap- 
tain Laning said, 

" I personally know these things to be facts and the Depart- 
ment itself did not make sufficient effort to have them remedied, 
and they were not remedied. On the contrary such glowing ac- 
counts of the Navy, and its splendid condition and efficiency were 
given out that few, if any, outside the Navy realized the true con- 
dition. The Secretary's reports, his hearings before Congress, 
and his statements to the press at that time were to the effect that 
the Navy was entirely ready for war." 

From 1914 to 1917, said Laning, Congress showed every 
willingness to make the Navy ready for war, and to author- 
ize anything needed. The greatest need of all was for more 
men. Even then " the needs . . . were not truly presented 
to Congress. . . . The service was astounded to learn that 
the Department had recorded itself against any further in- 



164 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

crease of personnel, and this at a time when only about half 
our ships were manned with even peace complements !" 



IV 

Captain Laning went on to describe at length the shortage 
of men in the Navy and the resulting unpreparcdness for war 
in 1917. He quoted from his testimony before the House 
Naval Committee in December, 1918 (over a year before 
Admiral Sims' letter was written) when as Acting Chief 
of the Bureau of Navigation he had said : 

"At that time . . . (April, 1917) of our armoured cruisers 
... all but two were manned with partial crews so small the 
ships couldn't run. At League Island and other navy yards, we 
had a number of battleships laid up in reserve because we did 
not have enough people to operate them. We had about 25 de- 
stroyers half manned and a number of other ships that ought to 
have been in operation all the time and weren't even partly 
manned because we didn't have the officers and men even to half 
man them. . . . We began to enlist men by the tens of thou- 
sands . . . and these had to be trained. . . . We were in the 
predicament of not having personnel to man our ships and also of 
not having it even to train recruits to man them. A more diffi- 
cult and serious situation at the beginning of a great war can 
hardly be imagined. 

"Mr. Oliver. When was that? 

" Captain Laning. That was in 1917 at the beginning of the 
war with Germany. . . . Everywhere there was a cry for offi- 
cers and men that we did not have ... of all the vast Navy of 
the United States the only ships we had anywhere near ready 
were about half our battleships and destroyers and even they 
were not up to battle strength in personnel." 



In October, 1918, the Bureau of Navigation submitted to 
the Secretary of the Navy a statement for incorporation in 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 165 

his annual report with regard to the personnel situation in 
the Navy during the war. Captain Laning included in his 
testimony a copy of this official report of the Bureau, which 
began with the following statement: 

" At the time the United States entered tlie war, the person- 
nel of the Navy, while of a high standard, was entirely inadequate 
to meet the needs of war as it is waged today. Neither of en- 
listed men nor of officers were there enough to man the ships of 
the Navy that were then ready. It was possible to man and put 
into war operations those ships for which there were crews, but 
those ships were only a part of our available fighting force. The 
newer battleships and destroyers were manned and ready when 
war was declared, but the older sliips including battleships, 
armoured cruisers, destroyers, etc., had only half crews and a few 
were not even in commission. . . . Fortunately for us the enemy 
was not at our doors. The allied fleets that for nearly three years 
held the enemy sea forces in check were still sufficient to hold 
them enough longer to permit us to get our personnel ready. In 
this we were very fortunate, but we should not again let our navy 
personnel be so reduced that we cannot, on the declaration of 
war, put our full fighting forces into operation." 

The Secretary of the Navy suppressed this report and in 
his own annual report for 1918 gave a surprisingly different 
account of the condition of the Navy in 1917. Having this 
report of the Bureau of Navigation before him, he still had 
the audacity to write, on December 1, 1918, that on April 
6, 1917, the " Navy from stem to stern had been made ready 
to the fullest extent possible for any eventuality." 

VI 

In spite of the fact that the Navy Department had had 
" fairly accurate information of Germany's submarine build- 
ing program and of her intention to carry on unrestricted 
attacks on merchant shipping, . . . the Department failed 
to take steps to get the fleet ready for war." The Atlantic 



166 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Fleet was not sent to the yards for essential repairs, even 
after the breach of diplomatic relations, but was kept in 
Cuban waters at routine exercises. The result was clearly 
shown by Admiral Mayo in a report submitted at the time 
we entered the war of the repairs needed to get the ships 
ready for war service. Captain Laning testified that " it 
was found that it would take a period of over 100 days to get 
all battleships, even of the active fleet, materially ready for 
war." These were, moreover, the only vessels of the Navy 
that were even approximately prepared ! Yet, as Captain 
Laning said, " they were not ready at that time (April, 1917) 
either as to material or personnel." 



VII 

Captain Laning gave convincing evidence not only of the 
unpreparedness of the Navy for war, but also of the lack of 
plans or organization for meeting the emergencies created 
by war. As late as February 18, 1917, he, as the chief 
assistant in the material branch of Operations, had not heard 
of any plans. War then seemed close at hand, and Captain 
Laning felt that something should be done. He, therefore, 
submitted a memorandum calling attention to the lack of 
any plans and urging that a plan be prepared. 

In this memorandum he had said : 

" There seems to be no general plan for handling the immedi- 
ate menace. Without any other plan in mind than that developed 
to meet a situation in no way similar to the present situation, the 
Navy Department as a whole is proceeding with its task as if 
there was nothing new in the situation. . . . Not knowing what 
general plan must be followed in a situation like the present, 
practically the whole Department is at a standstill in preparing 
for it. . . . The country believes we are at least ready to put a 
plan of some sort in operation and I feel that we are not doing 
our duty if we fail to do so." 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 167 

Captains V. O. Chase, W. V. Pratt and F. H. Schofield 
of the Office of Operations finally drew up, in March, 1917, 
the general outlines of a plan to meet the immediate situation. 
This provided specifically for the use of the emergency fund 
voted by Congress on March 3, 1917. It received the ap- 
proval of Admiral Benson, but was never put into effect, as 
the Secretary declined to approve it, for the reason that he 
insisted on deciding himself on all expenditures. Neither 
this nor any other administrative plan was put into effect 
even after war began. 

The result, as Captain Laning described it, was that 

" no one knew what to do. The Bureau of Ordnance, not having 
any definite plan to provide guns and ammunition for, was forced 
to order them for all kinds of projects, whether or not such might 
be feasible in the war. . . . The Bureau of Supplies and Ac- 
counts had no information on which to base their purchase of 
supplies and was forced to buy, not what actually would be 
needed, but what they guessed they might possibly be called on 
for. . . . 

" A month or so after the armistice was signed Admiral Mc- 
Gowan, Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, said to 
me: ' Do you remember the plan you tried to put through at 
the outbreak of war, that provided for handling the emergency 
fund, and which the Secretary wouldn't approve. God, man, if 
he only had done it. The way things have gone . . . we have 
over expended the emergency fund by about $165,000,000! ' 

" The Bureau of Navigation had no idea of what they should 
do as to providing personnel. Every bureau and every office was 
in a similar predicament. 

". . . Not having a definite general plan to work on, the 
operating part of the Department was in quite as much of a 
quandary as the material part. Instead of concentrating on a 
broad and clearly defined plan, the Navy began the war with 
merely a series of efforts exerted in several directions, and only 
co-ordinated as each received consideration in one office, that of 
the Chief of Naval Operations." 



168 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

VIII 

To this lack of plans and the resulting confusion after 
war began, Captain Laning attributed the delays and hesi- 
tations of the early months of the war. Under the circum- 
stances it was impossible for Admiral Benson to " send to 
Admiral Sims the anti-submarine craft that were wanted so 
badly on the other side " or " to tell Admiral Sims what 
forces were ultimately to be sent to the war zone. . . . In- 
stead of having his original plan approved that he might put 
the machinery of our great Navy to work to carry it out 
... he was compelled to sink himself in details and get 
approval of first one and then another part of his plans. . . . 
Under the guidance of the Chief of Naval Operations, the 
Navy's efforts did ultimately follow a correct and sound 
general plan." Even this, however, was never laid down on 
paper nor was it ever formally approved. 

Nor had Captain Laning any doubt of the cause of the 
confusion and delay in our war efforts, resulting from un- 
preparedness and lack of suitable war plans. The Secretary 
of the Navy was himself responsible, for, as Captain Laning 
testified : 

" It was the personal characteristics of the Secretary of the 
Navy that often made it impossible to get approval of the really 
important policies. I found this myself, and many others found 
it. . . . 

" Whenever a plan or a policy was presented to the Secretary 
he almost invariably delayed action on it. The personal interest 
taken by him in all matters connected with the Department ab- 
sorbed so much of his time that he never had much left to give to 
us on the more important affairs. Therefore when we would 
present something important, even though it might be urgent, 
we could secure only a few minutes to discuss it. We would gen- 
erally be directed to leave the paper with him for consideration. 
Now it is remarkable but true that papers left for ' considera- 
tion ' were for the most part not heard of again until the officer 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 169 

who presented the paj^er hunted it out. Frequently wlien it was 
followed up the paj^er could not be found. If it was founds there 
would usually be some reason for not approving it or of further 
delaying action. We always considered it much easier to get up 
a sound plan or policy than it was to get permission or authority 
to carry it out. It generally took longer to get approval, when 
we succeeded in getting it at all, than it did to formulate the plan 
or policy. This condition finally became so bad that officers used 
every means possible to put their plans and policies through with- 
out obtaining the required authority. 

" My own difficulties in this respect were probably greater than 
those of officers who had only to get approval of plans or poli- 
cies, for not only did I have papers of that kind to present but 
also, being in charge of the officer personnel division, I had to pre- 
pare the vast number of orders to officers, commissions, etc., that 
the Secretary by law or by his orders had to sign." 



IX 

The officers in the Department, finding that they could not 
get the approval of the Secretary for measures of vital neces- 
sity, assumed responsibility and did what was necessary, 
even in some cases contrary to the express orders of Mr. 
Daniels. A number of instances, cited by Captain Laning, 
and fully corroborated later by Captain Palmer and other 
officers, were the following: 

" As you no doubt know, the Bureau of Navigation is responsi- 
ble for the personnel of the Navy. The mission of the Bureau is 
to obtain, train and distribute personnel. Early in the war the 
Bureau realized that it could rarely obtain approval of its plans 
for performing its mission in the war and from that time on the 
Bureau was forced to assume much more authority in those mat- 
ters than actually belonged to it. In spite of failure to get 
plans for obtaining men approved and even in spite of repeated 
orders not to take men into the reserves. Admiral Palmer directed 
that they be taken in and we took them in. Captain Palmer him- 
self can give you further information on this point. When it 



170 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

came to plans for training men, approval was equally hard to get. 
Captain Palmer and Captain E. L. Bennett can give you some in- 
teresting details of their difficulties in that line and of how they 
frequently went ahead and did things without having authority to 
do them. As for the distribution of personnel, the Secretary of 
course rarely knew about the distribution except in the case of 
officers. But in the case of officers I met a most remarkable atti- 
tude in regard to sending officers not attached to ships abroad for 
duty in the war area. I made it one of the rules of the office that 
when Admiral Sims asked for officers he was to get them but I 
always had lots of trouble getting such orders signed. As a mat- 
ter of fact, not once, but several times, during the war the Secre- 
tary told me, and told the Chief of Bureau too, that he didn't 
•want any more officers sent abroad. Of course they had to go 
and we sent them by the simple process of assuming an authority 
we did not have and issuing the orders and passports ourselves." 

Captain Laning submitted documents proving long delays 
after we entered the war in placing contracts for shells 
and torpedoes ; in repairing the vessels of the Navj ; in taking 
over the German ships for use as troop transports and in de- 
ciding on the program of building destroyers. 

These cases all demonstrated the tremendous efforts made 
by the officers in the Department to get on with the war, 
and showed, in Captain Laning's words, " what lengths we 
were put to, to get approval of vitally important matters 
and how such matters were delayed through the difficulties 
in getting approval. That these difficulties made the Navy's 
task much harder is certain; what the resulting delays cost 
in lives and treasure no one can even guess. 

" I was and still am amazed that the Navy was able to 
accomplish the remarkable work it did, but it is certain that 
what it did accomplish could have been accomplished much 
more quickly and much more efficiently . . . if we could have 
had a plan from the very start." 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 171 



Much of Captain Laning's testimony had referred to the 
personnel situation before and during the war. Every state- 
ment he had made with regard to the inadequate number of 
officers and men, the Secretary's responsibility for this con- 
dition, and the way in which the naval officers achieved re- 
sults by ignoring the Secretary was fully confirmed by the 
next witness called, Captain Leigh C. Palmer, who was Chief 
of the Bureau of Navigation from August, 1916, to Novem- 
ber, 1918. 

It was also corroborated by Captain J. K. Taussig, who 
had been in the Enlisted Personnel Division from April, 1912, 
to May, 1915, and again from September, 1918, to May, 
1919, and who had commanded the first division of destroyers 
that arrived at Queenstown on May 4, 1917. 

Every naval officer who testified, in fact, fully admitted 
that conditions were as described by Captains Laning, Pal- 
mer and Taussig. Officers called at the request of Mr. 
Daniels tried to explain and excuse the facts. They did not 
question them. Only Mr. Daniels did that. 

Captain Palmer testified that when he made his first review 
of the personnel situation, in October, 1916, he found that 
" we were approximately 950 regular officers short and 1,600 
to 1,700 reserve officers short, and in the case of enlisted 
men 28,000 regulars and 23,000 reserves short ... of the 
number required to man the vessels which the Chief of Naval 
Operations said were necessary to be manned for mobiliza- 
tion ; and we had this shortage after we made use of the 9,000 
militia. . . . This was an actual shortage and did not in- 
clude a percentage for sickness and transfers, etc. . . . nor 
any working surplus as a reserve." This, too, was a shortage 
of the number required for a peace and not a icur basis. 

The Bureau in 1916 had appealed to Congress for 40,000 
more men. The Secretary had only asked 10,000 additional. 



172 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

and Congress finally authorized an increase of 23,000 in 
August, 1916. Until war began, Captain Palmer had been 
able to do very little, therefore, to remedy the shortage in 
men. The naval reserve, authorized in 1916, had been put 
under the direction of the Bureau of Navigation, by a gen- 
eral order signed by Admiral Benson one day when he was 
acting Secretary, while both Mr. Daniels and the Assistant 
Secretary, Mr. Roosevelt, were away from Washington. 
This gave Palmer the power to expand the reserve force in- 
definitely without further reference to the Secretary. He 
enrolled as many men as possible in the reserve and continued 
to do so in spite of repeated orders from Mr. Daniels, 
throughout 1917, to stop enrollments. 



XI 

In discussing the Navy's war efforts Captain Palmer said : 

" The shortage of regular personnel at the declaration of war 
was, of course, the initial handicap of the Navy's activities, be- 
cause the Navy had to begin at once to send officers and men 
afloat." 

Once war began and the Bureau was allowed a free hand, 
it went ahead with the work of recruiting and training men. 
The Navy in a year and a half was expanded ten fold. A 
wonderful work was done. But this work was accomphshed 
by naval officers, acting on their own initiative. 
J The Secretary hindered this work in many ways. In spite 

of the fact that few regular officers of the Navy were avail- 
able for recruiting duty, the Secretary refused to allow re- 
tired officers to be so employed. 

He opposed Palmer's efforts to increase the number of 
officers, and make up part of the shortage of over 3,000 from 
the number that would be needed in war, by increasing the 
number of midshipmen at Annapolis and by reducing the 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 173 

course temporarily from four years to three. Palmer per- 
suaded Congress to authorize this against the Secretary's 
opposition. 

The Secretary' also repeatedly ordered enrollments stopped 
and declined to authorize the establishment of schools and 
the building of training camps on a scale commensurate with 
the needs of the Navy. Captain Palmer testified that these 
things had to be done, and that " I decided that it was up 
to me to prepare . . . and to take the responsibility for 
going ahead and working up this organization ... so that 
I would be prepared for anything." . . . 

" The Chairman: And you took matters in your own hands 
and went ahead? 

" Captain Palmer: Yes, I did. I did not. however, until 
after I had exhausted every means to get the thing done. / think 
the whole thing was due to procrastination. 

" The Chairman: On the part of the Secretary? 

" Captain Palmer: Yes, sir. 

" The Chairman: Did the Secretary give you any reasons for 
delaying the carrying out of the plan.'' 

" Captain Palmer: Well, no reasons, of course that appealed 
to me, or appealed to our people that were charged with person- 
nel ; but he would say ' We have too many men now. We don't 
want any more.' 

" The Chairman: This was within two or three months im- 
mediately preceding the war? 

" Captain Palmer: And after the war began. . . . That was 
due to a lack of appreciation of what was required in order to get 
the men together. ... I knew that if I did not have them on 
time I would not be doing what I was ordered to do. . . . On the 
one hand I was pushed by Operations to get them, and on the 
other hand I could not make any headway with the Department 
(i. e. Secretary Daniels) in getting the necessary authority. . . . 
For instance take the subject of housing the men. ... I simply 
got the statement, after many trials and after presenting the 
thing in the most forcible manner: ' We have no appropriation.' 
. . . But still Operations wanted me to do these things. ... I 



174 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

decided it was best to go ahead and take the steps necessary . . . 
even if we did not have the appropriations or the authority." 

Captain Palmer knew from his experience with Congress 
that they would refuse, during the war, no reasonable re- 
quest. Consequently, he thought that " there was no reason 
for a delay of months, and the best thing would be to go 
ahead with it. ... So I arranged, for instance, with the 
Captains of the Training Stations, particularly with the 
Great Lakes Training Station ... to go ahead with the 
work without having full authority of Congress . . . when 
the Department would not take the responsibility, I went 
ahead, with the full assistance of the Commandants at the 
stations." 

Congress justified Captain Palmer's action by ap- 
propriating money for work already completed in many 
cases ; and completed, too, without Mr. Daniels ever know- 
ing about it. He was unaware that the Great Lakes sta- 
tion was being enlarged, to care for nearly 50,000 men, 
until the expansion was practically completed and he visited 
Cliicago on a speaking tour. Then he was pleased with the 
achievement and made a speech about the foresightedness of 
his administration in preparing so wisely for the emergency ! 

XII 

Captain Palmer gave many instances of the difficulties im- 
posed upon the Bureau of Navigation by the lack of any gen- 
eral war plans. 

" We had no plans, we had only a mobilization sheet . . . stat- 
ing the vessels which would be required for mobilization. . . . 
We had no definite plan on which to base future assignments. I 
could not go on the plan that we were going to go into battleship 
warfare or submarine warfare or anything of the kind. I could 
not look far enough ahead and specialize on those people both as 
regards numbers and duties." 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 175 

On the contrarj', the Bureau of Navigation would be told 
to provide for crews for certain ships within ten days or a 
month. Each project was handled separately. There was 
no general co-ordination, such as adequate war plans would 
have provided. 

On one occasion in March, 1917, said Captain Palmer: 

" I understood that a plan was being prepared in Operations 
and I went up and asked for it several times . . . because it was 
very valuable for me to have such a plan, so that I could place the 
personnel in a logical way and endeavor to train them; but I 
was told there was a plan in progress ; that they were getting up 
one at that time. That was just before the war. I heard again 
that it was being drawn up, during the first months of the war. 
But I did not get that plan. I do not know whether it was ac- 
tually gotten out or not. . . . 

" When I found that there was not any plan such as I ex- 
pected them to have, and we could not get a definite order of the 
kind (telling us what to do), I went ahead and made my own plan. 
To be sure, that is not a very good way to do, because I did not 
have the information which should have been had before you try 
to work out any plan. . . ." 

In default of any general departmental war plan, there- 
fore, the Bureau of Navigation had to guess what might be 
required of it, and do its best to meet any demands that might 
be made, without receiving in advance any indication at all 
as to what these demands might be. 

XIII 

Captain Palmer, like every other officer, felt that " the 
results accomplished by the Navy were perfectly wonder- 
ful during the war. I would say that they were accomplished 
in spite of the obstacle of not having people to start with, 
and having a short time to train. . . ." 

In .concluding his testimony Captain Palmer said he did 
not know how long the delays of the Navy Department pro- 



176 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

longed the war. He was quite clear, however, as to the 
causes of the delays, as the following passage indicates : 

" I should say that all those delays we had were simply due to 
postponement — xvell I guess ' procrastination ' would he the 
word — and when I found things could not be done^ after taking 
every step I could, I went ahead and provided a personnel, so 
we did not really have many delays, as far as the personnel was 
concerned, in winning the war. I would not say that we had a 
week's delay or a month's delay as far as the Bureau of Naviga- 
tion was concerned. But I do not know about the general 
plan." 

XIV 

Captain Taussig, in his testimony, described in detail the 
reasons for the personnel shortage in 1917. The Navy had 
been short of men from the beginning of the Daniels ad- 
ministration. This had been recognized in 1914, but nothing 
was done by the Navy Department to remedy the situation. 
Captain Taussig said: 

" Unless measures had been taken as early as 1914 to place our 
personnel on a proper and adequate basis, it could not possibly 
have been done by the time this country declared war, two and a 
half years later. 

" From 191 !• on the policy of the Department in regard to per- 
sonnel — and especially the enlisted force — was such that the 
Navy was far from being ready for war when we became a bel- 
ligerent. 

"In 1914, while on duty in the Bureau of Navigation, it was 
evident, and clearly recognized by the officer in charge of enlisted 
personnel and myself, his assistant, that the enlisted personnel 
was entirely inadequate for the proper manning of our already 
completed ships on a peace basis and dangerously deficient should 
we be suddenly thrown into war. 

" These facts were repeatedly brought to the attention of the 
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (then Rear Admiral Victor 
Blue) . . . and a memorandum was prepared showing that to 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 177 

man the ships and stations, even in accordance with the inade- 
quate peace complements, the authorized strength of the Navy- 
was more than 18,000 men short of what was needed. ... As 
new construction was being completed for which additional per- 
sonnel was needed, the unsatisfactory conditions in regard to 
personnel were continually growing worse. . . . These unsatis- 
factory conditions . . . continued to exist up to the time that the 
United States entered the war." 

XV 

The evidence submitted by Captain Taussig proved that 
Secretary Daniels, with the assistance of his friend from 
North Carolina, Rear Admiral Blue, had not only prevented 
the Navy from having the men it needed, but had declared 
to Congress that no such need existed. The following in- 
cident was cited: 

"The General Board of the Navy, in its 1914 annual report 
to the Secretary of the Navy, recognized that the unsatisfactory 
personnel situation greatly impaired the efficiency of the Fleet, 
and made recommendation to the Department that an additional 
19,600 enlisted men be immediately requested The Secretary 
of the Navy did not accept the report of the Board with this 
recommendation, but returned it to the Board with the request 
that all mention of a numerical increase be eliminated. This the 
Board did, in order that the other important features of the re- 
port be not lost to the public. . . ." 

The Secretary in his annual report for 1914 stated: 

" By wisely utilizing the present personnel all ships of the class 
named (in the General Board Report) can be maintained in full 
commission without addition to the present enlistment and there- 
fore no legislation is needed to carry out their recommendations. 
This is clearly shown in the report of the Chief of the Bureau 
of Navigation. . , ." 

Captain Taussig commented very forcibly on this state- 
ment of the Secretary ; 



178 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" The figures submitted by the Chief of the Bureau . . . did 
not allow for adequate complements for the ships mentioned in 
the General Board's report and did not provide for nucleus 
crews for the other 225 ships of the Navy required manned by the 
General Board. As the officer in the Bureau of Navigation who 
actually worked out the details of the enlisted personnel to ships 
and stations. ... I know that the personnel as it existed at that 
time could not be utilized so as to maintain ships as recommended 
by the General Board. 

" The General Board had found that in order to carry out its 
recommendations an immediate increase of 19,600 men of the ac- 
tive Navy was needed. 

" We in the Enlisted Personnel Division who were charged 
with the administration of the personnel found that the immediate 
increase should be approximately 19,000 men. 

" The Secretary requested no additions for the active enlisted 
force. Consequently the unsatisfactory personnel situation con- 
tinued." 



XVI 

In the course of his testimony, Captain Taussig stated 
that " while in the Bureau of Navigation, and immediately 
after leaving the Bureau in 1915, I made an exhaustive study 
of the whole navy personnel situation. The official records 
were at my disposal and I had an experience of three years 
in the administration of the enlisted personnel force of the en- 
tire Navy. This study resulted in my writing in 1915 a 
paper on the subject of naval personnel." 

This paper was submitted to the Naval. Institute, was 
awarded " first honourable mention " in the essay contest 
for 1915, and was accepted for publication. " In accord- 
ance with Navy Regulations," said Captain Taussig, " the 
Department's authority for publication was requested. The 
Navy Department refused authority for its publication, with- 
out giving reasons, and as a result it has never been printed." 

The chairman asked Captain Taussig to submit a copy to 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 



179 



the Committee, and it was accordingly printed in the record 
of the Hearings. The main points of interest, in regard 
to the personnel situation of the Navy in 1915, as summar- 
ized by Captain Taussig are : 

" 1. The allowed complements of ships in commission were 
' peace ' complements and were from 15 to 30 per cent, less than 
would be required for war. 

" 2. In spite of the inadequacy of the peace complements the 
ships did not even have these allowed peace numbers on board, 
— the battleships in full commission having an average of 100 
vacancies per ship in the enlisted force. 

" 3. There were 42 ships (on the General Board's list) with 
only 3/10 of their peace complements on board. 16 ships with 
only 1/10 of their peace complements on board, 38 ships out of 
commission with no naval personnel on board. No personnel was 
available to fill these up. 

" 4. There were in the Navy in 1915, a total of 1920 commis- 
sioned line officers and 53,000 enlisted men. 

" 5. To put what material we had (plus 75 auxiliaries to be 
immediately purchased) in operation for war there would be im- 
mediately required a total of 4,440 line officers and 106,900 en- 
listed men, which was 2,520 line officers and 53.900 men more 
than we had in actual service." 



XVII 

Captain Taussig gave extracts from many official reports 
sent the Department from 1915 to 1917, inviting attention 
to the distressing results of the shortage of men. The bat- 
tleship force, which was better supplied than any other part 
of the Navy, was 5,000 men short in 1915, as was officially 
reported by tlie Commander-in-Chief, Admiral F. F. Fletcher. 
The shortage continued up to the time we entered war, as a 
result of the Secretary's incorrect report in 1914, and his 
refusal to request the increases needed. 

The entire Navy, for several years prior to the entrance 



180 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

of this country into the war and up to the time of actual 
hostilities, was not as efficient as it should have been, because 
of this lack of necessary personnel. 

Captain Taussig, who had commanded destroyers in the 
war zone, testified that 

" while the destroyers could operate against submarines with 
some degree of success, I am safe in saying that not a single 
one of our destroyers in the war zone, shortly after the turn- 
over in personnel (to provide crews for new destroyers) com- 
menced, was in really satisfactory or efficient condition for tak- 
ing part in a fleet action or engaging enemy destroyers. It 
would have taken at least four months period of preparation 
with stable crews, away from the war zone before they could 
have been expected to operate successfully. 

". . . This procedure of depleting the destroyers in the war 
zone was absolutely necessary under the existing conditions, in 
order that the new destroyers could operate. . . . But such pro- 
cedure should not have been necessary, nor would it have been 
necessary had our personnel been adequate at the beginning of 
the war." 

XVIII 

In concluding his testimony, Captain Taussig summarized 
the evidence he had introduced. " It is evident," he said, 
" that the following facts have been established : 

" 1. That when the World War started in 1914 the person- 
nel of the United States Navy was entirely inadequate for peace 
purposes and deplorably deficient should this country be thrown 
into the war, an event which was apt to occur at any time. 

" 2. That this deplorable and unsatisfactory condition of the 
personnel was brought to the department's attention by the Gen- 
eral Board of the Navy, by the commander in chief of the At- 
lantic Fleet, by the officers of the Enlisted Personnel Division 
of the Bureau of Navigation, and by many other officers of high 
rank. 



PACIFISM AND PROCRASTINATION 181 

" 3. "That these same officers made repeated and emphatic 
recommendations to the department that immediate steps be 
taken to remedy these unsatisfactory conditions, showing con- 
clusively in their reports and recommendations that the effi- 
ciency of the entire Navy was adversely affected by the great 
shortage of personnel. 

" 4. That the department not only ignored these recommen- 
dations but took steps to prevent the reports as to the unsatis- 
factory personnel conditions from being made public, and the 
Secretary of the Navy in his annual report to the President in 
the fall of 1914, stated that the numerical strength of the en- 
listed personnel was adequate, and in his report of 1915 that 
only an additional 10,000 men were needed, while the General 
Board in its 1914 report had stated that 19,600 men were im- 
mediately needed. 

" 5, That the department did not take adequate steps to pro- 
vide personnel absolutely necessary for proper conduct of the 
Navy on even a peace basis, with a result that when this coun- 
try entered the war in 1917 the ships of the fleet were not as 
efficient as they should have been and for a large number of 
ships there was no trained personnel at all. 

" 6. The policy of the department in regard to personnel was 
one of unpreparedness rather than of preparedness. Such 
steps as were finally taken were too late to place the personnel 
on a proper basis by the time this country became involved in 
the war a few months later. 

" 7. That as a result of this department policy of unprepar- 
edness the larger part of the shijDs of the Navy operated 
throughout the war with inadequately trained personnel, and 
in consequence they were not as efficient as they should have 
been. 

" 8. That the efficiency of the destroyers in the war zone was 
decreased by the necessity caused by our unprepared personnel 
of sending many of their most efficient men to the United States 
to form nucleus crews for the new destroyers. 

" 9. That unless these nucleus crews had been taken from 
those destroyers actually operating in the face of the enemy the 
department would not have been able to provide sufficient 



182 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

trained personnel for the new destroyers to permit their operat- 



ing 



10. That the new destroyers commissioned during the war 
were not efficient for fighting purposes on account of the large 
proportion of untrained personnel on each one." 



CHAPTER XI 

UNPREPAREDNESS FOR WAR; EVIDENCE FROM 
THE FLEET 

(The Testimony of Rear-Admirals Plunkett, Grant 
AND Mayo) 

I 

THE testimony of Captains Laning, Palmer and Taussig 
proved that the departmental policy prior to 1917 had been 
one " of unpreparedness rather than preparedness " so far 
as the personnel of the Navy was concerned. Captain Lan- 
ing's testimony had shown a similar unpreparedness in the 
material condition of the ships, in lack of plans and in the in- 
decision and " procrastination " of the Department's heads. 
Further corroborative evidence of the existence of a chaotic 
state of unpreparedness from 1914 to 1917 was provided 
by the testimony of Admirals Plunkett, Grant and Mayo, 
who were the next witnesses to be examined. 

II 

Rear Admiral C. P. Plunkett had been Inspector of Target 
Practice in the Navy Department from December, 1915, to 
July, 1918, when he went abroad to command the Navy's ll*- 
inch railway batteries on the Western Front. 

Admiral Plunkett's testimony was characteristic of the 

man in its honest bluntness and vivid effectiveness. No one 

could have characterized Mr. Daniels' procrastination and 

unwillingness to pay heed to the Navy's readiness for war 

more strikingly. He said, for example: 

183 



184 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" When I took over the duties of gunnery training in the 
Navy Department I went to Mr. Daniels and stated in the most 
positive manner that there could be no gunnery without people,, 
and we did not have the people. To make a long story short. I 
argued with him first and last, for two years, without ever mak- 
ing any impression upon him whatever. ... I want to say 
right now that in all my dealings with Mr. Daniels I have never 
been treated with greater courtesy by any one, but he is the only 
man I ever had anything to do with that I practically left lit- 
tle or no impression upon. . . ." 

The gunnery exercises in the fleet brought home to all 
officers the fact 

" that we were terribly undermanned, and it was those reports 
that Captain Taussig speaks of here, which flowed over my desk 
in volumes, which kept me pegging away at the Secretary of the 
Navy all the time asking for more men. . . . 

" It may seem odd that as I was a subordinate officer I took 
those memoranda to the Secretary of the Navy; but I assure 
you that I took them there because the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions had exhausted all the talk he had in his system. 

" The Chairman: Who was the Chief of Naval Operations? 

"Admiral Plunkett: Admiral Benson. He said 'If you 
can get them, go and get them. I cannot get them.' " 



III 

Admiral Plunkett testified that as a result of Admiral 
Mayo's insistence on gunnery improvements and as a result 
of even slight increases in the crews, the gunnery of the At- 
lantic Fleet, in March, 1917, was " at the highest state of 
efficiency that it has been in the history of the American 
Navy." He went on to say, however, that " that applied 
only to the ships that were in commission with the fleet," 
and that " we were still undermanned." 

The shortage of men resulted in the immediate destruction 
of the gunnery efficiency of the fleet when war began. Such 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 185 

efficiency depends upon long training of the crews and on 
permanence of the personnel. The outbreak of war made it 
necessary to take half the trained men off the battleships and 
destroyers in order to provide armed guards for merchant 
vessels and to man the destroyers, cruisers and other vessels 
that had been practically without crews when war began. 
The outbreak of war inevitably destroyed, therefore, the ef- 
ficiency of the only vessels that were even approximately pre- 
pared for war in 1917. 

Admiral Plunkett was very emphatic on this point. " The 
trouble began," he said, " just before our entry into the 
war, and continued right along practically the whole of the 
year 1917." They had to take off the battleships nearly 
all the trained officers and men for other vessels. " That was 
the beginning of the downfall, you might say, of the fleet 
efficiency ; and I have seen nothing on record to indicate that 
they have ever fully recovered it." 

This depletion of the trained personnel very soon de- 
stroyed the efficiency of all the battleships, including those 
that Admiral Rodman took abroad. Concerning these Ad- 
miral Plunkett said: 

" They were very much depleted of the number of officers 
they had in the spring of the year . . . and had practically 
only a nucleus of those officers; and naturally they were not 
ready for battle when they got over there. . . . With 75 per 
cent, of green men on a ship, the wildest imagination would not 
claim that that ship was ready for battle." 



IV 

The desperate shortage of personnel that occurred when 
war came occasioned no surprise to Admiral Plunkett or to 
the officers in the Department. " We had been a long time 
trying to get more men and to impress upon everybody 
that a navy without men was no navy, and that a ship 



186 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

without a proper complement was no ship. We had not had 
any luck and when war actually did come upon us we were 
shorthanded, and it was nothing but the natural instinct 
of the American that saved the day." Even so, our fleet 
" was not ready for war at the end of the war, because it 
takes years to train officers and men to conduct the gunnery 
of a modern battleship." . . . 

" Unless you keep them fully ready for war, they are not 
worth the money you are spending on them, because every- 
thing is absent when a ship does not understand that the rea- 
son of their existence is their ability to fight and fight effec- 
tively; and a ship which is undermanned cannot fight effec- 
tively, no matter what the skill of the people may be." 

The shortage of personnel was such in 1917 that our un- 
preparedness was criminal. Admiral Plunkett made this 
point with picturesque emphasis. All the material may have 
been ready, but the fleet as a fighting unit was not ready. 

" The truth of the matter is that if we had been up against 
Germany at the outbreak of this war we would be paying the 
indemnity today instead of their paying it; and all because we 
did not have a sufficient personnel ship for ship right through 
the line. As we know their gunnery, although they stood the 
British on their heads at the Battle of Jutland, we were ready 
for them if we had had the men. We did not have them. 
The reason we did not have them is because Mr. Daniels would 
not let us get them. He would not let us argue with the com- 
mittees in Congress, would not let us do anything toward get- 
ting more men, in spite of the fact that everybody from the 
top clean through to the bottom knew that we must have 
men. . . ." 



Admiral Plunkett brought out with equal force the result 
of entering the war, as we did, without war plans. Instead 
of using our forces effectively against the enemy, we were 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 187 

swayed by indecision and inertia and adopted a purely de- 
fensive policy, at least during the first months of the war. 
Admiral Plunkett said: 

" I think you must realize by this time that we had no plan 
when we entered the war — no war plan. We had a mobiliza- 
tion plan, that is, a list of ships and the number of men and 
officers to go on them, but there was no plan for making war — 
using those ships for war purposes. As soon as we entered 
the war, I expect the Chief of Naval Operations was flooded 
with all sorts of suggestions. . , . But all our suggestions were 
based on a lack of information. 

" There was no plan for the offensive action. Whatever plans 
there were, or whatever plans were first evolved were entirely 
defensive. ... In the absence of any plan the most natural 
thing to do is to take the defensive until you find out ' where 
you are at ' and that was our situation. 

". . . The truth of this matter is that when we entered the 
war we were forced to take the defensive. . . . The first move 
was the organization of the patrol forces of the Atlantic coast; 
a purely defensive measure. 

". . . The change from a purely defensive attitude to an 
offensive attitude came about through a realization that the war 
was over there and not over here." 

VI 

Rear Admiral A. W. Grant gave much valuable evidence 
concerning the part of our submarines and reserve battle- 
ships in the war. From June, 1915, to August, 1917, he 
had commanded the submarine force. After August 20, 
1917, he commanded Battleship Force One, composed of the 
older battleships, which were used in the war to train men 
and occasionally to escort convoys. 

In discussing the condition of our submarines, Admiral 
Grant stated tliat at the time we entered the war we had 
not a single submarine fit for war service. In spite of his 
efforts from 1915 to 1917' " there was very little that could 



188 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

be done to get the submarines in an efficient condition for 
war or for any other purpose on account of the unreliability 
of poorly designed engines." 

In 1915, Admiral Grant had invited the attention of the 
Department to this fact, and had urged the construction 
of 800-ton submarines of a serviceable type, but " it took 
more than two years of propaganda to bring Department 
officials to recognize the importance of having a submarine 
capable of performing equal duty with the German 800-ton 
U-boats." 

The Congressional committee had been the first to take 
any steps toward improving the Submarine Force. The 
members of the General Board had opposed a more efficient 
type of submarine. The Chief of Operations and the Chief 
of Bureaus were " aware of the condition of the Submarine 
Force, but nothing was done by them. The result was, as 
Admiral Grant testified, that in April, 1917, " we had none 
suitable for entering the war." 

VII 

Admiral Grant also confirmed the testimony of previous 
witnesses concerning the lack of any war plan. When asked 
about such plans, he said : 

" I do not recall ever having received a plan from the Navy 
Department, looking to the use of the available submarines in 
the war. I did, however, plan to operate them from bases on 
this coast." 

The first intimation he had received that submarines might 
be used in the war zone came on July 2, 1917, in the form 
of an order from the Chief of Naval Operations, directing 
him to prepare the twelve most suitable submarines for serv- 
ice in European waters. These were to be ready to sail on 
August 15th. 

This order Admiral Grant carried out to the best of his 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 189 

ability although, as he informed the Department, all the 
submarines were inefficient. He reported officially, for ex- 
ample that " considering the facts concerning the 12 desig- 
nated boats: (a) unreliability of engines, (b) their fixed 
periscopes, (c) five of the 12 do not carry guns, (d) lack of 
habitability and radius of action ; I am of the opinion that, 
should the expedition arrive safely in European waters, the 
majority of the vessels would be laid up continually for re- 
pairs, as all of them have been (except the E-1) since being 
placed in commission." 

His prophecy was borne out, at least in the case of four 
K-boats sent to the Azores. These were laid up for repairs 
the greater part of the time. 



VIII 

When Admiral Grant assumed command of the 18 battle- 
ships of the Reserve Force, on August 20, 1917, he found 
that they were " sadly in need of urgent repairs." In spite 
of his representations " none of these vessels were permitted 
dui-ing 1917 and the winter of 1917-1918 to visit a navy 
yard for a longer period than 10 days." ..." Obviously 
nothing was accomplished at the navy yards, beyond the 
routine docking work." 

On December 3, 1917, an order was received directing 
that " all units of the fleet shall be maintained at all times in 
such condition that it will be practicable to proceed on 
distant service at any time after filling up with fuel." Few 
of Admiral Grant's force were fit for war service. None 
had an adequately trained crew. Yet from August, 1917, 
to April, 1918, he was unable to get even the most neces- 
sary repairs done, in spite of repeated requests. These 
repairs would have required from 30 to 50 days for each 
ship. Their condition was such that Admiral Grant said: 
" I doubt whether a single one of these vessels could have 



190 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

remained afloat in August, 1917, had they received a serious 
underwater body explosion at that time." 

In the case of these battleships, as with the submarines, 
" there was not a single vessel," so Admiral Grant testified, 
that was ready for war in April, 1917, either as to personnel 
or as to material. Nor was there a single one of these 
battleships ready for war in September, 1917. 

IX 

The Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet from 1917 
to 1919 was Admiral H. T. Mayo. He was called to testify 
before the Senate committee on March 30, 1920, three weeks 
after the investigation had begun. 

Admiral Mayo's testimony was largely devoted to a run- 
ning narrative in chronological order, of his activities from 
February 2, 1917, until the armistice. He told the story 
of the developments day by day, in so far as the Atlantic 
Fleet was concerned. He included also an account of his mis- 
sions abroad in 1917 and in 1918, and a report of the naval 
conference of September, 1917, in London, which he had at- 
tended as the representative of the Navy Department. 

In some few details. Admiral Mayo took issue with cer- 
tain of the previous witnesses. In all essentials, however, 
his testimony was in complete harmony with theirs, 
especially in regard to the condition of the Navy in 1917; 
the absence of war plans ; the failure to get into the war 
offensively in the early months ; and the violation of sound 
military principles by the Navy Department, especially 
in handling from Washington details of operations which 
should have been left to the commanders afloat. 



In discussing the activities of the Navy Department from 
1913 to 1917, Admiral Mayo again emphasized the failure to 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 191 

provide the fleet with adequate personnel. The outbreak of 
war in Europe, he said, " forced attention to the unsatisfac- 
tory condition of the fleet." Plans were made to assemble 
the fleet and put it in as good shape as possible. These 
could not be carried out until 1915, however, as the Secre- 
tary kept the battleships in Mexican waters on gunboat duty. 
The attempt to get the vessels into good condition, 

" emphasized the fact that available personnel was not suffi- 
cient. . . . This subject became acute and was discussed and 
considered by the Department and Congress. The discussion 
continued but did not result in the addition of any adequate 
number of trained men or officers to the fleet prior to our entry 
into the war. 

" In August, 1916, additional personnel was authorized. 
Our entry into the war came before these increases became ef- 
fective." 

When the battleships went to Cuban waters for training 
in 1916, many vessels " owing to the shortage of personnel " 
were left behind in reserve. " The shortage of personnel 
was as acute as before." 

In 1916, when the Reserve Fleet was placed under Ad- 
miral Mayo's command, " there was inadequate personnel 
available to place these ships in anything like the condition 
desired." 



XI 

At the time of the breach of diplomatic relations, the At- 
lantic Fleet was in Guantanamo Bay. At this time, the Fleet 
consisted of 12 battleships, 22 destroyers and 6 other vessels, 
a total of 40 units out of the 300 then on the Navy list. 

Plans were prepared for the defence of the fleet against 
submarines and a campaign order was issued providing 
against any surprise attack. On February 5th, the fleet left 
Guantanamo for the Gulf of Guacanayabo, where it could be 



192 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

more easily protected. It remained at anchor in this Cuban 
bay until the end of March. The exchange of messages be- 
tween Admiral Mayo and the Department, indicates that 
almost the only subject considered was the defence of the fleet 
against attack, in these sheltered waters three thousand miles 
from the enemy ! 

On February 12, 1917, the Department cabled: "Do you 
feel that the fleet is properly protected from possible sub- 
marine attack? If not what changes do you suggest? Do 
you advise bringing the fleet north or not? " To which Ad- 
miral Mayo replied that defence arrangements were satis- 
factory ; that " ships change anchorage frequently and 
darken except during gunnery work. Recommend fleet re- 
main South for the present." 

The destroyers of the fleet were kept on active anti-sub- 
marine patrol duty. Eight of them were ordered North 
with the battleship Illinois by the Department on March 3rd, 
leaving 11 battleships and 14 destroyers in the fleet. 

On March 20th, Admiral Mayo was directed to proceed 
north to Hampton Roads. The fleet sailed on INIarch 23, 
reaching its destination on March 27th. Admiral Mayo, 
on March 28th " proceeded to Washington to consult with 
the Chief of Naval Operations with regard to possible activi- 
ties." 

In discussing the condition of the Fleet on the eve of war, 
its commander-in-chief said: 

" it was in the best state of preparedness it had ever been, and 
there was a feeling of confidence in the personnel of being able 
to cope with any emergency; the personnel was, however, on a 
peace basis and the transfer of trained personnel for armed 
guard and other duty was already being felt in a decrease of 
efficiency. . . . However, it should be pointed out that this fleet 
was lacking in types of vessels essential to efficiency, such as 
battle cruisers, scout cruisers, light cruisers and fleet subma- 
rines, and, furthermore, none are now available." 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 193 

During the period after February 2, Admiral Mayo had 
received no intimation from the Navy Department about pre- 
paring for war, no instructions as to what arrangements he 
should make, nor no indication of any definite plans or 
policies, such as the commander of our main fleet, with war 
imminent, should have received. 

On February 23rd, a letter had been received from the 
Secretary commenting upon the part of the fleet campaign 
order of February 3rd, which directed the clearing of a chan- 
nel " of submarine and mines." The Secretary made the 
following astonishing statement: 

" The order to ' clear ' the channel of submarines could have 
been interpreted as authorizing the use of force against any 
submarines found therein. The Department assumes that it 
was the Commander-in-Chief's intention to sweep the channel 
for possible mines and to search for and report submarines; not 
to operate offensively against them " ! 

To this disconcerting illustration of the " neutrality " of 
Mr. Daniels, Admiral Mayo replied : " Intention was 
distinctly to authorize use of force against such vessels found 
in vicinity of fleet, or approaching fleet. Similar orders are 
now in force and are considered essential to safety of fleet, 
as intentions of any such vessels are assumed to be hostile." 

On March 11, an order was received from the Bureau of 
Navigation to send north 30 gun crews. Admiral Mayo 
remarked that 

" this order, issued by a bureau, reduced the military efficiency 
of the anti-torpedo defence of the battleship force. The policy 
on which such an order must have been based was not made 
known to the Commander-in-Chief. ... It was assumed that 
the policy had the approval of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions. . . . 

" It was realized that the active fleet contained the major 
part of the trained personnel of the service, and that it would 
have to supply the demands for personnel for other duties, 



194? NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

hence full and hearty co-operation was given to the Bureau of 
Navigation in the great work of expansion." 

After arriving in Washington, Admiral Mayo said that 
" no written plan or policy was given to me, but from con- 
versation I understood the policy as follows : 

" The Atlantic Fleet to be maintained in readiness for active 
operations. No vessels to be sent to navy yards unless in need 
of major repairs. Fleet to continue training of gun crews for 
armed guard duty." 

This was just one week before the declaration of war! 

While in Washington, Admiral Mayo learned of the in- 
tention to organize a " Patrol Force," a step which " was 
an entire change of organization policy." On April 4th, he 
received orders to organize this Patrol Force and to assign 
to it all destroyers that could be spared. Admiral Mayo 
believed that no destroyers could be spared, and that, on 
the contrary, another flotilla was needed by the fleet, as " it 
should be noted that no policy with regard to the future 
service of the battleships had been decided upon." 

On April 5th, Admiral Mayo was informed by the De- 
partment, in reply to his request to know the orders of the 
Patrol Force, that 

" The mission of the Patrol Force will be issued by the De- 
partment, through the Commander-in-Chief." 

Admiral Mayo believed this to be the first indication " of 
a false policy, namely, control of active operations of sub- 
ordinate forces by the Department." This was the same 
criticism that Admiral Sims had previously made with re- 
gard to operations in Europe. 

On April 6th, orders were received from the Department to 
mobilize for war. Arrangements had already been made to 
protect the fleet at anchor in the York River so " no modi- 
fication of existing conditions in the fleet were required ex- 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 195 

cept the establishment of censorship and the commencement 
of war diaries." This then was what constituted our mobili- 
zation for war of which Mr. Daniels spoke so often and so 
exultantly. The fleet was mobilized, he caid, five hours after 
war began. True ; but all that really happened was that the 
sailors' mail was subjected to censorship and a war diary 
was started ! At this time the only policies or plans of the 
Department, of which Admiral Mayo had any information, 
were that the fleet would supply armed guard crews and 
train other personnel ; that a patrol force had been formed 
to patrol the Atlantic coast; and that the battleship force 
would be maintained intact. " At this time I had no infor- 
mation as to any contemplated employment of any vessels 
in European waters in co-opv. "ation with the Allies." 



XII 

Admiral Mayo himself took no active part in operations 
against Germany during the war. In spite of repeated 
recommendations to the Department he was not ordered to 
duty abroad. The forces he commanded remained in Ameri- 
can waters, training many thousands of officers and men 
for other duties, and trying to maintain themselves in a con- 
dition of readiness for battle. Admiral Mayo, however, made 
two trips to Europe; one in August and September, 1917, to 
attend a naval conference of the Allies ; the other in the 
summer of 1918 to inspect the naval forces in European 
waters. He had therefore become fairly familiar with the 
conditions under which our forces abroad fought. Through 
his conferences with the Navy Department, he had become 
even more familiar with the methods and policies of that 
Department. 

In illustration of the departmental point of view in the 
first month of the war, Admiral Mayo told of the confer- 
ences with Vice Admiral Browning, R. N., and Rear Admiral 



196 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Grasset, commanders of the British and French patrol forces 
in the Western Atlantic. Admiral Mayo said that on April 
10th, at a conference at the Hotel Chamberlain at Old Point 
Comfort, attended by the two foreign officers and by Admiral 
Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mayo and Rear 
Admiral H. B. Wilson, the commander of the Patrol Force: 

" Vice Admiral Browning explained the mission of his force, 
and read a communication from the British Admiralty inter- 
rogating the representatives of the United States as to the na- 
ture of the assistance the United States Navy was prepared to 
render, and stating the desire of the British Admiralty for assist- 
ance, especially in anti-submarine craft. Rear Admiral Grasset 
explained the mission of his division and requested that the 
United States assist in the patrol of the Caribbean. 

"Admiral Benson stated that the present policy of the United 
States Navy was to maintain the fleet intact and to assist in the 
patrol of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States and 
waters adjacent thereto." 

This then was our naval policy on entering the war, as 
stated to Allied officials on April 10th, 1917, by the military 
head of the Navy Department and the chief adviser of Secre- 
tary Daniels ! There was no suggestion of co-operation with 
the Allies ; no hint of offensive action against the common 
enemy ! " Safety first " was to be the motto ; we were to 
maintain our fleet " intact " and " assist in the patrol " of 
waters adjacent to our coasts; in other words, we were not 
even to assume the full responsibility for our own coastal 
defence, but were merely to " assist " the Allied forces that 
had been defending us for the previous two and a half years ! 

Such a policy must have disconcerted the Allied represen- 
tatives. They had come to present the needs of the Allies. 
They were stonily received, their requests rebuffed. That 
they were not satisfied, may easily be inferred from Ad- 
miral Mayo's statement that the conference adjourned to 
meet on the following day in Washington, " as Vice Admiral 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 197 

Browning considered his instructions required a conference 
with the Secretary of the Navy." 

What a commentary this is, on Mr. Daniels' repeated as- 
sertions of the " bold and audacious policies," and the " de- 
sire for complete co-operation " that inspired the Navy De- 
partment from the day the war began ! The Allied repre- 
sentatives were permitted an audience with the Secretary only 
at their own insistence. They were not even invited to visit 
Washington, by Admiral Benson, whose attitude may be 
explained by the fact that two weeks before he had been as 
ready " to fight the British as the Germans ! " 

The conference on April 11th, as reported by Admiral 
Mayo, was equally illuminating. In addition to the officers 
who had attended the previous conference, there were present 
Secretary Daniels, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and two 
members of the General Board, Rear Admirals Fletcher and 
Badger. It is not difficult to imagine the atmosphere which 
such a group created as they faced the Allied representatives. 
Josephus Daniels, Admirals Benson, Badger, F. F. Fletcher, 
Wilson! No wonder the French and British admirals lost 
heart and reported to their chiefs that " too much reliance " 
should not be placed on help from America. 

Admiral Mayo is significantly brief in describing this 
second conference. He says only : 

" The subjects discussed were similar to those of the previous 
day. The following decisions were reached: 

" (a) Although the present policy of the United States re- 
quired that the fleet be kept intact, a division of destroyers (six 
vessels) will be sent to European waters to co-operate with the 
allied anti-submarine forces in that area. 

" (b) United States to patrol on Atlantic coast of United 
States and assist in the patrol of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of 
Mexico." 

Such then was the war policy of our Navy Department in 
April, 1917 ! 



198 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

XIII 

Subsequently, the Department apparently modified its 
policy to take into consideration the existence of a state of 
war in Europe. At least, Admiral Mayo testified that on 
April 28th, 1917 (N. B. the day after Ambassador Page 
had first appealed to the President for action on Admiral 
Sims' recommendations) : 

" I was informed of the new policy relative to assignment of 
destroyers to assist in anti-submarine operations in co-operation 
with the British." 

Admiral Mayo had been orally instructed, on April 12th, 
to prepare six destroyers for service abroad. On April 18th, 
the Department was asked for information as to the destina- 
tion of these destroyers. On April 24th, the six destroyers 
received orders directly from the Department to go to 
Queenstown. On April 26th, Admiral Mayo received orders 
to send six more destroyers to home yards to fit out for 
distant service. " No change in policy was received." The 
Department " gave no information or plan on which this 
order was based." 

The " new " policy of " co-operation with the British " 
in anti-submarine operations was imparted to Mayo on April 
28th, as indicated above. On the same day orders were is- 
sued to prepare a third division of six destroyers for distant 
service, and on May 1, 24 additional destroyers and the 
Dixie received similar orders. 

The information in the last paragraph was all that Ad- 
miral Mayo was able to obtain in the first month of the war 
about our war policies and plans. He testified that up to 
May 5, 1917, " I had received no definite statement of the De- 
partment's policy with regard to material readiness of the 
battleships for possible active service in European waters." 

It was imperative that, as commander of the fleet, he 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 199 

should know something of what might be expected of his ves- 
sels. He had received no war plans, nor anything even 
faintly resembling a war plan. He had been ordered to 
mobilize for war, and had mobilized by establishing a censor- 
ship, starting a war diary and keeping behind the anti-sub- 
marine net. But in war mobilization implies, normally, bel- 
ligerent activities on the part of a belligerent's main fight- 
ing force. Naturally, Mayo wondered a little about what 
was coming. So on May 5th he wrote the Department that 
the battleships " are, in general not now in proper material 
condition to operate indefinitely from some foreign base " 
and urged that all vessels be sent to the navy yards for es- 
sential repairs. " The Commander-in-Chief is without 
definite information as to the Department's policy regarding 
material matters." 

On May 18th, Admiral Mayo was informed that nine con- 
verted yachts had been ordered to fit out for distant serv- 
ice. On June 3rd, destroyers were ordered to report to Rear 
Admiral Gleaves but it was not until June 7th that Admiral 
Mayo, while in Washington, learned the details of the first 
troop convoy, which Gleaves was to command and which was 
to sail only a week later. Admiral Mayo said of this : 

" I was not properly informed of these activities, nor of the 
status of the various commanders to whom the Department was 
issuing orders direct." 

The Commander-in-Chief of the fleet was not only not con- 
sulted by the Department but was ignored. Orders direct 
from Washington were issued to his subordinates and to 
vessels of his force, without his even being notified. In a 
letter of June 13, 1917, Admiral Mayo officially protested 
against these gross breaches of military principles, pointing 
out that, although the forces abroad, the cruisers in the 
South Atlantic, the Patrol Force, Admiral Gleaves' convoy 
force, were parts of the Atlantic Fleet, the Commander-in- 



200 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Chief " has only a very general knowledge " of their activi- 
ties. Admiral Mayo therefore urged that he be informed 
" of the exact status of the several naval forces now operating 
in the Atlantic." 

The Navy Department did not reply to this letter un- 
til July 9th, and then only enclosed copies of orders issued 
a few days before assigning these forces to the Atlantic 
Fleet, but instructing them to report directly to the Depart- 
ment. 

The first statement of the Department's general war policy 
received by Admiral Mayo, came to him in July, in the form 
of a copy of the letter of July 3rd from the Secretary of 
the Navy to the Secretary of State, to which Admiral Sims 
had previously referred, as the first indication of policy 
he likewise had received. Similarly, it was not until July 
4th that Mayo learned of " a new policy, that of using U, S. 
cruisers to escort merchant convoys." Admiral Mayo had 
not been consulted about this. 

So, in chaos and confusion, without plans or policies, 
struggling blindly to find out what to do and how to do it, 
the Navy went through those first critical months of the 
war. 

XIV 

At the end of July the Department, for reasons yet to be 
explained, began to take a more active interest in the needs 
of the Allies. They requested that an international naval 
conference be held in London to tell the Navy Department 
what it should do. They had been receiving for four months 
the recommendations made by Admiral Sims, after consulta- 
tion and agreement with the allied leaders, but they had 
almost uniformly pigeonholed these and had failed, not only 
to act upon them, but even to reply to them. 

Now, at the end of July, 1917, it apparently seemed in- 
evitable to the Navy Department that something should be 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 201 

done. Yet Admiral Sims was known to be pro-British and 
pro-French. His recommendations were, therefore, hardly 
to be trusted. He had insisted too vigorously on a prose- 
cution of the war against Germany. This must have seemed 
a lamentable prejudice to men who a few months before 
had been as ready " to fight the British as the Germans," and 
who considered even in March, 1917, that it was none of Ad- 
miral Sims' business " to think who our enemy might be ! " 
(See testimony of Secretary Daniels, February 10th, 1920.) 

The Department therefore decided to send Admiral Mayo 
to Europe to find out what was really going on. The definite 
object of his mission, according to Mayo's own statement, 
could only be inferred from the conversations he had with 
President Wilson, Secretary Daniels, Admiral Benson and 
others ; for, as Admiral Mayo indicated in his report, " The 
instructions received from the Navy Department as to the 
purpose and object of the visit to England and France were 
not in definite and concrete form. ... A summary based on 
the above-mentioned conversations was made (while en route 
to England) in order to enable definite inquiries to be made 
to 'the governments concerned." 

Such was the efficiency of Mr. Daniels' Department. After 
failing to act offensively for four months, they failed to give 
to Admiral Mayo, their representative at a Naval Council 
of all the Allies, called at their own request, any definite in- 
structions or any detailed statement of what he was to find 
out. He was left to " infer " these things, and to make up 
his own questions from his memory of conversations ! 

In his report Admiral Mayo said that the principal 
matters he had to take up " were understood " to be eleven 
in number. First, "What has been done" (apparently a 
history of all war operations and experience) ; Second, 
" What is being done " — a review of the situation in all 
areas ; Third, " What is to be done," — all plans for future 
operations, the help expected from the U. S., the enemy and 



202 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

allied building programs, etc. ! Fourth, a description of 
anti-submarine measures under way and proposed ; Fifth, the 
aircraft situation and the help the U. S. can give ; Sixth, the 
shipping situation, as it affects the Allied communications ; 
Seventh, the transfer of U. S. troops to France and the ship- 
ping required ; Eighth, Inquiries in the matter of seeking for 
trade, the employment of oilers belonging to private com- 
panies and the rimtiourcd transfer of men-of-war after the 
mar; Ninth, the international naval conference, " which the 
United States had asked the British government to arrange " ; 
Tenth, consideration of the possibility of Norway entering 
the war, and the possibility of the capture of Russian ships 
by the Germans ; Eleventh, " General impressions regarding 
political, economic and morale conditions in the allied coun- 
tries." 

Truly, the Navy Department imposed a modest task upon 
Admiral Mayo ! 

All this information could not possibly have been col- 
lected by a few officers in a few weeks. The Navy Depart- 
ment had already received much of it from Admiral Sims 
and would have received everything of importance months 
before if Admiral Sims had been provided with assistance. 

Admiral Mayo and his staff discussed these eleven points 
with the representatives of the various Allied governments 
and with Admiral Sims. The naval conference of Septem- 
ber 4th and 5th submitted recommendations to the Navy De- 
partment, identical in all essentials with those Admiral Sims 
had been recommending since April. Admiral Mayo strongly 
endorsed these and urged the Navy Department to decide 
on its policy and to act. In his report dated October 11, 
1917, Admiral Mayo in fact said: 

(a) The military-naval situation among the Allies is such 
that it is strongly recommended that the United States make the 
earliest possible decision as to what forms and extent the assist- 
ance to be given shall take and then proceed to exert every effort 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 203 

to expedite the production, dispatch and employment of such 
assistance. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the importance 
of the time element. 

(b) It is further recommended that time be not lost in at- 
tempting greater development or improvement of material, which 
lias already reached a fairly satisfactory state of development 
abroad, but tliat all energy be directed to reproducing such sat- 
isfactory material at the maximum possible rate." 

If any further confirmation of Admiral Sims' criticism, 
that the Navy Department failed for six months to enter the 
war activeh^, in co-operation with the Allies, were needed, 
the fact that Admiral Mayo still found it necessary to make 
the recommendations above quoted, on October 11, 1917, 
is in itself abundant proof. Admiral Sims had made exactly 
the same recommendations six months before, on April 14, 
1917, and had been repeating them vainly almost daily. 
The six most critical months of the war had been lost by the 
indecision, procrastination, or worse, of Secretary Daniels 
and his naval advisers. 



XV 

Admiral Mayo himself commented very forcibly on the 
Navy's unpreparedness in 1917. He pointed out that: 

" Had the conditions not permitted the use of the battleships 
for training the personnel, the ability of the Navy to man trans- 
ports, anti-torpedo craft and cargo ships would have been seri- 
ously decreased. 

" Such a condition cannot be considered satisfactory, and the 
country should realize that the shortage of officers and enlisted 
personnel was at the beginning of the war, and is today, the most 
serious handicap under which the Navy is almost hopelessly 
striving for efficiency. 

" The quotations . . . from my report on my trip to Europe 
indicate plainly my opinion of the conditions existing at that 
time. . . . 



204 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" Our experience has taught us to look critically at our past 
history with a different point of view from that generally held be- 
fore the war. / hope the lesson of unpreparedness has been 
brought home to the country and to Congress. The present 
tendency seems to be a return toward the unsatisfactory condi- 
tion which is the cause of this investigation. 

" In a consideration of the effect of our failure to be prepared 
and of our progress in preparation after the policy was definitely 
settled upon (i. e. after October, 1917), it must never be forgot- 
ten that these preparations were made under conditions which 
may never happen again, and that to rely on sucli conditions ex- 
isting again would be folly. These conditions were: the enemy 
fleet contained by an Allied navy and the enemy army fully en- 
gaged with the Allied armies. These conditions permitted the 
United States Navy to prepare uninterruptedly (i. e., after war 
was declared), for even no enemy submarines appeared in United 
States waters for nearly 14 months after the declaration of war." 

Admiral Mayo insisted emphatically that the responsibility 
for such unpreparedness did not lie with the officers of the 
fleet, and that: 

" So far as was within the province of the Commander-in- 
Chief, the fleet was prepared for any emergency. . . . There 
never was a time when I or my staff failed to keep in touch with 
the general situation or neglected, so far as we are aware, any 
action or recommendation which we believed would increase the 
effectiveness of our Navy in the World War." 

The responsibility for the conditions that existed in 1917, 
were attributed by Admiral Mayo to various causes. 

" Our inability to throw the full weight of our resources into 
the war upon our entry into it, was due primarily to our national 
policies (i. e. Daniels' pacifism). . . ." 

" As to the broad general plans and policies of the Department 
for the conduct of war, the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions was not authorized until 1915 and then only against con- 
siderable opposition. Its scope never was, and is not now, suf- 
ficiently comprehensive to ensure the best plans and policies for 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 205 

the preparation of or the conduct of war. Without the office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, conditions in the Navy immedi- 
ately preceding and during the war would have been chaotic, and 
no one can say what would have happened. ... If the office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations had been in existence longer, with 
even more power and responsibilities, a better state of prepared- 
ness would have resulted." 



XVI 

In his summary at the end of his testimony, Admiral 
Mayo briefly explained the reasons for the existence of the 
conditions described by previous witnesses and in his own 
testimony. He again stated that : 

" It is my opinion that the material unpreparedness of the ves- 
sels in reserve and out of commission, and the shortage of person- 
nel, was due primarily to the national policy of strict neutrality, 
with its resultant effect of a failure to prepare against war. It 
should be recalled by contrast that Holland and Switzerland re- 
mained neutral during the entire war. They were ready to de- 
fend their neutrality. . . ." 

" The next most serious detriment to efficient preparation is 
the organization of the Navy Department. The laws and regu- 
lations under which the Navy was operating during the war, and 
is operating today, are unsatisfactory." 

After explaining the confusion of authority, and lack of 
any military co-ordination of activities in the Navy Depart- 
ment, Admiral Mayo said: 

" So long as the present organization exists the maximum effi- 
ciency, either in preparation for war, in the conduct of war, or in 
economical development of the Navy in peace, cannot be ob- 
tained. 

" In the present organization responsibility for the readiness 
of the Navy for war cannot be placed anywhere but with the Sec- 
retary of the Navy, who, under the present organization, must 
co-ordinate 13 offices, boards, and bureaus. 



206 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" Every dollar spent on our Navy should be spent with a view 
to the accomplishment of a definite plan of preparation for war. 
The Navy is built for war, and unless the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, under the Secretary of the Navy, is held responsible for the 
preparation, readiness, completeness, and eifectiveness of plans 
for national defence, including plans for the development of the 
Navy, plans for its maintenance and plans for its use, and is 
given power under the Secretary of the Navy to exercise super- 
vision through the bureaus, boards, and offices, over all naval ac- 
tivities, the maximum efficiency cannot be attained. 

" In my opinion, the faulty organization of the Navy Depart- 
ment, and the absence of definite foreign policy, except that of 
strict neutrality, were the primary causes of failure to prepare 
the entire Navy for war. 

" After definite policies and plans were definitely settled upon, 
after money was appropriated, and after the Bureaus voluntarily 
co-ordinated with the Chief of Naval Operations, the work was 
pushed with energy and vigour. The accomplishments were ex- 
cellent. But our delay in preparation did no doubt delay our as- 
sistance to the /llli&s at a critical time, and if such conditions 
regarding our preparation for war exist in the future they may 
result in disaster. 

" My statement also includes criticisms of another nature, 
namely, that I was not kept informed of policies nor properly 
consulted with regard to operations in the western Atlantic. As 
an example, the failure to consult me before ordering Rear Ad- 
miral Cleaves to organize and conduct the first troop escort op- 
eration. 

"In my opinion, authority was so centralized in the Depart- 
ment that it resulted in the neglect of the principle of " due sub- 
division of labour and decentralization of responsibility." Cen- 
tralized control over policy and general plans is sound, but cen- 
tralized control over details of execution most often results in 
loss of efficiency. 

XVII 

Many other matters were dwelt upon by Admiral Mayo, 
but the part of his testimony chiefly concerned with the is- 



EVIDENCE FROM THE FLEET 207 

sues involved have been described. He introduced many 
documents to support every statement of fact and his testi- 
mony, like that of Admiral Sims', was remarkably free from 
any purely personal opinions and from personal reflections. 
It was obvious that Admiral Mayo was not, in any sense 
of the word, a participant in a naval quarrel. His testi- 
mony was a simple narrative of what our Navy's condition 
and operations were in 1917, in so far as the Commander- 
in-Chief of our main fleet was able to observe them. 

In some matters, mostly of detail, such as the refitting 
of battleships, the disposition of forces and the condition 
of Admiral Rodman's battleship division, Admiral Mayo took 
issue with Admiral Sims. In substance, however, his testi- 
mony proved that the Navy was unprepared for war in 1917 ; 
that its vessels were not in the best of condition and were 
all short of men ; that our Navy had no policy of offensive 
action or co-operation with the Allies at the beginning of the 
war or for several months afterward ; that the Navy Depart- 
ment had no suitable war plans and very little machinery for 
making them ; that, for at least the first six months of the 
war, we failed to participate actively with our available 
naval resources ; and that the Navy Department, in its con- 
duct of war operations, violated many of the most funda- 
mental axioms of warfare. 

The Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet was there- 
fore in substantial agreement with the commander in Euro- 
pean waters, with the Chief and Assistant Chief of the Bureau 
of Navigation, with the Chief Assistant in the Material 
Branch of the Office of Operations, and with the officer. Cap- 
tain J. K. Taussig, who after serving three years in the En- 
listed Personnel Division, had not only the distinction of com- 
manding the first division of destroyers to go overseas in 
1917, but also that of adding another famous phrase to our 
naval history, when he replied to the question of the Admiral 



208 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

commanding at Queenstown as to when his vessels would be 
ready for service: 

" We are ready, now, Sir ! " 

Such is the spirit of our Navy. It was this spirit that 
made possible our naval successes in the war, in spite of un- 
preparedness and in spite of maladministration in Washing- 
ton. The officers and men of the naval service were placed 
in a position of tremendous difficulty, facing almost insuper- 
able handicaps, as a result of Mr. Daniels' failure since 1913 
to make any effort to get the Navy ready for war. That 
they were able to overcome them, and eventually to make the 
Navy effective in the war, in spite of Mr. Daniels and his 
policies, is the outstanding achievement of the officers and 
men of the naval service in the war. Their courage and 
efficiency does not excuse the Secretary of the Navy, how- 
ever, from responsibility for the handicaps his policies had 
imposed upon the Navy. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE FIGHT FOR PREPAREDNESS — 1913-1915 

(The Testimony of Rear Admiral Fiske) 

I 

REAR ADMIRAL FISKE has long been recognized as 
one of the ablest officers of our Navy. He has contributed 
in many ways to the upbuilding of our naval strength, both 
in its material development and in its training for war. 
Many of his inventions have contributed greatly to the revo- 
lutionary improvements made in naval gunnery in the last 
generation. For a decade before 1913 he had struggled 
for better organization in the Navy and for the adoption 
of sound policies based on our national needs and upon 
the accepted principles of naval science. 

His close association with Mr. Daniels from 1913 to 1915, 
when he was the Secretary's sole military adviser, had given 
him unique opportunities to become familiar with the methods 
and policies imposed on the Navy Department by Mr. 
Daniels. In his testimony before the Senate Committee he 
told of his insistent but vain efforts to make Daniels realize 
that the Navy existed for the purpose of fighting, and that 
the whole effort of the Navy Department should be devoted 
to making it fit to fight. Admiral Fiske, in describing the 
activities of the Secretary, also disclosed the degree of mis- 
representation that had characterized the latter's official re- 
ports and public statements. 



209 



210 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

II 

In beginning his testimony, Admiral Fiske reviewed briefly 
his own services in the Navy Department. In August, 1910, 
as a Captain, he had been appointed to the General Board 
of the Navy and had been for a year in charge of its war 
plans section. In this position he was responsible, under 
Admiral Dewey, " for the preparation and readiness of the 
war plans of the Navy." From his study of military history 
he had come to a full realization of the necessity of adequate 
war plans. He soon found that the existing plans were 
extremely meagre and unsatisfactory. 

Strange as it may seem, but few officers in the Navy at 
that time (1910) had really studied the art of war. They 
had learned to handle the vessels of the Navy in peace time 
with great skill and efficiency ; they had not learned how 
to use the Navy as a successful machine for waging war. 
The Naval War College was still regarded as a " highbrow " 
institution ; its teachings were scorned by the " practical " 
salty variety of naval officers who still believed in rule of 
thumb methods and who had failed to realize that naval 
warfare had changed since Nelson's day. 

The Navy Department at that time had still no organiza- 
tion adapted to meet the needs of war. There existed no 
adequate machinery for making war plans, for preparing the 
Navy for war in time of peace or for conducting naval opera- 
tions in time of war. The General Board was charged with 
preparing plans, but its status was doubtful and at best only 
advisory. The Aide for Operations was merely a personal 
adviser to the Secretary and could take no action himself. 
It was not surprising, therefore, that Fiske found in 1910 
that " the war plans were extremely meagre and did not em- 
body even one per cent, of what war plans should embody." 

During his service he did his best, with only two assistants, 
to improve the plans, but lack of time and experience greatly 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 211 

handicapped him. The task was one that required the con- 
tinuous services of many trained officers. These were not 
available. 

When Admiral Fiske accepted the position of Aide for 
Operations in February, 1913, he did so 

" with a grave sense of my responsibilities ; especially because the 
failure of the Declaration of London jjut the whole status of in- 
ternational law, as applied to maritime affairs, in a condition of 
approximate chaos ; so that if any war should occur between any 
great European nations, the position of the United States, as a 
neutral, would be almost impossible to maintain. Had the Navy 
been prepared for war, I should not have felt so much concerned, 
but I knew that the Navy was not only unprepared in personnel 
and material, but that it did not even have any plan for even 
entering an important war." 

Admiral Fiske fully realized also that under modern con- 
ditions the planning organization should be the " original 
source from which all work starts, because not only the 
actual operations of war, but all previous measures of prep- 
aration of personnel and material are taken up after the 
decisions of the planning division have been made and ap- 
proved. . . . The first thing necessary to do in order to 
prepare a Navy for war is to prepare a plan of war." 

Ill 

Josephus Daniels became Secretary of the Navy on March 
4, 1913. Admiral Fiske said that he was much relieved 
when he found the new Secretary " to be a delightful gentle- 
man, companionable, sympathetic and apparently open 
minded. He announced his desire to make the Navy ef- 
ficient." 

It was not long, however, before Fiske learned that Mr. 
Daniels did not even understand what constitutes the ef- 
ficiency of the Navy. An ardent pacifist of the Bryan 
school, the new Secretary would not discuss war or take any 



212 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

interest in preparedness for war. By August, 1913, Ad- 
miral Fiske had come " to realize that the Secretary's mental 
characteristics and his previous training were not such as 
to give him the capacity to regard the Navy as a whole. 
His tendency was to concentrate his attention on some one 
part of the Navy, usually connected with its personnel, and 
to exaggerate its importance." 

Admiral Fiske, as chief military adviser to the Secretary, 
spent many trying and fruitless hours trying to explain to 
him the A B C's of naval warfare. Mr. Daniels listened 
courteously enough, but it was all too obvious that he never 
understood. He took a keen interest in personnel questions, 
in the welfare of enlisted men, in getting chaplains and laun- 
dries and electric stoves for the battleships. He saw the 
necessity of building battleships, and delighted in the large- 
ness and power of our modern dreadnaughts. But his mind 
could not grasp the idea that the battleships were useless un- 
less so manned and prepared as to be ready for war. 

In the summer of 1913, Admiral Fiske took the Secretary 
to the Naval War College, hoping that the latter after see- 
ing the work there and after talking to the officers at the 
college might grasp at least the fundamental ideas of what 
a Navy's purpose is and of how it should be administered. 
Mr. Daniels listened patiently but learned nothing. 



IV 

On August 26, 1913, Admiral Fiske drew up a memor- 
andum on " Administration of the Navy Department " which 
he submitted to the Secretary with an accompanying ex- 
planatory letter. The memorandum gave as its reference 
" Exodus, Chapter XVIII, paragraph 13, et seq." Starting 
with this Biblical text, it described with remarkable concise- 
ness the purpose for which the Navy and the Navy Depart- 
ment exists, as a few passages will indicate. 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 213 

" The mission of the Navy is to maintain itself in the maximum 
possible degree of readiness for war in order that honourable 
peace may be maintained; or if war comes, in order that honour- 
able peace may be re-established in the shortest possible time." 

". . . No matter what the condition of a navy may be when 
judged by a non-competing standard, neither its strength nor its 
efficiency nor its readiness for war are what they should be unless 
it can compete successfully with the navies of probable enemies." 

". . . The mission of the Navy Department is to so adminis- 
ter the affairs of the Navy as to maintain the Navy in the maxi- 
mum possible degree of readiness for war. . . . Every decision 
as to naval administration should be derived from this general 
mission." 

". . . The first and highest mission of the Secretary is so to 
co-ordinate the efforts of the Navy as a whole with efforts of 
other departments of the government as best to further national 
ends. . . ." 

". . . The second mission of the Secretary is so to administer 
the affairs of the Navy, through the Navy Department, as to 
maintain the Navy in the maximum possible degree of readiness 
for war. . . . 

" Efficient administration requires that there be unity of ac- 
tion, co-ordination of effort ... a supreme authority flowing 
downward, through subordinates, in defined channels, to individ- 
uals. This arrangement permits to high authority time for the 
consideration of the great questions and delegates to subordinates 
questions graded in importance to the station and abilities of 
those subordinates. . . . Wherever high authority is so sub- 
merged in details that it cannot give proper attention to great 
questions as they arise, there we find the sources of the in- 
efficiency. A badly conceived intention of high authority rapidly 
spreads its influence through every ramification of the organiza- 
tion. . . ." 

For the next seven years Mr. Daniels continued to violate 
the very principles of organization here described with the 
identical result here depicted ! Absorbed in details, he left 
important matters undecided or made wrong decisions 



214 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

through lack of proper information and understanding of 
naval matters. None is so blind as he who will not see I 



V 

Admiral Fiske in the letter he sent tke Secretary, for- 
warding the memorandum above quoted, pointed out, by 
reference to history, the necessity of having an efficient naval 
staff, proper war plans, and a navy ready for war. Thus, 
for example, he said: 

" To get the Navy into readiness for war and keep it in readi- 
ness is not only the duty of the Secretary, it is his paramount 
duty. . . . When war breaks out all the forces that will deter- 
mine the result are already in existence. . . . Therefore, far 
above and beyond all minor responsibilities, the direct and imme- 
diate responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy is. the Navy's 
readiness for war." 

Admiral Fiske then pointed out that the German victory 
in 1870 was due simply to the superior preparation of the 
Germans, made possible by their general staff and its care- 
ful planning work. All European countries had profited by 
the lesson. The United States Navy alone had disregarded 
it. The U. S. Army had been given a general staff, but the 
Navy still had an organization with no provision for the 
proper delegation of authority, no co-ordination of activi- 
ties and no machinery for the preparation and execution of 
war plans. 

" Under the present system much of the time of the Secretary 
of the Navy . . . must be devoted to comparatively unimportant 
questions. . . . Much of it is spent on matters that a subordinate 
could handle, with the result that the amount of time he can give 
to important questions is abbreviated. He is sometimes com- 
pelled to delay the consideration of matters in which some subor- 
dinate needs a decision. . . . 

" The organization of the Navy Department is entirely differ- 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 215 

ent from that of any other of which the writer has knowledge. 
... In every efficient organization great or small, the head of 
the organization handles it as a unit through the heads of the va- 
rious divisions. He alone, at the top. handles no separate divi- 
sions. . . . The heads of divisions have authority in their divi- 
sions and should be held responsible to the chief not for details, 
but for results. Those principles . . . are common to every 
great organization of the world . . . that is efficiently handled. 
. . . If in these organizations a system is necessary, in which the 
heads of the organizations do not directly manage each depart- 
ment, but simply manage the heads of the departments, how 
much more is it necessary in our Navy Department, of which the 
Secretary is a civilian, who cannot be familiar with the details, 
and must therefore trust to his subordinates." 

For nearly two years longer Admiral Fiske continued his 
endeavour to make Secretary Daniels understand these ele- 
mefntary principles of organization. The Secretary ap- 
parently was incapable of understanding. He himself testi- 
fied that the only effect of Fiske's efforts was to " bore him 
to distraction." In fact, as Admiral Fiske himself said: 

" He seemed to me to have a curious characteristic of not 
looking at the Navy as a whole and it has always seemed to me 
that he was absolutely convinced in his own mind that there 
never would be another war. I found after a while that it was 
not a good thing to say anything to him about war. He did not 
seem to be ready to start on any subject connected with war at 
all. He approached the subject from a different point of view. 
To bring up a question in connection with the men or something 
like that, would secure his interest, but if you brought up any- 
thing in connection with the efficiency of the Navy and its part in 
the war, why that was not good. We must avoid that subject. 
I gave up using the word ' war 'as much as I could. ... It was 
very difficult as a rule to get him to take any action whatever. 
He was always polite. He would listen to you with the most un- 
tiring patience. He was always courteous. Then he would us- 
ually wind up by saying, ' Speak to me about this tomorrow, or 
next week.' " 



216 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

VI 

Throughout 1913 and the early part of 1914, Admiral 
Fiske had little or no success in getting any action toward 
making the navy ready for war. In fact the Secretary 
" was nettled," said Fiske, " at my insistence on certain 
measures of preparedness," In the summer of 1913, Daniels 
even wanted to send Fiske out of the Department to serve 
at the Naval War College, and only Admiral Dewey's insist- 
ence that Fiske should remain caused the Secretary to post- 
pone exiling the officer who " bored " him by trying to make 
the Navy ready for war. 

As an illustration of the situation, Admiral Fiske referred 
to the Secretary's refusal for two years to approve the 
General Board's " Administrative Plan." In 1913, the Gen- 
eral Board submitted to Mr. Daniels an administrative plan 
which " provided that the various bureaus and the depart- 
ment itself should co-operate toward preparedness by means 
of a system of reports which each bureau would make to the 
Department once every three months, in regard to the status 
of that bureau in preparedness." 

Admiral Fiske urged that the plan be approved, only to 
meet with an experience which he described to the committee 
in the following words : 

" I was unable to get the Secretary to approve the adminis- 
trative plan during my entire term of office with him, though it 
lasted more than two years until May 11, 1915. I frequently 
brought it to his attention and asked him to sign it, pointing out 
that until he had signed it, it was utterly impossible for the Navy 
even to start toward a state of preparedness; and that it was 
necessary for him to sign it as soon as possible, because even 
after he had signed it. it would take several years before war 
plans could be made and developed and the Navy got ready in 
accordance with them. On every occasion the Secretary declined 
to sign the paper." 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 217 

Yet in May, 1920, Secretary Daniels boasted before the 
Senate committee of his foresightedness in approving this 
very plan on Ma}' 28, 1915. He neglected to say that he 
had refused for two years to approve this measure which 
constituted only the initial step towards preparedness. It 
should not be forgotten that he had thus delayed by two 
years the first step toward readiness for war t 

VII 

The outbreak of the war in Europe brought home to Ad- 
miral Fiske with additional force the perilous condition of 
our Navy. At a time when it seemed probable that we would 
be compelled to go to war to protect our national interests 
our Navy was wholly unprepared. The battleship fleet 
had been for many months in Mexican waters engaged in 
gunboat duty. It was not in good material shape ; its train- 
ing had been neglected in the complications of the Vera 
Cruz incident. It was short thousands of men. Its gunnery 
efficiency was very low indeed. Admiral Fiske had realized 
for some time that the European War was brewing. But 
in answer to his repeated warnings and recommendations Mr. 
Daniels had smiled indulgently, ridiculed the idea of war and 
refused to approve any action intended to prepare our Navy 
for possible eventualities. 

On July 31, 1914, Admiral Fiske had arrived at New- 
port, where the General Board was then located for the 
summer. In order that steps might be taken at once to meet 
the situation created by the beginning of a general European 
war, he asked Admiral Knight to call a special meeting of 
the General Board. This Knight did, 

"and we spent the day of August 1, 1914^ in preparing and 
sending (to the Navy Department) a letter in which we pointed 
out the various dangers of the United States being drawn into the 
war, and the consequent necessity of making certain prepara- 
tions." 



218 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

It was in connection with this General Board letter of 
August 1, 1914, that Secretary Daniels, on April 21, 1916, 
made incorrect statements to the United States Senate, 
officially and in writing, in order to conceal his own criminal 
failure to make any effort to improve the efficiency and 
preparedness of the Navy. 

The parts of this Gener-al Board letter of especial in- 
terest were: 

" Naval War College, 
" Newport, R. I., August 1, 1914. 

"From: Senior member present. 
"To: Secretary of the Navy. 

" Subject: Withdrawal of battleships to home yards. 

" In view of the immediate danger of a great war in Europe, 
and in pursuance of its duties as laid down in paragraph R 167 
(a) of the Navy Regulations, the General Board earnestly urges 
that the battleships be brought home, docked and put in perfect 
readiness, with the exception of the ships actually necessary in 
Caribbean and Mexican waters. 

(2) The present situation in Europe is absolutely without 
precedent; not only in the vast extent and variety of the interests 
involved, but in the suddenness with which it has developed. 

" (3) It is not clear at this moment that any interests of the 
United States are threatened. Yet it would be rash to assume 
that there may not emerge from the extraordinary situation in 
which so large a part of the world has become unexpectedly in- 
volved some incident or combination of incidents fraught with 
danger to our interests. 

" (4) Our commercial interests are closely interwoven with 
those of every one of the great powers which are apparently on 
the verge of war. Our trade routes pass through the waters of 
those powers and terminate in their ports. Our privileges and 
duties as neutrals may easily become matters of misunderstanding 
and controversy. 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 219 

" (7) In the event of a general European war, it is probable 
that foreign shipping will endeavor to register under the United 
States flag. The shipping then needed adequately to supply the 
war requirements of European nations will be enormous. Many 
questions of neutrality, or alleged breaches of neutrality, may, in 
the irritable condition of public opinion at home and abroad, re- 
sult in strained relations; and notwithstanding all efforts to the 
contrary, may further result in the embroilment of this country 
with some country or countries of Europe. 

" (8) Again, the merchants of the United States will cer- 
tainly endeavour to supply immense quantities of munitions of 
war, arms, ammunition, fuel, food, and other warlike supplies, 
with the resulting accusation that the country has become a base 
from which war is supported against friendly nations in viola- 
tion of its proclamation of neutrality. 

" (9) There are other possible complications: Belligerents 
always tend to overstep their powers in executing the right of 
search; disputes will arise over the definition of contraband; and 
accusations of unneutral service will be brought against the 
United States traders and foreigners doing business under the 
United States flag. 

" (10) A serious possibility for the United States connected 
with a great European war lies in the changes of sovereignty in 
possessions on or adjacent to the American Continent that may 
result from corresponding changes in sovereignty on the Conti- 
nent of Europe. We cannot forecast the eventualities of such a 
war. Many indications exist that Germany desires a foothold 
in American waters, and it is well known that she does not con- 
cur in the Monroe Doctrine. If Great Britain is drawn into war 
the German fleet will be neutralized as far as any danger from 
it to our interests in the immediate future is concerned. If she 
is not, and if the end of the war should find Germany stronger 
than ever in her European position and with her fleet practically 
unimpaired, the temptation will be great to seize the opportunity 
for obtaining the position she covets on this side of the ocean. 
We should prepare now for the situation which would thus be 
created. 

" Austin M. Knight." 



220 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

No action was taken on this letter by the Secretary. The 
battleships were not recalled for many months, nor were any 
other steps taken to get the Navy into better condition. Ad- 
miral Fiske said that when he returned to Washington in Sep- 
tember, 1914, he found that 

" nothing had been done toward preparedness, and that the Sec- 
retary's principal thought was the work that he was outlining for 
an Aide for Education, an office that he had just established. 
Naturally I was much concerned. The officers of the War Col- 
lege had been extremely exercised during August with the situa- 
tion in Europe, and had concluded that the chances were in favour 
of Germany; and that if Germany succeeded in Europe, she 
would then attack the United States as the one bar between her 
and world dominion." 

The Secretary of the Navy, however, was too busy plan- 
ning kindergarten courses for sailors (that later proved a 
complete failure and were finally abandoned) to pay any at- 
tention to the world situation, to the possibility of war or to 
the military efficiency of the Navy. 

VIII 

During September and October, 1914, Admiral Fiske took 
occasion almost daily to urge upon Secretary Daniels the 
necessity of getting the fleet into war condition ; of increas- 
ing the personnel of the Navy by 20,000 so that there would 
be at least men enough to provide " peace complements " 
for the vessels on the active list of the Navy ; and of estab- 
lishing in the Department a naval staff to prepare war plans 
and conduct naval operations. Mr. Daniels listened to Ad- 
miral Fiske and was " bored," but refused to take any action 
or to approve preparedness measures, or to permit the of- 
ficers of the Navy to give information, even to Congress- 
men, of the lamentable condition of the Navy. 

The Secretary had at hand a pliant friend in Rear Admiral 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 221 

Victor Blue, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Daniels 
was also greatly influenced by his Aide for Materiel, an 
officer of German name and antecedents. Both this officer 
and Blue opposed Fiske ; and the Secretary was thus able 
to evade responsibility by placing the onus on them, and by 
getting them to make unsound recommendations to cover his 
own actions. 

In view of this situation Admiral Fiske 

" concluded that it was my urgent duty to make the Secretary see 
the truth, no matter what effect it might have on my professional 
future. ... As Aide for Operations, I was most concerned with 
the impossibility of getting the Navy ready in time, in case we 
got into the war, because mainly of the lack of a sufficient per- 
sonnel and the absence of any staff, or planning division." 

Admiral Fiske therefore drew up in definite form the 
warnings and recommendations he had made verbally dozens 
of times without having any effect. He took this himself to 
Mr. Daniels, on November 5, 1914, read it to him, and en- 
larged upon each point. While Admiral Fiske was read- 
ing the letter to the Secretary, his Aide, Lieutenant Com- 
mander Cronan, entered the office and so witnessed the scene. 
After he had finished reading the Secretary gave the letter 
back without comment. On coming out of the office, Fiske 
told his Aides what had happened. " I said, ' I will speak 
to him again about it,' and I put it on my desk ; but I 
thought about it later, and then thought ' Well, there is no 
use in doing" that. It will not do any good.' So I simply 
filed it. The fact of that letter was known to a good many 
officers." A copy was given to the Assistant Secretary, 
F. D. Roosevelt, who assured Admiral Fiske, on November 
10, 1914, that he agreed absolutely with it, that it was 
" bully " and that he would do what he could to secure 
action. Needless to say, Mr. Roosevelt never did anything 
at all in the matter. 



222 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

This letter, which was dated November 9, 1914, when finally 
filed, is quoted in part below : 

" Navy Department, 
" Washington, November 9, 1914. 

" From: Aide for Operations. 

" To: Secretary of the Navy. 

"Subject: The Navy's unpreparedness for war. 

" 1. I beg leave, respectfully but urgently, to request the at- 
tention of the Secretary to the fact that the United States Navy 
is unprepared for war. 

" 5. The present condition all over the world is one of general 
upheaval. The state of unstable equilibrium which the great 
powers maintained for many years with great skill and care has 
been at last upset. A conflict is going on, very few results of 
which can be foretold. One thing probably can be foretold, 
however. I mean that it can be foretold that the conflict will be 
violent and also will be long, involving other countries than those 
now taking part, and followed, even after the war at present out- 
lined has been ended, by a series of more or less violent readjust- 
ments of boundaries, insular possessions, treaties, and agreements 
of every kind, 

" 6. Surely he would be an optimist who would expect that a 
state of general peace will come in less than five years. Dur- 
ing the next five years we must expect a great number of causes 
of disagreement between this country and other countries, and 
periods of tension between this Government and others; periods 
like that preceding the Spanish War, needing only a casualty like 
the blowing up of the Maine to precipitate a conflict. 

" 7. In my opinion, as your professional adviser, and in the 
opinion of every naval officer with whom I have talked, the 
United States is in danger of being drawn into war and will con- 
tinue to be in danger for several years. And when I say war, I 
do not mean war of the kind that we had with Spain, but war 
with a great power, carried on in the same ruthless spirit and in 
the same wholesale manner as that which pervades the fighting in 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 223 

Europe now. It is true that I can not specify the country with 
which war is most probable, nor the time, nor the cause. But my 
studies of wars in the past, and my observations of conditions at 
the present time, convince me that if this country avoids war dur- 
ing the next five years, it will be accomplished only by a happy 
combination of high diplomatic skill and rare good fortune. 



" 9. Comparing our Navy with the navies which we may have 
to meet in war, I find that our Navy is unprepared in three ways: 

" 10. First, it has an insufficient number of officers and en- 
listed men. The number of officers can not be increased — that 
is, the number of suitable officers — because it takes four years 
to get a midshipman through the academy and several years aft- 
erwards to train him. But the number of enlisted can be in- 
creased, and very quickly. . . . the fact remains that we want 
enlisted men right now. To man the ships which should be used 
in war we need 19.600 more men. 

"11. The second way in which I find our Navy unprepared is 
in departmental organization. Our ships are well organized and 
pretty well drilled; the fleets are well organized, though not very 
well drilled ; but the department itself is neither organized nor 
drilled in a military way. Perhaps this is nobody's fault, and 
may be attributed to the fact that our Navy has never had to fight 
a serious enemy — certainly not in 100 years. The people of the 
country have naturally devoted their energy along the paths of 
most obvious profit, and have not been confronted with any obvi- 
ous military dangers. But in my opinion there is an obvious mil- 
itary danger at present, and the Navy Department should be or- 
ganized to meet it. The organization which other navies and all 
armies of great powers employ to meet this danger is known, in 
English, by the phrase ' general staff.' In different languages, 
of course, the words are different, but the meaning is the same. 
In Great Britain it is called the ' Board of Admiralty.' This 
general staff has as its first duty preparation for war, and as its 
second duty the conduct of war when war comes. In making 
preparation for war, the general staff makes war plans. These 
war plans are of two kinds — general and specific. The general 
plans are simply analyses of what should be the general conduct 



224< NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

of the Navy in case of war; and the specific plans are plans in 
which the general plans are worked out in detail. Besides these 
general and specific plans, however, the general staff" devises 
means whereby information regarding these general and specific 
plans shall be given to the various executive bureaus and divi- 
sions, corrected up to date, and whereby the various executive 
bureaus and divisions shall always be compelled to be ready to 
carry the various parts of those plans into immediate eff'ect. 

" 13. Our Navy Department has no machinery for doing what 
a general staff" does. The closest approach to it is the General 
Board, which, as part of its numerous duties, ' shall devise meas- 
ures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of 
the fleet for war,' and ' shall prepare and submit to the Secretary 
of the Navy plans of campaign,' etc. The General Board does 
carry out these duties but the plans that it makes are general and 
elementary. It exists entirely as an advisory board to the Secre- 
tary of the Navy. It is highly valuable; but, as its name indi- 
cates, it is only a ' general board.' It does hardly 1 per cent of 
the duties that a general staff" would do. Having no executive 
authority and no responsibility, and being called upon to do a 
great variety of work, it has not the time to prepare specific 
plans, and has no means to see that even its general plans are 
ever carried out. If we compare our General Board with the 
general staff" of any other country or with the Admiralty of Great 
Britain and when we see what those general staffs have been 
accomplishing during the past three months, we must become 
convinced that unless we go on the theory that we shall always 
have peace we shall be whipped if we ever are brought into war 
with any one of the great naval powers of Europe or Asia, We 
shall be like the lawyer who has not prepared his case when 
pitted against the lawyer who has prepared his case. We shall 
be as the French were before the Germans in 1870. 

"15. The third way in which I find our Navy deficient is in 
training. This deficiency in training is due not to lack of spirit 
or ability but to a combination of the two preceding causes ; that 
is, to insufficient personnel and lack of departmental organization 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 225 

to which must be added lack of small ships. I mean that, because 
we have had not enough small ships to do work on the coasts of 
Haiti, San Domingo, and Mexico, because our ships have been in- 
sufficiently manned and because the Navy Department has had no 
general staff which would devise and carry out a progressive sys- 
tem of training, lack of progressive training has resulted. . . . 

" 16. The subject of the improper organization of our Navy 
Department was exhaustively analyzed by the Moody Board and 
afterwards by the Swift Board in 1909. Certain recommenda- 
tions were made to remedy the evils that they found. These 
recommendations have not been carried out. They were, in ef- 
fect, to establish a general staff, though the words ' general staff ' 
were not used. In my opinion, the failure to adopt those recom- 
mendations was serious and will invite disaster if a great war 
comes. 

" B. A. FisKE." 
IX 

In order to complete the story of the General Board's 
letter of August 1, 1914, and Admiral Fiske's letter of No- 
vember 9, 1914, and to relate the incidents of April, 1916, 
the chronological sequence will be disregarded for a moment. 

As a result of the splendid efforts of the Navy League, 
and of many other patriotic influences, the country was 
roused, after the Lusitania was sunk, from the narcotic 
slumber into which the Administration had lulled it. The 
hearings of the House Naval Committee in the spring of 
1916, made public the facts about naval unpreparedness. 
Admiral Fiske's courageous fight for naval efficiency was 
noted and approved by the country. 

]Mr. Daniels appeared before the House Naval Committee 
on April 3, 1916, and in the course of his statement made a 
scurrilous and violent personal attack on Admiral Fiske. 
This attracted wide attention, especially as the Secretary 
denied much of Admiral Fiske's testimony, and perverted and 
misrepresented many of that officer's activities in order to 
make a case against him in the press. 



226 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Admiral Fiske wrote to the Chairman of the House Com- 
mittee on April 5, 1916, calling attention to some of the mis- 
statements of Mr. Daniels. This letter was also widely pub- 
lished. 

At the Navy League meetings on April 11th and 12th 
Admiral Fiske's actions were strongly endorsed. Colonel 
R. M. Thompson eloquently denounced the Secretary's 
methods. The issue of preparedness was presented squarely 
to the country. 

On April 12, 1916, the United States Senate passed a res- 
olution calling upon the Secretary of the Navy for 

" (1) A communication, dated August 3, 1914, from the Gen- 
eral Board of the Navy, warning the Navy Department of the 
necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness. 

" (2) A communication dated November 9, 1914, from Rear 
Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, senior adviser to the Secretary, warn- 
ing the Navy Department of the unprepared state of the Navy." 

On April 21, 1916, Secretary Daniels replied officially 
to this request in a letter which contained at least two false 
statements. 

X 

In speaking of the letter of Admiral Fiske, the Secretary 
stated that 

" the chief clerk was unable to find it in his files, it having been 
withdrawn by an officer who ' looked it up several times but could 
not find it.' However, the copy herewith transmitted was fur- 
nished the Department by Admiral Fiske at my request. 

" This communication was not furnished me, and I did not 
know of its existence until long after it was written. I find upon 
inquiry that it was filed with the chief clerk without my knowl- 
edge that it had been written. ... I was greatly surprised when 
I learned that a communication deemed important enough now to 
be the subject of a Senate resolution was not considered by its 
author of sufficient importance for him to present in person to me 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 227 

instead of depositing it, without acquainting me of his action, in 
the files of the Navy Department." 

This statement is of the sort that Theodore Roosevelt 
would have characterized as a " deliberate and malicious 
lie." The circumstances under which the letter was 
presented to Mr. Daniels personally by Admiral Fiske, have 
been explained. 

On April 29, 1916, Admiral Fiske wrote the President of 
the Senate in defence of his reputation. The statement in 
the Secretary's letter charged him with an act that " consti- 
tuted a grave breach of official propriety — in fact of actual 
underhandedness — of an attempt to conceal an important 
letter from the Secretary." Admiral Fiske reviewed the cir- 
cumstances under which the letter was presented to Mr. 
Daniels and quoted entries in his diary on November 5 and 
10, 1914, to show that the Secretary had been fully cognizant 
of the letter. 

On May 4th, 1916, Senator Tillman read Admiral Fiske's 
letter to the Senate, declaring it to be due to " wounded 
vanity " and " disappointed ambition." Senator Lodge 
warmly defended the action of Admiral Fiske. Nor did the 
matter rest there. On May 15, 1916, the American Defence 
Society addressed an open letter to the President calling at- 
tention to the " issue of veracity " raised by Secretary 
Daniels' statements, and urging that in justice to Admiral 
Fiske the matter be investigated. On May 22, 1916, Presi- 
dent Wilson, in reply, quoted a memorandum he had received 
from Secretary Daniels. In this occurred the following 
passages : 

" In a recent letter to the Senate, Rear Admiral Fiske stated 
that my statement showed a ' lapse of memory ' ; because he had 
presented the letter to me and I had read it. I have no recollec- 
tion that this paper was ever presented to me, or of reading it. 

" Inasmuch, however, as Admiral Fiske states that he did show 
it to me before it was filed, I of course accept his statement. It 



228 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

was his custom while Aide for Operations to present to me scores 
of papers bearing upon all naval matters. It is utterly impos- 
sible for any Cabinet officer in the multiplicity of papers pre- 
sented to him to recall all of them. 

" I had talked with Rear Admiral Fiske several times about the 
subject matter of the communication, upon which I had rather 
fixed views. But I did not, when my letter was written to the 
Senate, and do not now recall that he had at any time committed 
his views to paper, presented them to me or placed them on file." 

President Wilson said that in view of this statement " the 
matter does not seem to me to call for any comment." 

It is a curious fact that a man, with a memory as retentive 
of details as that of Josephus Daniels, should be able to for- 
get so conveniently a letter from his chief naval adviser 
warning him of the Navy's total unpreparedness for war ! 

XI 

In the case of the first communication called for by the 
Senate, that is, the General Board's letter of August 1, 
1914, the Secretary's choice of statements was even more un- 
fortunate. 

The Secretary wrote: 

" We are unable to find any communication, such as that de- 
scribed in the resolution, from the General Board under date of 
August 3, 1914, though our files contained a letter of two days 
previous not bearing upon the subject mentioned in your resolu- 
tion." 

Admiral Dewey sent the Secretary a copy of this letter of 
August 1, 1914, on April 18, 1916, in reply to a request from 
that official. In transmitting it. Admiral Dewey wrote: 

" You will note that this is a confidential communication, and 
as it bears intimately upon our policy with regard to certain for- 
eign powers I do not think it advisable that it should be given to 
the public." 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 229 

Secretary Daniels was not content with this reason for 
withholding the letter from publicity. In fact, the matters 
affecting foreign powers, dwelt upon in the General Board 
letter, were the same as those contained in Admiral Fiske's 
letter of November 9, 1914. As far as the confidential char- 
acter of the information was concerned, therefore, there 
was no reason for withholding one, when the other was trans- 
mitted to the Senate. jNIr. Daniels in his letter to the Senate 
declined to transmit the General Board letter for another 
reason. He said : 

" In view of the statement of Admiral Dewey, and of the fact 
that the letter of August 1, lOlJf, does not refer to the necessity 
of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness, as stated in the 
resolution adopted by your body, it does not appear to be in 
the public interest to transmit the confidential communication of 
the General Board of August 1, 1914." 

In spite of Secretary' Daniels' statement, a glance at the 
parts of this letter quoted above will show that it dealt ex- 
clusively " with the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state 
of preparedness." The opening paragraph stated : 

" In view of the immediate danger of a great war in Europe. 
. . . The General Board earnestly urges that the battleships be 
brought home, docked and put in perfect readiness. . . ." 

Then, after reviewing the possible complications which 
might draw the United States into the war, the General 
Board ended its letter with the following sentence : 

" We should prepare now for the situation which would thus 
be created." 

XII 

On Tuesday, May 25, 1920, Chairman Hale confronted 
the Secretary' with the documents above quoted. After a 
moment of panic, ]Mr. Daniels set his jaw and with shame- 
less effrontery attempted to squirm out of the corner. 



230 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Senator Hale, after reading the documents, asked Mr. 
Daniels : 

" Now Mr, Secretary, will you please reconcile the statement, 
in your letter of April 21, 1916, to the United States Senate, with 
the purport of the letter of the General Board to you, which I 
have just read? 

"Secretary Daniels: This letter that you have just read 
stated — and it was not — I thought you were referring to the 
report of the General Board which would come to me in the regu- 
lar way. This seems a report from Newport, which is not the 
report of the General Board, with regard to the building pro- 
gram or other strengthening of the Navy. It seems that that 
report deals with conditions in Europe," etc., etc. 

Mr. Daniels went on to describe how Americans were 
helped from Europe in 1914 and how money was sent them 
on the U.S.S. Tennessee. It was with great difliculty that 
the Chairman punctured his web of evasions and brought him 
back to the question, " How can you reconcile these state- 
ments .^ " 

The Secretary then caught at another phrase " withdrawal 
of battleships from Mexican waters," and went into another 
verbose disquisition in which he said that it was none of Ad- 
miral Fiske's business where the battleships were kept. 
Fiske, he said, had repeatedly urged that they be brought 
back from Mexico. They were there " by direction of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. It was not the business 
of Admiral Fiske or Admiral Knight or the General Board 
to tell the President of the United States when he should 
take ships away from Mexico." 

Again the Chairman recalled Mr. Daniels' attention to the 
question. Not being able to dodge any longer, the Secre- 
tary asked to see the letter and then said : " I do not re- 
call Admiral Knight's letter, Mr. Chairman. . . ." 

" The Chairman: Yes, but you recalled it when you wrote 
this letter of . . . 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 231 

Secretary Daniels: . . . April 21, yes. The letter speaks 
for itself. I cannot recall the facts but the letter speaks for it- 
self. . . ." 

Again the Chairman asked : " How do you reconcile 
that.?" 

"Secretary Daniels: I do not recall, Mr. Chairman. I do 
not recall this letter from Admiral Knight (of August 1, 1914). 

" The Chairman : But you said in your letter that the letter 
did not bear upon the subject mentioned in the resolution. On 
looking the letter over, do you not think it bore on the subject of 
the resolution.^ " 

Still Mr. Daniels refused to answer and in desperation 
quoted Admiral Dewej^'s statement that the letter was con- 
fidential. 

" The ChaiT'man: Now you think, therefore, that you were 
justified in telling the Senate that this letter . . . did not bear 
upon the subject mentioned in the resolution.^ ... If Congress 
asks of you a communication, a specific communication bearing 
upon a specific matter, and you have that communication and 
know that it bears upon that specific matter . . . you feel you 
would be justified in telling them that it does not bear upon that 
matter and is merely a confidential communication? 

"Secretary Daniels: I say to you that it did not bear upon 
that matter primarily . . . and Admiral Dew^ey said it was con- 
fidential. 

" The Chairman: Could you not have told Congress it was a 
confidential letter and therefore not to be sent to them? Did 
you have to tell them it did not touch on the matter connected 
with the resolution ? 

"Secretary Daniels: I do not tliink, sir, that this letter can 
be said, in its primary import, to bear upon it (naval prepared- 
ness)." 

The Secretary then wandered off onto another diversion, 
saying that he resented the action of Admiral Fiske and 



232 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the General Board in venturing to write a letter making sug- 
gestions to him about policy. 

The colloquy ended with the following passage: 

" TJie Chairman: Then you have no further explanation to 
give of your letter? 

"Secretary Daniels: I have given you a full explanation. 
That is all I have to say." 

And there the matter rested! 

This incident has been dwelt upon simply because it 
is a proved case of the kind of deliberate evasion and mis- 
representation which was so characteristic a feature of Mr. 
Daniels' methods during the whole period of his administra- 
tion. 

XIII 

Admiral Fiske, after discussing the fate that the General 
Board letter of August 1, 1914, and his own letter of No- 
vember 9, 1914, met at the hands of Mr. Daniels, referred 
also to the action of the Secretary in the case of the annual 
report of the General Board for 1914. Early in November, 
1914, the General Board, in outlining the policy that should 
be followed with regard to manning the vessels of the navy, 
had urged that Congress be asked to increase the personnel 
of the Navy by a minimum of 19,600 men. This addition 
the General Board considered absolutely necessary to keep 
the Navy manned on a peace basis. The Secretary insisted 
that the General Board eliminate this from its report, and 
refused to permit the report to be published until this had 
been done. The full details of this incident have been given 
in the account of Captain Taussig's testimony. Admiral 
Fiske fully confirmed the evidence of Captain Taussig and 
gave further details. The Secretary not only suppressed 
this recommendation, but even reported to Congress that no 
more men were needed. 

As a result of this one act, the Navy entered the war 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 233 

dangerously short of men in April, 1917. In fact, Rear 
Admiral Thomas Washington, Secretary Daniels' latest 
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, told the House Naval 
Committee in January, 1920, that " I think the lack of 
preparedness which the country showed at the beginning of 
the war ought to prevent us from even thinking of dropping 
back to that point again (i. c., attempting to run the Navy 
in peace time with less men than are absolutely essential to 
war needs) ... we do not want to get back to that same 
condition of almost helplessness we then (in April, 1917) 
found ourselves in." 

This testimony at least cannot be suspected of being 
prompted b}^ hostility to Mr. Daniels or by any " grievance." 
Mr. Daniels has attempted to explain away the unprepared- 
ness of the Navy in 1917 by representing it as a myth con- 
cocted by the disappointed ambition and wounded pride 
of his naval critics. But the facts cited by his critics are 
admitted by every naval officer who was in a position to know 
anything about them, as in the case of this statement by 
Rear Admiral Washington. 



XIV 

Admiral Fiske also described the means by which the Office 
of Naval Operations was established in 1915. 

The Secretary would not recommend any change from the 
inefficient organization then existing, lest his personal pre- 
rogatives might be interfered with. Indeed Mr. Daniels had 
discarded even the " Aide System " established by Secretary 
Meyer. Mr. Daniels himself has said that he found the 
Navy Department " encumbered " with aides and so did away 
with them. 

Congress, however, was taking a keen interest in the ef- 
ficiency of the Navy at this time. The long years of work 
of the Navy League were bearing fruit. 



234 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Admiral Fiske therefore resolved to put the matter be- 
fore the House Naval Committee, regardless of the fate which 
he knew would be meted out to him by Mr. Daniels for dar- 
ing to tell the truth. 

In his testimony before the Senate Committee in 1920, 
Admiral Fiske briefly summarized the incidents of 1914- 
1915. 

" Realizing that the safety of the country was at stake, I sug- 
gested to Representative Hobson that he get me called before the 
House Naval Committee, as the official expert of the Navy De- 
partment in strategy, which includes, of course, preparedness. 
Hobson did so. 

" In the course of my testimony, I showed how wholly unpre- 
pared the Navy was, and, I believe, convinced the Naval Commit- 
tee in a very great measure. In my testimony, I gave certain 
figures showing the composition and manoeuvres of the German 
fleet in the autumn of 1913, in which dirigibles, aeroplanes, mine 
sweepers, and battle cruisers operated in the fleet, and the fleet 
manoeuvred according to strategic plans drawn up by the general 
staff"; and I declared that it would take ' at least five years ' to 
get our Navy ready to fight eff'ectively against such a navy. Our 
Navy is not yet able to carry on manoeuvres such as the German 
Navy carried on in 1913. 

"During the following month of January, 1915, I induced 
Representative Hobson to get the House Naval Committee to in- 
corporate in the appropriation bill a provision for a Chief of 
Naval Operations, who should be given the authority and the 
staff" necessary for preparing war jDlans and for putting the Navy 
in a state of preparedness, and be held responsible that those 
things were done. I drew up the phraseology myself with Hob- 
son's assistance. The committee adopted the provision exactly 
as I had drawn it up, with two or three unimportant changes in 
words, and incorporated it in the bill." 

Mr. Daniels had been furious on learning of the action of 
the House Committee. He even declared to Mr. Hobson 
that if the Office of Naval Operations was created he would 
pack up and go home. 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 235 

The provision was struck out of the naval appropriation 
bill on a point of order raised by Congressman Mann of 
Illinois. It was restored in the Senate, but with modifica- 
tions suggested by the Secretary. 

In commenting on these modifications, Admiral Fiske said : 

" It will be noted that although this provision as finally passed 
was a tremendous boon to the Navy, yet that it omitted to supply 
the Chief of Naval Operations with any staff for preparing war 
plans. It charged him with the preparation and readiness of 
plans, but provided no officers for making the plans. It is true 
that the Secretary of the Navy could, if he so desired, order offi- 
cers to Washington but I had sought to make this mandatory, be- 
cause I realized that, if it were not done, officers would probably 
not be ordered." 

Mr. Daniels, in spite of his opposition to the creation of 
the Office of Naval Operations, later attempted to take the 
credit for its organization. In his annual report for 1915, 
he wrote in characteristic vein : 

"Operations — Better Organization Effected 

" Upon my recommendatian the naval appropriation act of 
1914< provided that 'there shall be a Chief of Naval Operations 
. . . who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, 
be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the prepara- 
tion and readiness of plans for its use in war.' " 

It is the virtually unanimous opinion of naval officers that 
this was the most important piece of naval legislation since 
the Civil War. Without it our situation in 1917 would 
have been indescribably chaotic. The office of operations, 
emasculated though it was by Mr. Daniels' opposition, still 
provided the nucleus of a war organization. It was estab- 
lished in 1915 against the opposition of the Secretary, only 
because the educative influence of the Navy League had con- 
vinced Congress of the necessity of better organization, and 



236 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

because Admiral Fiske took the initiative at the cost of his 
own career. 

XV 

In the early part of 1915 the situation had become such 
that Admiral Fiske felt he could no longer be of service in 
the Department. The Secretary refused to take any steps 
toward preparedness or to listen longer to his recommenda- 
tions. He therefore decided to resign in the belief that an- 
other officer might have a greater influence on the Secretary's 
policy. Admiral Fiske said that : 

" The reason why I was not in harmony with the Department 
was that I insisted on the signing of the administrative plan and 
the establishment of some system like that embodied later in the 
Office of Naval Operations. Yet both of these measures the Sec- 
retary approved of highly later; and it was by means of them 
that the Navy was handled with whatever of success it did attain 
in preparing for the war^ and afterwards in waging it." 

Admiral Fiske has paid dearly for his loyalty to the naval 
service and to the country. For five years he has had to 
endure in silence the false accusations and malicious insinu- 
ations of Josephus Daniels. He has been publicly condemned 
by the Secretary as a " colossal failure," as " an obstacle 
for Operations," as a " monumental egotist," as a militaristic 
" disciple of Von Tirpitz," a " Prussian," etc., etc. 

It may be useful to give one characteristic illustration 
of the methods by which Daniels hounded the conscientious 
naval officers out of responsible positions and enforced a 
sickening sycophancy as the chief quality required of officers 
appointed to high positions in the Navy during his regime. 

In the course of his testimony before the House Naval 
Committee on April 3, 1916, Secretary Daniels said: 

" I do not recollect the date, Mr. Chairman, but some time 
after Congress had created the Office of Naval Operations. Ad- 
miral Dewey said to me one day that he would like to have Ad- 



TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FISKE 237 

miral Fiske go on the General Board when he was relieved from 
Operations. I told him I would consider it. . . . Later Admiral 
Dewey requested me not to put Admiral Fiske on the General 
Board. He said he wanted a practical man; that Fiske was too 
theoretical." 

The last statement was an absolute invention of Mr. 
Daniels. Admiral Dewey repeatedly denied ever having 
made any such statement. Admiral Fiske himself went to 
see Admiral Dewey about it. As soon as Fiske entered 
Dewey's office the latter " jumped out of his chair and came 
forward and said: 

Fiske, I never said it; I never said it. No communication 
passed between me and the Secretary about you being on the 
General Board except when you were present, and you heard me 
ask him to keep you on the Board.' " 

Admiral Dewey's aide, Lieutenant Commander (now Com- 
mander) David D. LeBreton, was present in the room at 
the time. 

Secretary Daniels' statements were widely circulated by 
the press. As a result, said Admiral Fiske, 

" I lost my position and was officially discredited. I was put 
in the position of a man who had gotten to the highest position 
in the Navy and did not make good and had to be fired." 

Thus did Secretary Daniels reward the officer who, at 
the cost of his position, the highest command in the Navy, 
had fought so valiantly for preparedness, and had secured 
for the Navy, the organization (in the office of operations) 
without which the Navy would have been wholly ineffective 
throughout the war ; and Mr. Daniels wholly disgraced. 

Fiske saved Daniels! 



CHAPTER XIII 
THE CAUSES OF DEPARTMENTAL INEFFICIENCY 

(Admiral, Fullam's Testimony) 

I 

REAR ADMIRAL W. F. FULLAM, retired, gave tes- 
timony on April 1, 1920, fully substantiating the points 
brought out by Admiral Fiske and the previous witnesses. 
Admiral Fullam had been the Secretary of the Moody-Mahan 
Commission which had recommended in 1909 a reorganiza- 
tion of the Department so that the Navy could be made 
efficient and could fight successfully in war. He was there- 
fore unusually familiar with the problems of naval admin- 
istration. 

From 1913 to February, 1914, Admiral Fullam had been, 
as Aide for Personnel, very closely in touch with the admin- 
istration of the Navy Department a-nd with Secretary Dan- 
iels. In 1915, he was ordered to command the Pacific reserve 
fleet, and remained in this command until 1919. The Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was sent to the South 
Atlantic in April, 1917, to patrol duty, and Admiral Ful- 
lam then became the senior officer in the Pacific, in charge 
of co-ordinating our naval activities in the Pacific, with those 
of the Japanese and English naval forces- 
Admiral Fullam's testimony and the official documents he 
introduced reveal the story of his struggle to get the forces 
in the Pacific into efficient condition for war, not only from 
1915 to 1917, but even after we entered the war. For a 
year he was unable to get any action from the Department, 

238 



ADMIRAL FULLAM'S TESTIMONY 239 

although none of the vessels under his command were in 
an efficient material condition, or had personnel to man 
them. 

By Herculean efforts and after long delays, Admiral Ful- 
1am was able finally to get these ships in shape and they were 
able to render effective service in the war. In his efforts, 
however, far from being helped by the Department, he met 
discouragement, and convincing evidence of the lack of any 
intelligent direction or co-ordination of the military activi- 
ties of the Navy Department. 

Admiral Fullam did not believe, however, that the re- 
sponsibility for this condition could be laid upon the naval 
officers in the Department. He said, with regard to them : 

" I wish to testify to the high character, zeal and ability of all 
of these officers and to the belief that every one of them wished to 
prepare the Navy for war and did their best to that end. But 
their hands were tied — they were helpless, for the simple rea- 
son tliat it was not the policy of the Navy Department to prepare 
actively, or even encourage preparations for war during the years 
between 1913 and March, 1917. As a result of this policy of in- 
difference the Navy was not ready for war in any respect — or- 
ganization, material or personnel. This was not the fault of 
naval officers or chiefs of bureaus. They all did their duty. 

" The United States escaped disaster, as usual, in spite of its 
unpreparedness, simply because the German and Austrian fleets 
were both bottled up, with the exception of submarines, before 
we entered the war, and because all maritime nations joined the 
Allies instead of aligning themselves with the Central Powers." 

II 

When Fullam took command of the eleven cruisers and 
other vessels of the Pacific reserve fleet, in October, 1915, 
" these vessels . . . Avere at stations with complements of 
officers and men so small that they could not move." 

These vessels were essential to the fleet, for they formed 



240 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the only available scouting units. Without them the fleet 
would have met the enemy blindfolded. 

" This weakness was most serious and the condition was aggra- 
vated by the fact that the Navy had a very small, and wholly in- 
adequate, air service available for scouting duty, owing to the 
failure of the Navy Department (i. e.. Secretary Daniels) to sup- 
ply such a force even after the vital importance of the subject 
had been brought to the attention of the Secretary and earnestly 
emphasized by Admiral Fiske in my presence in 1913, when I 
was on duty as one of the Aides to the Secretary of the Navy. 

" In view of this situation, it was manifestly my paramount 
duty to get the reserve ships away from the docks and make them 
ready for the important work that would inevitably be forced 
upon them. I had n-o orders or instructions to do this^ but I did 
it of my own accord." 

Repeatedly, for nearly a year, Admiral Fullam gave the 
Department full and detailed reports of the hopeless condi- 
tion of these reserve vessels, but, as he told the Senate com- 
mittee : 

" It is, perhaps, needless to say that no action whatever was 
taken by the Navy Department. Not one of the suggestions 
made in my letters was favorably considered. The Navy De- 
partment did practically nothing. It did not lift a finger nor 
initiate any measure to carry out its own policy (of keeping re- 
serve ships in fit condition) as outlined in its letter of February 
10, 1916, . . . Operations and Personnel (i. e., the Bureau of 
Navigation under Admiral Blue) did not or could not co- 
operate." 

Ill 

Mr. Daniels' deliberate suppression of the personnel needs 
of the Navy in 1914, had left the service so shorthanded 
that no vessel of the Navy had a full crew. The reserve 
vessels had not enough men even to go to sea. Admiral 
Fullam said: 



ADMIRAL FULLAM'S TESTIMONY 241 

" To my i^ersonal knowledge the Navy Department did noth- 
ing but carry on a routine — and a peace routine at that — at a 
time during 1916 and the first months of 1917 when war was 
practically inevitable. Not a move of any consequence was made 
to prepare the Navy for war. It is plain that naval officers who 
followed the same supine policy would have been guilty of crim- 
inal neglect of duty to the Navy and to the country. ... It is 
pertinent to remark that if the Department had any plans at all 
they must have remained on paper. There was no evidence in 
the Pacific of any intent to prepare for war." 

In a personal letter of June 12, 1916, to Admiral Benson, 
Admiral Fullam urged that steps be taken to put his ships 
in fit condition, as otherwise " as far as the Navy is con- 
cerned, on the Pacific coast, a condition of war would find 
things in a state of absolute pandemonium and inefficiency 
— unreadiness instead of preparedness in every essential 
that counts in actual warfare." 

In his testimony, Fullam added the statement that " the 
condition mentioned in the last paragraph of this letter 
. . . was fully realized when war was finally declared in 
1917." 

IV 

When Admiral Palmer became Chief of the Bureau of 
Navigation in August, 1916, things took a turn for the bet- 
ter. He set out vigorously to build up the personnel of 
the Navy. But he " found the Navy," said Fullam, " short 
of officers and men, with no adequate provision and no de- 
termined attempt of the Navy Department to supply the 
deficiency. . . . The hopelessness of the situation that con- 
fronted Admiral Palmer is shown by the fact that he could 
allow only four officers for each of my ships ' until the De- 
partment releases sufficient personnel by placing ships out 
of commission,' and he declared that no enlisted personnel 
' could be made available for Fullam's vessels.' Admiral 
Palmer attempted to assist me . . . but he, too, found his 



242 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

hands tied by the Department's policy of inaction along 
these lines." 

On September 14, 1916, Admiral Fullam addressed a very 
strong letter to the Navy Department with regard to the 
condition of the Pacific reserve fleet. It so happened that 
the higher official? in the Navy Department were absent 
and Palmer, as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, was Act- 
ing Secretary. As a result, a satisfactory policy was estab- 
lished and a strong order sent to all bureaus and navy yards 
concerned, directing that this policy be carried out. 

Commenting on this circumstance. Admiral Fullam said: 

" This letter was prepared in the Department of Material of 
the Office of Operations and showed the efficiency of that office. 
... It was the one agent and the only agent that could co-ordi- 
nate all these bureaus and get anything done. . . . Under a 
proper organization this order should have been and doubtless 
would have been issued a year sooner. This letter conclusively 
proves that a directing, and ever present, controlling and co-ordi- 
nating military head is at all times essential to the efficiency and 
preparedness of a military service for war. If the Secretary 
will not or cannot co-ordinate all agencies, nothing may be done, 
unless he leaves the Department temporarily in charge of an 
officer vested with the Secretary's power over the bureaus — an 
officer who knows what should be done and who has the energy to 
do things — ... With the signing by Admiral Palmer of the 
Department's letter of September 30, 1916, we had the first glim- 
mer of a departmental policy concerning the preparation of the 
armoured cruisers for the war which we entered six months later. 
And it is only the truth to state that the Department would not 
have taken this action had it been left to its own initiative. It 
took this action only after eleven months of constant prodding 
and unceasing effort by the Commander and officers of the Pa- 
cific reserve fleet. That was September 30, 1916, six months be- 
fore we entered the war. 

"... I wish to bear testimony to the very important action 
and to the efficiency of the division of material. Palmer did 
everything in his power to help. Their hands were tied through 



ADMIRAL FULLAM'S TESTIMONY 243 

no fault of theirs, as I believe the hands of every one of the offi- 
cers in the Navy Department were tied, because the Navy De- 
partment had no policy and was not imbued with the absolute 
necessity of getting ready for war." 



When we entered the war in April, 1917, of the six ar- 
moured cruisers in the Pacific fleet, only one, the flagship, 
was ready for battle or for war service. Admiral Fullam at 
that time warned Admiral Caperton, the Commander-in- 
Chief in the Pacific, of the unpreparedness of these vessels 
for action. 

" The armoured cruisers of our Navy, officered and manned 
though they were with a personnel unequalled, in intelligence, 
patriotism and bravery by the men of any navy in the world, 
would nevertheless have been at such a fatal disadvantage, due to 
their lack of training, that a battle at this time with enemy ves- 
sels, manned with trained and seasoned crews, could only have 
resulted in inevitable defeat for our ships. To claim the con- 
trary would be to exhibit a degree of ignorance and bombast of 
which any American citizen or naval officer should be ashamed. 
It was a condition of complete naval unpreparedness, as far as 
the scouts and screening vessels of the Navy were concerned." 

Throughout the war the greatest difficulties were expe- 
rienced in the Pacific, as a result of the strain caused by 
the necessity of preparing after war began, by the lack of 
any plans to guide effort and by the indecision and lack 
of policy of the Navy Department. 

Admiral Fullam gave repeated cases of the chaos, con- 
fusion and delay for which these conditions were responsible. 
No guns nor torpedoes were available for the ships in the 
Pacific. As a result the submarines that were sent to the 
Atlantic had to leave for the war zone without guns or tor- 
pedoes. Target practice for recruits was forbidden on 
September 20, 1917, by order of Admiral Benson, because 



244 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

of lack of ammunition. On September 11, 1918, the Bureau 
of Ordnance stated that guns would not be available for 
vessels in the Pacific until the spring of 1919. 

In the matter of local defences and in co-operation with 
the Army in the Pacific, conditions were equally hopeless. 
After reviewing eight months' vain efforts to get proper 
co-ordination Admiral Fullam summarized in the following 
words his difficulties in this matter : 

" In concluding this remarkable account of eight months' vain 
effort by the senior naval officer in the Pacific to secure an effec- 
tive organization and proper co-ordination of Army and Navy 
forces, it is proper to summarize as follows : 

" (1) The important recommendations made by the senior 
Army and naval officers on the Pacific coast were not approved by 
the Navy Department and were practically ignored for weeks. 

" (2) The appearance of three whales, mistaken for subma- 
rines off San Diego, May 19, 1917, demonstrated the inadequacy 
of the Navy Department's organization, proved the lack of co- 
ordination of Army and Navy forces, and had more influence in 
bringing the Navy Department to act than the official report and 
recommendation of a rear admiral backed by the opinion of a 
brigadier general, made three months previously. 

" (3 Army commandants in the Pacific at all times showed a 
desire to co-operate with the Navy and entered into the plan of 
joint boards with enthusiasm, as shown by the correspondence in 
the attached confidential file. The Navy Department objected 
to a closely knit organization in the Pacific, and insisted that con- 
ferences should be ' informal ' rather than mandatory. This ac- 
tion practically forced the division commander to revoke or mod- 
ify his orders and it decidedly lessened his authority or threw 
doubt upon it. The efi'ect was most unfortunate. 

" (4) The reliance of the Navy Department upon its regula- 
tions proved to be ill-considered. Regulations alone never have 
and never will secure efficiency in the administration of war afloat 
or ashore. There must be personal action and thoroughness of 
organization with definite orders as to the exact part that each 
unit is to play. Without such explicit orders, and without a care- 



ADMIRAL FULLAM'S TESTIMONY 245 

fully prepared jilan the Army and Navy can never co-ordinate 
effectively and the safety of the United States in war will be 
jeopardized. An ' informal ' organization, with the mere direc- 
tion that Army and naval officers shall ' keep in close touch/ will 
not suffice. As well might we rely upon Naval Regulations alone 
to secure efficiency in our battle fleet. 

" (5) The objection of the Navy Department to local joint 
boards of Army and naval officers was inexplicable. I have been 
informed, however, that the Navy Department did not favour any 
real joint organization witli the Army for offensive and defensive 
purposes, and that the Navy Department discouraged, if it did 
not forbid, meetings of the joint board in Washington during the 
one or two years before the war. I am not personally cognizant 
of this fact, but it came to me from a reliable source, and if true, 
it would explain the department's action toward joint boards in 
the Pacific in 11)17. It would appear, therefore, that the Navy 
Department, and not the War Department, objected to this 
means of securing proper co-ordination. That is a matter I wish 
to leave for somebody else to investigate. But I am informed 
that the importance of the joint Army and Navy board is now 
recognized, and it is to be hoped that it will play a very im- 
portant role hereafter in providing a proper system of coast and 
harbour defence for this country. 

" I was told that the Navy Department apparently was afraid 
that the Army and Navy joint board in Washington might med- 
dle with questions of preparation for war, and therefore they 
did not want it to meet; and that the officers on it were afraid to 
push the matter, because they were afraid that the board would 
be abolished if they did meet. That, I say, is my information. 
I believe it, but I can not swear to it. 

" The invulnerable principle must be recognized that there 
shall be organization — definite, authoritative, and complete — 
or there will be chaos. There is no alternative. The Navy De- 
partment did not itself perfect, nor permit anybody else to per- 
fect, a thorough organization on the Pacific coast between Feb- 
ruary, 1917, and October, 1917. The appearance of three 
whales off San Diego made the need of a new organization very 
plain. The existing machinery did not work. There was no 



246 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

head, no board of Army and Navy officers to control the situation, 
and there was no plan. Confusion was inevitable." 

VI 

During his service in the Navy Department, Admiral 
Fullam had closely followed the efforts made to develop a 
naval aviation service. He testified that practically nothing 
had been accomplished because of the failure or refusal of 
the Secretary to take the necessary action, or permit others 
to act. 

In 1913, Admiral Fiske, in Fullam's presence, had called 
the attention of the Secretary to the increasingly great im- 
portance of aviation for naval purposes, and had explained 
what all other nations were doing. " Notwithstanding Ad- 
miral Fiske's efforts, which continued unremittingly until his 
retirement from the Navy Department in 1915, compara- 
tively little had been accomplished in Aviation before the 
declaration of war, and, as a result of this failure to act dur- 
ing four years, we had only 45 trained aviators, and a piti- 
fully inadequate service in July, 1917, three months after 
we entered the war." 

In 1916, Captain M. L. Bristol, Director of Aeronautics, 
had his estimates cut from $13,000,000 to $2,000,000, and, 
though this was later increased to $3,500,000, this sum was 
altogether insufficient. 

As a result of the failure to have developed naval aviation, 
no American built planes were used by the Navy in Europe 
until July, 1918, fifteen months after the war began. After 
war was declared, much was done, but with an expenditure of 
hundreds of millions of dollars. Most of this was wasted — 
or could have been saved — had one per cent, of the war 
expenditures been used before 1917 in building up our naval 
aviation. 

This unpreparedness in aviation was not due, in Admiral 
Fullam's opinion, to the officers and bureaus, " The respon^ 



ADMIRAL FULLAM'S TESTIMONY 247 

sibility rested with the Secretary of the Navy, wlio cut the 
estimates and prevented the full development of this im- 
portant element of naval warfare during the years preceding 
the declaration of war." 

VII 

The picture of Josephus Daniels functioning as Secretary 
of the Navy had already been sketched by previous witnesses. 
Admiral Fullam added many interesting features. Of Dan- 
iels' pacifism there was no doubt in his mind. 

" I regret very much to say that Secretary Daniels did not 
take the same interest (as Secretary Meyer) in the preparation 
of the Navy for war. He was greatly interested in many things 
that were good, but generally they did not affect the preparation 
of the Navy for war or stimulate officers to exert themselves." 

In 1913 when relations with a foreign power seemed 
strained Admiral Fullam as an Aide drew up a memorandum 
of things that should be done immediately. He did not take 
it to Mr. Daniels, as he knew from experience that as it 
related to war preparations, the Secretary would oppose any 
such recommendation from a naval officer. So Fullam took 
the memorandum to the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Roosevelt, 
who presented the recommendations to the Secretary. Ful- 
lam graphically described the occasion. 

" I remember so well that he sat down in his chair and put this 
paper on the floor between his feet and read off from time to 
time' the items ; and, coming from him as a civilian. . , . some of 
those tilings were done." 

One of the measures recommended was the preparation of a 
list of assignments of retired officers to active duty. This 
too was acted upon in a way characteristic of Daniels' naval 
administration, 

" The Bureau of Navigation (under Rear Admiral Blue) was 
so rattled at getting a suggestion to really do something — I do 



24?8 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

not hesitate to say so — that they assigned this duty ... to a 
picked up board of three comparatively young officers. . . . 
They were unfamiliar with the personnel of the Navy; they did 
not know the names of these retired officers ; nor of the officers 
on the active list who were practically incapacitated; and their 
recommendations were very amusing. They had a one-legged 
captain ordered to command a battleship. They had officers in 
an insane asylum . . . assigned to important duties. . . . The 
thing was impossible and had to be revoked." 

Mr. Daniels always rather scorned the advice of naval 
officers. Said Admiral Fullam: 

" He was one of the most agreeable men personally that I 
ever had anything to do with." . . . Yet " he did not want to 
give admirals much authority and I cannot tell you how it hurt 
us. He did not trust us. He did not take our advice and realize 
that we were citizens of the United States, just as he was, 
and that it was our life to do that thing and to help him to 
do it. . . . It was a very trying situation that naval officers were 
subjected to. We could support Mr. Meyer's policies with 
great enthusiasm, because they were directed toward the prep- 
aration of the Navy for war. It was not to him a political 
matter at all, ... it was to prepare the Navy for war. How 
could I, the next day after Mr. Meyer left office, and I became 
Mr. Daniels' Aide, view with equal enthusiasm and zeal policies 
that destroyed and smashed everything that Mr. Meyer had 
attempted to do or did do? It is impossible, unless a naval 
officer can turn his coat in 24? hours and say one thing today and 
another thing tomorrow." 

This, in Fullam's opinion, was one of the most distressing 
features of Mr. Daniels' administration. Mr. Daniels in- 
sisted on having his own way, and his own way was not 
for the good of the Navy. He would not tolerate officers 
around him who would not accept his way. 

" That is going to ruin the Navy if you keep it up," Admiral 
Fullam told the committee. " If you establish the principle that 
a man has got to be subservient almost servile, almost to efface 



ADMIRAL FULLAM'S TESTIMONY 249 

himself and say yes and not dare to express himself, the inevit- 
able result is that you put mediocrity itself upon a pedestal and 
you will throw ability and zeal into the discard and you will 
hurt the Navy if that system becomes imbedded in the Depart- 
ment. Officers must be assigned to duty not by reason of their 
subservience, but by reason of their ability and they must be 
ready to have any job and go to sea . . . when they find that it 
is planned to do something that will injure the Navy and not 
help prepare the Navy for war." 



vni 

Admiral Fullam had been graduated at the head of the 
class at the Naval Academy and had been on duty several 
times at Annapolis. He had always been keenly interested 
in education in the Navy. As Aide for Personnel in 1913, 
he came into close contact with Mr. Daniels' ideas about edu- 
cation. These, to him, were merely another proof of the 
misguided political enthusiasm of the Secretary. 

In the Navy, the instruction of enlisted men had been 
going on for many years. The problems had been carefully 
studied and a very effective system of technical training had 
been developed. All this Mr. Daniels ignored. He was 
going to make the Navy " the greatest university in Amer- 
ica " whether the Navy liked it or not. 

Admiral Fullam drew up a plan 

" particularly emphasizing the professional spirit, in order that 
all men in the Navy might make themselves eligible for promo- 
tion. ... I made academic instruction optional with each man, 
after he left the training station, except for men who were illit- 
erate. But . . . the Secretary insisted tliat they should all be 
forced to go to school even those who had been to school, so that 
I think it did harm . . . and tended to drive men out. . . ." 

In spite of his objections to Mr. Daniels' frills. Admiral 
Fullam had endeavoured to carry through the educational 



250 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

plan for the good there was in it. But Mr. Daniels insisted 
on his hobbies. 

" If he had not been so extreme ... it would have worked. 
But it was so emphasized that the officers of the Navy had to 
look upon that as the principal duty of the Navy ; and, therefore, 
it hurt the morale of the Navy, because the chief business of 
readiness for war was lost sight of." 

The scheme was harmful and died. " The whole system is 
now a dead letter in the Navy." 



IX 

It was characteristic of INIr. Daniels, that he condemned 
the " aristocracy " of the Navy and set about " democratiz- 
ing," by destroying its splendid traditions, by lowering tlie 
standards required of the naval officer and by levelling the 
distinction in ranks to the detriment of the discipline and 
morale of the Navy. Of this, too, Admiral Fullam spoke 
from experience when he said : 

" About democratizing the Navy, I talked to the Secretary. 
I told him he was mistaken; that there was no aristocracy in 
the Navy . . . that officers loved their men, and were ten times 
more solicitous of their men than any employer in civil life is of 
his. . . . The men of the Navy, why, vre stood together all our 
lives. . . . 

" These charges of caste and aristocracy hurt the Navy. The 
officers felt hurt. . . . This caused resentment, enmity, perma- 
nent resentment, permanent enmity. It hurts the morale. No, 
sir, there is no caste, or aristocracy. There are traditions that 
were established by John Paul Jones and Decatur, perpetuated 
by Farragut and Porter and Sampson and Dewey and Mahan and 
Evans and Bronson and Schroeder and Wainwright, and men 
like that. If you call that caste or aristocracy, the more you 
have of it the better for the Navy and for this country; and 
when you wreck it, you will wreck the Navy, just as sure as 
there is a God in Heaven! " 



/x 



ADMIRAL FULLAM'S TESTIMONY 251 

X 

To Admiral Fullam as to Admiral Fiske, there seemed a 
curious similarity between Daniels' regime in our Navy 
and the disastrous administration of the French Navy, some 
twenty years ago, by M. Camille Pelletan, a politician not 
unlike Josephus Daniels in his policies and views. A con- 
temporary report of our Naval Intelligence, read by Ad- 
miral Fullam, gives the following account: 

" Camille Pelletan's administration was disastrous to the 
Navy. And yet he was a patriot, animated by the best inten- 
tions. Unfortunatel}^ almost all his ideas were contrary to a 
good organization of the Navy Department, where so many out- 
of-date and incomjjrehensible- traditions survive. He left his 
department in chaotic disorder. 

" The Navy is succumbing to a double anarchy — anarchy at 
the top, due to an out-of-date organization of the central ser- 
vices of the ministry, which has permitted politics to reduce in a 
few years all the services to a state' of complete impotency and 
irresponsibility ; anarchy from below, due equally to the intru- 
sion of the political element into our dockyards, thanks to which 
intrusion the dockyards have ceased to be able to build and 
maintain the fleet. 

" Speaking of Camille Pelletan as Minister of Marine of 
France in Les Marines Fran9aise et Allemande, 1904, the author 
states that the distinguishing characteristic of M. Pelletan's 
regime is ' an increased tendency to lessen the combatant corps, 
to lower its prestige, to belittle it in the minds of the enlisted 
men and the public.' 



" The name of democracy has been invoked to explain this 
merciless war on tlie spirit of discipline and duty; it was pre- 
tended that it was desired to make the Navy democratic. It is 
one of the most daring jokes that a minister has ever permitted 
himself to play. Between demoralization and democratization 
there is an abyss." 



252 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

The French Navy was so wrecked by M. Pelletan and 
by the failure to permit naval officers to say anything about 
the navy that it has not yet recovered. 

It was obviously Admiral Fullam's fear that the Daniels 
regime might have a similarly disastrous sequel, particu- 
larly as the Secretary has always " smothered and throt- 
tled " naval officers. In January, 1916, for example, Mr. 
Daniels summoned Admiral Fiske and forbade him to write or 
speak or even talk in private about the Navy " even to say 
that two and two make four." So, too, in 1915, the Sec- 
retary had asked Admirals Fullam and Knight to attend a 
society dinner in New York city as representatives of the 
Navy, and to speak if they wished it. Admiral Knight, then 
President of the Naval War College, prepared a paper deal- 
ing with naval organization and administration which Ful- 
lam thought " one of the finest things I ever heard. It was 
just in line with Admiral Mahan's work . . . about the or- 
ganization of the Navy Department and the control of the 
Navy to make it fit for battle." The Secretary was intensely 
annoyed and severely reprimanded Admiral Knight. He also 
demanded Admiral Fullam's notes but as the latter's remarks 
were "more or less jocular," the Secretary returned them 
without comment. 

" I felt that when officers of high rank, who have been forty 
years in the service are not permitted to speak at all about the 
service in which their whole life has been spent, and where their 
energies are concentrated, it is not democracy, sir, it is autoc- 
racy." 

XI 

The heart of the naval controversy, the summation of the 
issues at stake was clearly and forcibly restated by Admiral 
Fullam, in concluding his testimony. 

" In concluding this statement regarding the preparedness of 
the Navy for war as regards both personnel and material, it is 



ADMIRAL FULLAM'S TESTIMONY 253 

only proper to state that the officers and men of the Navy were 
and always have been mdividually ready for war; that the un- 
preparedness of the Navy for war in 1917 was not primarily the 
fault of any officer or officers, but that it was due to the fact that 
the Navy Department as a whole declined or failed to adopt 
policies which demanded, or even permitted officers to prepare 
the Navy for its duty as a fighting machine. 

" That the officers and men of the Navy, both regular and 
reserve, did their whole duty with great gallantry and devo- 
tion is admitted by everybody, and that they contributed loyally 
to the winning of the war is also beyond question. Tliat the 
bureau chiefs were in no sense responsible for the lack of pre- 
jDaredness of the Navy Department and that they accomplished 
wonders as soon as their hands were free can not be denied. 

" That we escaped disaster was plainly due to the fact that 
tlie enemy's fleet, with the exception of submarines, had been 
driven from the seas before we declared war against Germany. 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that we had no naval 
war in the full sense of the word. No admiral led an American 
fleet into battle. Not one American ship fired a single gun at a 
German ship, and not a German ship fired a single gun at an 
American ship, with the exception of a few engagements be- 
tween German submarines and our destroyers, armed merchant 
ships, and small craft, and noting the gallant little fight made 
by our subchasers at Durazzo. It was a war without naval 
battles. 

" In other words, there was, strictly speaking, less sea fighting 
than in tlie war with Spain, and the Navy of the United States 
was not fully tested as to its readiness for battle nor as to the 
adequacy of all its units to meet the emergency of war had 
Germany's fleet been free to take the sea against us. 

" Escaping as we did by our great good fortune, in that the 
German fleet never appeared after the battle of Jutland in June, 
1916, it is the duty of every naval officer who realizes the actual 
condition of our unpreparedness to tell the truth upon the occa- 
sion of the investigation of the conduct of the war by a co- 
ordinate branch of the United States Government, in order that 
the people of this country may no longer be deceived and that 



254 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the United States may not again be threatened by the inexcus- 
able failure of the Navy Department to prepare the fleet in all 
respects for sudden war at any time in the future. . . . 

" But a naval officer's duty does not, or should not, begin and 
end in battle, nor in time of war. He has duties and responsi- 
bilities before the war and before the battles begin. And it 
should be clearly understood that any officer of the Navy who sits 
supinely or subserviently idle and indifferent when an armed 
enemy nation with an efficient fighting navy is in plain sight (and 
has been for years )^ and fails with energy to prepare and to 
urge others to prepare his country's navy for war, when he knows 
or should know that it is unprepared in every respect, is un- 
worthy of his cloth; that he is neglecting his first duty, fails to 
measure up to the standards of the American Navy, and is de- 
serving of a more severe punishment than a captain who fails 
to prepare a ship for battle. The neglect in time of peace to 
prepare the great Navy of a great nation for battle imperils the 
whole country, and for this reason the offence is the more repre- 
hensible. 

" The experience of the past demonstrates clearly, if we probe 
for the facts, that in throttling and ignoring officers of high rank 
who are seeking zealously and patriotically to prepare the Navy 
for war, the real truth concerning the Navy may be suppressed, 
the public may be deceived, and as an inevitable result the Navy 
may be placed in a condition of unreadiness involving danger of 
humiliating and disastrous defeat, or that it may fail to put 
forth its best efforts in affording ' all practicable relief and 
assistance to our allies ' when engaged in war. 

" The Navy of the United States was not properly prepared 
for war in April, 1917. The question is, Shall such a condition 
be permitted to exist again in the future.^ " 



CHAPTER XIV 

MR. DANIELS' ADMIRALS AND THEIR SMOKE 

SCREEN 

(The Testimony of Admirals Rodman, Wilson, Niblack, 
Strauss and Fletcher) 



INSPIRED announcements in the press, beginning as 
early as January, had indicated the method by which Sec- 
retary Daniels would attempt to defend his administration. 
From the first it was his obvious desire to escape responsi- 
bility by converting the naval investigation into a domestic 
feud within the service. He spared no effort to align his 
appointees to high positions against Admiral Sims. Hence 
his publication of Admiral Sims' personal letter advising 
against the appointment of Wilson to command the fleet. 
Hence, too, his playing up of Admiral Benson. If he could 
convert the affair into a Sims-Benson, or Sims-Operation 
" row " he could reasonably hope to escape unscathed. 

Of course, there were difficulties in the way of such a 
course. The facts were so obviously as Sims had stated 
them that it would be impossible to meet the issues squarely. 
Naval officers, even of the Daniels camp, have still the 
habit of telling the truth, and if these officers — however 
friendly to himself, or hostile to Sims they might be — who 
reallv knew intimately the activities of the Department be- 
fore and during the war, were put on the witness stand they 
would probably make damaging admissions by telling the 

truth. 

255 



256 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

So the Secretary was faced with the problem of mapping 
out his case in such a way that he could make the maximum 
use of those officers whose assistance he could depend upon, 
in return for favours rendered or anticipated, while not run- 
ning the risk of any very damaging admissions in the cross- 
questioning. The obvious way was to call officers of high 
rank and in high positions, who were indebted to him for 
their advancement, and yet who knew little or nothing of the 
issues of the investigation. That this was the course decided 
upon is evident from the testimony of the first five of his 
witnesses ; Admirals Rodman and Wilson and Rear Admirals 
Niblack, Strauss and F. F. Fletcher. 

Their testimony indicated clearly the method of defence. 
Even the Secretary must have realized that the facts of un- 
preparedness and inefficiency could not be disputed. Con- 
sequently, they were to be evaded, misstated, misrepresented, 
obscured and perverted. The criticisms of his administra- 
tion could be presented to the public as " attacks " upon the 
Navy, as a " belittling " of its war record. The issues could 
be obscured by introducing vast masses of testimony, and 
emphatic statements of high officials, to demonstrate how 
splendidly the Navy performed its task in the war, especially 
in the later months of 1918. False constructions could be 
put upon disconcerting evidence, these misrepresentations 
could be used as targets, and the public might be led to be- 
lieve, that in annihilating his own misrepresentations, he was 
meeting the criticisms of Admiral Sims and the other officers 
who had told the real story of his administration. What 
little favourable evidence was available could, by artful mis- 
statement and half truth, be made to appear a complete 
defence. Finally, in order to distract the public attention 
from himself, violent denunciation could be heaped upon the 
critics, in the hope of persuading the public that in damning 
the witness, the facts he had sworn to could, in some myste- 
rious way, be neglected. 



MR. DANIELS' ADMIRALS 257 

II 

In other words, if one may employ a naval term, Secretary 
Daniels used counter-barrage and smoke screen tactics. In 
order to make these effective he proposed to overwhelm his 
critics by weight of rank if not by evidence. At first he had 
announced his intention of calling all officers who held high 
positions in the Navy during the war. But when the cross- 
examination of his witnesses demonstrated the fact that the 
truth was going to be dragged out of the men he called, he 
hurriedly revised his list of witnesses. 

The officers whom he finally did call can be divided into 
two chief groups. There were first the five officers already 
named, who knew very little of the Department's activities 
during the war, and nothing of the relations existing between 
the Department and Admiral Sims, and hence could not give 
much away. Some of these officers also had private grudges 
against Sims and could be counted on to even up scores when 
on the stand. 

The second group was composed of the officers who had 
served in the more responsible positions in the Navy Depart- 
ment during the war. They felt resentment toward Sims 
because they believed, as they expressed it, that in aiming 
at Daniels, he had hit them. They failed to realize that 
Sims was not criticizing them personally for the depart- 
mental errors, but was rather condemning the departmental 
inefficiency, lack of organization and unpreparedncss which 
made it inevitable that, in the stress of war, mistakes would 
result, no matter how ably or faithfully or persistently they 
struggled to overcome the handicaps imposed upon them by 
tlie Secretary's policy. 

Nothing is more significant than INIr. Daniels' failure to 
call as witnesses in his behalf the group of officers of high 
rank in the Department who knew most intimately what the 
departmental policies and activities before and during the 



258 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

war had been. Not a single Chief of Bureau was called by 
him. The obvious inference must be that they knew too 
much. They had not been subjected to any criticism by 
Admiral Sims. They had all laboured under enormous dif- 
ficulties during the war, as a result of the lack of plans and 
definite policies. If called, these conditions would certainly 
have been admitted by them. Hence, they were not called. 
Instead, Mr. Daniels had each of them write a neat sum- 
mary of the work successfully accomplished by them during 
the war, with enormous masses of statistics showing every 
projectile, every bolt, every ounce of powder or sugar pro- 
duced. These Mr. Daniels introduced in his own testimony 
in lieu of running the risk of calling them as witnesses and 
of having questions asked them that would bring out further 
damaging confirmation of the unpreparedness and lack of 
plans before 1917, and the mistakes and delays in the first 
six months of the war. 

Ill 

Certain salient facts stand out very sharply after a 
careful review of the testimony of the witnesses called by 
Mr. Daniels. In the first place a comparison of the mere 
bulk of the evidence is interesting. In the printed volumes 
of the Hearings the testimony of Admiral Sims occupies 375 
pages ; that of the other eight witnesses called by the Com- 
mittee on its own initiative 465 pages ; that of the first group 
of six admirals called by the Secretary 358 pages ; that of 
the three officers who served in the Office of Operations 883 
pages; that of the Secretary himself 1,188 pages. The tes- 
timony of the first nine witnesses dealt almost exclusively 
with the issues raised by Admiral Sims' letter of January 7, 
1920, which was the raison d'etre of the investigation. Of 
the testimony introduced by Secretary Daniels' witnesses, 
only a very small percentage, certainly not more than 10 per 
cent., dealt specifically with these issues. In other words, 



MR. DANIELS' ADIMIRALS 259 

the defence was primaril}^ a smoke -screen. Its purpose was 
to obscure the facts, not to elucidate them. 

In the second place, each of the Daniels witnesses was 
intent on clearing his own skirts of any responsibility. They 
had few good words to say for Mr. Daniels. When they 
could, they kept resolutely off the subject of his methods 
and policies. In no case did they attempt any general en- 
dorsement or approval of them. But they did most earnestly 
endeavour to show how nobly they themselves had laboured 
during the war ; how greatly their efforts had contributed to 
making the best of a bad situation. 

In the third place, at least sixty per cent, of their testi- 
mony is devoted to a discussion of the undeniably magnificent 
work accomplished by the officers and men of the Navy dur- 
ing the war. No better or more lucid description of this can 
be found than is provided by Admiral Sims' own book " The 
Victory at Sea," originally published in the World's Work. 
Consequently it is hard to understand in what way this 
type of testimony contributed to a settlement of the ques- 
tions under consideration. Of course the motive that in- 
spired the testimony is clear. Admiral Sims was to be 
accused of attacking the Navy, in order to create an un- 
favourable public attitude toward him. He was to be con- 
demned and his statements deprecated as injurious to the 
Navy. The Daniels men were to provide in this way an ef- 
fective counter-barrage to facilitate the Secretary's escape. 

In the fourth place, irrelevant issues were introduced to 
provide means for malicious and petty personal insinua- 
tions or vehement denunciation of Sims. It is a curious fact 
that the testimony of the eight other officers, reviewed in the 
preceding chapters, was hardly mentioned, nor were they 
assaulted, except by ]\Ir. Daniels himself. The effort was to 
be concentrated against Sims. He had caught the public 
notice. The country had been greatly impressed by his clear 
statement of actual conditions. Consequently, fire and brim- 



260 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

stone with sulphuric trimmings was to be his fate at the hands 
of Daniels and his hellions. 



IV 

It must be noted that in almost every Instance the wit- 
nesses called by Mr. Daniels, when subjected to the patient 
but searching and astute cross-examination of Senator Hale, 
admitted that the Navy as a whole was unprepared for 
war in 1917 ; that no special steps had been taken to pre- 
pare for war until after April 6 ; that the Navy was short of 
men as a result of Mr. Daniels' own actions ; that the Navy 
had no war plans applicable to the situation which we faced 
on entering the war; that for many months no definite plans 
nor policies were formulated ; that our forces were held back 
from the war zone for months ; and that Admiral Sims re- 
ceived little assistance in the early months of the war. 

One has only to read the cross-examination of the officers 
called by the Secretary and it will be found that these wit- 
nesses admitted the accuracy of every essential criticism 
of the Daniels administration by Admiral Sims or other wit- 
nesses. The Secretary stands convicted by the words of 
his own defenders of having prevented preparedness ; of hav- 
ing prevented an efficient organization of the Department ; 
of having failed to help the Allies in the hours of their great- 
est need, immediately after we entered the war. In fact, 
Admiral Sims, in his rebuttal statement, quoted only from 
Mr. Daniels' witnesses in substantiating all of his criticisms, 
and he demonstrated from their admissions, willing or reluc- 
tant, that the Secretary, intentionally or otherwise, had de- 
ceived the country and misrepresented the state of the Navy 
before, during and after the war. 



MR. DANIELS' ADMIRALS 261 



It will be unnecessary to linger long with the testimony of 
the first five admirals called by Daniels to start the laying 
of his smoke screen. Four of them, Rodman, Wilson, 
Niblack and Strauss, had been selected by the Secretary 
himself, Avithout ever consulting Admiral Sims, for subor- 
dinate posts abroad, during the war. All four had received 
further preferment from Mr. Daniels after the armistice. 
Rodman and Wilson are now the commanders-in-chief of 
the two unhappily divided portions of our main fleet. 
Strauss, who had been a member of the General Board dur- 
ing 1919, was rewarded for his service to the Secretary by 
being appointed in December, 1920, to be the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, with the rank of Admiral. 
Niblack was made Director of Naval Intelligence and more 
recently naval attache to Great Britain. In other words, all 
are recipients of Mr. Daniels' favours. All had obligations 
to him. At the same time none of them knew very much 
about anything. They were unfamiliar with the Depart- 
ment's activities before and during the war, and of the mat- 
ters dealt with in Admiral Sims' letter and testimony. Hence 
they devoted themselves exclusively to the smoke screen 
tactics of the four varieties described above. 

Admiral Fletcher, like Admiral Badger, whose testimony 
will be taken up a little later, had been commander-in-chief 
of the fleet during the Daniels regime. Both had, after 
retirement, been kept on active duty in pleasant billets in 
Washington as members of the General Board, drawing ac- 
tive pay and allowances of about $10,000 a year instead of 
the $6,000 retired pay. Mr. Daniels' good will has meant, 
therefore, $4,000 a year to them. These officers also be- 
long to the group of reactionary die hards whose intellectual 
processes were frozen long before the dreadnaught era and 
eons before the era of aircraft and submarines. They con- 



262 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

sequently consistently opposed progress, and hence Sims. 
For in the Navy, Sims and Progress are ahnost synonymous 
words. 

VI 

All of these officers freely admitted their ignorance of 
the relations between Admiral Sims and the Department and 
of the matters discussed by Admiral Sims in his ktter and 
in his -testimony. 

Admiral Rodman, for example, said: 

" I wish to reiterate that I have not one single document or 
record of any kind, class or description to substantiate my state- 
ment. ... I am simply trying to lay before this committee my 
views, in general, of what the Navy accomplished." 

He added that he put all his papers in the " Rodman file 
system," that is, the waste basket. 

When questioned by Senator Hale, Admiral Rodman said 
he knew " very little " about the convoy system and " very 
little " about the sending of forces abroad. 

When the chairman added with permissible sarcasm 

" or about the state of affairs there or anything else? " 
Rodman replied: 

" No; I do not. I was not in the position to; except what I 
read in the public press I knew very little about it." 

Rodman did not know exactly what Sims' authority or 
position abroad was. He was " not very familiar with the 
organization of the Navy Department." He did not know 
just how short the battleship crews were at the beginning of 
the war. He did not even remember the names of the bat- 
tleships he had taken abroad in December, 1917. 

Admiral Rodman's idea of contributing to the discussion 
was to remain conscientiously in ignorance of all facts that 
might be pertinent. He said in fact : 



MR. DANIELS' ADMIRALS 263 

" I have studiously avoided attending the hearings before this 
committee, or of reading in detail the testimony which Admiral 
Sims or any one else has presented." 

Similarly, Admiral Wilson, when asked if he knew of the 
Department's action on Admiral Sims' recommendations 
said : " Not a word do I know about it." Of Admiral Sims' 
testimony, he said also : " Not a word do I know about it." 
Of the Department's attitude toward the forces abroad, he 
knew " not a word of it. . . . My time was fully occupied in 
other ways." 

Rear Admiral Niblack knew a great deal about his own 
services in the war, but as he explained, " I know little of my 
own knowledge of what it is claimed the Navy did not do." 

Rear Admiral Strauss, likewise, had no knowledge of 
any part of the operations abroad save those of the Mine 
Force, nor did he know anything in detail about the De- 
partment's work during the war. 

Even Rear Admiral F. F. Fletcher was too busy with his 
own work on the War Industries Board to know what, if 
anything, the Navy Department did. 

" I was not very closely associated with the executive officers 
of the Navy Department charged with the duty of conducting the 
operations of the war. My views upon the questions involved 
will therefore be confined 'to that obtained from the viewpoint 
of a member of the General Board, but more particularly from 
the viewpoint of a member of the War Industries Board." 

He admitted that he knew but little of the anti-submarine 
campaign, of the personnel and materiel conditions of the 
Navy in 1917, nor of the action of the Department in the 
early months of the war. 

In view of the confessed ignorance of these officers on most 
of the questions at issue, their testimony need not be very 
seriously considered. Mere expressions of personal opinions 



2640 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

on subjects of which they knew nothing will hardly throw 
light on anything save the state of their own minds. That 
is hardly to be considered an edifying subject. 

VII 

All of these officers had much to say about preparedness. 
They vied with each other in describing the spotless efficiency 
of their illustrious chief, Josephus Daniels, and the magnifi- 
cent condition of the fleet in 1917. Their ignorance of the 
facts must be considered as relieving them from any sus- 
picion of deviating consciously from the truth! Otherwise, 
it would be hard to explain the contradiction between their 
several statements and the testimony of Admiral Mayo, the 
Commander-in-Chief, and other well informed officers, such 
as Admiral Grant, Admiral Fullam, Captain Pratt and Ad- 
miral Benson. 

In considering their testimony about preparedness, there 
is one point that must be .remembered constantly. When 
they speak of the preparedness of the Navy, or the fleet, 
they refer only to the twelve battleships, and twenty-two 
destroyers that were with Admiral Mayo in the spring of 
1917. These were the only vessels in the Navy even approxi- 
mately ready, as they all admitted. Yet in their testimony 
they so described the relative efficiency of this fraction of 
the Navy as to convey the impression that all the Navy was 
equally ready for war; which, of course, was absolutely un- 
true. 

Admiral Rodman said for example: 

" At the beginning of the war the Navy had so far profited 
from previous appropriations that I have no hesitancy in saying, 
from having been in the fleet, that never have I seen such ef- 
ficiency and preparedness as obtained at that time." 

This was the statement that the press headlined. Yet 
Rodman knew that his statement applied only to a few of 



MR. DANIELS' ADIMIRALS 265 

me battleships and destroyers. He should have known that 
these alone constitute neither a navy nor a fleet. He ad- 
mitted this later. 

Senator Hale after cautioning him that he was under 
oath to tell the truth asked the following question: 

" Do you want it to be understood from your statement that 
you consider that the United States Navy was in a thorough state 
of preparedness at the beginning of the war? 

"Admiral Rodman: No, sir, not by any manner of means. 
. . . There were certain of our ships that were lacking. We 
lacked types of ships that we should have had and some of our 
ships were not, possibly, as well prepared as they might have 
been, but in general the battleship fleet was in a high state of 
efficiency." 

Again Senator Hale asked: 

" Do you mean that it (the fleet) was in a high state of 
efficiency as a fleet.'' 

" Admiral Rodman: No, sir; I would confine myself to saying 
that the battleship fleet was. Other types were not efficient." 

Admiral Rodman admitted that our fleet was not prepared 
to meet the German fleet, as it was constituted in 1917, that 
it was short of men " I do not know how much ; possibly 
ten to twenty per cent., something of that kind." He ad- 
mitted also that the Navy was not " ready from stem to 
stern " in 1917, as alleged in the Secretary's report for 1918. 
None of Mr. Daniels' witnesses, in fact, could swallow this 
ridiculous assertion. 

VIII 

Admiral Wilson's testimony on preparedness was identical 
in substance with that of Rodman as may be judged from 
the following extracts from his testimony: 

" I have no hesitation in saying that no nation upon the ap- 
proach of war has ever had a force of battleships more nearly 



266 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

prepared for battle than was the force to which I was attached 
and which spent the winter of 1916-1917 in southern waters; and 
I feel sure that if this force had engaged an enemy on its cruise 
north in the spring of 1917, the victory would have been ours." 

What Wilson really meant is indicated by the following 
questions : 

" The Chairman: Do you mean that the fleet as a battle fleet 
was prepared? 

"Admiral Wilson: No. I referred to the battleships. . . . 
That is what I know about and all I can speak of is what I 
know." 

Fortunately, he knew nothing of the condition of the re- 
serve battleships, of the cruisers, of the submarines, or of 
any other part of the Navy than the twelve battleships and 
22 destroyers already mentioned as being the " fleet." 

Admiral Wilson admitted that this fleet was " theoreti- 
cally " not in any condition to meet a fleet like that of Ger- 
many in 1917, but said that nobody feared such a con- 
tingency, as the British fleet stood between us and the enemy. 
We relied upon it to protect us, said Wilson. 

He tried heroically to explain the state of unprepared- 
ness. " You know, we were not able to prepare anything 
to speak of, because a few months before we entered the war 
the majority of the people voted . . . that they approved 
our not having gone into the war, and we could not take 
any steps leading to war under such circumstances ! " 

Admirals Niblack, Strauss, Fletcher and Badger all de- 
clared the " fleet " was admirably prepared in April, 1917. 
Yet all were forced to admit that this " fleet " was one only 
in name, that the necessary scouting and screening vessels 
were lacking, and that our cruisers and most of our de- 
stroyers were not with the fleet, as they had too small crews 
to be of any immediate use. 

From their testimony alone, it was proven that of all the 



MR. DANIELS' ADMIRALS 267 

vessels in the Navy, only Admiral Mayo's force was approxi- 
mately prepared in April, 1917. Even this force could 
have been annihilated by the German fleet, as it existed at 
that time. Of course we were quite safe, as several of the 
witnesses pointed out, because the British fleet would con- 
tinue to protect us by the blockade of the German High 
Seas Fleet, as it had been doing for nearly three years. 
The Navy Department knew this. They had known for at 
least two years that we might enter the war, and that we 
would enter, if at all, on the side of the Allies. They knew, 
therefore, that the only part of the fleet even approximately 
ready for war was just that part which would not be re- 
quired for any immediate effective co-operation with the 
Allies. The vessels that were needed — the cruisers, many of 
the destroyers, and all other light craft — were not ready. 
They had no crews, and were often in bad material condi- 
tion. 

The fac-t of the matter was, as Admirals Fletcher, Wilson, 
and Niblack clearly stated it, that our naval policy from 
1914 to 1917 had ignored altogether the war in Europe, and 
the Navy had continued the ordinary routine of pre-war 
years. 

Some of these witnesses attempted to justify this Josephan 
perversion of neutrality. They explained that our neutrality 
prevented us from doing anything beyond what we had always 
done. Mr. Daniels, so they admitted, would not permit the 
Navy to enter upon any unusual preparedness measures lest 
the Germans should be offended and suspect that some day 
we might cease to be supine and would, perhaps, even fight 
for our rights ! 

IX 

Admiral Rodman's intention to help out Secretary Dan- 
iels was made perfectly clear. He explained indeed, that 
his only purpose was to defend the " Navy " from the attacks 



268 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

of Admiral Sims, a remark that proves the truth of his own 
admission that he had read " not a word " of Admiral Sims' 
testimony. A few quotations will serve to show Admiral 
Rodman's attitude. 

" I am here purely from a sense of duty to defend the good 
name of the Navy . . . for this purpose alone, without malice 
and with no ulterior motive. . . ." 

" There is no question whatever in my mind but that our Navy 
did its full share most efficiently and splendidly in helping to 
bring the war against the Huns to a successful and victorious 
conclusion, and I am here solely, as far as I know, to defend its 
deservedly good name." 

As this had never been attacked, one may wonder if Mr. 
Daniels did not know, better than Rodman himself, why 
the latter was called. Some of Rodman's later statements 
at least indicate the extent to which Rodman was willing to 
play the part of a Daniels witness. 

He said, for example: 

" I would naturally like to be impersonal but Admiral Sims 
has been thrown directly into the limelight and occupies the 
middle of the stage . . . hence my references to his person- 
ality. . . . 

" Though doubtless my subsequent statements concerning Ad- 
miral Sims may appear to be too personal and that I shall have 
beggared and failed to controvert many of the salient statements 
which he has made, this will not be my primary motive. ... I 
will try . . . more particularly to express my own opinion of 
what I believe to be the general sentiment of the Navy to the 
indiscreet and injudicious methods which he has employed in 
setting forth his views." 

Rodman then condemned Admiral Sims' letter as " very 
indiscreet " : " his indiscretions lay primarily in the tone, 
wording and phraseology of the letter." 

Rodman then proceeded to criticize Sims for his disposition 
of forces, for the handling of the convoy system, etc., only to 



MR. DANIELS' ADMIRALS 269 

admit shortly after that he knew nothing about these things, 
save " what I have read in the press." 

To explain why the Department did not approve or even 
reply to Sims' recommendations, Rodman said: 

" His status in London, as I understand it, was that of a 
liaison officer, which later was combined with the duties of Naval 
Attache there. His title as ' Commander U. S. Naval Forces in 
European Waters ' is particularly misleading. He was in reality 
a subordinate part of Naval Operations, with his office in Lon- 
don; he was its advanced agent; his was the relay office for all 
communications between Washington and the forces in the field." 

During the cross-examination, however, Rodman admitted 
that his forces and all other naval forces overseas were sub- 
ject to Sims' orders ; that Sims could have removed him ; 
that his authority was unquestioned. Senator Hale then 
asked Rodman what he meant by stating that Sims was only 
a liaison officer ; that his title of " Commander " was mis- 
leading. Rodman replied: 

" No, sir ; I said it might be misleading to the public . . . my 
idea was this. The public — now just notice that I refer to the 
public, and this is intended for the public — 

" The Chairman: Your testimony, Admiral, is for this com- 
mittee. 

"Admiral Rodman: Yes. sir; but I am trying to explain to 
the public at the same time, sir, if I may, and what I was saying 
there was for the public. 

" The Chairman: Does the public have different opinions 
than this committee.'' 

"Admiral Rodman: I do not know, sir. They get some 
mighty curious ones sometimes. 

" The Chairman : Apparently ! " 

Thus naively did Rodman reveal the object of his testi- 
mony. He was not there to assist the committee to arrive at 
true conclusions concerning the issues involved. He was 



270 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

there to make headlines for the press, in accordance with the 
Secretary's instructions. 

Rodman, therefore, proceeded to impugn Admiral Sims' 
motives and misrepresent his statements. For example, he 
said: 

" The motive which prompted this public investigation is veiled 
to me under a smoke-screen of words, and I cannot for the life 
of me see but that it will discredit the work of the Navy in this 
war. . . . The impression left on my mind, by giving his letter 
all this publicity, and the evident effort throughout to (Mscredit 
the Navy, is that it may have been the intention to give the im- 
pression that he had most of the responsibility for running this 
war and that the department fell down upon its job, because it 
did not follow his advice. This at the expense of the good name 
which the Navy so justly deserves. This whole affair, in my 
mind, savours of ill-advised criticism against the Navy." 

Rodman went on to liken the investigation to the Sampson- 
Schley controversy and to " regret exceedingly " that a 
" classmate of mine and a life long friend " should have 
caused such an investigation. 

In discussing Admiral Sims' estimates of the probable re- 
sults of our naval unpreparedness and delays, Rodman made 
the illuminating renjark that there are " lies, damned lies 
and statistics," and implied that Sims' testimony fell into 
the latter category. " I do not believe there is a particle 
of truth in that statement." He qualified his remark a 
moment later, however, by saying, " I do not know anything 
about " the facts in question. 



Willing though he was to contribute to the Daniels smoke 
screen, Rodman unwillingly and perhaps unwittingly, cor- 
roborated most of Admiral Sims' points. He admitted that 
many mistakes had been made by the Navy Department and 



MR. DANIELS' ADMIRALS 271 

testified to facts revealing even greater inefficiency, though 
he apparently failed to recognize it as such. The only really 
satisfactory conditions he found were those that prevailed 
in the war zone after he had joined Sims' command. 

" I do not for one minute wish to detract one iota of my opin- 
ion that Admiral Sims rendered most conspicuous and valuable 
services during the war. I can say that I know of no officer who 
was more conspicuous in this war and who rendered better service 
than Admiral Sims. . . . He was pre-eminently conspicuous 
among the officers who had rendered the most valuable services. 

" There never was a time when there was the slightest diffi- 
culty of any character, class or description raised between Ad- 
miral Sims and me." 

" No one could have been better in every way, shape and 
form than Admiral Sims," i. e., in the manner in which com- 
mand was exercised over the forces abroad. 

Rodman could not say this of Mr. Daniels or the Navy 
Department. He/ had received no intimation he was to be^ 
ordered abroad, nor had he even heard the possibility of 
sending battleships discussed until a few hours before his 
division was constituted and ordered to the Navy Yards to 
fit out for foreign service. He had not previously com- 
manded the ships sent across. These ships had never pre- 
viously operated together as a division. They were not of 
uniform type but had to be sent, as the others were not in 
fit condition. They were filled up with a large percentage of 
raw recruits just before sailing. Rodman did not know any- 
thing about -the war plans, nor what the policy governing 
his activities abroad would be. 

He knew, however, that there were war plans in the Gen- 
eral Board. ..." I do not care how good or bad they 
were, they were there." 

" The Chairman : Did you ever see any of them ? 
"Admiral Rodvian: I do not know. They kept them locked 
up, as I understood. 



272 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" The Chairman: Did you ever hear of them later in the war 
or were they put into practice? 

"Admiral Rodman: No^ sir! 

" The Chairman: You never heard of their being used? 

"Admiral Rodman: No, sir. I do not know a thing about 
them." 

Consequently it was not surprising that on sailing for 
the war zone he had no definite instructions of any kind, 
not even as to whom he was to report, or with whom he was 
to operate. The following testimony is unusually divert- 
ing: 

" The Chairman: Were you given any plans or policy, by the 
department, before you went over? 

"Admiral Rodman: None whatever. I was simply directed 
to follow a designated route, and I followed that route and 
found myself amongst the British Grand Fleet. 

" The Chairman: No policy or plan for the conduct of the 
war? 

"Admiral Rodman: No, sir. 
i " The Chairman: Did you know any such plan? 

j "Admiral Rodman: No, sir; I did not need any. I was to 

( go over to splice out the British Grand Fleet. 

" The Chairman: Whom were you to report to over there? 
"Admiral Rodman: I do not remember. I will tell you the 
incident. When I arrived, I reported in the usual naval 
j fashion, my arrival, to the Department. That is a cut and dried 
affair. 

" The Chairman: Did you report to Admiral Sims? 
"Admiral Rodman: No, sir. And then I got a telegram 
1 from the department: ' In future send all your reports and com- 
I munications direct to Admiral Sims ' ; so that I was placed un- 
I der Admiral Sims' command by a telegram from the depart- 
« ment. 
j " The Chairman: After you had gotten over there? 

"Admiral Rodman: Yes, sir. It was explained to me before 

I left the department, by Operations, that I was going over to 

i splice out the British Grand Fleet. A verbal order is as good 



MR. DANIELS' ADMIRALS 273 

to me as any other kind, you know. I knew what I was going 
for. 

" The Chairman: Did the department give you any instruc- 
tions to govern your actions after you were on the other side.'' 

" Admiral Rodman: None, whatever. 

" The Chairman: Was that not rather embarrassing to you.'' 

"Admiral Rodman: Not to me. I knew what I went for. 
Never the slightest embarrassment. 

" The Chairman: Just what did the department tell you to 
do when you went over there.'' 

" Admiral Rodman: I could not repeat the words. I had an 
intimate conversation with the Acting Chief of Operations. The 
chief, I think, was abroad. He simply said, ' You are designated 
to take this command, to go over and splice out — and strengthen 
the Grand Fleet in their operations against the German main 
force. Why, Senator, I did not have to have any more instruc- 
tions than that. 

" The Chairman: And you were told 'to report to the head 
of the British Grand Fleet.'' 

"Admiral Rodman: No, sir. I did report to the head of the 
Grand Fleet, and reported my arrival to the Department. I 
had my orders. 

" The CJmirman: What.? 

" Admiral Rodman: They left it to me to report to -the Grand 
Fleet. That was my object in going. They supposed they 
could trust my judgment, or they would not have sent me. 

" The Chairman: You were simply told to go over and report 
to the Grand Fleet.'' 

"Admiral Rodman: Yes, sir." 

XI 

In general, it may be said that Admiral Rodman displayed 
the most remarkable uncertainty and ignorance about nearly 
all naval matters — an ignorance incomprehensible in a 
Commander-in-Chief — until one remembers that he is a 
Daniels Commander-in-Chief. 

In his direct statement he seldom was sure of his facts. 



274 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

His usual preface to his statements, upon which he based 
criticism of Admiral Sims, was of the following type: 

" I have an idea that when our convoys were organized, etc." 

" His status in London, as I understand it. . . ." 

" I understand that the destroyers, etc., etc." 

" My conception of his duties was." 

" Reasoning from a standpoint of experience, I would natu- 
rally infer that "... et-c. 

" I have an idea that the war was not fought and won in 
London alone." 

" The impression left upon my mind is that," etc. 

" I believe that he has stated . . ." 

Admiral Rodman's customary answer to embarrassing 
questions was " I do not remember " or " I do not know." 
He didn't remember what action the Department had taken 
on any recommendations. He was not even s-ure that he had 
made recommendations. 

" I would not be surprised if I did, sir, but I do not recall. 
I am not trying to evade answering your question, Mr. Senator, 
but I do n'ot remember anything. ... I suppose I made hun- 
dreds of them. I do not know." 

Even with regard to the Atlantic Fleet, in which he served 
in 1917, his ideas were most nebulous, as his testimony, 
i quoted below, indicates : 

" The Chairman: How many battleships were there in the 
Atlantic Fleet when you were serving there ? . . . 

"Admiral Rodman: I think there were eight. . . . 

" The Chairman : I mean of the actual battle fleet as dis- 
tinguished from the reserve. 



"Admiral Rodman: I think approximately sixteen. 
" The Chairman: And for a fleet, a properly prepared battle 
fleet, how many destroyers would we need.'' 

"Admiral Rodman: Oh! I do not know. sir. I think that 



MR. DANIELS' ADMIRALS 275 

the General Board has laid down some rule, that for each battle- 
ship we should have so many destroyers." v 

{ 
And yet this was the Commander-in-Chief of our Pacific 

Fleet in 1920 who was testifying! | 

When Senator Hale asked Rodman what destroyers were ;' 

with the fleet in 1917, a similar exhibition of ignorance \ 

occurred. f 

"Admiral Rodman: There were nowhere near the number of j 

destroyers they should have had. \ 

" The Chairman: Do you know how many you should have j 

had.? J 

" Admiral Rodman: I do not remember. No, sir. / 

" The Chairman: You say you had nowhere near as many as ' 

you should have had } \ 

" Admiral Rodman: Yes, sir. ' 

" The Chairman : Did you have half what you should have j 
had.? 

" Admiral Rodman: I would rather not try to say. I do not 
know." 

It would be profitless to examine further Admiral Rod- 
man's testimony. It has been quoted thus extensively only to 
permit a visualization of the kind of evidence introduced in 
defence of the Department. 

XII 

Practically all of Admiral Wilson's testimony dealt with 
his own war services. His own summary of the subjects 
covered was : 

"(1) The condition of the fleet just prior to the outbreak of 
war. 

" (2) The organization of the patrol force; its object, organ- 
ization and the plans adopted prior to and immediately after the 
declaration of war. 

" (3) The routing and escorting of convoys carrying a great 



276 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

part of our troops to France; together with their stores and 
supplies. 

" (4) The work of a successful and important part of our 
naval forces overseas — the United States Naval Forces in 
France." 

Very little of Admiral Wilson's direct statement is per- 
tinent to this inquiry. His discussion of the preparedness 
of the " Fleet " in 1917 has been noted. 

In dealing with his second subject, Admiral Wilson gave 
an illuminating indication of our war policy in 1917. A 
few days before war was declared the Department took its 
first active step in preparing for war. This was not a meas- 
ure intended to strike a heavy blow at Germany at once, 
nor even to co-operate actively with the Allies. It was the 
purely defensive step of organizing all our effective light 
forces into a " Patrol Force " to scurry back and forth off 
the Atlantic coast, 3,000 miles from the war zone, " pro- 
tecting " the United States from attack. This was carried 
even to the point of patrolling the North Carolina sou-nds, 
inshore waters impenetrable to submarines ! 

After war began the Navy Department gallantly held back 
our forces from the Allies and ignored Admiral Sims' and 
the Allies' recommendations that these anti-submarine craft 
be sent to the war zone. No less than 55 vessels, all of 
which would have been invaluable abroad, were thus em- 
ployed after we entered the war. 

Such a purely defensive policy was undoubtedly due to 
the lack of any guiding plan or policy. It was the old game 
of " watchful waiting " again. The Navy Department left 
it to time and accident to determine what the Navy's war 
operations should be. 

When Senator Hale asked if there was any " compre- 
hensive war plan," Admiral Wilson replied: 

" I know nothing about that, sir." 

" The Chairman: You were never shown any such plan? 



MR. DANIELS' ADMIRALS 277 

"Admiral Wilson: I have never been attached to the organ- 
ization that had charge of such work." 

Truly it seems a curious attitude for a commander-in- 
chief of a great fleet, to regard war plans as esoteric reading 
matter which commanders of operating forces should not be 
shown, and of which they knew nothing. 



XIII 

It would be merely a useless repetition to quote exten- 
sively from the testimony of Admirals Niblack, Strauss and 
Fletcher. Their point of view and the evidence they offered 
was of the sort illustrated in Rodman and Wilson's rather 
pathetic efforts to comply with Mr. Daniels' smoke-screen 
plan. 

Niblack in the course of his prepared statement made 
many petty flings at Admiral Sims. This is not the place 
to go into th:;m. They were the cheapest kind of argumen- 
tum ad hominem. 

Niblack, like Rodman and Wilson, had received no definite 
instructions on going abroad to command at Gibraltar. 
Fortunately, he passed through London and there received 
full instructions at Admiral Sims' headquarters. Like Rod- 
man, he was enthusiastic in his praise of Sims' services in 
the war, and described the admirable efficiency of the ad- 
ministration of the forces overseas. 

Strauss, Niblack and Fletcher all devoted much effort to 
contradicting Admiral Sims' estimate of the results of the 
delays and blunders of the Navy Department. That these 
had occurred was tacitly admitted. But, by depreciating 
the part we played in the war, these officers sought to show 
that our intervention was not sufficiently important, so that 
any delay could have postponed the end of the war. Yet, 
quite inconsistently, some of them maintained vigorously 
the effectiveness of our interv'ention, and endeavoured to 



278 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

show that the end of the war was brought about by means 
quite independent of our naval intervention, however effective 
that may have been. As most of them were willing to admit 
that the American intervention did shorten the war, it seems 
difficult to follow their contention that an earlier and more 
effective intervention would not have shortened it even more. 

In general, it was obvious from the testimony of these 
officers, that they were offended with Admiral Sims and in- 
dignant at the investigation, not because the facts alleged 
were questionable, but rather because they were so undoubt- 
edly true as to seem to reflect not only on the Navy Depart- 
ment and Mr. Daniels, but upon the Navy as well. 

Admiral Sims excellently summed up their attitude, in 
his rebuttal statement, when he said: 

" Thus, in summarizing, it seems clear that the evidence which 
has been introduced by the various Department witnesses fully 
substantiates the points brought out in my letter of January 7th, 
1920, and in my testimony before this committee. The testimony 
of the witnesses who were called at the request of the Depart- 
ment has been confined, in so far as it dealt with these issues at 
all: 

"First, to explaining and justifying the Department's mis- 
takes and delays. 

" Second, to disputing the conclusions which I drew regarding 
the results of these mistakes and delays; and, 

" Third, the expression of resentment that these things should 
have been brought to the public notice, and to attacks upon me 
for what they considered to have been my responsibility for this 
publicity." 



CHAPTER XV 

CORROBORATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS BY THE NAVY 
DEPARTMENT'S WITNESSES 



THE testimony of Admirals Badger, McKean and Ben- 
son and of Captain W. V. Pratt, at least under cross-exam- 
ination, was of an entirely different character than that of 
the smoke-screen admirals. Rear Admiral C. J. Badger 
had been the head of the General Board before and during 
the war. Admiral W. S. Benson had been Chief of Naval 
Operations. Rear Admiral McKean had been the head of 
the Material Section of Operations and for a time the Act- 
ing Chief of Operations. Captain W. V. Pratt had become 
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations about July 1, 1917, 
and had also served for a time as Acting Chief of Operations. 
These officers therefore were in a position to know exactly 
what was done toward getting the Navy ready for war be- 
tween 1914 and 1917, and what was actually done by the 
Department after the declaration of war to make our naval 
forces effective against the enemy. 

Each of these officers, save Admiral Benson, read a long 
prepared statement. That of Admiral Badger covered the 
whole of the activities of the General Board from 1914 to 
1918; that of Admiral McKean, some 300 printed pages in 
length, reviewed the activities of his own section of Opera- 
tions in preparing for war, and the action of the Navy 
Department after war began in getting the vessels of the 
Navy into a fit condition for war service ; that of Captain 

Pratt was the most illuminating of all, for, although it re- 

279 



280 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

quired 700 pages only to print it, it was a clear, lucid and 
reasoned review of the policy of the Navy Department, of 
the reasons for unpreparedness, and for delays in interven- 
ing after war began, and of the efforts of himself and his 
chief to get on with the war in spite of almost insuperable 
difficulties and handicaps. 

In many details, and verbally, these officers took exception 
to some of Admiral Sims' criticisms of the actual conduct of 
war operations. They confirmed absolutely his testimony 
so far as the state of unpreparedness in 1917, the lack of 
war plans, the shortage of personnel, the delay in active 
intervention was concerned. 

In the next few pages will be found that part of Admiral 
Sims' final statement in which he collected together the ad- 
missions of the departmental witnesses. 

In this part of his rebuttal testimony. Admiral Sims said: 

" In concluding my testimony in March last, I stated that the 
documentary evidence which I had submitted established fully 
tliirteen points. A very careful review of the evidence submitted 
by the Navy Department's witnesses shows that in no single 
instance were these points disproved. On the contrary, most of 
them were freely admitted, and the testimony of the Depart- 
ment's witnesses seemed to be designed, not to disprove them, 
but to explain them away or to obscure them by the raising of 
extraneous issues. In order to show you how fully the chief 
officers in the Navy Department confirmed these thirteen points, 
I propose to quote brief statements from their testimony sub- 
stantiating each one of these points." 



II 

Admiral Sims then took up the first point of his sum- 
mary: that of the unpreparedness for war in 1917. 

" Point 1. ' That, in spite of the fact that war had been going 
on for nearly three years, and our entry into it had been immi- 



CORROBORATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 281 

nent at least from February 2, 1917, the vessels of the Navy 
were not ready for war service when the United States entered.' 

Admiral Benson's Testimony 



<e ( 



Chairman : Would you say that the statement in the Secre- 
tary's annual report that the navy was from stem to stern ready 
for war in April, 1917^ was justified? 

Admiral Benson: Not from my point of view, no. 

Chairman: Was its personnel adequate? 



<( < 

"' Admiral Benson: No. 



(< t 



' Chairman: Were all the ships ready? 
Admiral Benson: No, they were not all ready. 
" ' Chairman: Were they fully manned? 
"' Admiral Benson: They were not fully manned. 
" * Chairman : Was the navy mobilized ? 
"'Admiral Benson: It was not.' 

" ' Chairman: Was our fleet in 1917 in a condition to meet the 
German fleet constituted as it was at that time? 

"'Admiral Benson: Theoretically, no, Mr. Chairman, it 
could not be. 

"' Chairman: An admiral or commander-in-chief who would 
have informed the Department that his fleet was in such condi- 
tion that he could have met the German fleet on a footing of 
equality would at least be lacking in a duty, would he not? 

"' Admiral Benson: I should consider that he was. . . . With 
the situation as you stated it, I would have no hesitancy in saying 
so.' 

Admiral Badger's Testimony 

"' Admiral Badger: The action of the Secretary in 1914 (in 
failing to ask Congress for the increase of 19.600 men recom- 
mended by the General Board), prevented having adequate 
personnel for the fleet. ... It was plain that it would be the 
part of prudence, and perhaps necessity, to have more person- 
nel for the fleet. There is no doubt about that. Now, what pre- 
vented that from being accepted as a proper view, I do not know.' 

" Admiral Badger at the same time stated that the addition 



282 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

of the men recommended by the General Board in 1914 would 
have made possible the manning of all light craft which were not 
ready in 1917, because of lack of personnel. 'The responsibil- 
ity lay with the administration . . , the Navy Department.' 

Admiral McKean's Testimony 



(e t 



Chairman: Would you say that the Navy was ready from 
stem to stern (on April 6th, 1917)? 

"' Admiral McKean: From my interpretation of that phrase, 
I would not, by a good deal.' 



ff f 



Chairman: How long did it take to get . . . the light 
craft in a condition of materiel readiness for war? 

"'Admiral McKean: Some of them two days, some two 
months and some of them six months. 

"' Chairman: How long was it before substantially all of 
them were in readiness for war? 

Admiral McKean: Oh, I should say six months.' 



« { 



" ' Chairman: Was the Secretary backing you ... in your 
requests on matters necessary ... to prepare the country for 
war? 

" ' Admiral McKean: Oh, I do not think that the Secretary or 
I ever said " preparing the country for war." * 

" ' Chairman : I gathered from your te'stimony that you 
would not say that the fleet as a whole was ready for war in 
materiel or personnel in April, 1917? 

'"Admiral McKean: No, sir, it was not ready for war as to 
personnel or materiel, that is, a hundred per cent, ready or 
anything like a hundred per cent, ready.' 

" Admiral McKean testified that the action of Admiral Blue 
and the Secretary in 1914 led to a shortage of personnel in the 
Navy; that in 1916, the number recommended first was 9 or 
10,000, finally increased to 28,000; that much of the materiel 



CORROBORATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 283 

depreciation of ships was due to lack of personnel; — that the 
Secretary was wrong in his action, 

" ' Chairman : And you think that certainly waiting, until 
two weeks before the war began, to increase the personnel was 
rather a tardy way of going about preparing the Navy? 

" ' Admiral McKean: Yes, I do; but you have got to take our 
people's attitude and our fall elections of the year before, and 
a lot of national policies into consideration before you condemn 
individuals.' 



Captain Pratt's Testimony 

" Captain Pratt asked liimself, in his direct statement, the 
following question: 

"'Suppose that on April 6th, 1917, the United States fleet 
had been forced, in the state of preparedness it then was in, to 
meet single handed the German High Seas Fleet . . . what 
would be your opinion of the state of preparedness we were in? 

" ' Captain Pratt: I would consider such a state of affairs to 
be criminal.' 



"'Captain Pratt: Owing to our previous lack of prepared- 
ness in materiel and personnel, it was not possible to place them 
(our naval forces) at the front and ready to operate as soon as 
was desired, nor was the organization or administration of the 
Department at the time such that it lent itself to the most 
efficient handling of a great war ... at the beginning. . . . 
These conditions were true when we entered the war and they 
lasted until the defects could be remedied; . . . but by April, 
1918, . . . they had been in the main remedied.' 

" ' Captain Pratt: If the Navy, as it existed, had been ready 
for war in 1917, it would have relieved us of a certain amount of 
anxiety, due to the overload . . . which it placed on people who 
have suddenly to jump from peace-time activities to war-time 
activities.' 



284 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

"'Captain Pratt: I have already told you of the Navy's 
struggle to prepare after war was declared.' 



"' Captain Pratt: In this particular war, we were fortunate 
in being given a period of preparation, due largely to the fact 
that the control of the sea' was held by the British fleet and that, 
barring the submarine, the German fleet was contained. Had the 
situation been reversed . . . our difliculties would have been 
greatly increased, if not rendereid impossible.' 

"' Chairman: Was the Navy ready for war as to person- 
nel . . . when war was declared.'' 

" ' Captain Pratt: Not the way I would like to see it.' 

" ' Chairman : Who. was responsible for this lack of prepara- 
tion that rendered our forces incapable of quick action? 

"'Captain Pratt: The Secretary^ of course, was the re- 
sponsible head.' 



<( ( 



Chairman: You would not repeat the policies and methods 
of handling the Navy that prevailed from 1914 to 1917.'' 

" * Captain Pratt: No, sir, not if I had to prepare for another 
war.' " 

HI 

Admiral Sims, in discussing the testimony of these officer-s 
concerning war plans, included the following quotations : 

" Point 4. ' That the Navy Department supplied me with 
no plans or policy covering our participation in the war for three 
months after our entry therein.' 

Admiral Benson's Testimony 

Chairman: Why did you not outline just what his (Sims') 
duty should be.'' 

"' Admiral Benson: I did not give Admiral Sims his definite 
and particular instructions. My impression is, although I do 
not know that, that they were given by the Secretary. ... I 



CORROBORATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 285 

think he had sufficient instructions for the duty he was called 
upon to perform. ... I did not give him such instructions, be- 
cause I did not think it necessary.' 

"' Chairman: Was there a sound, complete and well defined 
plan for conducting this particular war? 

"' Admiral Benson: For this particular war I do not think 
so; only such general plans or policies as I have already out- 
lined. . . . No definite war plan was drawn up on paper. No, 
Mr. Chairman, there was not.' 

"' Chairman: What definite plans were drawn up? 

"' Admiral Benson: I cannot give you that information. I 
cannot tell you that now. I assume that there were (plans 
made). I know that all that was necessary was done and that 
is all that I do know. . . . The purposes that any plan would 
have accomplished were accomplished. I assume that as the 
policies went out to my subordinates, what we had of a planning 
section drew up the necessary plans or memoranda or instruc- 
tions or whatever you wish to call them.' 

"' Chairman: Did you formulate any definite operational 
plans ? 

"' Admiral Benson: I merely outlined general policies and 
left it to the subordinates to develop any plans that were neces- 
sary for carrying them into execution. How many plans were 
developed at all it would be very difficult or practically impos- 
sible for me to state. . . . There must have been plans, but I 
cannot recall them.' 

Captain Pratt's Testimony 

"' Captain Pratt: There were not issued to Admiral Sims 
any instructions beyond the simple statement of July, 1917. . . • 
The Department relied on him, in close touch with the Allies, 
while guided by its fundamental principles, to formulate all gen- 
eral war plans within the area of his command and to send them 
back to us as the basis on which we could begin our work.' " 



286 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

IV 

There was no question in the minds of the officers who 
served in the Department but that our available forces were 
not sent immediately. Hence their corroboration of Ad- 
miral Sims again : 

" Point 5. ' That, having information as to the critical situ- 
ation of the Allies, the Navy Department did not promptly assist 
them, and thereby prolonged the war by delaying the sending of 
anti-submarine vessels, none reaching Europe for nearly a month 
after tear was declared and over two and one-half months 
elapsing before thirty vessels arrived.' 

Admiral Benson's Testimony 



t( t 



Admiral Benson: We might have sent more destroyers 
(and other anti-submarine craft . . .) but I doubt if I would 
have sent more destroyers because I felt very strongly the neces- 
sity of safeguarding the battleships (-and the American coast). 
. . . There were a great many (light craft) that we had use for 
over here but I think, as far as we could get them ready and in 
my judgment they could be. spared, they were sent over.' 

Captain Pratt's Testimony 

"'Captain Pratt: That there were delays, that there were 
mistakes, that it took time before we got into the war in full 
force is fully and frankly admitted. . . . Some of the reasons 
why our Navy did not quickly enter the war in full force might, 
. . . with the knowledge gained in this war, be avoided in the 
future. . . . Some of these (which in my opinion could be 
avoided) are: lack of material preparation in the ships con- 
cerned; lack of adequate supplies, and of supply and repair 
bases ; lack of sufficient personnel and facilities to train them ; a 
building program planned specifically to meet the needs of the 
war the country intends to engage in; modern methods of organ- 
ization and administration and the maintenance of a nucleus 
organization in peace; a budget system; . . .' 



CORROBORATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 287 

Admiral McKean's Testimony 

"'Admiral McKean: While there were and always will be 
delays, delays in subordinated parts in coming to conclusions on 
what to base their recommendations; delays in convincing su- 
periors of the desirability or necessity of approving these recom- 
mendations; delays in getting necessary appropriations; delays 
in obtaining material and men witli which to carry out the plans 
. . . the responsible authority, the Chief of Naval Operations, 
the Secretary of the Navy, the Committees of Congress must each 
be given time for consideration and deliberation to enable them 
to act wisely.' 



({ f 



ti ( 



(f t 



Chairman: If these recommendations (of Sims) could 
have been followed out very shortly after they were made, do you 
not think it would have been a very good thing? 

Admiral McKean: Most of them yes, decidedly. 
' Chairman: So that if there was delay it was unfortunate? 

Admiral McKean: In some of them ... in the case of 
the destroyers yes . . . and the anti-submarine craft.' 

Captain Pratt's Testimony 

"' Captain Pratt: We should have had about fifty-one de- 
stroyers, six tenders, about seven gunboats, two cruisers and 
twelve submarines. . . . All these vessels could have been sent 
at once if th'ey had been in shape.' 

" ' Captain Pratt: The reason why these ships were not sent 
at that time can of course best be explained by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. . . . Personally I was not in accord with this policy, 
as I favored making concessions and sending the ships at once.' 

" ' Captain Pratt: Many delays were caused by discussions in 
the Department. Sims was left free in executing decisions but 
a great many explanations were asked. . . . In the case of con- 
voys the Department was opposed to the scheme at first until the 
Admiralty co'uld prove it xvould he successful. . . . They were 
not ready to accept decisions of others or by United States repre- 
sentatives in Europe. . . . It would have been better if the con- 
voy had been adopted earlier.' " 



288 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 



The Department's failure to support Admiral Sims in the 
early months of the war was also freely admitted, as the fol- 
lowing quotations demonstrate: 

" Point 8. ' That the Department's representative with the 
allied admiralties was not supported, during the most critical 
months of the war, either by the adequate personnel or by the 
adequate forces that could have been supplied.' 

Admiral Benson's Testimony 

"' Admiral Benson: He (Sims) was not supplied with all 
the assistants that it would have been desirable for him to have 
had.' 

Admiral Badger's Testimony 

" On April 5, 1917, the General Board recommended that 
officers be sent abroad to London and Paris. They gave a long 
list of the subjects on which data was desired and suggested that 
ten officers be sent to London and six to France, stating that: 

" ' The General Board recommended this number of officers so 
that the work can be divided up and expedited and believe that 
if this number of officers is detailed the information can be ob- 
tained in about two months.' 

" Only two officers were sent and none more until four months 
later — then only five instead of the sixteen recommended. 

Admiral McKean's Testimony 

" 'Admiral McKean: There is no doubt that Admiral Sims 
should have had additional assistance: Much more than he had, 
as his duties expanded, but, likewise, there is no doubt that we 
were all short-handed. . . .' 

Captain Pratt's Testimony 

" ' Captain Pratt: Admiral Sims has a just complaint in this. 
He should have been allowed more assistants and earlier.' 

"'Captain Pratt: The Department made a mistake in not 



CORROBORATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 289 

sending more officers to Sims. He should have had them. . . . 
It ivas a stupendous task with which he was confronted. . . . An 
adequate staff was required from the beginning.' 

"' Captain Pratt: It seems to me that the facts pretty well 
speak for themselves; that if we had intended to immediately 
dispatch our destroyers abroad we could have had them in mate- 
rial shape, thoroughly manned to the minute. That is not an 
impossible thing to do, and if it was not done it is because steps 
were not taken to get them ready for it. It could have been 
done, I believe.' 

" ' Captain Pratt : I would have sent them over as soon as I 
could lay my hands on them. But the power of decision was not 
mine.' " 

VI 

The attitude taken by the higher authorities in the De- 
partment toward the question of co-operating with the 
Allies, and their violation of fundamental military principles 
was similarly admitted : 

" Point 9. ' That the Navy Department violated fundamen- 
tal military principles in dispersing forces away from the critical 
area in order to meet diversions of the enemy.' 

" Point 10. ' That the Navy Department, in the first months 
frf the war, attempted the direction of details althongh threei 
thousand miles dis'tant from the scene of active operations, where 
the situation was changing from, day to day.' 

" Point 12. ' That the Navy Department, by controlling the 
operations and movements of certain forces within the war area, 
violated the fundamental military principle of unity of com- 
mand.' 

Admiral Benson's Testimony 

"' Admiral Benson: The Department would have been dere- 
lict in its duty, in my opinion, even admitting they were all sound 
and right, to have adopted recommendations without due delib- 



290 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

eration and careful consideration of all the conditions surround- 
ing the situation. . . . Even if the recommendations were abso- 
lutely perfect, we would not have been justified in doing it.' 

Captain Pratt's Testimony 

"' Captain Pratt: The Department was wrong in interfering 
with the detailed movements of our forces at the front.' 



"' Captain Pratt: Operations at the front must be handled 
from London, ... I think that in' certain minor instances we 
may have interfered with him (Sims) in the details of ships' 
operations-. . . . We issued direct orders to ships that were over 
there, when it would have been wiser to have turned them over 
to him bodily and said to him: " Order them where you please." 
Those, however, are mistakes that are liable to happen under all 
conditions, and I do not think they were very material.' 

" ' Captain Pratt: If the Admiral was handicapped by inter- 
ference with the movement of his forces in contact with the 
enemy, this was wrong in principle.' 

"Point 11. 'That the Navy Department, in not clearly de- 
fining the responsibility and delegating authority to its repre- 
sentatives in Europe, faded to follow sound principles, common 
alike to the business and military professions.' 

Admiral Benson!s Testimony 

"'Admiral Benson: I think there is an exaggerated idea as 
to Admiral Sims' position that he occupied. I think the Allies 
understood that the operations in Europe were being directed 
from Washington.' 

"'Admiral Benson: As I said, I was the responsible officer 
and I sized up the situation and made my decisions.' 

"'Admiral Benson: I was willing to do it (that is, send 
forces abroad) but not until I had personally investigated. I 
did not have sufficient confidence in Admiral Sims' judgment and 



CORROBORATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 291 

in his decision to warrant me of relieving myself of that grave 
responsibility.' 

Captain Pratt's Testimony 

" ' Captain Pratt: It is the universal practice of the Navy for 
flag officers to make the recommendations for their subordinates. 
The final assignments are made by the Secretary in consultation 
with the Chief of Naval Operations. It is conducive to efficiency 
to associate those officers together whose relations are bound to 
be harmonious.' 

" (Captain Pratt admitted that Admiral Sims was not con- 
sulted about the choice of his subordinates.) 

" Point 13. * That the Navy Department failed to keep its 
representative abroad completely informed as to its plans affect- 
ing dispatch and disposition of forces in the war zone, and fre- 
quently reached decisions in such matters through information 
gained from sources other than its representative in the war 
zone.' 

" The cases cited in the direct testimony were not questioned 
by any witnesses. The fact was admitted and an effort made to 
justify the Department's negligence. 

Admiral Benson's Testimony 



ti ( 



Admiral Benson: I think the Allies were kept informed of 
the development of all of our ideas and intentions. . . . While a 
good deal of the information may not have gone directly to Ad- 
miral Sims we satisfied ourselves that the allied naval authorities 
were kept sufficiently well informed with regard to the develop- 
ment of the situation.' 



Captain Pratt's Testimony 

*^' Captain Pratt: He should hav^ been informed of all de- 
partmental plans for operations abroad, but I do not think he 
was, and in that way I hold myself rather negligent.' 

"' Captain Pratt: Admiral Sims ought to have had this in- 



292 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

formation; but those were strenuous times and no doubt a lot of 
information he wanted and should have had he did not get.' 

"'Captain Pratt: Admiral Sims knows if he did not get 
answers. He knows whether he did get them or not. If Ad- 
miral Sims says " I did not get an answer to this," why, that 
stands, he did not get it.' 

" Captain Pratt did not know if any effort was made to get 
prompt and favourable action on Sims' recommendations. 

"'Captain Pratt: I tried personally very frequently, and 
would go with these cables, acting mys.elf, as a sort of nuisance, 
possibly, in the subject, to get this don'e, and I have no doubt that 
we were doing all this . . . but not being the actual executive 
I . . . should hate to say . . . that I know that every one of 
them was carried out.' " 

VII 

It would be impossible within the limits of this book, to 
deal in detail with all the testimony introduced by Mr. 
Daniels and his witnesses. It is to be hoped that the whole 
of the proceedings of the investigation will be made avail- 
able to the public. 

In his rebuttal statement, Admiral Sims himself made the 
following summary of the essential points confirmed by the 
statements of the witnesses called at the request of Secre- 
tary Daniels : 

" Review of Conduct of the W^ar by the Navy Department 

" The testimony of the Department's witnesses which has been 
quoted, together with other evidence that has been brought before 
this investigation, seems to me to have established conclusively 
the following features of the manner in which the Navy Depart- 
ment functioned during the war: 

" 1st. — That in the years before the war, no real effort was 
made to get the Navy in a condition which would make possible 



CORROBORATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS 293 

immediate and effective operations under the conditions which 
would obviously prevail in the event of war with Germany ; though 
this war had seemed probable after 1915. 

" 2nd. — That the Navy Department was responsible for the 
shortage of personnel, which made it impossible adequately to 
man the vessels of the Navy in 1917, or to provide the necessary 
officers and men required for the war expansion of the Navy. 

" 3rd. — That although the war had been in progress long 
enough for the probable activities of the U. S. Navy to be fore- 
seen, in the event of America's entrance into the war, no plans 
whatsoever had been made to meet the special conditions under 
which the Navy had to fight. 

" 4th. — That the Navy Department's organization was not 
adequate to meet the situation which developed after we entered 
the war. The Secretary not only seems to have failed to initiate 
an effort to improve or correct the inadequacy of the organization 
or the lack of preparedness and plans, but also to have strenu- 
ously resisted such efforts as were made. A makeshift reorgani- 
zation to meet war conditions had to be devised by the individual 
effort of many individual officers, working for the most part inde- 
pendently, and often without any co-ordination whatever of their 
efforts. Only their own initiative and voluntary co-operation 
made possible the achievements of the Navy in the war. 

" 5th. — That for at least the first three or four months after 
we came into the war, the Navy had no consistent policy, or if it 
had any, failed to carry it out. It had no adequate war plans 
or, if such existed, they were not put into effect. 

" 6th. — That during this time, the Navy Department's repre- 
sentative abroad was ignored and his recommendations in prac- 
tically every case disregarded. Requests from the Allies for re- 
inforcements in many cases were unheeded. No organization 
was created by the Department to meet the situation, by gather- 
ing the necessary information and by taking the steps to meet 
the situation revealed by this information. 

" 7th. — That during these months, the activities of the Navy 
Department were inspired not by the announced policy of co- 
operating whole-heartedly with the Allies and defeating the sub- 
marine campaign, but were dictated essentially by avowed motives 



294 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

of prudence and self-interest; by the desire to defend the Ameri- 
can coast, American shipping, and to maintain intact the Ameri- 
can battle fleet, regardless of what fate might be overtaking the 
Allies. This defensive policy was carried to such an extent, that, 
td citd only one example, naval vessels were set to patrolling the 
North Carolina Sound in waters impenetrable to submarines. 

" 8tH. — That at the time the President sent 'his dispatch to 
me, July 4, 1917, the policy which he announced had not been 
followed by the Navy Department. On the contrary, that its 
action had been in contradiction to the very principles which he 
laid down. 

" 9th. — That after the President's message was sent to me, 
the Department suddenly displayed a new spirit in its attitude 
toward the Allies and toward my recommendations; immediately 
adopted the convoy system; sent many additional anti-submarine 
craft abroad; provided me with additional officers; adopted a new 
destroyer program; and took many other steps looking toward 
an active prosecution of the war, all of which measures could 
and should have been put in force at least three months earlier. 

" 10th. — That these conditions were well-known in the Navy 
Department at the time; that the officers in the- Department, them- 
selves commented upon and criticized them; and my letter of Jan- 
uary 7th, 1920, was written only because I feared that these 
errors would be so completely forgotten that their repetition in 
future would be more than probable; and that I considered it 
my duty officially to invite the Department's attention to them." 



CHAPTER XVI 
VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 

(The Testimony of Admiral Badger and Captain Pratt) 

I 

ADMIRALS BADGER and McKean and Captain Pratt 
described in great detail the endeavours of the officers who 
served in the Navy Department to improve the efficiency 
of the Navy. They fully succeeded in demonstrating the 
fact that such steps toward preparedness as were taken be- 
fore 1917 were accomplished in spite of Mr. Daniels ; and 
that our naval effort in the war was ultimately made suc- 
cessful, after nearly a year of delay, not because of the ac- 
tivities of the Secretary, but in spite of him. 

Each of these officers gave practically the same descrip- 
tion of conditions in the Navy Department during the 
Daniels regime. Authority and responsibility were divided 
up among many conflicting and overlapping agencies. No 
definite plans and policies were in existence to insure the func- 
tioning of the whole organization as a unit, but each was left 
to follow its own inclinations or the behests of the Secretary, 
without any common guiding policy or direction. The Sec- 
retary himself did not understand and was not interested 
in the fighting efficiency of the Navy, but only in what he 
would call the general good of the Navy ; that is, in the wel- 
fare of the personnel. He was so absorbed in a multitude of 
small problems that he failed to even consider the most im- 
portant of all. He lacked decision and postponed pressing 

295 



296 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

matters for days and even months. He was suspicious of 
the naval officers and refused to trust them or heed their 
advice, unless he was convinced that the officer was only 
seeking to carry out blindly and in servile spirit the Sec- 
retary's own desires. 

In an organization like the Navy Department, with its 
many semi-independent parts, the only co-ordination was 
that exercised by the Secretary himself. There was no naval 
officer who had authority to give any orders to the Bureaus 
or to see that a common policy was followed by all. Every- 
thing depended upon the action of the Secretary himself. 
When he failed to act, plans could not be approved. When 
the plans were not approved, the thirteen independent divi- 
sions of the Department were without a common purpose or 
a unified direction. The naval officers in the Office of Opera- 
tions and in the General Board undoubtedly did everything 
in their power to get the Navy into condition for war. But 
at every turn they found their efforts blocked. Their pro- 
posals were listened to politely and ignored. Their recom- 
mendations were seldom, if ever, definitely rejected. These 
were simply filed. Consequently the hands of the officers 
were tied. 

All of the officers who served in Operations admitted that 
the actual conditions were as Admirals Sims, Plunkett, 
Fiske, Fullam and Mayo, and Captains Palmer, Laning and 
Taussig had described them. They sought in their testi- 
mony to explain that everything that they could have done, 
they had done ; that the faulty organization of the Depart- 
ment, the policies of the Administration, the attitude of the 
Secretary and the action of Congress had all combined to 
nullify the efforts of the naval officers in the Department. 
Their testimony, in other words, was primarily a defence 
of their own services, and secondarily an attempt to ex- 
plain or excuse the conditions whose existence in 1917 they 
admitted willingly or reluctantly. 



VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 297 

II 

Rear Admiral Badger, it is true, as a representative of 
the old guard in the Navy, sternly disapproved of Admiral 
Sims and blindly denied in general terms the truth of the lat- 
ter's criticisms. But when cross-examined even Badger had 
to contradict or explain away many of his own flat state- 
ments. 

Admiral Badger, for example, said: 

" The gist of the criticism of the operations of the Navy 
Department and the Navy now under investigation is contained 
in the charges of unpreparedness to enter the war; absence of 
war plans or policies at the commencement of the war ; vacillating 
and hand-to-mouth policies and plans after war was declared 
resulting in extending the duration of the war and thereby enor- 
mously increasing the Allied war losses in lives, ocean tonnage 
and money. 

" To each and all of these, I enter emphatic denial. I do not 
mean to say that we had attained perfection in the Navy — we 
never shall; that no errors of judgment or mistakes were made 
— they will always occur, but I assert that the Navy when it 
entered the war was as a whole, well prepared and adminis- 
tered." 

Admiral Badger's main ground for his belief was Indicated 
in the next paragraph of his statement. 

" Despite the adverse criticisms that have recently been widely 
circulated it may confidently be maintained that the Navy met 
and efficiently stood the stress of a great war; it aided greatly 
the allied nations, and if success is any test of a military or any 
other organisation, then the alleged shortcomings of the Navy 
and its directing heads can properly and justly be dismissed 
from serious consideration." 

In other words, we won the war and should now forget 
any unpleasant failings and hope we will have as good luck 
next time! 



298 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Admiral Badger further qualified his denials when he went 
on to point out that we really could not prepare for war 
before April 6, 1917, as 

" the policy of this country was one of strict neutrality. The 
people, the Congress and the Administration hoped until the last 
moment to be able to keep out of the war with honour, and every 
effort was made by the Government to avoid showing bias as be- 
tween the belligerents, as well as any expectation on our part of 
becoming embroiled. Although there were many, particularly in 
the Navy, who believed our eventual participation in the war to 
be inevitable, the Navy Department was handicapped in making 
preparations which would indicate to belligerent agents in close 
watch upon our doings, that we were preparing for war. Only 
the normal increase in our naval power was under these con- 
ditions permitted us." 

No more dangerous and mistaken doctrine than this can 
be imagined. It could be pardoned in an ultra-pacifist. It 
is inexcusable from a naval officer. If we had shown bel- 
ligerent agents that we were preparing for war we might 
very easily have escaped war. Our very failure to prepare 
was an invitation to the Prussian war lords to heap upon us 
the impudent affronts and insults that we swallowed between 
1915 and 1917. 

Admiral Badger often reiterated this curious ultra- 
pacifism. Thus he said of the fleet that on April 6, 1917 : 

" In some types, principally of small craft, we were deficient 
and that mainly because of the rapid development of the sub- 
marine warfare." 

We had not been able to build light craft, as such a step 
" was denied us by our neutral attitude and effort to avoid 
giving ground for the belief that we were preparing to take 
part in the war. / would like to accentuate this, for it ex- 
plains many things." 

It most certainly does ! 



VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 299 

To have prepared our Navy for war after 1914 would not 
have meant that we were intending to enter the war, as 
Badger naively implies. It would have meant merely that 
we intended to defend our national honour and national in- 
terests, and to do it as effectively as possible, and that if 
compelled to go to war, we intended to be ready for the 
emergency. 

Later on, Admiral Badger unwittingly gave his case away 
when he said that there was " no lack of effort to prepare 
the fleet for any eventuality, as soon as our change from a 
neutral to a war policy became possible." 

It is hard to believe that a former commander-in-chief of 
the fleet should really think that readiness for war is incom- 
patible with neutrality. 

Ill 

Admiral Badger had denied the criticism that we entered 
the war without adequate plans. A little later he proceeded 
to say that our plans were all right ; but that they were 
not approved and that in any case the enemy refused to 
fight the only kind of war for which these plans provided. 

In his prepared statement he said : 

" one of the principal criticisms now before this committee for 
investigation is that the Navy Department had no plans. That 
is both unjust and incorrect. We had plans, well considered 
ones. The trouble is that the plans and the execution of them 
did not meet rtith the approval of the critics." 

Thus we learn that Admiral Badger did not really intend 
to deny the criticism that the Navy had no plans that were 
adequate to the situation or were used in 1917. He admitted 
this. No one, indeed, had denied that the Navy had a war 
plan for operations on the Atlantic coast and in the Carib- 
bean against Germany. But that plan did not apply to 
the war and was never even consulted during the war. Ad- 



300 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

miral Badger, in other words, was quibbling, in the interest 
of Mr. Daniels, and making statements intended to give false 
impressions. By denying charges that had not been made, 
he tried to make it appear that he was answering criticisms 
whose correctness he himself was later compelled to admit. 
This attitude is characteristic of the testimony of Admiral 
Badger and is the prevailing feature of the testimony given 
later by Admiral McKean and by the Secretary himself. 



IV 

Rear Admiral Badger introduced a long list of memoranda 
presented by the General Board to the Secretary of the Navy 
between 1914 and 1918. He knew full well that a memor- 
andum, even of the General Board, is only so much waste 
paper unless it is acted upon by the Secretary, officially ap- 
proved and put into effect. He knew, too, as he testified 
later, that the efforts of the General Board had been almost 
as consistently ignored as those of Admiral Fiske and Ad- 
miral Sims. In spite of this Badger offered these unap- 
proved and officially ignored memoranda of the General 
Board as " Departmental War Plans." The Secretary 
later made desperate efforts to convince the committee, on 
the authority of Badger, that these memoranda were in real- 
ity official war plans. 

Fortunately, however, the Senate Committee insisted that 
a list of all such General Board memoranda be prepared with 
a notation as to what action was taken on them by the 
Department. Admiral Badger submitted such a list of " sub- 
jects acted upon by the General Board, upon which recom- 
mendations were submitted to the Secretary of the Navy 
relative to the World War." 

An examination of this list shows how little importance 
the Secretary attached to these recommendations from 1914 
to 1917 ; no matter how hysterically convinced he may have 



VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 



301 



seemed in his testimony, in May, 1920, that these recom- 
mendations were the war plans of the Department. 

The following figures will indicate to what extent the 
recommendations of the General Board were followed : 



Recommendations Affecting War 



Total number of recommendations 

Officially approved 

Officially approved but not made effective. 

Partially approved 

Officially disapproved 

Officially ignored without action 

Officially ignored and disregarded 



1914 


Apr. 6, 1917 




to 


to 


Total 


1917 


Nov. 11,1918 




45 


70 


115 


6 


8 


14 


7 


10 


17 


5 


6 


11 


3 


1 


4 


14 


32 


46 


10 


12 


22 



Sixty per cent, of all the General Board's recommenda- 
tions were ignored; only % or 12 per cent, were approved 
and actually put into effect. Most of those that were 
approved were relatively unimportant matters. There was 
no record of any action on the memoranda submitted by 
the General Board on February 4, 1917, March 20, 1917, 
and April 5, 1917, which Admiral Badger quoted in full and 
which Secretary Daniels later calmly and impudently 
claimed were the plans we used on entering the war. When 
Admiral Badger read the General Board paper of February 
4, 1917, on " steps to be taken to meet a possible condition 
of war with the Central European Powers," he explained 
that he read it " in order to show that the Department was 
neither neglectful nor ignorant of the critical situation as 
has been charged." 

Badger admitted that no action had been taken on this 
paper nor on the others mentioned above, and did not know 
whether any of the recommendations it contained had been 
carried out. The activity of the General Board or of Ad- 
miral Sims in making recommendations to the Navy Depart- 
ment certainly neither explains nor excuses the failure of 



302 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the Department to take action, or its long delays in putting 
recommendations into effect. Admiral Badger and Secre- 
tary Daniels reflect gravely on the intelligence of the country 
when they pretend that a recommendation by any one, even 
the General Board, is an official action of the Navy De- 
partment. 

The failure to take action and to prepare the Navy for war 
rests entirely on the person responsible for ignoring the rec- 
ommendations. Admiral Badger's testimony merely served 
to fix that responsibilit}'^ on the Secretary himself, by his 
proof of the fact that the General Board had had as little 
success as Admiral Sims in getting action from the Sec- 
retary. 



A few quotations from the cross-examination of Admiral 
Badger will show the quality of his testimony. 

When the chairman asked him if any plan was drawn up 
to provide for our operating with the Allies against the 
German submarines Badger replied : 

" No ; because it was believed that we should have to do what 
the people abroad were doing: to follow their lead. You under- 
stand that we entered the war under the handicap that we came in 
to co-operate after the others had been at war three years. Our 
neutrality prevented us from completing the necessary ships to 
prepare for a new type of war. . . . The idea of the Secretary 
of the Navy and of the General Board and of every other Depart- 
ment so far as I am informed, was that our plan must be de- 
pendent upon the plans of the Allies." 

Consequently no attempt was made to prepare plans for 
a war in co-operation with the Allies ; our neutrality pre- 
vented us before April, 1917, from finding out what the 
Allied plans might be; after April, 1917, we had to carefully 
study the allied plans and delay action for months before we 



VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 303 

accepted them. Such was Badger's explanation of our war 
plans and their execution. 

" The Chairman: Had any plan been formulated for a war 
against submarines? 

"Admiral Badger: We could not say that, no, sir. . . ." 

"The Chairman: Had any plans been formulated, prior to 
our entrance into the war, for sending anti-submarine craft 
abroad ? 

"Admiral Badger: Not that I know of. 

" The Chairman: Was any general plan governing anti-sub- 
marine operations ever drawn up in the Navy Department.'' 

"Admiral Badger: I do not know; I do not believe that any 
such plan was prepared. 

" The Chairman: Was it better, in the opinion of the Gen- 
eral Board, to keep the anti-submarine craft on the Atlantic coast 
or to send them to the war zone? 

" Admiral Badger: Now, you are opening a very broad ques- 
tion. Senator, and one that is very controversial. 

" The Chairman: Your report of May 3 recommended send- 
ing abroad as much as possible. 

" Admiral Badger: As much as the condition of our fleet and 
the number that we had would permit. Now, I do not object to 
saying this as one view of the situation. It looked in April and 
May very much as though peace would have to be declared by the 
British and the French — the Allies. The reports that we were 
receiving were most pessimistic here, that they could not hold 
out. In that case, if the German navy had remained untouched, 
there was no telling how we in this country might become in- 
volved with Germany ourselves, and therefore it was a very 
doubtful policy whether we should strip ourselves and run the 
chance of coming in at the last moment and being defeated on the 
other side as far as prevention of the collapse of the allied 
powers was concerned, or whether we should look out for our- 
selves and our own fleet until we could see about it. Therefore, 
the men who had a responsibility of that kind considered it from 
that point of view also, that we must look out for our own fleet, 
in addition to the fleets of the other powers concerned, and not 
strip our battleships of protection against the submarines that 



304 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

might attack them. We had our fleet here in the Chesapeake. 
We went to sea for practice purposes, to keep them up, without 
any real protection, and it was a very dangerous thing, but we 
had to take the chance, because we had to send all of our other 
vessels abroad." 

In further cross-examination Admiral Badger was obliged 
to admit that our policy was one of pacifism until 1917 as 
far as Germany was concerned ; although there was no doubt 
that if we entered the war we would be on the side of the 
Allies, no steps were taken to meet such a contingency for 
fear of offending Germany. On the other hand, in 1916 we 
did make a radical departure by adopting a building pro- 
gram of battleships and battle cruisers intended to very 
greatly increase our naval power. Badger was at a loss 
to explain this curious departure from the otherwise con- 
sistent pacifism of the Daniels administration. 



VI 

Just as Admiral Badger had described the work of the 
General Board, so Captain W. V. Pratt, the next witness, 
gave a detailed account of the work of the Office of Opera- 
tions. Pratt freely admitted the accuracy of most of the 
criticisms of Admiral Sims and, like Badger, sought to ex- 
plain why we were so unprepared for war in 1917 and why 
it took so long to get into the war. 

In discussing Admiral Sims' criticisms, Captain Pratt took 
the letter of January 7, 1920, and analyzed it paragraph by 
paragraph. In no case did he question a single point of 
fact. Nine- tenths of the subject matter he freely and 
frankly admitted. He took issue with some of Admiral Sims' 
criticisms, especially when these were such that they could 
be construed as a criticisms of the Office of Operations. 
But, as Admiral Sims later pointed out, every important 
contention he had made was fully corroborated by Captain 



VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 305 

Pratt In his prepared statement. Captain Pratt's whole tes- 
timony in fact was based on the assumption that we entered 
the war without plans, with the ships unready, with wholly 
inadequate personnel, without an efficient organization. His 
only endeavour was to show that after war began the Office 
of Operations did everything it could to overcome these ini- 
tial handicaps, to expand the Navy, to remake the depart- 
mental organization and to get into the war actively as soon 
as possible. 

He took issue with Admiral Sims, therefore, only on the 
question of the wisdom of certain of the decisions made by 
the Office of Operations after war began. The Navy was 
very slow in getting into the war, but this Pratt thought to 
be due to the initial handicaps and to the imperfect de- 
partmental organization. Pratt's testimony is therefore an 
even stronger indictment of the policies enforced upon the 
Navy from 1913 to 1917, than anything Admiral Sims him- 
self said. 

In this connection a single quotation out of a scoie that 
could be selected should suffice to illustrate the general im- 
port of Pratt's exceedingly able and frank statement. In 
commenting on paragraph 10 of Admiral Sims' letter, in 
which Sims had said that his cables in 1917 had not produced 
any result, Captain Pratt said: 

" The statement of fact in the paragraph is correct, but the 
conclusion drawn ' but without producing the desired result ' is 
misleading and subject to discussion. It produced the desired 
effect at once and every effort was made to put all the naval 
forces desired in the war zone, but owing to our previous lack of 
preparation in materiel and personnel it was not possible to place 
them at the front and ready to operate, as soon as was desired. 
Nor was the organization or administration of the Department at 
home such that it lent itself to the most efficient handling of a 
great war at the beginning. 

" The entire building program of the Navy had to be changed 
to make it effective to engage in operations for which it had never 



306 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

been planned, that is, to operate against the submarine exclu- 
sively. 

" These conditions were true when we entered the war and 
they lasted until the defects could be remedied, but by April, 
1918 . . . these had been in the main remedied, and many ships 
, . . had been sent across the Atlantic and were operating in the 
war zone. By this time the organization of the Office of Opera- 
tions Iiad been modified and the methods of administration 
changed." 

At another time Captain Pratt emphasized his striking 
indictment of our unpreparedness in 1917 when he said: 

". . . The forces did not go over as fast as any of us desired, 
but the reasons for it do not lie in the failure to accept the 
recommendations made. The failure to get into the war immedi- 
ately, in full force, upon the declaration, is not the fault of Op- 
erations or the failure to recognize the character of the war, and 
where it was being waged, but were, for the most part, due to 
natural causes and to causes which antedated our entry into the 
war. It was not possible to press a button and move ships, men, 
and supplies with the rapidity desired either by Sims or by the 
department. All of the destroyers were not ready to move in- 
stantly; navy yards and mercantile ship yards were not ready to 
undertake the vast amount of work thrown at them. Subma- 
rine chasers had to be built. Tugs had to be bought, refitted, 
and built. Yachts had to be bought, stripped and made ready 
for war service. The transports, which were the seized German 
ships, had to be repaired, manned, and put into service. Other 
transports and supply ships had to be built. Arrangements had 
to be made with the Army for the transport of its great military 
force to Europe. 

" The reorganization and expansion of the Office of Operations 
and of the bureaus had to be undertaken. The co-ordination of 
the bureaus with this office had to be developed; the methods of 
administration had to be divested of their pre-war conservatism, 
the red tape abolished, and more authority given to subordinates 
in the matter of detail ; habits of quick and accurate thinking and 
quick decision under the stress of war, had to be developed. 



VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 307 

The personnel had to be expanded and trained; the task of creat- 
ing sufficient reserves of war supplies had to be undertaken. 
The organization of the various bodies which acted as the co-op- 
erating agents between the Navy Department and all other de- 
partments and with the allied representatives on this side of the 
water had to be undertaken. Though we knew that the immedi- 
ate and pressing problem was the suppression of the submarine 
menace and acted in accordance with the knowledge, we also 
knew that this problem had to be considered in connection with 
all the other problems I have outlined. Our country could not 
afford to make any disjointed effort nor to move forward along 
any one line of action, without due consideration of all lines. 
We had to profit, if we could, by any previous mistakes of our 
allies, and we had to prepare for the contingency of a long war. 
The situation demanded of us that we should make a united, 
powerful effort, and in this effort the naval establishment had to 
play its appointed role, in harmony with every other effort our 
country was putting forth. Every master of military warfare 
and naval warfare knows that the great general's first concern is 
with the reserves. The weight of the first blow is ultimately 
controlled by the strength and co-ordination of tlie reserves. To 
build up our reserves was one of our naval problems and had to 
be considered at the same instant we were called upon to strike 
at the front. 

" All of these conditions were difficulties to surmount. Tliey 
retarded the flow of ships and supplies to Admiral Sims, but the 
spirit was willing, and the principles he laid down were, in the 
main, accepted. He always had back of him the loyal support of 
the office of operations and of the bure'aus." 

Again and again these same points were emphasized in 
Pratt's testimony. He was not defending Mr. Daniels save 
in form. He was in reality drawing a vivid picture of the 
results of the Daniels regime, all the more deadly because it 
was camouflaged as part of the case for the defence. 



308 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

VII 

Captain Pratt gave the details of the long fight he made 
to get the Secretary to approve the change in the building 
program and concentrate effort on new destroyers. This 
plan was at first a minority opinion even in the Office of 
Operations. From March until July, Captain Pratt fought 
to secure the adoption of so obvious a measure. It was not 
until July 20th that the Secretary finally approved the 
plan. It was not until October 6th, that Congress appro- 
priated the money to carry it into effect. Six precious 
months had been lost, with the result that less than a dozen 
of the 250 new destroyers undertaken actually saw active 
service prior to the armistice. 

Similarly, Captain Pratt admitted that no definite state- 
ment of policy was sent to Sims, or drawn up in the Depart- 
ment until July. The statement finally signed by the Secre- 
tary on July 3, 1917, was drawn up by Pratt himself, on his 
own initiative. Otherwise the Department would probably 
have muddled through the whole war without attempting to 
formulate any general policy. 

These instances are typical cases of the trend of the tes- 
timony of Captain Pratt. He was ostensibly a witness for 
the defence. His testimony was often verbally critical of 
Sims. Yet, in substance, the evidence he presented was a 
convincing confirmation of the testimony of all witnesses 
who had criticized and condemned the Daniels methods and 
policies. 

Captain Pratt had much to say also of the splendid work 
done by Admiral Sims during the war. He described in de- 
tail Sims' position abroad and pointed out the importance 
of his position with its six-fold responsibilities. In fact Cap- 
tain Pratt said: 

" The Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the 
Navy^ in so far as I know, had the fullest confidence in Admiral 



VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 309 

Sims. His reports were excellent and there is no officer in the 
service who could have done the work he was doing better or even 
so well. He understood our need for informartion and the desira- 
bility of spreading it effectively. H,e kept the department well 
informed. During the war it was thought that the closest co- 
operation existed between his office in London and our office in 
Washington. 

" The Chief of Naval Operations has often said^ if I recollect 
correctly, that he could not find another officer to take Sims' 
place." 

VIII 

Captain Pratt endeavoured to present a valise full of the 
personal memoranda he drew up in 1917 as the " war plans " 
of the Department. It is quite probably true that, in the 
absence of any real plans, Captain Pratt's memoranda and 
the individual suggestions of many other officers provided 
the ideas and the direction that should have been provided 
by war plans. But the fact that resort had to be made to 
such makeshift substitutes for war plans does not entitle Cap- 
tain Pratt to call his personal, unsigned, undated, unap- 
proved suggestions " war plans." They were not war plans. 
That Captain Pratt knew full well. Yet he did not hesitate 
in 1920 to label each of them " Plan " and even to assign 
numbers to them ! The Secretary, following his example with 
alacrity, quoted Pratt's testimony as proof of the thorough- 
ness of our war plans. 

It is true that Pratt was only one of the officers in the 
Navy Department in 1917 who did attempt to plan ahead. 
His services in the Office of Operations were of inestimable 
value. He spared no effort to get on with the war and 
to support Admiral Sims. But his activities are neither an 
explanation nor an excuse for the conditions our Navy faced 
in 1917. 



310 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

IX 

Captain Pratt's main criticism of Admiral Sims' letter and 
testimony was directed against what Pratt assumed to be 
Sims' contention, that the Navy Department should have 
turned over all powers of decision to him in London. This 
same assertion was made by many other witnesses. Yet, 
as a matter of fact. Admiral Sims never advocated any such 
measure. 

Pratt for example said: 

" The Admiral was not the only person in this war with whom 
the Department had dealings. It seems necessary to explain 
that Admiral Sims, important though he was, could not and 
ought not to attempt to handle the work of the entire Navy." 

Admiral Sims' point was, of course, not that the Depart- 
ment should resign full direction of the war to him, but that 
the Department should itself exercise its powers of decision. 

That was Admiral Sims' whole point : not that his par- 
ticular recommendations were not followed, but that no ac- 
tion whatever was taken by the Department for months. 
Ultimately every one of Sims' chief recommendations were 
approved and put into effect by the Navy Department. The 
whole question before Captain Pratt, therefore, was how the 
delay could be justified. He testified that he would have 
acted more promptly had he had the authority. Before 
he succeeded Captain Chase in June, 1917, there had been 
long delays. After he became Assistant Chief of Naval 
Operations he attempted to expedite action. As soon as a 
request came from Sims he would prepare a reply, usually 
a favourable one, but often his reply would not be approved 
by Admiral Benson or Secretary Daniels. In the case of the 
request for battleships to reinforce the Grand Fleet no reply 
at all was sent, and for six months the ships were held back. 
In many other cases, cited by Pratt, Admiral Benson had 



VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 311 

vainly endeavoured to secure the Secretary's approval or 
decision. As far as possible the Office of Operations acted 
without reference to the Secretary. But many matters had 
to be taken to him. Pratt did not know definitely why such 
matters were not promptly acted upon. The bare fact of 
delay he admitted freely and without reservation. 

Captain Pratt also argued that, while such delays are re- 
grettable, and indeed dangerous, in war time, in this parti- 
cular war, they had no serious consequences, because the Al- 
lies were able to hold off the enemy until we were finally 
ready to get into action. Pratt would not admit that our 
naval delays lengthened the war a day, insisting that the 
duration of the war depended upon troop action on the 
Western Front. The Navy was only a part of the lines of 
communication, he said, and could not directly affect the 
duration of the war. Yet he admitted that without the de- 
feat of the submarine campaign our intervention and the 
allied victory could not have come about ; that the sending 
of troops was dependent on the defeat of the submarines ; 
tliat our efforts largely contributed to putting down the 
submarines and keeping them down ; and that to this extent 
our naval effort shortened the war. It seems difficult to 
understand why, if our naval intervention had been made ef- 
fective earlier, it would not by the same means have brought 
an earlier victory. 

X 

Captain Pratt introduced in evidence many long docu- 
ments prepared in the Navy Department to prove the activity 
of the Department in 1917. No less than 90 printed pages 
are devoted to the personal memoranda which he wrote be- 
tween February, 1917, and April, 1918, on every phase of 
the naval situation. 

Seventy-seven pages of his testimony' are devoted to an 
interesting history of the Northern Mine Barrage, prepared 



312 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

by the Bureau of Ordnance. This proved the incorrectness 
of Mr. Daniels' amazing assertions about Sims having de- 
layed the Barrage. 

Captain Pratt also introduced copies of a report he pre- 
pared as acting Chief of Operations on November 15, 1918, 
covering our operations in the war. In this he had assumed, 
without directly making the assertion, that the successful 
policies and methods ultimately adopted, had been put into 
force by the Navy Department immediately after war began. 
He said, for example: 

" The present war had been going on for so long before we 
entered it that it was possible for the Department to make a 
fairly accurate estimate of the exact part we should take in it, 
were we called upon to enter the conflict. . . . 

" Having definitely decided upon the character of the naval 
war, it became necessary to outline our general policy. Briefly 
speaking, the naval mission of the Allies was this: while main- 
taining command of the surface of the sea to make every eff'ort 
to obtain control of the subsurface of the sea." 

The memorandum went on to rewrite the whole story of 
the Department's activities, by reading back into the first 
months of the war in 1917 the policies and methods that were 
in reality not made effective until late in 1917 or in 1918. 
How complete a camouflage this report was, has been fully 
demonstrated by Admiral Sims, and was, in fact, the subject 
of a letter Suns wrote Pratt in January, 1919, a year before 
the naval investigations began. Pratt himself, in his testi- 
mony of 1920 — as the many quotations previously cited 
show — contradicted completely the impression conveyed by 
this memorandum of November 15, 1918. 



XI 

In his defence of the Department, Captain Pratt made 
many statements which, while true in themselves, were sus- 



VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 313 

ceptible of interpretations radically at variance with the 
facts. Captain Pratt was careful to include qualifying 
clauses. The press did not always include these. The 
Secretary practically never did. 

The following is an excellent illustration of the manner in 
which Captain Pratt resorted to camouflage: "Admiral 
Sims himself says that the Department did accept all of his 
plans and policies some six months after they were first made, 
but he does not seem to realize that they were the basis upon 
which we worked from the start. As to the adequateness of 
plans made ahead of time to cope with the particular situa- 
tion which confronted us upon entry into the war, it can be 
said that the General Board had in its files many of them 
made in peace. None fitted this particular case in war. 
And none could ever meet the situation efficiently until Ad- 
miral Sims . . . could get in touch with the Admiralty and 
with the naval departments of the Allies and find out from 
them the real needs of the war. 

" Today I can find nothing in the evidence presented which 
makes me change my mind as to the soundness, in the main, 
of the policies indicated as the Departments policies." 

These statements would appear to be a general vindication 
of the Navy Department and a repudiation of Sims' criti- 
cisms. A closer examination, however, shows that such is 
not the case. All that Pratt really meant by the above 
statement, was that he and the group of officers associated 
with him in the Office of Operations were from the first in 
entire sympathy with Sims' recommendations. They laid 
down policies to guide their own action which were later " vn- 
dicated as the Department's policies " and, after some months 
of struggle, they succeeded in getting a better organization 
in the Department and in compelling action in accord with 
policies on which they and Sims were in general agreement. 
Pratt omits to say here what he repeatedly admitted in other 
parts of his testimony, i. e., that his views and the policies 



314 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

followed by the Department, after the first six months of the 
war, were, in the beginning, the minority view even in the 
Office of Operations. 

As late as June 7, 1917, Pratt wrote a forceful appeal 
for a modification of the building prograjn to provide the 
kind of vessels needed in the war with Germany, rather than 
the kind that might be needed in some later war. This 
modification was not actually approved by the Department 
until late in July. In his letter of June 7, Pratt specifically 
said : " This view is not in accord with the general view 
of the office ; but it is submitted as one view of what the 
policy should be." 

After setting forth his reasons for urging that the Navy 
Department's activities in 1917 should take into considera- 
tion the existence of the state of war against Germany, Cap- 
tain Pratt said: 

" We did not enter this war alone. We have Allies and their 
efforts against the now common enemy have stood between us 
and possible aggressions for over two years. They have needs. 
Their needs are immediate and imperative. Their cause is our 
cause now. . . . 

" For the above reasons I am obliged to differ with the con- 
sensus of opinion expressed in the Office of Operations, and im- 
plied in the General Board's recommendations and do concur in 
the opinion and propositions (as to priority in new construction) 
expressed in General Goethals' letter of May 28, 1917." 

Of course Captain Pratt was right. The officers who 
served with him in Operations and ultimately determined the 
Departmental policies, were perfectly sound in their ideas 
of what should be done. But they were in the minority in 
the beginning. Six months or more was lost while they were 
converting the Department to their point of view. But 
that is not an excuse for the existence of conditions that 
made their sound and correct views inoperative for the early 



VICTORY IN SPITE OF DANIELS 315 

months of the war and that resulted in long delays and errors 
that, under less fortunate circumstances, would have been 
fatal. 

There can be no question of the splendid work accomplished 
by Captain Pratt, Captain Schofield, Captain Laning, and 
other officers in the Navy Department. It is only to be re- 
gretted that Pratt in speaking of that woi*k should have 
been tempted in his testimony in 1920 to quibble and to 
diminish the glory of their achievements in 1917 by at- 
tempting to camouflage the conditions he then knew so well 
and had then fought so valiantly to overcome. 

XII 

Captain Pratt had no doubt at all as to the real causes 
of the difficulties he encountered in attempting to prepare 
the Navy for war after war began. He pointed out to the 
committee in his direct statement, that the Navy cannot be 
efficient unless its administration is based on sound prin- 
ciples. Its organization was imperfect in 1917 and had to 
be remade amid the stress of war conditions. In fact Pratt 
said : " I think the organization is not fitted to conduct 
war efficiently." He believed that the Secretary's opposition 
to the establishment of a real naval staff was " a return to 
the older order of things which was not as wise." Pratt 
therefore placed the responsibility for the chaos of 1917, 
partly on Congress for having failed to provide an efficient 
organization for the Department; partly on the Secretary 
for his refusal previous to 1917 to carry out the expansion 
of the Office of Operations directed by Congress, and for his 
opposition to all preparedness measures. 

In concluding his statement Pratt said: 

" You have by law appointed a head, but have not definitely 
placed responsibility. As the head of an organization, there is 
the perfectly natural inclination to perform such acts as in his 



316 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

judgment he deems wise, but upon these acts depends the entire 
present and future of our Naval Establishment, its development, 
maintenance, and operation. To efficiently effect this requires 
the most intimate knowledge of the Navy and the power to co- 
ordinate its many activities. As its development, maintenance, 
and operation are conducted, so fares the fate of the country's 
first line of defence. 

" To administer the duties of chief executive of this depart- 
ment there is called a civilian. Gentleman, please do not mis- 
understand me. Under no circumstances should the supervisory 
head be other than a civilian, who in this capacity is best able to 
co-ordinate the Navy's activities with Congress, and who in his 
person is the strongest connecting link between us and the peo- 
ple. He comes to the office as an individual, a splendid man, 
able, efficient, highly trained in some subject, but not technically 
trained in the activities of the Navy nor a student of the art of 
war. This system functions after a fashion in peace, but it 
does not function when preparation for war becomes necessary, 
nor does it function in war. It is necessary that at the outbreak 
of hostilities the military head should assume the direction of and 
responsibility for the conduct of military operations, for whose 
preparation he has had, by law, no direct control nor authority 
to co-ordinate in peace. Such is the system we work under to- 
day and did at the outbreak of war. Thanks to the voluntary 
and hearty co-operation of every distinct departmental organiza- 
tion, including the Secretary, the Navy was able to pull itself to- 
gether and to work exceedingly well in war. 

" If any lack of preparation existed within the naval service 
prior to our entry into the war, if any lack of harmony existed 
then or exists now within our Navy, it can be laid more justly to 
the system of organization the department labours under than 
upon the shoulders of any individual." 



CHAPTER XVII 

RESPONSIBILITY AND ACTIVITIES OF THE 
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

(The Testimony of Admirals McKean and Benson) 

I 

THE last two naval witnesses who testified before the 
committee were Rear Admiral J. S. McKean, chief of the 
Materiel Section in the Ofl'ice of Operations, and Admiral 
W. S. Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations during the 
war. 

Their testimony was similar to that of Captain Pratt. 
Like that officer they freely admitted the facts stated by the 
Department's critics. They, too, sought to explain away 
the conditions that prevailed in 1917 ; b}^ emphasizing the 
pacifism of the Administration ; by showing that under the 
conditions that existed they had themselves done everything 
they could to get into the war quickl}^ and effectively ; and 
by referring to the inefficient departmental organization and 
to the personal characteristics of Mr. Daniels. 

Admiral McKean was prone to occasional outbursts of ill- 
considered violence ; as when he said that Admiral Sims' esti- 
mate of the results of the unpreparedness of 1917 and the 
delay in getting into the war was of the sort to be expected 
only from the " inflamed, exaggerated, diseased ego of a 
patient in St. Elizabeth's, the government hospital for the 
insane " ; that this was " an insult to every officer and man 
in the Navy." 

317 



318 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Admiral McKean was obviously hostile to Sims. His testi- 
mony indicated that he was almost equally hostile to the 
Secretary. He allowed his feeling against Sims to be ex- 
ploited for headline purposes by Mr. Daniels, however, and 
reserved his description of the Secretary for the cross-ex- 
amination which was hardly noticed at all. 

McKean's testimony was devoted chiefly to the work of the 
Materiel Division of Operations from 1916 to 1918. He 
gave a complete account, with much documentary illustra- 
tion, of his own recommendations and activities, though, as 
he freely admitted, many of his memoranda had not been ap- 
proved by the Department, and consequently had not been 
made effective. In general it can be said that his testimony 
fully substantiated the statements of the departmental 
critics, and served merely to show the long continued and 
often unavailing efforts made by himself and other officers 
in Operations to get the Navy ready for war before April 
6, 1917, and to get it into the war after that date. 

II 

In the first part of his statement, Admiral McKean said: 

" From a study of the original letter on which this investiga- 
tion is based, and from listening to the testimony given by vari- 
ous witnesses, I have arrived at the conclusion that this whole 
controversy can be reduced to two main issues. 

" First, neglect of preparation before the United States went 
into the war; and, second, not putting the whole or not concen- 
trating the whole efforts of the Navy Department and the fleet, 
ships, officers, and men on the anti-submarine menace in Euro- 
pean waters, on April 6, 1917, on the declaration of war. 

" As to the first charge, neglect of preparation, before the 
United States went into the war, this may be divided under three 
heads : 

" (a) That there were no plans. 

(b) That the personnel was not ready. 

" (c) That the material was not ready." 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 319 

McKean then proceeded to take up each of these points in 
turn. He admitted the Navy Department had no real plan- 
ning section before the war, that it had too few competent 
officers available to prepare any suitable plans, and that the 
General Board plans *' were not detailed complete paper 
plans for the meeting of all possible conditions, because the 
trained personnel to work out the plans was not available, 
nor was the information." 

In this connection McKean made it clear that the Secre- 
tary himself was responsible for the inefficient organization 
and for the absence of adequate machinery for the planning 
and conduct of war. In fact, McKean said that he himself 
in 1913 had told the Secretary how the Navy should be 
run, but that his advice had not been followed: 

". . . In late May or early June, 1913, shortly after the pres- 
ent secretary came into office, he visited the Naval War College, 
Newport, R. I., and at a dinner he was, at his own request, lit- 
erally swamped with advice in reference to his duties and oppor- 
tunities by all officers present, among them Capt. W. S. Sims 
and myself, both at the time students at the college, and we con- 
tributed at least our share. 

" After a long session at the table, we adjourned to the draw- 
ing room, and thus the Secretary had his first opportunity to face 
the whole of his numerous advisers ; whereupon he said in sub- 
stance : * Gentlemen, you have given me a great quantity of val- 
uable advice, which will take me a long time to digest. I have no 
doubt it is all good, but it is like a great deal of the advice given 
me by my official aides in Washington. It is not sufficiently con- 
crete to put into immediate use. What I wish you would tell me 
is the first and most important single act which I can perform 
to most help the Navy.' Captain, now Rear Admiral Sims, im- 
mediately replied, ' What you want to do, Mr. Secretary, is to 
appoint a board.' I rudely interrupted Sims, with apologies, I 
hope, saying, * Pardon me, Mr. Secretary, you do not want to ap- 
point a board. The Navy Department cellars are full of boards' 
reports never acted upon. As I understand it, you wish to know 
now what single executive act of yours will do the most good to 



320 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the Navy. My recommendation is that you send a wire to the 
aide for operations, informing him that hereafter he, the aide tot 
operations, will be your sole military adviser, and that his duties 
will be to co-ordinate the activities of the other aides, for per- 
sonnel, material, and inspections, in the same way that they co- 
ordinate the activities of the various bureaus and divisions under 
each of them.' 

" This recommendation met the approval of the officers present, 
but the Secretary demurred; said he could not do that without 
great consideration, as he feared he would be giving up too much 
of his authority and avoiding what should be his responsibilities. 
After some discussion in an attempt to show the Secretary that he 
was not giving up any authority and that he could not possibly 
avoid his responsibilities, this recommendation was passed over, 
and he asked what next we had to offer." 

III 

In regard to the second point, the unreadiness for war 
as far as personnel was concerned, Admiral McKean said: 

" There is no question that we were short of both officers and 
men; the Navy personnel was too small for its job. . . . The 
shortage of enlisted personnel has been fully gone into. We 
were short; I believe the primary causes of incorrect recom- 
mendations of the then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Blue) 
were due to the use of that old delusion ' Peace complements 
for fighting ships' . . . His estimates in 1914 were entirely 
wrong. I tried to convince him of it in his own office. . . . He 
defended it and believed in it at the time and I suppose he so 
advised the Secretary." 

In McKean's opinion, the shortage of trained personnel in 
1917, resulting from Secretary Daniels' refusal to request 
an increase in 1914, was the most serious part of our unpre- 
paredness in 1917. 

The material condition of the Navy in 1917 was also one of 
unpreparedness. Admiral McKean was quite emphatic about 
this: 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 321 

" The material was not ready. This is the particular part 
that I am, through association and duty as assistant for material, 
most famihar with and most responsible for; and at the outset I 
will say that the fleet was not 100 per cent, ready, is not 100 per 
cent, ready now and never will be 100 per cent, ready at the out- 
break of war. 

" The navy yards were not 100 per cent, ready; they are not 
now, although the Atlantic coast yards are much better prepared 
than they have ever been before." 

Admiral McKean then made a long outline of his own ef- 
forts between 1915 and 1917 to improve materiel conditions. 
He believed that much had been accomplished, although many 
of his plans had failed of approval. He pointed out that 

"the old way was that Navy Yards grew, just like Topsy, and 
depended on local favour, etc., more than upon the demands of 
the fleet. The fleet was used to keep up the yards instead of the 
yards being used to keep up the fleet and that was not either eco- 
nomical or efficient. 

". . . Very early in my duties my investigations confirmed my 
previous opinions acquired with the fleet that our shore establish- 
ments had not been developed as rapidly as the fleet had been 
built up, and that they were not capable of maintaining the fleet 
materially fit for war." 

After the Office of Operations was organized in 1915, 
progress was made in getting a general plan for navy yard 
development, but very little had been definitely accomplished 
before 1917. 

IV 

Admiral McKean and Admiral Benson both had much to 
say of the achievements of the Office of Naval Operations be- 
fore and during the war. Without the Office of Operations, 
they were convinced the situation would have been hopelessly 
chaotic in 1917. It was the existence of this co-ordinating 
agency, established against the opposition of the Secretary 



322 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

of the Navy in 1915, that provided the nucleus around which 
a war organization could be built up. 

They did not attempt, however, to show that everything 
possible had been done or that their efforts had been sup- 
ported adequately by the Secretary. In concluding his in- 
troductory statement, indeed, McKean said: 

" The preceding narrative is intended to show: 

" First. That Operations was awake to the situation before 
the war and was doing its best within the appropriations to pre- 
pare the fleet for war^ and to prepare the shore bases to main- 
tain it in fighting trim during the war : 

" Second. That even before we became a belligerent the diffi- 
culties and prices were increasing daily, making progress slow 
and getting us less for every dollar appropriated ; and 

" Third. That when funds became available practically with- 
out limit, the demands on the material and labour markets were 
such that new facilities had to be built up to provide the material, 
and that unskilled labour had to be trained by hundreds of thou- 
sands to perform jobs calling for high skill and long training. 

" The above explains why it was impossible for the Navy De- 
partment or any other department to instantaneously, or even in 
what under normal conditions would be considered a reasonable 
time, meet the infinite numbers of demands made upon it." 

Admiral McKean introduced a long list of documents to 
illustrate his effort to improve the material conditions of the 
Navy. Many of these, like many of Pratt's " plans," were 
simply his own memoranda containing recommendations 
which he admitted had not been carried into effect. On Feb- 
ruary 3, 1917, for example, McKean submitted a mem- 
orandum to the Chief of Naval Operations outlining steps 
that should be taken to : 

" (a) prepare all ships now built for war service at once. 
" (b) complete new ships as rapidly as possible." 

This memorandum contained seventeen definite recommen- 
dations as to what should be done to prepare for the im- 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 323 

mediate possibility of war. No definite action was taken 
on this memorandum for, as McKean said, " suggestions came 
from different sources of what we should do to get ready for 
the war, and they were taken to the chief (Benson). The 
chief acted on them or took them up with the Secretary. 
I only cite these to show what we were thinking about and 
what we were trying to do and I want to say that I suc- 
ceeded in getting most of them done in time. ... I did have 
the support of my chief in this business and, within limits, 
also of the Secretary." 

McKean had found it very difficult in many cases to get 
any decision. During the cross-examination he stated that 
the Secretary 

" was always thinking about justifying himself before your com- 
mittees up here and until you could convince him of the military 
necessity absolutely and beyond question, and also that he could 
justify the expenditure before Congress, you would not get him 
to approve an expenditure of any large amount ; and I often had 
to present the same subject many times before I got a favourable 
decision. I never had the Secretary refuse to listen to my argu- 
ments. I always tried to get a little new point of view on it and 
present it in a different light, and sometimes I thought I had 
proven the case beyond question a dozen times, and then I would 
try it the thirteenth and I would get it." 



Admiral Benson, unlike the other witnesses who testified, 
had prepared no statement. He said: 

" I have intentionally avoided preparing a studied statement. 
I have attempted to keep my mind as free as possible from any 
of the influences that might have been i^roduced by hindsight. 
. . . I tried to keep my mind unprejudiced by any subsequent 
study of the problems and my memory is quite clear in regard to 
the main principles. ... I feel that I should make this state- 



324 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

ment, that as the naval adviser to the Secretary of the Navy, I 
was responsible for the naval operations of the war." 

Admiral Benson's unwilling confirmation of the Navy's un- 
preparedness for war has been already noted. He gave the 
committee plain statements of Conditions as he remembered 
them. He did not feel that he had been at fault. He 
believed that the Navy had done exceedingly well in the 
war. He felt deeply grieved that Admiral Sims had criti- 
cized the Department's activities. Though he did not deny 
the facts as stated by Sims or other witnesses, he too en- 
deavoured to explain them away, to show that our delays 
and our unpreparedness had had no serious results. 

He felt very strongly that the whole responsibility for our 
naval operations had rested on him and on him alone. While 
he had endeavoured to aid the Allies, he had always kept in 
mind first of all America's own interests. If he had de- 
\ayed sending forces in 1917, it was because he felt that 
American interests had to be protected even at the cost of 
Allied losses. He had delayed decisions in many matters 
until he had had time to make up his own mind fully as to 
what should be done. He felt that the decisions were of 
such great importance that great caution had to be exer- 
cised in approving any recommendation from abroad. While 
he had been willing to assist in the execution of any plans 
the Allies had, he had insisted before giving his approval 
on having all possible information. He had recognized the 
seriousness of the situation in 1917, but did not believe that 
it was as critical as Admiral Sims had represented it to be. 
He felt that Sims had been perhaps unconsciously influenced 
by English ideas and consequently had used his own discre- 
tion in deciding whether Sims' recommendations should be 
approved or not. After he had gone abroad in November, 
1917, he had been more impressed with the necessity for ac- 
tion and had taken immediate steps to provide for a more 
complete co-operation with the Allies by sending additional 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 325 

forces abroad, in the creation of an Allied Naval Council 
and in the formation of a planning division in London. 

Admiral Benson felt that much of the responsibility for 
conditions fell upon him and displayed a generous disposi- 
tion to accept the onus of any errors. He felt at least par- 
tially responsible for the unpreparedness in 1917, as he might 
have urged upon the Secretary more strongly, in the two 
previous years, the necessity of preparedness. 

VI 

Admiral Benson testified that : " even before the war 
started in 1914," he felt that " sooner or later we would 
have to fight Germany." After 1914 " I felt as firmly as 
I could that we would have to fight Germany." He did not 
believe that neutrality barred us from preparing for war be- 
tween 1914 and 1917. The torpedoing of the Lusitania did 
not seem to him an occasion for any especial preparations 
against Germany. From his " professional standpoint " he 
would have had the Navy prepared for war at all times, but 
not from the attitude of mind of the people of the United 
States. 

" The Chairman: From the standpoint of the people of the 
United States, when did you first feel that you were justified in 
preparing for war. 

"Admiral Benson: I think about the time Congress decided 
to declare war. 

" The Chairman: April 6, 1917.'' 

" Admiral Benson: Yes." 

As an indication of how thoroughly the Secretary had 
suppressed Admiral Fiske and nullified his efforts to increase 
the efficiency of the Navy, Admiral Benson's description of 
the situation he found in 1915, is of great interest. 

" I assumed office on the 11th of May, 1915. I found abso- 
lutely nothing in my office that was of any service to me. Even 



326 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the office into which I came was not in proper condition for an 
officer of my rank and the position I held. All there was to it 
was a room in the Navy Department and one or two small rooms 
outside for clerical help. ... Of course the General Board had 
been functioning . . . and the general plans for war that had 
been worked out by the General Board existed and certain studies 
had been made as regards communications. . . . That is prac- 
tically all I found in the way of preparation." 

Admiral Fiske, as aide for operations, had had no inde- 
pendent authority, such as Benson, as Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, had been given by act of Congress. Fiske had there- 
fore been unable to do anything save by action of the Secre- 
tary. 

Admiral Benson described in a general way his activities 
from 1915 to 1917. In May, 1915, he had obtained the 
Secretary's approval of the administrative plan, which Mr. 
Daniels had refused to approve for two years, or since March, 
1913. Later a new fleet organization was carried through. 
Naval communications were organized and centralized. A 
Board of Inspections made a study of merchant vessels that 
might be needed as auxiliaries in war. General development 
plans were prepared for navy yard improvements. Extra 
supplies of torpedoes, projectiles and powder were laid in. 

All these measures Benson had carried through as steps 
in preparing for the possibility of war with Germany. He 
repeated his professional belief that " the function of the 
Navy is to keep prepared for war as nearly as possible, at 
all times," but stated that the attitude of the people made 
any special steps to prepare for a war with Germany im- 
possible until April 6, 1917. 

Mr. Daniels' objection to discussing the possibility of war 
or preparedness was also unwillingly confirmed by Admiral 
Benson. 

" The Chairman: You repeatedly informed the Secretary of 
your professional belief that we would get into the war.^ 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 327 

"Admiral Benson: I do not know that I would put it that 
way; whether I did or not. That is a question that I could not 
answer positively. 

" The Chairman: Your relations with the Secretary were very 
close were they not ? 

" Admiral Benson: Yes, sir. 

"The Chairman: If you had this professional belief about 
our getting into the war, is it not probable that you would have 
made it manifest on numerous occasions ? 

" Admiral Benson: Oh, I think I did. That is my belief that 
I did. 

" The Chairman: Did you advise the Secretary to prepare 
for war.^ 

" Admiral Benson: Well, I must have done it, Mr. Chairman. 
Just at what time and in what way, it would be difficult for me to 
answer that question. I felt it strongly, and I felt my responsi- 
bilities and my duties, but just to what extent I expressed them, 
it is impossible for me to say now. From time to time I did 
the duty that came to me; I realized that I was responsible for 
the situation and did everything that I felt it was my duty to do 
with reference to it. I can not answer your question in any more 
detail than that. 

" The Chairman: You do not recall especially advising the 
Secretai-y to prepare for war ? 

" Admiral Benson: No; I do not. 

" The Chairman: At any time? 

"Admiral Benson: No; I do not." 

VII 

Admiral Benson clearly stated this refusal of the Secre- 
tary to take any interest in the Navy's readiness for war, 
and his opposition to the efforts of naval officers. 

" The Chairman: Could you have prepared the Navy for war 
without the consent of the Secretary of the Navy.'' 

" Admiral Benson: No, sir. 

" The Chairman: . . . Did the Secretary ever give you any 
definite instructions with regard to active preparations for war, 



328 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

in regard to personnel, material or organization, prior to the 
declaration of war? 

"Admiral Benson: Not as a definite preparation for war; 
I do not think he did. I cannot recollect his having done so. 

" The Chairman: Did he ever hold you up or delay you in 
any way when you were seeking to make such preparation.'' 

" Admiral Benson: Well, it depends upon how far you mean. 
I think this: I think that the Secretary was very careful to go 
over the recommendations that were made to him, and that he 
gave very careful consideration to matters pertaining to any in- 
creases in expenditures and things that might involve unusual 
outlay, and there were delays in that way; but I do not think 
there was anything I could state definitely as a hold up, except 
that there were many things that I felt as a naval officer that we 
ought to do; that he felt as a politician we ought not to do. 
But in what we had, with the facilities we had, I do not think 
that he ever interfered with getting them ready as far as we 
could, for war." 

Then Admiral Benson proceeded to enumerate a number 
of things he thought should have been done, that the Secre- 
tary would not approve ; such as the manning and prepara- 
tion of vessels in reserve " so that in case of war we could 
not only have manned the ships in reserve at once, but the 
auxiliary vessels and things of that kind." 

When the Chairman asked at what time the Secretary first 
had " the idea that we would be brought into the war," Ad- 
miral Benson replied: 

" I can only answer in this way: I do not know whether the 
Secretary thought we would be drawn into the war before war 
was declared or not." 

" The Chairman: There was nothing that indicated to you 
that he did think so up to that time } 

"Admiral Benson: No, sir. Not to the best of my recollec- 
tion. 

" The Chairman: If you had been ordered and permitted to 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 329 

begin preparations for war after May, 1915, would not the Navy 
have been better prepared than it was in April, 1917? 
"Admiral Benson: Yes, sir." 

Then Benson admitted, as quoted in Chapter XV, that 
in April, 1917, the Navy was not prepared for war; that 
from his point of view Daniels' statement that it was " ready 
from stem to stern" was not justified; that its personnel 
was inadequate; that the ships were not all ready for war; 
that they were not fully manned; that the Navy was not 
mobilized; that the fleet was wholly inadequate and lacked 
the necessary scouting and screening vessels to accompany 
it; that our fleet could not have met the German fleet with 
any hope of victory. In fact. Admiral Benson admitted 
that any officer " who would have informed the Department 
that our battle fleet in 1917 was in a condition to meet the 
German fleet on a footing of equality would have been lack- 
ing in his duty." 

The condition of total unpreparedness thus revealed was 
not due to naval officers but to the refusal of the Secretary 
to heed their advice. Admiral Benson said that the steps 
necessary for preparedness had been submitted but 
" they have never been fully complied with. The reason in my 
opinion is this, that the officers in the service, who are educated 
by the government for this special purpose and for no other pur- 
pose, have never been permitted to exercise fully the responsibil- 
ities, as I see them, that should be placed upon them. They 
study these questions; they prepare what they believe is neces- 
sary for proper preparation of the nation's navy for war, and 
those recommendations have never been fully carried out." 

Admiral Benson felt that he partially shared the re- 
sponsibility for the condition of the Navy in 1917 with the 
Secretary, as he might have urged more strongly the neces- 
sity for preparedness. The final responsibility, however, 
rested solely upon the Secretary. " Of course, the Secretary 
is ultimately responsible for everything." . . . 



330 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Previous to April, 1917, no special or " unusual " effort 
had been made to prepare the Navy for war. Although a 
large building program was authorized in 1916, no special 
effort had been made to get the ships built. 

After the battle of Jutland it was apparent to Benson 
that Germany " relied largely upon the submarine campaign 
to win the war by starving England and France." He felt 
that we would enter the war on the side of the Allies, but 
no effort was made to increase the number of anti-submarine 
craft before March, 1917. This was because the election of 
1916 seemed to indicate that the people " did not want war 
and did not expect it." 

The campaign cry, " He kept us out of war," was there- 
fore the keynote to the Navy Department policy. Daniels 
loyally kept the Navy from getting ready for war and al- 
lowed its ships to remain undermanned and in poor material 
condition, at a time when practically every officer in the serv- 
ice felt that war was inevitable. 



VIII 

Even after we entered the war, the first aim of the Navy 
Department was not the defeat of Germany and victory of 
the Allies. Admiral Benson admitted that for many months 
the Department was concerned primarily with defensive 
questions ; the protection of the Atlantic coast against sub- 
marine attacks ; the protection of American merchant ships ; 
the maintenance of our fleet intact to meet some hypothetical 
future emergency. No clearer statement of our failure to 
support the Allies wholeheartedly from the beginning of the 
war than is contained in Admiral Benson's own admissions 
could be made: 

" After war was declared," said Benson, " I felt very 
strongly that we were in danger of attack by submarines — 
the only way he could attack us." 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 331 

He believed that as many as half a dozen might appear 
on the Atlantic coast and although he admitted that we 
would have had full information of their coming, he felt " at 
the outbreak of war that the first thing for us to do was 
to protect ourselves against this attack by German sub- 
marines." . . . 

" The Chairman: That^ first, we should keep our coasts and 
interests safe, and, second, help out on the other side? 

"Admiral Benson: I felt it would be this way — that we 
should be first able to protect our own coasts and then do every- 
thing we could to help them on the other side." 

Admiral Benson told the chairman that " as a principle " 
he believed in offensive warfare, but in describing the agree- 
ment with allied officers on April 10th and 11th, 1917, he 
admitted that the policy we actually followed in the first 
months of the war was purely defensive. 

" The Chairman: Then you do not think it would have been 
strategically wise to assume the offensive ? 

"Admiral Benson: Not under those conditions, no, sir. I 
think we did what was exactly the right thing to do at the time 
with what we had. As a principle in warfare, I believe in ac- 
tive offensive warfare. This was not altogether our war. The 
Allies had been in it some years and they had, or should have had 
very definite policies and plans upon which they were conducting 
war and we were going in to join them and I do not think we 
made any mistake at the time. I think we did exactly the right 
thing under the circumstances." 

The Chief of Naval Operations during the war thus con- 
firmed absolutely Admiral Sims' two main contentions ; first, 
that our Navy was not prepared for war; second, that we 
failed to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Allies from the 
beginning, and lost many months before getting our effective 
forces into the war zone. 

It should not be forgotten that Admiral Benson testified 



332 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

that " This was not altogether our war.^' There is a current 
impression in the United States that it was very much our 
war. Apparently the chief figures in the National Admin- 
istration did not think so. 

IXi 

The " safety first " policy was repeatedly mentioned by 
Admiral Benson. He had been the chief naval adviser of 
Secretary Daniels. It can at least be presumed therefore 
that he knew something of the leading policies of the De- 
partment. A further quotation may serve to illuminate even 
more these policies. 

The chairman read a quotation from Mahan. 

" One clear idea should be observed first by every one who 
recognizes that war is still a possibility and desires to see his 
country ready. However defensive in origin or character a war 
may be, the assumption of a simple defensive in war is ruin. 
War, once declared, must be waged off'ensively and aggressively. 
The enemy must not be fended ofF but smitten down." 

"The Chairman: Do you agree with the general principle 
expressed? 

"Admiral Benson: I do agree with the general principle. 

" The Chairman: Do you think then that waiting until we 
were advised just what ships or men were needed on the other 
side was a very aggressive policy for us to follow? 

"Admiral Benson: I do not think it was aggressive, but I 
think it was in absolute keeping with the actual conditions which 
confronted the country. 

" The Chairman : Do you feel that Admiral Sims' recom- 
mendation about the battleships was acted upon at once ? 

"Admiral Benson: . . . No, it was not. That was another 
case in which I had the responsibility and I assumed it, and I 
acted on my own judgment in the matter and I felt that the re- 
sponsibility resting on me for our own national defence was first. 
That it was my duty to safeguard American interests. That was 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 333 

my first duty^ regardless of any other duty, of humanity or any- 
thing else, and that was always the underlying motive in all the 
actions that I took. . . . 

" It has been referred to, and taken as a matter of fact, that 
when I went over there I realized the necessity of sending them 
over and immediately did it, implying that my judgment had been 
wrong in the beginning. That is not the case. In my position 
it was necessary for me to view the world situation; not only 
what was going on at the time but wliat might take place after 
the war" was over, and I had in view the possibilities that might 
come after the war; the condition that our Navy might be left in, 
etc., and I did not feel that I would be warranted in leaving our 
Navy in such a position that it could not look out for America's 
interests, unless the situation over there was very desperate. 

" Another thing, I always had this in mind. We were grad- 
ually getting our troops into France, and if a forced peace had 
been brought on, or if a complete defeat of the Allies had been 
accomplished, and our troops had been left in France and we had 
not sufficient naval force to protect their return to America, that 
would be unpardonable in me, as the responsible naval authority, 
to allow such a condition to arise. . . . 

" It was only when I went to London and had close and inti- 
mate conferences with the British Admiralty, in which I ad- 
vanced my views and my reasons, and with which they — as I 
recall it — were heartily in sympathy that I agreed to let them 
come over. It was for tliat reason, determinedly, that I did not 
send them over in the beginning. To begin with, I said that I 
would not, under any circumstances, send them until I got a 
statement from them that they thought it was necessary." 



No more accurate statement of the " safety first " de- 
fensive policies of the Department in the early months of 
1917 could be imagined than this testimony of Benson's. 
Our forces, instead of being advanced to the war zone, where 
they would have made impossible an allied defeat, were to 
be held back so that if and when the Allies were defeated 



334* NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

we could withdraw gracefully and leave the Allies to their 
fate. 

The chairman wanted further information on this point, 
and asked : 

" How would a forced peace have been brought about? 

" Admiral Benson: That I do not know. 

" The Chairman: By the defeat of the Allies? 

" Admiral Benson: I do not know. Suppose the British fleet 
had been defeated? 

" The Chairman: I do not think there was very much chance 
of that, was there, after we entered the war? 

"Admiral Benson: There was in my mind the possibility of 
it; and it was that possibility I had to fac'e. I was the re- 
sponsible party and I appreciated the responsibility very clearly. 

" The Chairman: But it was not enough, in your mind, to jus- 
tify you in sending additional ships over so that the Allies should 
not be defeated, was it? 

"Admiral Benson: Later on, when I had assurances, I was 
willing to do it; but not until I had personally investigated. I 
did not have sufficient confidence in Admiral Sims' judgment and 
in his decisions to warrant me in relieving myself of that grave 
responsibility ; and, in saying that. I do not want to reflect on Ad- 
miral Sims' judgment, but I mean to say that I was the re- 
sponsible head, and mine was the responsibility, that I could not 
pass to anybody else until I had investigated and satisfied myself 
of it." 

Admiral Benson had not believed, however, that there was 
any danger of allied defeat through the success of the sub- 
marine warfare. He considered the submarine situation " a 
very serious matter " but not " a very critical matter." He 
said: 

" In my professional opinion, I do not believe they ever would 
have been able to have forced a peace by the action of the sub- 
marine. 

" The Chairman: Were you not at least alarmed when you 



TESTi:\IONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 335 

found that they were sinking 800^000 tons of shipping in April, 
1017? 

"Admiral Benson: I was alarmed because the situation was 
a very serious one. 

" The Chairman: But not critical? 

"Admiral Benson: I said that it was critical, but not very 
critical. I do not say that it was very critical. 



" The Chairman: Was that tlie attitude of the Secretary? 

"Admiral Benson: I do not know what the attitude of the 
Secretary was. 

" The Chairman: You do not? 

"Admiral Benson: I do not. 

" The Chairman: I take it you were in conference with him 
on such matters ? 

" Admiral Benson: That may all be, sir; but I could not state 
to you what the Secretary's attitude was." 

This is an utterance of our war Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, probably unprecedented in the history of warfare. 
He was totally ignorant of Mr. Daniels' attitude toward the 
war situation in 1917! 

Admiral Benson admitted that Ambassador Page, Mr. 
Hoover and Admiral Sims had all urged upon the Govern- 
ment the fact, that — as Mr. Hoover expressed it — " the 
situation was dangerous almost beyond description and the 
anxiety in the whole of that period was terrific. I cannot 
overestimate the critical character of that position and the 
dangers in wliich the allied cause rested." Yet Benson con- 
tinued to insist that the situation in 1917 was not really 
" very critical ! " 

Refusing, in his mental blindness, even in 1920, after all the 
facts were known, to believe that the Allies had really needed 
our help very much, Admiral Benson's attitude in 1917 may 
be readily imagined. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
he insisted, in the early months of the war on " safety first." 



336 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 



XI 

On the following day, when Senator Pittman was attempt- 
ing to get Admiral Benson to qualify his extremely damaging 
admissions about naval conditions in 1917, the Admiral gave 
an even more complete statement of this " safety first " 
policy. 

" Senator Pittman: If we had sent our fighting ships imme- 
diately to the' war zone, they would have been placed in danger 
of destruction immediately, would they not? 

"Admiral Benson: They would while in the submarine zone; 
certainly. 

" Senator Pittman,: The loss of every one of our major ships 
during this war would have weakened our permanent navy, would 
it not? 

*' Admiral Benson: It would. 

"Senator Pittman: The General Board, as had you, as Chief 
of Naval Operations, had those things in mind, did it not ? 

"Admiral Benson: Yes. 

"Senator Pittman: And, as you testified, your first thought 
was for the protection of our own coast and the preservation of 
our Navy? 

"Admiral Benson: Absolutely, sir." 

"Senator Pittman: I want to ask you whether or not you 
agree, with what all agree to be Admiral Sims' position, that we 
should have sent over immediately, on the beginning of war, all 
our available craft to the other side ? 

" Admiral Benson: I do not think we should, sir, for the rea- 
sons I have already stated. I did not think so at the time and I 
do not think so naw; and as I have repeatedly stated mine was 
the responsibility; I had to exercise my judgment; and my first 
thought in the beginning, during and always was to see that our 
coasts and our own vessels and our own interests were safe- 
guarded. When I was satisfied that that was done as far as I 
could, witli what we had, then to give everything we had and to 
do everything we possibly could for the common cause." 



TESTIl\rONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 337 

The Chairman called Benson's attention to the recommen- 
dations from London to the effect that all forces should be 
sent abroad, as no submarine activities were probable in 
American waters save for sporadic and ineffective raids. 

Admiral Benson replied: 

" You always have one choice out of two, Mr. Chairman, to be 
right. When you make a prediction you are either right or 
wrong. But I had to act on my judgment; I could not take 
chances; I had to view the situation and act according to my 
judgment; and my inclination, and my duty, as I saw it, was to 
safeguard American interests, and I did that, and whether I was 
right or wrong, I should do the same thing again. 

" The Chairman: But you think it was more important to 
keep them away from this coast than it was to go over and put 
down the menace on the other side.'' 

"Admiral Benson: If we could have been sure that we could 
prevent them coming over here, and made it impossible for them 
to come, then of course that would have been the right thing to 
do." 

In considering the absolutely contradictory statements, 
made immediately afterwards by Secretary Daniels, Admiral 
Benson's testimony is of the greatest importance. Admiral 
Benson is an honest, straightforward gentleman. He would 
not stoop to lie, nor to make wild assertions to distract at- 
tention from the Department's errors. Firmly and flatly 
he gave the evidence quoted above. The policy of the De- 
partment in the war was not aggressive, it was not primarily 
one of co-operation with the Allies. The Department was 
actuated by personal " inclinations," and by purely defen- 
sive considerations, rather than with the defeat of the Ger- 
mans and with giving assistance to the Allies. 

XII 

Thus far, it has been demonstrated from Admiral Benson's 
testimony alone, first, that we entered the war without plans, 



338 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

with our vessels unready and with inadequate personnel ; 
second, that, for at least the first six months of the war, i.e., 
until Admiral Benson's visit to London, we held back forces 
from the Allies, delayed action on recommendations at the 
most critical phase of the war, and followed a safety first 
policy rather than one of full co-operation with the Allies. 

Admiral Benson demonstrated equally forcibly, by his 
testimony, that fundamental military principles were repeat- 
edly violated, that Admiral Sims was not supported, that no 
definition of authority was ever made and no satisfactory 
principle of command ever recognized. 

His testimony is full of indications of his attitude of mind 
on these points. For instance : 

" The Chairman: Do you think that all the available anti- 
submarine craft were sent to Europe as soon as they could have 
been sent? 

"Admiral Benson: Strictly speaking, I think they were. 
There were a great many that we had use far over here, but I 
think as fast as we could get them ready, and, in my judgment, 
could he spared, they were sent. . . ." 

" The Chairman-: But you do not feel that if all vessels had 
been ready when war broke out, that that would have been the 
case, do you? 

"Admiral Benson: We might have sent more destroyers — 
a few more — but / doubt if I xoould have sent more destroyers, 
because I felt strongly the necessity of safeguarding the battle- 
ships. . . ." 

" The Chairman: But you could have sent gunboats. 

"Admiral Benson: A very few, sir . . several that we had, 
if they had been ready, could have been sent over. . . . 

" The Chairman: Can you tell me, if these vessels were not 
ready, why they were not ready? 

" Admiral Benson: No, sir; I could not go into that now, I do 
not think." 

In succeeding testimony Admiral Benson explained that 
tugs were not sent abroad to comply with the requests of 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 339 

Admiral Sims and the Allies, as they were needed on the 
Atlantic coast. 

The convoy system was not accepted for many weeks, said 
Admiral Benson. " There was some delay, yes, and there 
was some difference of opinion. That was a very important 
question to decide . . . and I still have some donbf in my 
mind about it. We did eventually do it because the weight 
of opinion was decidedly in favour of it, and that was pos- 
sibly one reason why we delayed it." 

"The Chairman: And do you feel that the adoption of the 
convoy system was a mistake? 

"Admiral Benson: No, I do not think it was a mistake; but I 
say it is a question in my mind still whether they — of course 
the convoy as carried out was very successful, but when you are 
dealing with questions of that kind, technical questions, technical 
men differ in their viewpoints." 

" The Chairman: You feel that the recommendations to adopt 
it, in view of the fact that you did adopt it later on, were justified, 
do you not ? 

"Admiral Benson: Yes; I will admit that they were jus- 
tified ; but I do not admit that the Navy Department, or that I, 
as the technical head of it, would have been justified in adopting 
that or any other recommendation of such vast importance, sim- 
ply on the recommendation of Admiral Sims, or anybody else, 
without due consideration. 

" The Chairman: Even if they were in great need of shij^s at 
a very critical time.'' 

"Admiral Benson: Even if the recommendations were abso- 
lutely perfect, we would not have been justified in doing it." 

So the Chief of Naval Operations explained the delay that 
averaged from four to six months, in acting on every es- 
sential recommendation made by Admiral Sims in the first 
most critical months of the war. " Deliberation " is too 
often an excellent camouflage for lack of plans, ideas, energy, 
and for the absence of the will to victory ! 



340 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

XIII 

It is a curious conception of warfare that insists on the 
kind of defence that lets the enemy pick out his place to 
hit you and gives him entire freedom to land his blow, rather 
than on the offensive, which prevents the enemy from striking 
at all. It is a no less curious circumstance that in war, 
when time is vital, the one thing that may not be wasted 
with impunity, the head of a navy should have kept that navy 
away from the front while he spent months deliberating. 

Yet that was Benson's conception of war, as revealed 
in his testimony. Needless to say, he was not a graduate 
of the Naval War College. He had heard of Mahan's prin- 
ciples of naval warfare, but considered them only vague gen- 
eralities of no real application in time of war. Benson's 
conception of the principles of command were equally naive. 
He was the responsible head of the Navy. Therefore all 
naval operations had to be directed by him. Even the forces 
in Europe were operated by his orders from Washington, 
or at least so he declared to the committee, in the following 
words : 

" I felt and still feel that Admiral Sims' interpretation of his 
mission was not in accord with the mission that the Department 
intended him to perform or fulfill. 

"... I feel that as Chief of Naval Operations I was responsi- 
ble for the policies carried out in all parts of the world, in Eu- 
rope as well as elsewliere, and I looked upon Admiral Sims 
simply as my representative to carry out those policies in Euro- 
pean waters. ... 

". . . The forces (in Europe) were being operated in a man- 
ner very similar to the way in which they were being operated 
by my orders from Wasliington. 

" The Chairman: Was not Admiral Sims commander-in-chief 
of the forces on the other side ? 

"Admiral Benson: No, sir; he was not. 

" The Chairman: At any time? 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 341 

" Admiral Benson: No^ sir. 

" The Chairman : Who was ? 

*' Admiral Benson: The Commander-in-Chief was Admiral 
Mayo, then the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. . . . 

" The Chairman: Did he give orders direct to Sims.'' 

"Admiral Benson: Just what orders he gave I do not know, 
but the situation was such that the orders were given directly 
from Washington to Admiral Sims by me, and as far as we could 
I kept Admiral Mayo informed of those orders. . . . 

" The Chairman: Is it not true that Admiral Sims did not 
take his orders from Admiral Mayo.'' 

"Admiral Benson: He would have to take any orders that 
Admiral Mayo gave him, sir. 

" The Chairman: But Admiral Mayo gave him practically 
no orders during the war. 

"Admiral Benson: I doubt if he gave him many orders. As 
I say, the situation was a peculiar one, like this whole war was a 
peculiar one and we had to meet the situation that confronted 
us." 

Admiral Benson went on to say that Admiral Sims was 
the " Commander " but not the " Commander-in-Chief " of 
the forces abroad. All forces sent over were directly under 
Sims and all subordinate commanders, such as Wilson at 
Brest, Niblack at Gibraltar, Strauss and Rodman in the 
North Sea, reported only through Admiral Sims. He was 
their immediate superior, the senior naval officer in European 
waters, but decidedly, insisted Benson, not the " Commander- 
in-Chief " abroad. The quibble over the " in-Chief " part 
of his title seems to indicate only that Benson believed that 
he himself was really the commander-in-chief of the forces 
abroad. In fact he practically said as much. 

" The Chairman: I assume that the allied authorities sup- 
posed that when they were dealing with Admiral Sims they were 
dealing with an authorized representative of the American na- 
tion, did they not .'' 

"Admiral Benson: I think that they understood perfectly 



342 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

well what Admiral Sims' position was, sir. I think, as I said 
just now, that there is an exaggerated idea as to the position that 
Admiral Sims occupied. I think the Allies understood that the 
operations in Europe were being directed from Washington." 

XIV 

Throughout the war, Sims was left in London with no 
definite understanding of what his position really was. Much 
of the difficulty that arose in connection with the conduct 
of the war was due to this failure of the Department to 
heed one of the most elementary principles of war, the delega- 
tion of authority and the definition of command. Even the 
witnesses before the committee in 1920 expressed very differ- 
ent conceptions of Sims' position and responsibilities. 

Still Admiral Benson did not see that any further instruc- 
tions were required. His reason for such a view is simple. 
He, as Chief of Naval Operations, was the responsible head. 
" I was the one who determined on the policies to be carried 
out and gave them to my subordinates. I hope the impres- 
sion has not been made here . . . that there was ever any 
question as to who was at the head of Operations. . . ." 

"... I would like to state here if I may, Mr. Chairman, 
that points have been brought into this discussion in re- 
gard to the principles of Mahan. ... Of course Mahan was 
writing general principles for ordinary war. . . . But this 
war was a very unusual one, the conditions were very un- 
usual." 

So Mahan was put on the shelf and Daniels and Benson 
ruled supreme 1 

Indeed, as Benson admitted liimself, with a certain uncon- 
scious sense of superiority, 

" I am not what you would call a graduate of the War College. 
... I do not pose as a theoretical War College officer. I am 
simply a plain sailor and practical naval officer." 



TESTIMONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 343 

XV 

The final point to be considered, in reviewing Admiral Ben- 
son's testimony, is his hostility to the ideas that came from 
across the Atlantic. Repeatedly he insisted that no sugges- 
tion of Admiral Sims could be accepted until after the most 
mature deliberation. 

This attitude came out sharply when Benson was ques- 
tioned as to the causes for the long delay of the Navy De- 
partment in adopting the convoy system. 

When Admiral Sims' message of May 1st, 1917, urging 
the Navy Department to co-operate in establishing the 
convoy system was read by Senator Hale to Benson, his 
animosities exploded and he said: 

" We received that message. I would like at this time to in- 
vite the attention of the committee ... to this fact. . . . That 
message clearly indicates that Admiral Sims got all of his in- 
formation and his ideas as to what should be done from the Brit- 
ish Admiralty, and as I stated before, he simply transmitted them 
to the Navy Department. 

" The Chairman: I think the British Admiralty consulted 
with him in making up all his plans . . . did they not.'' 

"Admiral Benson: I think he consulted with them and got 
their ideas, sir. 

" The Chairman: That makes it all the more authoritative, 
does it not.'' 

"Admiral Benson: Coming from the British Admiralty? 

" The Chairman : Coming directly from the British Ad- 
miralty through Admiral Sims.'' 

"Admiral Benson: Yes, but I want to emphasize the fact 
that Admiral Sims was simply the means of the information that 
came to us from the British, except what we got from other 
sources." 

*' The Chairman: ... I should think that it might be of some 



344 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

value to us to get the results they had reached after watching 
the operation of the submarines; was it not, Admiral? 

"Admiral Benson: It was of value; . . . But, as I said yes- 
terday, ... it was a very serious policy to be adopted, and I do 
not think any right minded American could settle down quietly 
and accept his instructions practically from the British Ad- 
miralty. I, for one, am not willing to do it. 

" The Chairman: But were not the plans for adopting the 
convoy system based largely on our co-operation with them? 

" Admiral Benson: I so understand from the message." 

In this statement of Admiral Benson of his unwillingness 
to adopt the convoy system, because he believed the sugges- 
tion came from the British, lies much of the real reason for 
his long delays in acting on Admiral Sims' recommendations 
in 1917. 

As a matter of fact, the Admiralty were persuaded to take 
up the convoy system largely by Sims' own efforts. His 
recommendations to the Navy Department were not at all 
mere repetitions of ideas he had picked up from the British, 
nor were they " instructions " from the British. The facts 
upon which these recommendations were based the Allies, of 
course, supplied. The recommendations themselves repre- 
sented conclusions reached after careful discussion and full 
agreement with the Allies. More often than not the idea 
concerned had been supplied by Sims himself. 

The attitude of the Navy Department, however, as ex- 
pressed above by Benson, made it infinitely more difficult, at 
least in the early months of war, to get the Navy Depart- 
ment to act, than to get all the Allies to agree. There was 
in the Department a surprising insularity and a deep-rooted 
prejudice against the Allies, which made co-operation in the 
early months very difficult. Admiral Sims was left without 
a staff, his recommendations were ignored ; our Navy De- 
partment held back its forces in the most critical months of 
the war. All this Benson freely admitted. 



TESTLVIONY OF McKEAN AND BENSON 345 

This constituted Admiral Sims' chief criticisms of the 
actual conduct of the war by the Department. His points 
were fully substantiated by the testimony given under oath 
by Admiral Benson. 



CHAPTER XVIII 
MR. DANIELS' SMOKE-SCREEN TACTICS 



ON May 9, 1920, the naval investigation entered upon a 
new phase. On that day the Secretary of the Navy ap- 
peared before the Senate sub-committee to begin his testi- 
mony. 

Mr. Daniels, unlike the previous witnesses, did not hesitate 
to deny flatly and vehemently all the criticisms that had been 
made. He even went so far as to continue to maintain that, 
in 1917, " the Navy had been made ready from stem to stern 
to the fullest extent possible for any eventuality." 

It should be borne in mind that Secretary Daniels, like 
all the other witnesses, took an oath to tell the truth. Any 
variations from fact to be noted in his testimony cannot 
therefore be excused as " journalistic expressions." 

II 

The general outline of the Secretary's plan of defence has 
already been stated. These may be briefly recapitulated. 
The methods of Mr, Daniels were those of diversion, evasion, 
and misrepresentation. 

Most of his testimony was designed to divert attention 

from the real issues, raised by Admiral Sims' letter and by 

his testimony. This diversion took various forms. The 

actual achievements of the Navy were recited at length. 

Extraneous issues were raised, by attacks on Admiral Sims 

and other witnesses and by criticisms of the allied powers. 

346 



MR. DANIELS' SMOKE-SCREEN TACTICS 347 

All the really critical points were evaded. The Secre- 
tary merely made a general denial, without substantiating 
this denial. He made no attempt to disprove the testimony 
of practically every naval witness, but dismissed all critical 
testimony by asserting that it was inspired by grievances. 

In many important matters, the Secretary made state- 
ments which were so phrased as to give an entirely false im- 
pression and to misrepresent the facts, while skilfully avoid- 
ing such actual misstatements as would constitute perjury. 
Such were his accusations against Admiral Sims ; his ex- 
planation of the delay in adopting the convoy; his explana- 
tion of the " new, bold and audacious policies " of the Navy 
Department ; and particularly his discussion of the Northern 
Mine Barrage and of the question of troop protection. 

In some notable instances, especially during the cross-ex- 
amination, when taken off his guard, Mr. Daniels, in his 
anger and chagrin, blurted out statements, at variance with 
fact and with the previous sworn testimony. 



Ill 

Mr. Daniels' testimony in but few Instances dealt 
specifically with the vital points at issue. He stated that 
all the criticisms of Admiral Sims and " other officers with a 
grievance " had been fully disproved by the testimony of ten 
admirals. He made much of this point, apparently for the 
benefit of the press. The ten admirals to whose testimony 
he referred were Admirals Mayo, Plunkett, Badger, Fletcher, 
Niblack, Strauss, Rodman, Wilson, MjcKean and Benson. 
Of these, four — Niblack, Strauss, Rodman, and Wilson — 
had served abroad in subordinate commands during the war 
and admitted that they knew little or nothing of the facts 
at issue. Badger, McKean and Benson, under cross-ex- 
amination, admitted that the facts were as stated by Admiral 
Sims and the other critics of the administration. Mayo 



348 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

and Plunkett fully supported every important " charge " 
against the Department. Mr. Daniels either did not know 
or understand what they had said in -their testimony, or was 
misrepresenting their statements. 



IV 

On May 23rd, 1920, Admiral Sims during his final testi- 
mony made a summary of the character and content of Mr. 
Daniels' statement which can hardly be excelled for its clear- 
ness and precision. 

" In reviewing the lengthy statement of the Secretary of the 
Navy," said Admiral Sims, " the general outline of his method of 
defending the conduct of the Department, during the early 
months of the war becomes perfectly clear. As in the case of 
the other witnesses who appeared for the Department, nine- 
tenths of the material that he introduced had no bearing on the 
questions before this Committee. The reading of such a state- 
ment is inclined to confuse these issues, rather than to meet them. 
Large masses of documents have been introduced, stressing the 
navy's achievements; giving a lengthy history of the activities of 
the Navy Department since 1913, and even before; and intro- 
ducing extraneous matter which has no bearing whatsoever on the 
investigation. They seem to be designed solely to serve as the 
basis of reflections or attacks upon myself. In the few instances 
in which the Secretary attempted to answer specific criticisms, his 
testimony is based upon remarkable misconceptions and misinter- 
pretations of fact. 

" In taking up the Secretary's testimony, I shall deal with it 
under six main heads: 

" 1st. The Secretary has dealt voluminously with the Navy's 
achievements during the war. This stressing of the Navy De- 
partment's successes naturally tends to gloss over its failures and 
withdraw attention from the latter by arousing enthusiasm over 
the former. 

" 2nd. He has reviewed at length the acts of his administra- 
tion and has bestowed unrestrained praise upon these acts. He 



MR. DANIELS' SMOKE-SCREEN TACTICS 349 

has gone into great detail in pointing out the achievements of 
the Navy during his administration, and in calling attention to 
the expansion of the naval service in the last seven years. How- 
ever meritorious these things may be, it is obvious that they too 
have no bearing upon the issues, except once again to withdraw 
attention from failures by putting the emphasis upon obvious suc- 
cesses. 

" 3rd. The Secretary has attempted to meet certain of my 
criticisms. He has repeated the contentions of some of the De- 
partment's witnesses. For example, that plans for all possible 
emergencies were in existence; that the Navy had never been so 
well ijrepared; and that no department of any government had 
ever been so well administered as the Navy Department during 
the war. He has based this contention upon the assertion that 
my criticisms had been completely refuted by the witnesses called 
by the Department. He had apparently failed to read the tes- 
timony of these same admirals, or he would have noted the rather 
curious fact that, whereas the witnesses called seemed in many 
cases quite willing to state in general terms, subject to different 
interpretations, that the Navy was all right, had always been 
all right, and would always be all right, they had yet in every 
case, where they had any intimate knowledge of detailed facts, or 
of the specific issues under investigation, almost invariably con- 
firmed my criticisms. 

" 4th. The Secretary has attacked the whole policy followed 
by the Allies in the conduct of the war upon the sea, apparently 
believing that this demonstrated the infallibility of the Navy De- 
partment. He has referred enthusiastically to the bold and au- 
dacious policy that inspired the Department, and to his own in- 
ability to persuade the professional heads of the Allied Navies 
to adopt his interpretation of such policies. He has evidently 
introduced this contention in the belief that the test of a war 
policy is not its effectiveness or its practicability, but is its bold- 
ness and audaciousness. He has even assumed that the Depart- 
ment had practicable plans by which such- a policy could be writ 
into action, although, as will be shown, there is no basis in fact 
for his assumption, and the Department itself admitted, after 
they had given sufficient study to these very bold and audacious 



350 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

plans^ in the early months of 1917, that they were impracticable 
and impossible of execution. 

" 5th. The Secretary of the Navy has seen fit in his statement 
to make" reflections and direct charges against my personal char- 
acter, against my professional services, against my ability as an 
officer and against my loyalty to my country. These have no 
bearing whatsoever upon the facts, except in so far as they may 
serve, by discrediting the source of criticism in the uninformed 
public mind, to result in discrediting also my statements, even 
though they have been established by official documents and con- 
firmed by the testimony of the Department's own witnesses. 

" 6th. In defending the Navy, the Secretary has also seen fit 
to introduce matters reflecting upon the war services of the Navy 
of a friendly nation with whom we were associated in the war. 
He has charged that this navy was ineff"ective, that it had no 
plans, and he has quoted the President's assertion to the eff"ect 
that in the crisis it was helpless to the point of panic. He has 
further charged that I was so hypnotized by this service that I 
genuflected continuously to its policies and leaders ; that my dear- 
est hopes were bound up with such trivialities as decorations, that 
I consistently depreciated the eff'orts of my own service, ignored 
my own Department, attempted to deceive the head of my own na- 
tion, and endeavoured to use the forces under my command in the 
interests of Great Britain, and contrary to the interests of the 
United States. These charges were, of course, so baseless, so 
thoroughly in contradiction to the established facts, that it seems 
hard to understand how they could be seriously made." 



Mr. Daniels' testimony is characterized by the inclusion 
of large numbers of documents, reports and statements which 
have no conceivable relation to the specific criticisms of Ad- 
miral Sims and other witnesses. These documents were 
avowedly introduced to show " what the Navy had done in 
the war." We already kne<vv that. Admiral Sims had told 
the story clearly and eloquently in his " Victory at Sea." 
The object of the investigation was to discover what had not 



MR. DANIELS' SMOKE-SCREEN TACTICS 351 

been done by Mr. Daniels and his naval advisers in the De- 
partment, to prepare for war before April, 1917, and to 
enter the war effectively in the first year of our intervention. 
These reports, however interesting, bore not in the least upon 
these questions. 

A simple list of the documents of this character intro- 
duced in evidence by Mr. Daniels will show to what extent 
he used these smoke-screen tactics of diversion and evasion. 
In this list will be found the title or subject of the documents 
and the number of printed pages of the testimony devoted to 

each. 

Page Total 

TiTUE OR Subject Nos. Pages 

Allied praise of the U. S. Navy 2008-2018 10 

General Summary of War Activities: Bureau of 

Ordnance 2047-2080 33 

Magnitude of the Navy's Task 2099-2106 7 

Report of First Troop Convoy 2125-2135 10 

Troop Transportation 1917-1918 2142-2156 15 

The Naval Overseas Transportation Service 2^168-2173 5 

Battle of Jutland 2200-2203 4 

Attacks by U. S. vessels on submarines 2206-2227 21 

Naval Consulting Board 2228-2233 5 

Report of House Naval Committee, 1918 2234-2247 14 

Naval Appropriation and Construction 1903-1918. 2253-2278 25 
Letter from Daniels to President Garfield of Wil- 
liams College, 26 April, 1915 2320-2325 5 

Speech of Admiral Benson, Naval Academy, 1915 2326-2330 5 

1916 Building Program 2331-2346 15 

Report of War Activities, Bureau of Supplies and 

Accounts 2346-2448 103 

(Including 50 pages of statistical tables of all 
articles bought during the war.) 

The Abolition of Wine Messes in the Navy 2449-2458 10 

Engagements of Armed guards with submarines.. 2459-2466 6 
Report of War Work — Bureau of Construction 

and Repair 2473-2553 80 

Work of the Bureau of Steam Engineering 2556-2580 25 

Report of Naval Communication Service 2580-2593 14 

Report of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 2593-2604 11 

Summary activities of Judge Advocate General . . 2604-2614 10 

The Marine Corps in the World War 2616-2644 28 

Daniels' speech in London May 1, 1919 2649-2652 4 



352 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 



Report of the War Operations of the Bureau of 

Yards and Docks 2652-2675 23 

Record of Development of Aviation in the United 

States Navy 2677-2710 33 

Work of the OflBce of Naval Intelligence 2710-2716 T 

Personnel of the Navy — Report of Bureau of 

Navigation 2719-2779 60 

Quotations from- previous witnesses with regard 
to efficiency of Atlantic Fleet and of naval op- 
erations in the war 2781-2813 32 

620 

Secretary Daniels' direct statement occupies pages 1981- 
2827 of the printed record and amounts therefore to a total 
of 836 pages. Of this no less than. 620 pages, or approxi- 
mately three-fourths, is devoted to the documents, reports 
and statements listed above. 

JMany of these will doubtless be of great interest to the 
historian who writes the full story of our naval activities 
and operations in the war. None of them relate specifically 
to the issues raised by Admiral Sims' letter. Three-fourths 
of Mr. Daniels' testimony, in other words, was pure camou- 
flage. 

VI 

The Secretary seemed to think that a recital of what the 
Navy did in the war. and the mere fact of the allied victory 
invalidated any criticism that might be made of his own 
policies and methods. He asserted that Admiral Sims' 
criticisms of our unpreparedness in 1917 and of mistakes 
made by the Department, were reflections on the Navy it- 
self. Repeatedly, throughout his testimony, he used expres- 
sions like the following: 

" In the face of a great job greatly done, it is a matter of na- 
tional regret that any naval officer should for any reason or any 



MR. DANIELS' SMOKE-SCREEN TACTICS 353 

motive seek either to minimize it or to cast aspersions upon the 
splendid work by brother oncers in or out of the Department." 



. ." The Navy and its service in the World War stand without a 
trace of the mud with which a few have sought to bespatter it." 

" The only man injured in public esteem by his charges^ re- 
flecting upon his brother officers, and his attempt to hold their 
self-sacrificing and successful service up to condemnation is Ad- 
miral Sims himself." 

" You have heard many great admirals of the American Navy 
testify that Admiral Sims' attacks upon the work of the Ameri- 
can Navy during the war are either wholly unwarranted or 
grossly exaggerated." 

" The results — the success of the naval ships in every char- 
acter of service, in fighting submarines, in transporting troops, in 
convoys, in minelaying, in patrol and all other activities — attest 
the efficiency of operations and the department. Against that 
record, applauded at home and abroad, the discharge of poison 
gas by men with or without a grievance cannot prevail with any 
just men in the country against the patriotic men in and out of 
the Department, who served with such fidelity and efficiency." 

These are only a few of scores of such statements to be 
found in ]\Ir. Daniels' testimony. Yet he knew full well that 
Admiral Sims had never attacked the Navy, or made charges 
against it, or reflected on its war service. The criticisms 
were directed only against the heads of the Department. 
It was no fault of the Navy's that Mr. Daniels had prevented 
it from being adequately prepared for war in 1917 ; that 
he had kept it from having an organization fit to prepare 
plans and conduct operations ; that he had refused to re- 
quest an increase of personnel to man the ships ; and that 
the departmental policies and methods had kept it from get- 
ting actively into the war for many months, and handicapped 



354? NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

its operations by military blunders. The criticisms of Ad- 
miral Sims and other officers were directed solely against the 
unpreparedness, the delays, the military errors, which so 
sorely handicapped the Navy in the war. The revelation 
of these handicaps, far from belittling the war service of 
the Navy, makes it stand out with increased glory. It was 
indeed wonderful that under such conditions the Navy was 
able to operate at all. 

VII 

Another method used by Mr. Daniels to divert attention 
from himself was that of counterattack. He made many 
baseless assertions and insinuations concerning the officers 
who had volunteered testimony critical of his administra- 
tion. Most of these were directed against Admiral Sims. 
The other witnesses who gave testimony unfavourable to him 
he dismissed contemptuously as minor persons, or officers 
with a grievance. A few typical instances are quoted below : 

" The officers who, upon minor details, made criticisms either 
xvere not in the war at all or held positions not comparable in 
responsibility to those intrusted to the twelve (admirals), some 
holding positions so unimportant or subordinate as not to give 
them opportunity to know the great policies and activities of the 
Navy in the World War. You have heard their testimony and 
you know that, beside the great record made by the Navy, the 
charges brought forward touch matters which had only the small- 
est bearing on the Navy's great service. . . . The war was won, 
and that the Navy did its full share toward that great result has 
been thoroughly established." 

" On the part of certain critics, self-appointed, to ferret out 
the molehills of mistakes which they exaggerate into mountains, 
you have been wearied and the public nauseated with the abor- 
tive attempt to make a perspective in which a noble and notable 
accomplishment appears as the dim and fading background of 
comparatively unimportant errors of judgment." 



MR. DANIELS' SMOKE-SCREEN TACTICS 355 

" You, gentlemen, have heard certain witnesses who have to 
some extent supported Admiral Sims, but who mainly devoted 
their energies to rehashing ancient animosities, being largely peo- 
ple with a grievance . . . and no personal knowledge of the prin- 
cipal matters dealt with by Admiral Sims himself." 

The Secretary was unsparing in his attacks upon Admiral 
Sims. In the very beginning of his statement he said: 

"In the fact of a great job greatly done, it is a matter of 
national regret that any naval officer should, for any reason or 
any motive, seek eitlier to minimize it or to cast aspersions upon 
the splendid work by brother officers, in or out of the Depart- 
ment. I confess to surprise and regret when Admiral Sims made 
public the letter which was the occasion of your hearings. Dur- 
ing the conduct of war, in several important particulars, I felt 
he did not wholly measure up to expectations in certain particular 
ways, of which six may be mentioned : 

" 1. He lacked the vision to see that a great and new project 
to bar the submarines from their hunting grounds should be 
promptly adopted and carried out, no matter what the cost or 
how radical the departure from what ultra prudent men regarded 
as impracticable. 

" 2. He seemed to accept the views of the British Admiralty 
as superior to anything, that could come from America, and urged 
those views even when the Navy Department proposed plans that 
proved more effective. 

" 3. In public speeches and other ways he gave a maximum of 
credit to British efforts and minimized what his country was 
doing. 

" 4. He coveted British decorations and seemed to place a 
higher value on honours given abroad than on honours that could 
be conferred by the American government. 

" 5. He aspired to become a member of the British Admiralty 
and wrote complainingly when the American Government de- 
clined to permit him to accept such tender by the King of Eng- 
land. 

" 6. He placed protection of merchant shipping, with concen- 
tration of destroyers at Queenstown, as the main operation of our 



356 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

forces abroad, failing to appreciate that the protection of trans- 
ports carrying troops to France was the paramount — and I wish 
to emphasize that was the paramount — naval duty until I felt 
impelled to cable him peremptorily that such was our main mis- 
sion." 

VIII 

The most superficial review of Mr. Daniels' testimony 
suffices to show that he was not really trying to disprove 
the incontrovertible facts which had been sworn to by a long 
list of naval witnesses, including even those officers he had 
summoned to defend him. He was trying to win his case be- 
fore the public by sensational headline appeals. He was 
obviously appealing throughout to prejudice and to ignor- 
ance. 

On no other ground can one explain his statements quoted 
above, with regard to the credibility of witnesses who gave 
testimony damaging to him. Admirals Benson, Mayo, Mc- 
Kean, Grant, Plunkett, Palmer and Captain Pratt were as- 
suredly not men with a grievance. The witnesses whose 
testimony proved Mr. Daniels' unfitness and the betrayal of a 
public trust had, without exception, occupied during the war 
positions of great importance, as has been pointed out in 
previous chapters. 

In his attack upon Admiral Sims, Daniels overshot his 
mark in the use of headline tactics. In addition to the six 
specific charges against the Admiral, noted above, Daniels' 
testimony was replete with nasty flings and insinuations, un- 
worthy of a Cabinet officer. 

Mr. Daniels spared no words in his effort to make it ap- 
pear that Sims had been treasonously disloyal to American 
interests. Characteristic passages are quoted below: 

" There is a peculiar malady which affects a certain type of 
Americans who go abroad and become in many respects un-Amer- 
ican. That malady causes them to regard others who do not lose 
their thorough-going Americanism and undivided allegiance, as 



MR. DANIELS' SMOKE-SCREEN TACTICS 357 

having ' idiosyncrasies.' Sims genuflected so before the British 
Admiralty ideas and accepted British views so fully and coveted 
British honours so earnestly that he came to regard as anti-Brit- 
ish such a rugged American as Admiral Benson." (Benson on 
March 28, 1917, be it remembered, was as ready "to fight the 
British as the Germans.") 

" Is it proper for a naval officer to send a cablegram for the 
purpose of deception.^ . . . Until recently no naval officer has 
acted as if he thought it proper or excusable to say anything of- 
ficially to mislead the people of his own country. ... It is gen- 
erally recognized that in war it is not only justifiable but laud- 
able to deceive the enemy. Admiral Sims now propounds a new 
doctrine that he considered it justifiable and proper to deceive 
his superior officers." 

" Admiral Sims was so hypnotized by British influences that 
he was willing to try to lure the President of the United States 
into the feeling that ' regardless of any future developments, we 
can always count upon the support of the British Navy.' ... It 
is to be hoped that if Admiral Sims has such assurances he will 
send a copy ... to be filed in the archives of ' Sops for the 
Simple.' " 

" It is one thing to co-operate heartily on equal terms with the 
navy of another country. It is quite another thing to be ab- 
sorbed in a belief in the infallibility of another country, and to 
have an obsession of its supposed superiority. That was the at- 
titude of Admiral Sims, as evidenced by his own statements and 
action." 

" This article (referring to Sims' long fight for gunnery im- 
provements in the Navy against the opposition of older and re- 
actionary officers) shows a spirit of pride in continued insubor- 
dination to authority . . . little of which I was familiar with 
when Admiral Sims was entrusted with the confidential mission 
to London. If I had fully understood and properly assessed his 



358 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

past attitude and conduct with respect to the highest spirit of 
loyalty he would not have been sent." 

The Secretary quoted from a personal letter Admiral Sims 
had written to Admiral Bayly of the British Navy in which 
Sims had said : 

" There is no doubt at all that the principal dignitaries at home 
are very nervous lest some of our troop transports be torpedoed. 
^Of course you will understand that this nervousness is largely of 
a political kind." 

The Secretary then said: 

" An attack upon the American Government in a letter to a 
British admiral^ that because we wanted to protect the lives of 
our 2,000,000 soldiers, it was political. If I had seen that letter, 
gentlemen, I should have ordered him home and put him under 
court-martial." 

In referring to Admiral Sims' estimate of the probable 
results of our naval unpreparedness and our delay in getting 
into the war effectively, Mr. Daniels said : 

" Admiral Sims' statement is preposterous, absurd and with- 
out foundation, an outrage upon the American people and upon 
the American Navy ... a preposterous and outrageous slander 
upon an honoured service." 

Mr. Daniels quoted a passage of Admiral Sims' letter of 
July 16, 1917, discussing our general naval policy in the 
war, in which Sims has pointed out the advantage of unity of 
command. Then the Secretary made a characteristic state- 
ment : 

" He (Sims) did not tell you voluntarily, though it was 
brought out in cross-examination, that he recommended that the 
British Admiralty (for that was what he meant, though he cam- 
ouflaged it by naming Italy and France first) direct all opera- 
tions. ... I assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we viewed with 
hesitation and caution the proposition of turning over the control 



I 



MR. DANIELS' SMOKE-SCREEN TACTICS 359 

of the American Navy to any other navy in the world; and we 
never thought of doing it; and we would have been unworthy as 
Americans, if we had followed the advice given by Admiral 
Sims." 

Mr. Daniels also charged that our officers and men had 
not received rewards for their attacks upon submarines be- 
cause of " Sims' neglect " ; that Sims was a disciple of " Von 
Tirpitz " and that his motive in commenting on the naval 
lessons of the war was a desire to " Prussianize the Navy." 

In another place Daniels sought to convey the impres- 
sion that Sims had been inspired by Senator Penrose to 
present his criticisms and condemned his action as a purely 
political move ; because of the fact that Senator Penrose, 
member of the Naval Affairs Committee, had called atten- 
tion on the floor of the Senate in August, 1918, to the per- 
fectly well known facts about the unpreparedness of the 
Navy in 1917, and the long delay in getting into the war, 
and had made an estimate of the cost to the country of the 
Secretary's " procrastination," which was very similar to 
that made, altogether independently, by Admiral Sims in 
1920. 

IX 

Every single statement quoted above, reflecting upon Ad- 
miral Sims, was proven untrue by the sworn testimony of 
many other witnesses and by the official records of the Navy 
Department. They were obviously made by the Secretary 
for the purpose of discrediting one of the most distinguished, 
honourable and patriotic officers who has ever worn the 
uniform .of the United States Navy. 

The enormity of his action can be the better appreciated 
by contrasting these statements, made in 1920, with the 
tribute he paid to Admiral Sims on July 22, 1919. Eight 
months had then pa-ssed since the armistice. Mr. Daniels 
had not only had a full opportunity to review our naval 



360 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

part in the war, but had made a trip abroad, had conferred 
with the heads of the alHed navies and had seen for him- 
self the character and results of the work done by Admiral 
Sims, while in command of our naval forces in the war zone. 
As a result of his careful survey, Mr. Daniels on July 22, 
1919, recommended to Congress that Sims be given the rank 
of admiral for life. In his letter he described Sims' serv- 
ices in the following terms : 

" In the anxious days before duty led the United States to 
enter the World War, when it was decided to arm merchant ships, 
the President determined to send to Great Britain a naval officer 
of high rank and of proved ability, to represent our country. He 
was selected for' what was then a delicate mission, as it was during 
all the succeeding months, an assignment that called for a man of 
quickness of grasp, mastery of Iris profession, and ability to sit as 
the equal in any conference of the naval leaders of free nations. 
The country approved the selection of Rear Admiral William 
Sowden Sims. He had already shown the qualities which made 
his mission not only of the greatest service to his own country, 
but which brought the Allied navies into warm fellowship as well 
as in close co-operation. He was at once welcomed into the con- 
ference of naval leaders and during the whole war was recognized 
among our Allies, as well as by his own countrymen, as one of 
the ablest and most brilliant naval officers in the cause that de- 
manded initiative, understanding and a comprehension, which in- 
cluded among other things the hard duty to safeguard the carrying 
of millions of fighting men across the seas and to defeat the sub- 
marine menace. It is a matter of national gratification that in 
Rear Admiral Sims, America sent, as commander of the naval 
forces operating in European waters, an officer who served the 
world with such conspicuous ability as to win the confidence, 
the approval and also the sincere admiration of the entire world." 

On February 7, 1920, Secretary Daniels, in testifying with 
regard to the medal awards, said " every word I could say 
then (July 22, 1919) or now, of Admiral Sims as a naval 



MR. DANIELS' SMOKE-SCREEN TACTICS 361 

officer of ability and, in certain lines, of brilliance ... is 
true," 

Is one to believe the Daniels of 1919, smugly and happily 
appropriating the splendid war record of the Navy as a 
chariot to bear him in triumph to the White House? Or 
the Daniels of 1920, cowering before the judgment seat, seek- 
ing by evasive methods to keep the public from realizing his 
neglect of his primary duty, and his degradation of the naval 
service? 

X 

The quotations from Mr. Daniels' testimony thus far given 
are in no sense unrepresentative. They indicate correctly 
his whole attitude of mind, and the spirit in which he gave 
his testimony. Beneath his suave geniality there lurks an 
unscrupulous vindictiveness which the officers of the Navy 
have long since come to know. 

As one reads his testimony and remembers that he was a 
Cabinet officer testifying under oath, on questions of the 
gravest import, affecting vitally the future of our first line 
of national defence, the tone of his statement, his lack of 
dignity, his shifty evasions present a spectacle almost un- 
precedented in our history. 

Admiral Sims, in language the more forceful, by contrast, 
in its dignity and restraint drew up a formidable indictment 
of the Secretary in beginning his final testimony. 

" You have listened," said Admiral Sims, " to a long statement 
from the responsible head of the Navy Department, remarkable 
alike for its mistakes and misinterpretations, and for its unre- 
strained assault upon my services during the war, upon my mo- 
tives, and upon my ability and credibility as an officer. 

" But before proceeding any further, I wish to state very 
clearly, and once for all, that in all of the comments that I shall 
have occasion to make upon the mistakes and misinterpretations 



362 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

in question, I do not desire in the slightest degree to imply that 
they were intentional, or that the Secretary was not sincerely 
convinced of the fairness and correctness of his conclusions. 

" I have no desire to enter upon any personalities, and I have 
no intention of doing so; nor will I attempt any answer to the 
personal reflections and aspersions contained in the testimony of 
the Secretary. 

" He has dealt at length with many technical questions, and 
in doing so has almost invariably drawn conclusions therefrom 
reflecting upon my conduct and upon my motives, not only dur- 
ing the war, but during a large part of my naval career. 

" However interesting may be the subject of my personal opin- 
ions, and private character, it seems to me to have no connection 
however remote with the question as to whether or not the Navy 
Department committed serious errors in the conduct of the war. 
I am not appearing before you to defend myself. My sole pur- 
pose from the beginning has been, and still is, to do what I can 
to prevent a repetition of the military mistakes to which I have 
invited attention. 

** It was to be expected that some errors should appear in such 
a discussion of technical military matters. No civilian without 
previous military training could hope to deal at such length with 
so many questions of naval policy, strategy and tactics, without 
some misunderstanding, misinterpretations and mistakes. 

" It was hardly to be expected, however, that the responsible 
head of the Navy should make, under oath, before this commit- 
tee, a statement in which every essential conclusion was based on 
errors of facts or misinterpretations of naval matters. 

" The fact remains, however, that he has done so. In pointing 
these out, I will confine myself to the testimony presented not by 
myself, or by the witnesses called at my request, but solely by 
the Department's own witnesses." 



CHAPTER XIX 
MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 



IN his first day's testimony the Secretary clearly ex- 
plained the methods by which he hoped to discredit the criti- 
cisms of his administration. After admitting that Admiral 
Sims' letter " might have resulted in good," if it had been 
considered by " professional experts," the Secretary said : 

" Wide publicity has been given to a number of charges by 
Admiral Sims reflecting upon the conduct and results achieved 
by the U S. Navy in the World War." 

Mr. Daniels must have known that Admiral Sims has 
never made any charges against the Navy. His criticisms 
of departmental mal-administration were not reflections on 
the Navy itself. 

The next sentence of the Secretary's statement, however, 
is more significant. 

" We know that hindsight is better than foresight, and after 
any great undertaking, however successful, it is easy to point 
out things done that ought not to have been done, and things 
left undone that ought to have been done. The most serious 
charges made by Admiral Sims are without foundation and 
others are not justified. . . . You have heard a number of the 
most competent officers of the Navy, with first hand knowledge 
of what happened during the war . . . whose testimony I think 
would have been accepted by any open minded man as absolute 
refutation of practically all of Admiral Sims' charges. 

" I can add but little to what has been told you already with- 
out covering again the ground which has been covered by the 

363 



364 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

most capable officers of the Navy. I feel, however, that the 
charges against the Navy are so scandalously unwarranted by 
the actual facts and conditions that it is my duty to give you 
gentlemen the benefit [?] of the fullest possible statement, 
ccfvering^ of course only those actimties which constitute the out- 
standing achievements of the American Navy, which from top tc 
bottom, did its full duty during the war and measured up to the 
highest standards that can be conceived." 

Stripped of its excess- words this statement means : 

1. Some of Admiral Sims' charges are admitted to be true. 

2. A general denial is made of other unspecified charges, 
based upon a simple assertion of Mr. Daniels and upon his 
incorrect assumption that other witnesses had already dis- 
proved them. 

3. An intention on the part of the Secretary to devote 
his own testimony to matters never in question and hence 
irrelevant to the investigation, i.e., " onli/ those activities 
which constitute the 'outstanding achievements of the Ameri- 
can Navy." 

Mr. Daniels also attempted to divert the attack from him- 
self. He did not feel it necessary to say a word in defence 
of his own acts during the war, he said, as the criticisms 
" have been directed solely against the military activities of 
the Department." . . . These, he declared he had entrusted 
entirely to his naval advisers. This statement is but another 
illustration of his effort to convert the investigation into an 
internal service feud by setting one group of officers against 
another in the hope of thus evading his own responsibility. 

II 

A typical case of misrepresentation of the testimony of 
the naval witnesses occurred in the Secretary's endeavour 
to show that the Navy was fully prepared for war in 1917. 
He quoted from many witnesses testimony relating to the 
efficiency, in 1917, of Admiral Mayo's fleet of battleships 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 365 

and destroyers ; this he represented as proof that the whole 
Navy was equally efficient. 

No one had denied the gunnery efficiency of the modem 
battleships in 1917. The Fleet comprised, however, only a 
dozen battleships and some twenty destroyers, out of the 
300 fighting vessels then on the navy list. None of the other 
ships were even half prepared. Many of them had no crews. 
The only vessels of the Navy, in fact, that were even re- 
latively ready for war were those which could not be used 
against submarines, i. e., the battleships. Yet, since 1916, 
it had been apparent that if we entered the war the vessels 
needed would be, not the battleships, but the light craft. 
Of these only a score of destroyers were adequately pre- 
pared for war in 1917. All the naval witnesses admitted 
this. Mr. Daniels, ignoring their omissions, endeavoured to 
make it appear that their statements with regard to the 
dreadnaughts applied to the whole Navy. 

Ill 

Similarly, the Secretary said: 

" Perfectly uninformed and wanton statements have been 
made that the Navy Department lacked war plans and prepara- 
tions. . . . The truth is that from its creation the General Board 
has been employed with a study of naval warfare and prepar- 
ing for any conditions of war that might arise." 

The question, however, was not whether the General 
Board had some war plans locked up in a safe somewhere. 
It has been proven that the Navy Department had no plans 
that were adequate to the situation in 1917, or that were 
actually used during the war. This Mr. Daniels could deny 
as flatly as he pleased. There was indeed no power to pre- 
vent him perjuring himself if he chose so to do. His attempt 
to present as the departmental war plans the unapproved 
memoranda of the General Board, most of which had never 



366 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

been acted on at all, or the personal notes of Captain Pratt, 
was an absurd evasion of the issue, as the testimony proves. 



IV 

The attempt of the Secretary to show that any real 
preparations had been made for the war, previous to 1917, 
was equally futile. He presented the administrative plan, 
originally prepared by Admiral Fiske, that he had approved 
on May 28, 1915, after refusing for two years to sign it. 
This only outlined in the most general way the probable 
activities of the various branches of the Department in the 
event of war and required quarterly reports from them as 
to progress made in preparations. As this was done, said 
the Secretary, " the Navy, therefore, exercised all the fore- 
sight and preparedness that was possible before we entered 
the war! " No more complete admission than this could be 
asked, of the whole case against Mr. Daniels. The making 
of a simple administrative plan, he regarded as the sole 
step toward preparedness we could take before actually 
entering the war ! 

As a matter of fact, the approval of this administrative 
plan, the organization of the Naval Consulting Board and 
the creation of the Office of Naval Operation, all in the year 
1915, were the only definite steps toward preparedness be- 
fore 1917 that Mr. Daniels was able to cite. 

These three measures had been advocated unsuccessfully 
by Admiral Fiske for the two previous years, and it was 
with great reluctance that in 1915 Mr. Daniels accepted 
them. The Office of Naval Operations, in fact, had to be 
created by Congress against Daniels' opposition. Truly, 
Admiral Fiske saved Daniels from utter ruin. Without 
these measures our Navy would have been in chaos at the 
outbreak of war. Daniels calmly presented them to the com- 
mittee as evidences of his own foresight! 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 367 

As further evidences of the preparedness of the Navy be- 
tween 1914 and 1917, the Secretary quoted passages from 
his own annual reports. These were on a par with his 
declaration in his annual report of 1918, that on April 6, 
1917, " the Navy had been made ready from stem to stern 
to the fullest possible extent for any eventuality." 

Mr. Daniels' attempt to prove that the Department had 
done everything possible to get the Navy ready for war 
before 1917; that it had perfected its organization, that it 
had officially approved war plans, that its personnel was 
adequate, that its ships were ready to fight, was based alto- 
gether, either on his own unsupported assertions, or upon 
misrepresentations of fact and of the testimony of the 
previous witnesses, perhaps not intentional but inspired by 
that utter failure to understand naval problems that has 
always characterized his actions. 



The testimony of Secretary Daniels is chiefly notable for 
its avoidance of the specific criticisms that had been directed 
against his administration. 

When one eliminates the six hundred and twenty pages 
of his testimony, devoted to reports of the activities of various 
sections of the Navy Department before and during the 
war, and to other documents equally irrelevant to the specific 
questions under investigation, the remainder of his testimony 
can be said to be devoted almost exclusively to an attempt 
to establish three main points ; each of these involved attacks 
or reflections not only upon Admiral Sims, but upon the 
Allies as well. 

These three main points were: 

First: Admiral Sims and the Allies opposed the "new, 
bold and audacious policies," which characterized from the 
first the effort of the Navy Department. 



868 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Second: Sims not only " genuflected " to British views 
but was almost treasonably pro-British, in that he placed 
British interests above those of his own country. Sims 
and the Allies had proposed no effective plans. Every- 
thing that had been done during the war was " suggested " 
by President Wilson, or the General Board, or Mr. Edison, 
or Henry Ford, or Mr. Daniels himself, before it was finally 
put into operation by the Allies. Sims accepted all the 
British ideas and wanted to turn our Navy over to the 
British, because of his " love of the glitter of foreign decora- 
tions and his desire for British honours." 

Third: Admiral Sims was influenced in his actions and in 
his disposition of forces in Europe almost solely by a de- 
sire to save British shipping. In doing this he neglected the 
duty of protecting American troops. 

VI 

Nothing was more characteristic of Mr. Daniels' methods 
than his assertion that the Navy Department in 1917 had 
advocated " new, bold and audacious policies." 

The motive for presenting such a contention seems clear. 
The American people like to believe in the inventiveness, 
courage and intrepidity of their race. They know too little 
of military subjects to be able readily to discriminate be- 
tween fact and fancy. The Northern Mine Barrage had been 
made possible by American inventiveness; it had been laid 
chiefly by the American Navy; it was a gigantic and very 
successful feat of those colossal proportions which we like 
to consider American in their conception and execution ; it 
was the chief war project initiated and carried out chiefly 
by Americans. 

The Secretary, as point one in his attack on Sims, said 
that the Admiral 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 369 

" lacked the vision to see that a great and new project to bar the 
submarines from their hunting grounds should be promptly 
adopted and carried out, no matter what the cost, or how rad- 
ical the departure from what ultra-prudent men regarded as im- 
practicable." 

" As to the North Sea Barrage the Department felt it neces- 
sary, — so much importance did it attach to the enterprise, — to 
send Admiral Mayo over to convince our British naval asso- 
ciates of its feasibility after Admiral Sims had accepted the 
view of the British Admiralty that it was impracticable, and had 
tried to induce the Bureau of Ordnance and the Department not 
to press it." 

" It will be necessary, as a matter of justice to the United 
States Navy, which has been charged with failure to act with 
more expedition in the first few months of the war, to contrast 
the bold and audacious policies we presented and urged, with the 
delay in some of those great projects caused by Admiral Sims' 
opposition and the lack of faith in the practicability of some of 
them by the British Admiralty." 

" When war was declared the President sensed better than 
any naval expert across the seas the necessity for a bold and 
audacious plan of naval warfare . . . long before any naval 
authority abroad had approved the idea of the barrage, which 
was placed across the North Sea. the President had sensed the 
futility — the utter futility — of depending solely upon pursu- 
ing submarines all over the ocean and declared the logical idea 
was to shut them up in their nests." 



VII 

Mr. Daniels quoted from President Wilson's speech to the 
officers of the fleet on the U.S.S. Pennsylvania on August 11, 
1917. The President had said at that time : 



370 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" This is an unprecedented war and, therefore, it is a war in 
one sense for amateurs. Nobody ever before conducted a war 
like this and therefore nobody can pretend to be a professional 
in a war like this. , . . 

" We are hunting hornets all over the farm and letting the 
nest alone. None of us knows how to go to the nest and crush 
it, and yet I despair of hunting for hornets all over the sea when 
I know where the nest is, and I know that the nest is breeding 
hornets as fast as I can find them. I am willing for my part, 
and I know you are willing, for I know the stuff you are made 
of — I am willing to sacrifice half the Navy Great Britain and 
we together have to crush that nest, because if we crush it, the 
war is won. 

" We have got to throw tradition to the winds." 

" Every time we have suggested anything to the British Ad- 
miralty, the reply has come back that virtually amounted to 
this, that it had never been done that way, and I felt like saying, 
' Well, nothing was ever done so systematically as nothing is 
being done now.' " 

One or two points in the President's address should be 
particularly noted. His general criticism of the lack of ef- 
fectiveness of the British Navy can be explained by the as- 
sumption that he was receiving his information about naval 
matters chiefly from his Secretary of the Navy and from the 
Chief of Naval Operations. His statement, that " none of 
us knows how to go to the nest and crush it," is in itself a 
sufficient contradiction of the fairy tales Mr. Daniels told 
the Senate Committee in 1920. On August 11, 1917, no 
practicable " bold and audacious " plan had yet been ap- 
proved by the Navy Department. 

VIII 

Mr. Daniels' repetition of the phrase " new, bold and 
audacious policies," grew decidedly monotonous. The 
Committee had heard Admiral Benson, only a few days be- 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 371 

fore, relate the full details of the policies of timid prudence 
and of " safety first " for merely American interests, in utter 
disregard of what might happen to the allied cause, that 
had in reality inspired the Navy Department in the first 
months of the war. 

When Mr. Daniels attempted to get down to facts and 
state what he really meant by his " new, bold and audacious 
policies," he was able to cite only one example, the Northern 
Mine Barrage. Yet this in its very nature was the very op- 
posite of a bold, aggressive policy. No weapon is more 
passive, more defensive in its character than a mine. The 
building of a fence of mines across the North Sea, far re- 
mote from the German bases, was indeed an enormous under- 
taking, so far as the amount of material required and the 
difficulties involved, were concerned. But no one who knows 
anything of warfare would ever call the laying of a barrier 
of mines several hundred miles from -the enemy as a particu- 
larly bold and audacious or aggressive project. 

The attack on Zeebrugge was indeed a " bold and 
audacious " undertaking. This, though a minor operation, 
had required over six months' preparation. Any similar 
scheme, such as was suggested by President Wilson, and as 
had been fully studied by the Allies two years previously, 
would have required a prohibitive amount of material and 
a great sacrifice of men and ships, with no assurance of 
complete success. Even the attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend 
did not succeed in closing those ports to submarines. 

The Northern Mine Barrage was an undertaking of a 
distinctly different character — an essentially passive and 
defensive plan. 

The Secretary, unable to discover for his testimony any 
really practicable aggressive plans, such as President 
Wilson hoped for, therefore seized upon the Northern Mine 
Barrage as his stalking horse. The general public would 
not realize the difference between offensive and defensive 



372 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

measures. He would therefore condemn the British for their 
failure to act aggressively against submarines and would 
assert that the essentially defensive mine barrage was one 
of those " new, bold and audacious " projects which Admiral 
Sims had opposed and the British resisted for months while 
the Navy Department was thirsting for blood, and concen- 
trating its war efforts on the maintenance of a patrol off 
the Atlantic coast three thousand miles from the war zone 
to such an extent that even the inshore waters of the North 
Carolina Sound were patrolled ! 

IX 

This criticism of the alHed war policy and of Admiral 
Sims' activities was completely demolished by the exceed- 
ingly able review which Admiral Sims made in his rebuttal 
statement : 

". . . Let me review briefly the facts concerning the mine bar- 
rage. Secretary Daniels has told you that this plan was first 
proposed to the Department in a memorandum of the 15th of 
April, 1917, submitted by Commander Fullin wider of the Bureau 
of Ordnance. He also stated that on receiving this memo- 
randum, the Department immediately cabled me asking me to 
take up the Northern Mine Barrage proposal with the British. 
This is a completely inaccurate statement of what happened. 
On the 15th of April, Commander Fullinwider submitted a 
memorandum to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance on the 
subject "Anti-submarine Warfare." This was not a plan for 
a Northern Mine Barrage, but was a general review of the 
whole military situation at that time, containing the personal 
ideas and recommendations of Commander Fullinwider as to a 
great variety of different things that he believed should have 
been done. About half the memorandum was a discussion of 
various methods of protecting merchant shipping; the other half 
was devoted to a discussion of various anti-submarine methods. 
He suggested that there were three general lines of attack on 
submarines, that is. 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 373 

" * (a) Destroy them at their home base. 

" ' (b) Prevent their egress from or ingress to their home 
port, 

" ' (c) Hunt them down and destroy them at sea.' 

" Commander Fullinwider proposed, among other things, that 
the offensive efforts against submarines should take the form, 
either of closing the German ports or channels, or of establish- 
ing mine barriers to seal up the North Sea. He said: 

" ' All measures for sealing ports or channels present the diffi- 
culty tliat the Germans have so extensively mined their waters 
and have such supervision and control thereof as to render such 
measures almost, if not entirely, impracticable. It is possible, 
however, to establish mine barriers in zones at a distance from 
the German coast, practically sealing up the North Sea. This 
will require between 500,000 and 1,000,000 mines.' 

" After a further discussion of the question of barrages in 
the North Sea, Commander Fullinwider estimated that 774,000 
mines would be required. 

" The message which the Secretary of the Navy sent to me on 
the 16th of April, 1917, has already been quoted numerous times 
during these hearings. It made not the slightest reference to 
any proposal of a barrage in the North Sea. It merely desired 
to know whether any plans had been made to seal up the German 
bases and ports, and whether such a plan would be feasible. I 
replied to this, at length, by cable and by letter, pointing out the 
fact that such proposals had been made since the beginning of 
the war, had been carefully studied and were considered imprac- 
ticable. I have already read you in this statement Admiral 
Mayo's comment on one proposal to accomplish this, which was 
discussed at the naval conference in London. Admiral Mayo 
believed the scheme quite impracticable. The Navy Depart- 
ment, in their cable to me, of October 21, 1917, similarly stated 
that, in the opinion of the Department, this scheme was imprac- 
ticable. . . . 

" In the Bureau of Ordnance's official history of the Mine Bar- 
rage, we find the following statement: 

"'On April 16, 1917, the Department cabled Admiral W. S. 
Sims, in command of the U. S. Naval Forces in European waters, 



374* NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

directing him to report on the practicability of blocking the 
German coast efficiently in order to make the ingress and egress 
of submarines practically impossible. He, in answer, stated that 
this, of course, had been the object of repeated attempts by the 
British Navy with all possible means, and had been found un- 
feasible. Failure to shut in the submarines by a coast blockade 
using mines, nets and patrols in the Bight and along the Flan- 
ders coast focused the attention of the Department upon plans 
for the alternative of restricting the enemy to the North Sea, 
by closing to him the exits through the Channel and the northern 
end between Scotland and Norway. . . . These are outlined in a 
memorandum of the Office of Operations dated May 9, 1917. • . . 
This was proposed to be done by establishing a barrage of nets, 
anchored mines and floating mines.' 

". . . The Department itself suggested no barrage until the 
cable which I received on May 11th, and the kind of a barrage 
which they proposed at that time was clearly impracticable in 
view of the amount of material that would have been required 
and the length of time necessary to have made it effective. 
The British had long before carefully considered similar plans, 
but had recognized that the quantities of material required, and 
the length of time and the number of vessels necessary, made 
the scheme entirely impracticable. As has been pointed out to 
you, the whole basis of the Northern Barrage, the one thing 
which made it possible was the invention of a new type of mine 
which enormously reduced the amount of material required and 
the length of time necessary. The Department themselves have 
at all times fully recognized this, until the Secretary made his 
astonishing statement before you that the mine barrage could 
have been laid in 1917 and that I was myself personally re- 
sponsible for the delay. 

" In 1918, the Secretary of the Navy evidently had a very dif- 
ferent opinion, for we find, in his Annual Report submitted to 
the President, in December of that year, the following state- 
ment, page 48: 

" ' The plan to close the North Sea and thereby deny enemy 
submarines free access to the Atlantic from German bases, had 
its inception in the Bureau of Ordnance in April, 1917, immedi- 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 375 

ately following the entrance of the United States into the war. 
At this time there had not heeih developed anywhere a type of 
mine suitable for the Scotland-Nortcay line, whereon the depths 
of water were as great as 900 feet and where a prohibitive num- 
ber of mines of the then existing type would have been required 
to mine this line from the surface to a depth of 250 to 300 feet.' 



" As a matter of faet, the first test of the new firing device 
which was to form the basis of the new mine, did not occur until 
the 18th of June, 1917, at New London. Those tests were not 
altogether satisfactory, and no action was taken by the Bureau 
of Ordnance to submit plans for a barrage based on the use of 
this mine until after further tests had been made on the 10th 
of July, 1917. At this time 'although the design of the com- 
plete mine had not yet been decided upon and could not be com- 
pleted for several months, the mine section of the Bureau of 
Ordnance was sufficiently assured of the successful development 
of the mine to submit tentative plans to the Chief of Bureau.' 
(This quotation is from the Bureau of Ordnance's official history 
of the mine barrage.) It was not until July 30, 1917, that the 
Bureau of Ordnance addressed a communication to the Chief of 
Naval Operations, submitting complete information regarding 
the new firing device, and ' proposing an American-British joint 
offensive operation in the form of a Northern Barrage.' 

" The question of the possibility of a Northern Barrage is 
clearly and accurately discussed in the official history of the 
mine barrage, issued by the Bureau of Ordnance; for example, 
The possibility of a Northern Barrage depended upon the 
successful design of a mine to a far greater extent than is usual 
in sucli matters. Had nothing better than the ordinary type of 
mine such as that used by the British (and also by the United 
States at that time) been available, the Northern Barrage project 
tcould have been utterly impossible of execution within the time 
allowed by reason of the enormous number of mines required for 
a barrage 280 miles long. The combined resources of the Allies, 
especially in the matter of high explosives, could not have pro- 
duced the required number of mines, nor could the combined min- 
ing forces have planted them in a single year. . . . On November 



376 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

1, 1917, after the barrage project had been finally and definitely 
adopted, the only parts ... of the mine that had been com- 
pletely designed were the firing mechanism and the mine case. 
However the Mine Section of the Bureau of Ordnance, under the 
immediate direction of Commander Fullinwider, felt no doubt of 
its ability to complete a satisfactory development of the new 
mine, and to get it into production in due time.' 

" In another place we find the statement: 

" ' The tentative design of the mine had to be modified as a re- 
sult of experiments and more mature study of the subject. . . . 
It was found, too, that the Bureau had been too optimistic in its 
forecast relative to the early completion of the design and its 
early production.' 

" In view of this official Departmental statement of the real 
facts in the case, the Secretary's contention that I had anything 
to do with delaying the barrage needs no further comment. . . . 

". . . The laying of the barrage was not in any case the single 
bold stroke that ended submarine warfare. The submarine had 
already been defeated in its mission of forcing the Allies to peace 
long before the barrage was laid, or even before it had been 
begun. The very possibility of laying the barrage depended in- 
deed upon first mastering to a great extent the submarine. Only 
thus was it possible to transport the material needed overseas. 

" Thus the whole of the Secretary's contentions concerning the 
bold and audacious policy which he favoured reduces itself to 
this: That the Department, in the early months of the war, 
knowing little or nothing of the war experience of the Allies, 
were obsessed by a desire to astonish the world by doing some 
new and unheard of thing, by discovering the ' royal road to 
victory ' ; in the desire to do this, they proposed two plans in 
April and May, 1917, both of which were impracticable and both 
of which the Department itself later admitted to be imprac- 
ticable; and in thus concentrating upon an endeavour to find the 
end of the rainbow, they postjDoned the effective intervention of 
our Navy in the war for a number of months, and thus con- 
tributed to the postponement of the ultimate victory. 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 377 

" It therefore seems clear that this is one of those cases of 
misrepresentations of fact into which the Secretary, as a civilian, 
has fallen, because of his failure to understand certain very 
simple technical considerations. It is hardly a defence of the 
Department's delays in 1917 to say that they did not do what 
they could have done because they hoped that they might ulti- 
mately be able to do very much better. It is not enough to 
declare one's allegiance to a bold and audacious policy. It is 
necessary also to meet the crisis of a war in such a way as to 
make possible victory. No war policy is of any value unless 
means are available for carrying it out immediately and effec- 
tively." 



Secretary Daniels' contention that Sims had " genu- 
flected " to British views, had looked to the British for all 
his ideas, and had been actuated chiefly by a " love of glit- 
ter and foreign recognition and honour " was based on 
equally flimsy grounds. 

The Admiral had lived in London ; he had been respected 
and admired by the British service ; he had established clos- 
est possible co-operation with the British Navy ; he had 
obtained from the Admiralty a wealth of information of the 
most secret character. There had indeed been no secrets 
between the two services. 

Sims had made many recommendations, after consulta- 
tion with the British, most of these urging that naval assis- 
tance be given in the war zone ; in which the greater part of 
the allied forces were naturally British. 

Sims had placed his forces under the operational com- 
mand of the senior allied officer in each area, who was often 
British. 

Sims had urged that the officers and men of the American 
Navy be permitted to accept the same allied decorations for 
distinguished service or acts of valour, that were given to 
allied officers and men for acts of equivalent merit. 



378 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Finally, the British had proposed, that inasmuch as the 
United States had a large number of vessels operating in the 
critical areas of the war zone, which lay about the British 
Isles, Admiral Sims should be given an honourary member- 
ship on the Admiralty Board which directed all naval opera- 
tions in those waters. 

It is a curious type of mind that can -make a formidable 
indictment of what constitutes almost tre"asonable disloyalty 
out of such facts. It should be rem.embered, moreover, that 
Mr. Daniels knew all these things when he wrote his letter of 
July 22, 1919. He was no less familiar with them when he 
said in his Annual Report to the President of December 
1,1919: 

" In the Allied Naval Council, Admiral Wm. S. Sims, who had 
been the able representative of the Navy in Europe during the 
entire war, displayed ability of the highest order. His bril- 
liant services abroad won world wide admiration and he demon- 
strated that he is worthy of the highest honours Congress can 
confer upon him." 

Nor was Mr. Daniels unfamiliar with Admiral Sims' rela- 
tions with the British, when he said in his Annual Report 
for 1918: 

" Abroad the American Navy has given a demonstration, which 
can be characterized only as wonderful, of its readiness to join 
with our associates in teamwork for the common end and the 
common good." 

" The outstanding accomplishment of the Navy abroad in this 
war, outside of rigorous and valorous service in the danger 
zone, has been the character and degree of co-operation and 
practical consolidation for the time being of our service with 
those services with which we have been associated. The Navy, 
beginning with the arrival of the first ship abroad, has stood out 
for unity of command", even though this in some instances in- 
volved sacrificing temporarily something of our identity as an 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 379 

independent service. This has not been an easy task. It is 
believed to be a safe statement that the degree of accomplish- 
ment of our service in this respect is without precedent in allied 
warfare. This vitally important co-operation has been accom- 
plished and continually maintained not only without friction but 
with a steadily increasing development of good feeling and un- 
derstanding. 

" When the President determined upon the policy of arming 
merchant ships, the Chief Executive decided to send a naval 
officer of high rank to Great Britain to be the representative of 
the Navy and in the war zone and keep the department posted 
upon all problems connected with possible naval participation in 
the great war. The choice fell upon Rear Admiral William S. 
Sims, easily one of the most intellectual, gifted and distinguished 
officers of the Navy. During his long service he had won high 
place in the estimation of naval experts in this country and 
abroad. Rear Admiral Sims was at that time president of the 
Naval War College. His knowledge of gunnery and seamanship 
were equaled only by his proficiency in diplomacy, strategy and 
tactics. In recognition of the important services he has rendered 
as commander of the European Forces, the President last year 
promoted him to be a vice admiral and will shortly give him 
another promotion to the rank of admiral. 

" It is too early yet to give proper place to the high character 
of the work done by Vice Admiral Sims and the other naval 
officers abroad, but all the world knows of the enthusiasm and 
the ability and spirit of co-operation which have enabled them 
to win a place for the Navy abroad higher than ever before 
accorded to it." 

On May 1, 1919, Mr. Daniels' ideas about Admiral Sims' 
relations with the Britisli were very similar to those ex- 
pressed in the quotations from his annual reports cited above. 
In the report of the London Times of Mr. Daniels' remarks 
in addressing a London audience during his visit to Great 
Britain there occurs the following passage: 

" The ships of the two navies had different flags, but they 
were united in everything and they might as well have sailed 



380 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

under one flag. They were united in sentiment and in valour 
and their flag was that of the Anglo-Saxon people fighting for 
Anglo-Saxon liberty. Their men had brought back a spirit of 
comradeship, and to the motto ' Match the Navy ' might be 
added today another, ' Hands across the sea and brotherhood 
with Great Britain.' 

" Ten years ago Admiral Sims, speaking at a banquet in Lon- 
don, made a speech in which he said that if the time ever came 
when the soil of Great Britain was threatened with invasion the 
American people would fight with the English people, shoulder to 
shoulder. Nor did they forget that the Admiral was rebuked for 
that speech; for the President in pursuance of policy sent him 
a formal reprimand. That reprimand, in the light of this hour, 
was a decoration of honour. 

" He rejoiced that in this co-operation with the British Navy, 
the Navy of the United States was represented here by a cour- 
ageous, a wise and a brave man, who understood the very heart 
of the struggle and who entered into it with sympathy and the 
heartiest feeling for his British comrades." 

XI 

Secretary Daniels time and again said that Admiral Sims 
sought foreign decorations. Yet he must have known that 
Admiral Sims is opposed to all decorations and that his op- 
position has long been a matter of official record in the Navy 
Department. Admiral Sims has never worn the ribbons that 
indicate the possession of a decoration. 

Admiral Sims had indeed requested that our men in the 
war zone be permitted to accept allied decorations. The 
Navy Department had provided no recognition for dis- 
tinguished or heroic service. Our men were working with 
allied navies whose personnel were receiving medals for acts 
no more meritorious than those of men of the American forces. 
Admiral Sims felt that it would stimulate the morale of the 
American forces if they were permitted to receive recogni- 
tion. This permission was refused, however, by Mr. Daniels. 



MR. DANIELS* MISREPRESENTATIONS 381 

Our naval forces, and those of the British, were practi- 
cally the only ones operating in the North Sea, in the Channel 
and in the area south of Ireland in which the trade routes 
focused. The British had a far greater number of naval 
vessels in this area than we. The Board of Admiralty con- 
trolled the operations of these British forces. The actual 
operations of American forces operating in British waters 
consequently rested also under the direction of the Board 
of Admiralty, in the same way that American divisions in 
France, and indeed the whole American Army, operated 
under the orders of Marshal Foch. The Admiralty pro- 
posed, therefore, that Sims be made an honorary member of 
the Board, with a voice and vote, in order that the American 
Navy could have direct representation in the body that ex- 
ercised the supreme naval command in British waters. 
French and Italian admirals fully agreed to the proposal, 
though they were not given membership for the simple rea- 
son that no Italian or French forces were operating in the 
North Sea or in the seas around Britain. The Navy Depart- 
ment refused to permit Admiral Sims to accept this position, 
and thus prevented their own representative from having a 
larger influence in the body that controlled the operations 
of many American vessels. 

Mr. Daniels said in regard to this refusal : 

" Admiral Sims' highest and dearest ambition, it would appear, 
was blasted when this government gently but firmly declined to 
permit him to become a member of the British Admiralty." 

More errant nonsense was never spoken 1 

XII 

The extent to which Admiral Sims influenced British and 
allied naval policy has not been realized in this country. 
Far from merely repeating to Washington ideas he had 
picked up from the British, Sims from the first had played 



382 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

a most important part in bringing about a better realization 
of the situation in the war zone, and more effective measures 
to cope with that situation. The officers and men who served 
in the Naval Headquarters in London know from their own 
experience, as does the author of this volume, that the chief 
contribution of the American Navy to the allied victory was 
the sending of Admiral Sims abroad. From the very first 
his advice was eagerly sought and often followed by the 
heads of the Allied navies. To him-, -more than to any other 
one man, was due the adoption of the convoy system by the 
British, the rapid extension of the use of depth charges, of 
listening devices and of other successful anti-submarine 
methods. 

Far from being a mental parasite, clinging to the barna- 
cles of the Admiralty, Admiral Sims gave many ideas to the 
Allies. Most of the reconmtiendations, which he cabled home, 
were not at all mere expressions of what the British wanted. 
They were decisions reached after full discussion with both 
the French and the British, a discussion in which the initia- 
tive and leadership often rested with the American repre- 
sentative. 

Admiral Jellicoe, in his recently published book, The Crisis 
of the Naval War, has fully acknowledged the services Sims 
rendered in the Councils of the Allies. He says for example : 

" Vice Admiral Sims had arrived in this country in April, 
1917. . . . He came to visit me at the Admiralty immediately 
after his arrival in London, and from that day until I left the 
Admiralty at the end of the year, it was my privilege and pleasure 
to work in the very closest possible co-operation with him. My 
friendship with the Admiral was of very long standing. We had 
during many years exchanged views on different naval subjects, 
but principally on gunnery questions. I, in common with other 
British officers who had the honour of his acquaintance, had 
always been greatly struck by his wonderful success in the past 
of Inspector of Target Practice in the United States Navy. 
That success was due, not only to his knowledge of gunnery, but 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 383 

also to his attractive personality, charm of manner, keen sense 
of humour and his quick and accurate grasp of any problem with 
which he was confronted. It was fortunate, indeed, for the 
allied cause that Admiral Sims should have been selected to com- 
mand the United States Forces in European waters, for, to the 
qualities mentioned above he added a habit of speaking his mind 
with absolutely fearless disregard of the circumstances." 

" Very fortunately for the Allied cause, a most distinguished 
officer of the United States Navy, Vice-Admiral W. S. Sims, 
came to this country to report on the situation and to command 
such forces as were sent to European waters. Admiral Sims, in 
his earlier career before reaching the flag list, was a gunnery 
officer of the very first rank. He had assimilated the ideas of 
Sir Percy Scott of our own Navy, who had revolutionized British 
naval gunnery, and he had succeeded, in his position as Inspector 
of Target Practice in the United States Navy, in producing a 
very marked increase in gunnery efficiency. Later when in com- 
mand, first of a battleship, then of the destroyer flotillas, and 
finally as head of the United States Naval War College, his 
close study of naval strategy and tactics had peculiarly fitted 
him for the important post for which he was selected, and he not 
only held the soundest views on such subjects himself, but was 
able, by dint of the tact and persuasive eloquence that had car- 
ried him successfully through his gunnery difficulties, to impress 
his views on others." 

Indeed, it may be said that Admiral Sims fought the over- 
conservatism of the Admiralty with the same energy, and with 
more success than attended his representations to the Navy 
Department. Far from " genuflecting " to British views 
he very successfully opposed many of them, and succeeded in 
bringing about a much more effective conduct of the war as 
a whole. 

XIII 

The third point which the Secretary repeatedly empha- 
sized and to which he devoted much time was his assertion 



S84> NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

that Admiral Sims had failed to appreciate the importance 
of protecting the American troops from submarine attack. 

Admiral Sims himself effectively disposed of this assertion, 
as the following quotation from his rebuttal statement dem- 
onstrates : 

" The statements and implications of the Secretary of the 
Navy, with regard to my attitude toward the protection of troops 
in the danger zone are characteristic of the kind of misinterpre- 
tation and misrepresentation into which the Secretary has, un- 
fortunately, so often fallen in his attempts to deal with technical 
military matters, which he does not understand. . . . He de- 
clared that I failed to appreciate that the protection of troop 
transports was my paramount duty until he (the Secretary) had 
cabled me peremptorily that this was my main mission. I invite 
the committee to try and imagine an officer, who was responsible 
for the safety of our troops, failing to appreciate the necessity 
for protecting them. 

" Running throughout the Secretary's statement is the repeti- 
tion of this assertion. For example, he refers to my ' one idea, 
and controlling idea, of carrying on the war by putting all our 
destroyers at Queenstown, giving priority to protection of mer- 
chant ships over that of troop transports.' Again, the Secretary 
of the Navy, in referring to the question of transportation of 
troops, said: 

" ' The great machinery of troop transportation, the cruiser 
and transport force, was initiated by the Navy Department, 
built up, organized and operated, not by Admiral Sims, but by 
other officers not under his command. His duty in this connec- 
tion consisted solely in arranging routes and providing escort 
vessels through the submarine zone, and in the performance of 
this latter and vitally important duty he had to be reminded time 
and again by the Department — bear this in mind now, gentle- 
men, with reference to the duty of protecting American troops in 
transport through the submarine zone. Admiral Sims had to be 
reminded time and again by the Department — that the par- 
amount duty of our destroyers, with which nothing must inter- 
fere, was the fullest protection of ships carrying American 
troops.' 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 385 

" In this same connection the Secretary also said : ' The 
Navy Department, from the moment it was entrusted 
with this task, regarded the protection and successful operation 
of these troop ships as its highest duty. Regarding human life 
as more valuable than supplies, I do not share the view of Ad- 
miral Sims that the escort of cargo ships was quite as important 
as the protection of vessels carrying troops.' 

" And . . . ' I found it necessary, soon after troop trans- 
portation began, to remind him sharply that the first duty of 
American destroyers in European waters was to protect ships 
carrying American troops. I could not conceive that an Ameri- 
can admiral, charged with such high responsibility, could regard 
supplies as of more value than human life, and cargo vessels 
more important, for any reason, than ships carrying American 
troops.' 

"Again . , . the Secretary said: 'If I had believed, Mr. 
Chairman, that Admiral Sims cherished any such idea; that he 
valued supplies more than the lives of American soldiers ; that he 
was willing to endanger troop transports in order to save cargo 
ships, he would have been instantly removed from command.' 

" These instances that I have quoted are only a few of the 
many similar statements found throughout the testimony of the 
Secretary. There are certain considerations in this connection 
that should be made perfectly clear. 

" At the time I went abroad, and our forces began to arrive in 
European waters, no troops were being sent from the United 
States to France, and the primary mission of the vessels in the 
early months, before the troop movements began, was necessarily 
the protection of merchant shipping and offensive operations 
against enemy submarines. As soon as I was informed that 
troop movements were to begin, I made every effort to induce the 
department to draw up adequate plans to insure the protection 
of the transport of these troops. As I have already told you, 
the first troop convoy was sent to France on plans drawn up 
hastily in Washington, without consultation or consideration of 
allied war experiences, and in consequence the first troop convoys 
narrowly escaped disaster. In my letters and cables at the time 
I pointed out to the Department, in the strongest possible terms. 



386 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

the necessity and importance of adequately protecting American 
troops on the high seas. The Department finally requested me 
to submit full plans for the handling, routing and protecting of 
troop convoys through the war zone. These plans I drew up. 
They were accepted by the Department, put into operation, and 
throughout the remainder of the war governed the whole of our 
troop transportation in the war zone. At no time were any of 
our troop transports, escorted by American forces, successfully 
attacked by submarines. 

" This shows that in no case was the protection afforded them 
inadequate. The disposition of our naval forces in European 
waters was made by me, and all our plans and arrangements for 
handling troops were made before I received any of the admoni- 
tions which the Secretary said he had to send to me as peremp- 
tory orders. Not a single one of the plans that had been made, 
not a single detail in the disposition of forces, not a single detail 
of the convoy operations, was changed in the slightest degree as a 
result of, or after, these so-called peremptory orders were re- 
ceived from the Navy Department; and this for the simple 
reason that it was unnecessary that any such changes should be 
made. The arrangements that had been made were adequate, 
as was amply demonstrated by the results. Only four or five 
convoys were attacked, no torpedo ever touched a loaded trans- 
port, not a single soldier was lost under the protection I gave 
them. 

" I, of course, realized at the time that these messages were 
simply the result of nervousness in official quarters, the result 
of the inevitable misunderstandings and misconceptions of the 
naval situation at the ' front.' 

" In repeated letters to the Navy Department, which I have 
read you, and to officers in the Department, in June and July, 
1917, and at later dates, I called attention to the fact that my 
primary duty was the protection of American troops, and that 
the forces under my command had received instructions based 
upon this mission. Not only was there never, at any time, any 
question in the forces in Europe as to this primary mission, but 
you will find it clearly defined in my instructions to my subordi- 
nate commanders. The messages of the Secretary, inspired by a 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 387 

natural anxiety, due to a lack of knowledge of the situation and 
the dispositions which had been made, were therefore wholly 
unnecessary. No further action, in any event, could have been 
taken, than the measures already in operation. 

" Throughout the war. and since the war, and during this testi- 
mony, I have never stated that I considered that merchandise 
was of more value than human lives, nor have I ever stated that 
I considered the protection of a merchant ship to be more im- 
portant than the protection of a troop ship. 

" As a matter of fact, the plans of the convoy and protection 
of troops in the war zone were all drawn up at my headquarters 
in London. The routing of all these troops was handled, either 
directly by my staff in London, or by Admiral Wilson at Brest, 
acting under my general directions. The Secretary himself has 
told you how successful were the efforts of the forces under my 
command, and thereby refutes his contention that troops were 
not adequately protected. . . . He said: 

The carrying to Europe and the bringing home of two 
million troops of the American Expeditionary Force has been 
justly termed the biggest transportation job in history. They 
had to be transported three thousand miles through submarine 
infested zones, facing the constant menace of an attack from an 
unseen foe, as well as the perils of war time navigation. Yet 
not one troop ship was sunk on the way to France, and not one 
soldier aboard a troop ship manned by the United States Navy 
lost his life through enemy action. That achievement had never 
been equalled. It was not only the most important but the most 
successful operation of the war. . . . The Germans never be- 
lieved it could be done. . . . The sinking of our transports would 
have been the most telling blow the Germans could have dealt 
the Allies, — the greatest victory of their submarine warfare.' 

" That they failed to sink a single allied United States troop 
ship and sank only three ships of other nationalities carrj'ing 
American troops was not due to any lack of intention or effort, 
but to the fact that we gave our troop ships such efficient pro- 
tection that it was almost impossible for the U-Boats to sink 
them. 

" This success was the result of the disposition of forces I 



388 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

made for the protection of our troops, and this disposition was 
not changed. With regard to the Secretary's statement that I 
had to be repeatedly reprimanded in a similar way throughout 
the war for failing to realize the necessity of protecting troops, 
let me say that the two nervous messages quoted by the Secretary, 
one in July, 1917, the other in May. 1918, were the only mes- 
sages of this character that I ever received. 

Department's Failure to Recognize Necessity of 
Protecting Merchant Tonnage 

" There is another aspect to the situation which has been sim- 
ilarly misrepresented. Previous to the first of April, 1918, the 
number of troops sent from America to Europe had amounted 
in all to only about 300,000. It had taken nine months to get 
these 300,000 men to Europe. There were seldom more than 
two or three troop convoys each month, on an average, during 
these nine months. While it was recognized that it was the par- 
amount mission of the forces overseas to protect these troops 
while en route through the war zone, other considerations could 
not be neglected. These convoys during these nine months were 
always fully protected. At least three times as many destroy- 
ers, per convoy escorted, were assigned to the duty of escorting 
them than were ever assigned to any merchant convoys, although 
the merchant convoys usually had from five to ten times as many 
ships as the troop convoys. No troop transport was sunk during 
this period while en route to France. 

" It should be unnecessary, however, to state again that the 
submarine campaign against merchant tonnage constituted, at 
this time, the greatest threat to the allied cause. If sufficient 
merchant ships had been sunk by the submarines in 1917, the 
Allies would have been forced to make peace, and all of the 
American effort would have been in vain, so far as assisting the 
Allies was concerned. Therefore, while it was important — and 
all important — to protect the American troops, it was also vitally 
important to protect the merchant shipping which was carrying 
supplies and war materials for these troops, for the troops of the 
Allied armies, and for the civilian populations of the Allied coun- 
tries. My problem was not only to protect American troops, but 



MR. DANIELS' MISREPRESENTATIONS 389 

also to safeguard, so far as I could, Allied lines of communica- 
tion. 

"The forces were consequently so located, in 1917, as to give 
the maximum possible protection to merchant convoys as well as 
to troops. Our destroyers escorted ten merchant convoys for 
every troop convoy during these early nine months, before our 
troop movements really began. Without the assistance they 
gave, it is very probable that the allied countries would have been 
forced into an unsatisfactory peace. This was, throughout 1917, 
the Allies' greatest anxiety. The repeated statements that I 
received from the Department indicated that they were consid- 
ering, not the protection of the whole of the allied shipping, but 
were concentrating their efforts in protecting American shipping 
alone. They seemed constantly to fail to realize that our Army 
in France, and the cause for which we were fighting, was de- 
pendent upon the whole of the allied shipping. At this time, in 
1917. the American shipping in the war zone was only a very 
small part of the whole of the allied shipping. Any protection 
to American ships, however adequate, would not therefore have 
saved the Allies, if the measures adopted had not protected also 
the whole of the allied shipping. 

" The criticisms of the Secretary of the Navy of my attitude 
in this regard are in reality a condemnation of the attitude which 
the Department took at that time. I realized to the full, just as 
thoroughly as any official in Washington, the necessity of giving 
our troop ships priority over all other vessels in the war zone in 
the matter of escort, and they were given this priority. I also 
realized, what the Department seems to have failed to realize, 
and what the Secretary in his testimony completely ignored, and 
that was that we were not. fighting the war alone, that our causp 
was inseparably bound up with the cause of the Allies, that the 
defeat of the Allies might very well have involved our defeat, 
and that the only means of insuring an allied victory was to 
maintain and protect their overseas communications, their sup- 
ply lines, as well as our American troop transports. Conse- 
quently, the forces under my command, during the first nine 
months, were engaged most of the time in protecting these supply 
lines, not because they were neglecting the protection of troops. 



390 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

but because at this time our troop convoys were so few and so 
far between that if our forces had been reserved for the protec- 
tion of them alone, it is very probable that the Allies would have 
been defeated or forced into an unsatisfactory peace before the 
American effort on the Western Front could become effective. 
Too much stress cannot be laid upon this point." 



CHAPTER XX 

THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE: AN ANALYSIS 
OF MR. DANIELS' OWN SUMMARY OF HIS 
EVIDENCE 



IN concluding his direct testimony on May 20, 1920, the 
Secretary made a general summary of his case and of the 
evidence presented by himself and the witnesses called at his 
request, to refute the charges of Admiral Sims. No better 
proof of the correctness of the points established by Admiral 
Sims can be imagined than is afforded by a critical study 
of the Secretary's own summation of his own defence. 

Before going into this, it is advisable to state once again 
the specific counts in the indictment actually brought by 
Admiral Sims against Mr. Daniels and his administration of 
the Navy Department. These Admiral Sims stated, in be- 
ginning his own testimony on March 9, 1920, in the follow- 
ing brief and concise form. 

" Let me point out, in the simplest and clearest possible man- 
ner, the paramount motive by which my letter was inspired. It 
is this: We entered a great war. The war was won. thanks to 
a combination of circumstances which it would be entirely unsafe 
and unwise to depend upon in future. From the United States 
naval standpoint, the prosecution of the war involved numerous 
violations of well-recognized and fundamental military princi- 
ples, with which every student of naval warfare is familiar. 

" Briefly stated, they were: 

" First. Unpreparedness, in spite of the fact that war had 
been a probability for at least two years and was, in fact, immi- 
nent for many months before its declaration. 

" Second. That we entered it with no well considered policy 

391 



392 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

or plans, and with our forces on the sea not in the highest state 
of readiness. 

" Third. That, owing to the above conditions and to the lack 
of proper organization of our Navy Department, and perhaps to 
other conditions with which I am not familiar, we failed, for at 
least six months, to throw our full weight against the enemy; 
that during this period we pursued a policy of vacillation, or, 
in simpler words, a hand-to-mouth policy, attempting to formu- 
late our plans from day to day based upon an incorrect appreci- 
ation of the situation. . . . 

" I am convinced that our failure to give adequate support, 
with the means at our disposal, during these first six months 
seriously and unnecessarily jeopardized the outcome of the whole 
war. I believe that this failure, combined with the equally 
grave one of neglecting to prepare adequately, . . . probably 
postponed victory four months. Since the average loss of life 
per day was about 3,000 and the total daily cost was more than 
$100,000,000, it can be appreciated what this delay meant to 
humanity and how serious was any fault that resulted in mate- 
rially prolonging hostilities. 

" 1 wish particularly to emphasize that it is to this early period 
that my letter principally refers. 

". . . My sole object in submitting my letter to the Depart- 
ment was, not to demonstrate who was right and who was wrong, 
but rather to insure so thorough an appreciation of our errors, 
before time had obscured them, that the chances of repeating 
them would be minimized, if not eliminated, in the future. 

" In other words, gentlemen, let me state as forcibly as I can 
that in this entire question I have no object other than that of 
the future efficiency of the naval service and the safety of the 
country. I am at the end of my career. I have everything to 
lose and nothing to gain. There is no possible question of my 
having a grievance. There is absolutely no question of personal- 
ities." 

II 

When one keeps this clear statement of the issues in 
mind and returns to a consideration of the testimony of the 



THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE 393 

Secretary, but one conclusion can be drawn. An examina- 
tion of the concluding summary of Secretary Daniels' state- 
ment completely confirms the judgment that his defence was 
based altogether on diversions, evasions and misrepresen- 
tations. 

It must have seemed to Mr. Daniels that ultimate success 
is a sufficient excuse for any failure or mistakes, no matter 
how disastrous these might have been under less fortunate 
circumstances. No other explanation can be offered for 
the following statement in his summary : 

" The war was won, and that the Navy did its full share toward 
that great result has been fully established. That it was 100 
per cent, perfect, that no mistakes were made, no one for a 
moment contends." 

The Secretary continued, with an assertion that fairly 
outdoes his previous claims : 

" It has been established that fewer mistakes were made in 
plans, policy and operations, than were made by any other 
navy or by our own Navy in any previous war. The testimony 
proves that no department of our own or any other government 
functioned more efficiently, made decisions more promptly or put 
them into execution more swiftly or successfully." 

Whether the testimony " proves " such an astonishing ex- 
hibition of infallible and instantaneous efficiency on the part 
of Mr. Daniels' department can be easily determined by an 
examination of that testimony. 

Ill 

Continuing with his statement, the Secretary proceeded 
to enumerate the achievements of the Navy in the war. It 
is to be remarked that nearly all of the achievements 
enumerated by Mr. Daniels relate to events in the last half 
of the war, i. e., in 1918. 



394 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Thus, he referred to the transport of 2,000,000 troops 
abroad " without loss," as " the outstanding accomplishment 
of the war." Until April, 1918, a year after we entered 
the war, only 300,000 troops had been sent to France. 
After that date an average of 300,000 men were sent 
monthly, as opposed to an average of 25,000 per month for 
the first year of our intervention. 

The Secretary spoke of the operation of cargo transports 
by the Naval Overseas Transportation Service. This was 
not even organized until January 9, 1918, nine months after 
war began. 

The Secretary referred to the fact that few of our own 
ships with armed guards were sunk in the war zone. This 
is not surprising, as in 1917, at the time of the heaviest sink- 
ings, only 5 per cent, of the total shipping traversing the 
war zone was American. 

IV 

The Secretary asserted that our wholehearted co-opera- 
tion with the Allies, from the beginning, was proven by the 
conferences held with the British and French local naval 
commanders in the western Atlantic in April, 1917. Yet 
at those conferences the Allies had been told that our Navy 
was to be held intact on the Atlantic coast; that a few de- 
stroyers would be sent to the war zone only " to show the 
flag"! 

The Secretary contended that the 28 destroyers that 
reached the war zone in the first three months of the war, 
were all that were needed. Yet on May 3, the allied missions 
had told him that a hundred anti-submarine vessels were 
needed at once. There were then 55 such vessels in Admiral 
Wilson's force patrolling the Atlantic coast ; but it was many 
months before they were sent abroad. 

The Secretary asked himself, " Did we send to Europe as 
many ships and men as we should or could have sent? " and 



THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE 395 

answered to his own satisfaction by telling how many men 
and ships we had abroad, not in April or July or Novem- 
ber, 1917, but on November 11, 1918. He also told how 
many hundreds we were building — not in 1917 — but at 
the time of the armistice. 

Similarly, the Secretary queried himself with, " Did we 
delay the putting into effect of the convoy system.'' " and 
replied that the Allies had not used convoy until May, 1917 ; 
that " eminent naval authorities (i. e. Benson) doubted 
whether it could be made a success ; " that " the President and 
myself favoured it from the beginning," and that " we put it 
into effect soon after the British did." Then follows a 
curious bit of reasoning. " Admiral Sims himself," declared 
Mr. Daniels, " says our vessels made it possible to put the 
convoy system into effect. Could that have been possible if 
we had ' resisted ' or sought in any way to prevent its adop- 
tion.'* " Admiral Sims' point had been that, just as the con- 
voy system had been finally established in September, 1917, 
with our indispensable help, so it could have been established 
in May, 1917, if our help had been forthcoming then instead 
of months later. 



The Secretary noted with satisfaction the adherence of 
the Navy in the war to the principle of unity of command, 
forgetting, apparently, for the moment, that this was a 
policy established by Admiral Sims ; and that he himself had 
severely condemned Admiral Sims only a few moments before 
of disloyalty for carrying into effect that very principle. 

The Secretary answered the next question — " Did the 
Navy Department, as Admiral Sims charges, fail to give him 
its confidence and support," — by saying " It did not." In 
substantiation of this flat denial, he said : " We gave every 
consideration to his recommendations, and most but not all 
of them were adopted." Yet Mr. Daniels carefully avoided 



396 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

adding, that this " consideration " was so very careful and 
undecisive that it often continued for six months and that the 
recommendations were adopted only after delays averaging 
many months, during the most critical period, the " crisis 
of the naval war," as Jellicoe called it. 

VI 

The Secretary said tugs and other small craft had not been 
sent abroad, as none were available, but that " we built new 
ones as fast as facilities in America could construct them." 
He failed to state that the Navy Department made no effort 
to construct tugs until January, 1918, nine months after the 
recommendation had been made. 

The Secretary referred to the " establishment " of bases 
in France, declared that Sims had " objected," and that " we 
disregarded his protest and established bases at Brest, at 
Bordeaux, at St. Nazaire. . . . These bases, established 
without waiting for recommendations of Admiral Sims, be- 
came the centres of our activities." Admiral Sims never ob- 
jected to the establishment of such bases. The Secretary 
" established " them on paper, in May, 1917, without in- 
forming Sims or the French as to what purpose the bases 
were to serve nor to what extent they were to be developed. 
Officers were sent, without any instructions as to what they 
were to do, to command bases that did not exist, and the 
utmost confusion resulted. The bases were not " estab- 
lished " except in Mr. Daniels' mind and in the Navy Direc- 
tory, until months later, and then only by Admiral Sims' 
direction. 

VII 

Mr. Daniels then set himself an even more difficult ques- 
tion to answer. " Were there, as Admiral Sims would have 
you believe, no war plans worked out and no policy adopted 
before war was declared? " 



THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE 397 

Here the Secretary apparently realized what thin ice he 
was treading upon and refrained from a categoric answer. 
Instead, he quoted Admiral Badger's statement about the 
" Black " war plan and the steps which the General Board 
had recommended. Admiral Sims, however, had not said that 
there were no war plans, in a safe somewhere. He had only 
proven that we had no " well considered policy or plans," 
before war began, that were actually followed during the 
war. No officer claimed that the General Board's war plan 
was ever used, or that it ever came out of the safe where 
Admiral Rodman believed it to have been. The mysterious 
disappearance of the " plan " of February 17, 1917, which 
Mr. Daniels said was the especial plan we used in the war, 
may indicate, however, that it is doubtful whether the plans 
were even in the safe. 

In speaking of the ignored memoranda of the General 
Board and their suggestions as to plans, Admiral Badger 
had said, with a touch of unconscious pathos, that plans had 
been prepared but " the trouble is that the plans and the ex- 
ecution of them did not meet with the approval of the critics." 

The fact is that the only people in a position to act as 
critics to the General Board were the Secretary of the Navy 
and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Benson. 

Yet the Secretary, carefully evading a direct statement, 
now said that Admiral Badger had testified " that these rec- 
ommendations, with few exceptions, were approved and put 
into effect is shown hy events." 

Rhetorically the Secretary continued " all this was in 
progress before Sims left for Europe. . . . How could he 
have been totally ignorant of all these plans? The General 
Board, as did every other official of the Navy, favoured the 
closest co-operation with the Allies, in case of war, and send- 
ing to Europe such craft as would be of most assistance to 
them, and aiding them in every way we could. That was our 
fixed policy, adopted and thoroughly understood." 



398 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

After the testimony of Admiral Mayo, Admiral Badger, 
Admiral Benson and Captain Pratt, this is a most amazing 
assertion. For these officers, the commander-in-chief of the 
fleet, the chairman of the General Board, the Chief of Naval 
Operations and his assistant, testified that no such policy 
was " fixed," or " adopted " or " thoroughly understood." 
In fact all agreed that no one in the Navy Department, on 
April 6, 1917, had even the vaguest idea of what the Navy 
would do next, beyond getting behind nets to avoid being at- 
tacked by German submarines. No one, but Daniels, had 
cared to take such liberties with the facts of history. 

VIII 

" Another one of our policies," said the Secretary, " was 
to increase the Navy in ships and personnel, especially anti- 
submarine craft, as rapidly as possible." 

Yet it was not until July 20, 1917, that the officers in the 
Navy Department succeeded in convincing Secretary Daniels 
that the Navy should concentrate its naval construction on 
the most effective type of anti-submarine craft, destroyers. 
It was not until October 6, 1917, that the war program of 
destroyers was authorized. In fact on July 20, 1917, over 
three months after war began. Admiral McKean considered 
it necessary to address a memorandum to the Secretary, the 
last of a score that had been sent him since February on 
the same subject, in which the following statements occur: 

" With an earnestness beyond expression, backed by a convic- 
tion that has endured from the first, I ask that we meet this great 
world crisis by contributing our maximum national effort in build- 
ing, manning and fighting destroyers to drive enemy submarines 
from the sea. . . . 

" The question of types may rest for the moment while we 
make the great decision to do our utmost. Let it not be said by 
posterity that we, seeing our duty, hesitated until too late, or that 
we failed to distinguish essential from incidental effort. Two 



THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE 399 

hundred destroyers would mean victory for us. They may be 
had within a year and a half. The power to accomplish mill 
follow the decision to accomplish. Let us decide! " 

Admiral Sims, in quoting this memorandum, said: 

" Here Admiral McKean states what is, in brief terms, the 
whole point of the criticism directed against the Department's 
conduct of the war. They did fail to distinguish essential from 
incidental eiFort. They failed to act upon the very policy 
which President Wilson so forcibly set forth in his message to me 
and in his speech of August 11, 1917." 

Yet on May 21, 1920, Secretary Daniels told the Senate 
committee that if in March, 1917, Sims didn't know the De- 
partment had war plans and policies, all " designed for the 
war we were to wage and to meet the conditions we were fac- 
ing," and if he didn't know that it was energetically carrying 
these out, " he was the only man in America who was in ig- 
norance of the active and efficient work and policy of the 
Navy Department." 

If the Secretary had bothered to read their testimony, 
he would have discovered that Benson, McKean, Pratt, Mayo, 
Palmer, Taussig, Laning, were as ignorant as Sims of these 
war plans and this active and efficient work of the *' Navy 
Department." As individuals, many officers in the Depart- 
ment were doing active and efficient work. But their chief 
obstacle, as all testified, was the " Navy Department " itself. 

IX 

One criticism the Secretary proudly admitted, " Admiral 
Sims charges that we did not allow him to select flag officers 
who were to serve in Europe. That is correct; we did not. 
We had no idea of allowing him to determine which admirals 
should go to Europe and which should not. . . . No mili- 
tary rule was violated by the Department in this, because 
Admiral Sims was not Commander-in-Chief, though he de- 



400 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

sired such position and the Department decHned his request." 

The last sentence is an altogether petty and malicious in- 
sinuation. Admiral Sims never requested that he be ap- 
pointed " Commander-in-Chief," nor did he ever express, 
verbally or in writing, any desire for such a position. 

The principle involved is clear. Though Admiral Sims 
was not " commander-in-chief " of the Atlantic Fleet, he was 
most decidedly our naval commander in the war zone. No 
mere quibble can exempt the Secretary from conviction for 
the violation of so fundamental a principle of war as to re- 
fuse to permit the commander in the war zone to select, or 
even to ask him to suggest, his principal subordinates. 

Admiral Benson complained that he, too, had often not 
been consulted about even the most important appointments 
to naval commands made by the Secretary. Benson was 
moreover, the chief military adviser of the Secretary. Cap- 
tain Pratt stated the principle, to which every one who 
knows the rudiments of warfare subscribes, when he said that 
" It is the universal practice of the Navy for flag officers to 
make the recommendations for their subordinates. The 
final assignments are made by the Secretary in consultation 
with the Chief of Naval Operations. It is conducive to ef- 
ficiency to associate those officers together whose relations 
are bound to be harmonious." 

Mr. Daniels protested that " we had no idea of allowing 
him to choose his personal favourites for important com- 
mands." Quite apart from the fact that Sims is not the 
type who would play favourites, the Navy and the country 
know that they would have been far better served by his 
favourites than by the personal selections of Mr. Daniels. 



Said Daniels : 

" The work of the Navy was stupendous and mistakes were 
unavoidable ; but I feel sure the testimony has not only confirmed 



THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE 401 

the general impression of the splendid work done by the Navy 
but has given an even clearer and more impressive exhibition of 
the efficiency with which the Navy did its work of preparation 
for war and operations during the war." 

If by the " Navy " he means the naval officers and men, 
one can most heartily agree, as did Admiral Sims. If he in- 
cludes himself and his chief naval supporters, his statement 
becomes merely ridiculous, in the face of the testimony un- 
der cross-examination of Admirals Benson and McKean and 
of Captain Pratt. 

The Secretary, however, mentioned a few things that had 
been done. These were, in his own order: 

1. Congress had authorized from 1913-1917 a total of a mil- 
lion tons of new naval vessels (three-fourths of which are not 
yet built in the year 1920). 

2. The Bureau of Ordnance in 1913 was short 228,000 pro- 
jectiles. In 1917 it had a reserve of 112,000. The reserve of 
torpedoes had been increased 9l/^ times, of smokeless powder 
llA times, of mines, 4^2 times. 

3. The enlisted personnel authorized was: in 1913, 51,500; 
in 1917, 97,000. (This increase was not authorized until 
August 29, 1916, less than six months before war began; too 
late to be of any service at the beginning of the war.) Mr. 
Daniels refused in 1914 and 1915 to request the additional 
20,000 men that would have insured the manning of the active 
Navy in 1917. 

4. There was no naval reserve in 1913. In 1917, it was in 
existence (also authorized August 29, 1916, and hence in April, 
1917, still untrained and unorganized). 

5. " The organization of 1917 was far superior to that of 
1913." (The only change made had been the creation of the 
Office of Naval Operations in March, 1915, and the enlargement 
of its functions in August, 1916, at the initiative of Admiral Fiske 
and against the opposition of Secretary Daniels.) 

These five measures were all that Mr. Daniels could cite 
in the way of preparedness before 1917. How could any 



402 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

more convincing proof be requested of his failure to pay 
heed to his primary duty, — that of preparing the Navy for 
war at a time of world upheaval? 

Mr. Daniels' state of mind in 1920 can be judged from 
the fact that he said of the above evidences of war prepara- 
tions : 

" Such enormous undertakings were put through during the 
war that we are now apt to be little impressed by the accomplish- 
ments of the period preceding the war^ and figures such as are 
given above are needed to remind us that the pre-war achieve- 
ments, in the direction of preparation for war, were also enor- 
mous, compared with anything that had preceded them." 

The Great War did not begin until 1914. It was hardly 
even a threat until 1913. Although we were facing war be- 
tween 1914 and 1917, so little had been done to prepare for 
" any eventuality " that the actual preparedness measures, 
cited by Mr. Daniels himself, can be counted on the fingers 
of one hand ; and his initiative even in these was not estab- 
lished by the evidence. In the cases of the increases in per- 
sonnel, and the improvement in organization, he had origi- 
nally bitterly opposed the steps finally taken. 



XI 

Toward the end of his summary of the case for the defence, 
the Secretary became unconsciously ludicrous in his asser- 
tions. Thus spake Sir Josephus : 

"I am loath to believe that Admiral Sims believed in 1917 
that the department was making fundamental errors in the con- 
duct of the war. Certainly he never came out openly and 
straightforwardly with any such opinion at the time. It is diffi- 
cult even now to read by implication any such meaning into his 
numerous cablegrams and letters Had he felt that way it was 
his duty to bring his opinion clearly and sharply before his su- 
periors." 



THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE 403 

Can it be possible that the Secretary of the Navy had not 
read Admiral Sims' communications either in 1917, or in 
1920, when he presented many of them in his testimony? 
From the end of April, 1917, for many months, Admiral 
Sims was pointing out to the Navy Department, at least 
weekly, and often daily, in the most strongly worded cables 
and letters, compatible with official proprieties, these very 
same fundamental errors of the Navy Department. Indeed 
so strong were these in their tone that Captain Pratt, in his 
testimony, said they would have had more effect if they had 
not been so forceful. 

On April 28, 1917, when the Navy Department was con- 
cerned chiefly with protecting the American coast, with Ad- 
miral Wilson's patrol force of 55 vessels, and of keeping the 
American fleet intact in port. Admiral Sims cabled : 

" Owing to the gravity of the submarine situation, although 
I am unaware of the situation as regards our forces available 
and their material condition, I cannot avoid urging the impor- 
tance of the time element and the fact that the pressing need of 
the moment is numbers of vessels in the danger area. We can- 
not send too soon or too many. ... At present none (i. e., Ger- 
man submarines) are likely to be sent over (to the American 
coast). ... I believe our Navy has an opportunity for glorious 
distinction and I seriously recommend that there be sent at once 
the maximum possible number of destroyers." 

On June 21, 1917, nearly two months later, Admiral Sims 
cabled : 

" I trust I have made the critical nature of the military situa- 
tion entirely clear. I consider it my duty to report that if we 
cannot offer more immediate actual assistance even to the extent 
of sending the majority of the vessels patrolling our ozcn coast 
lines which cannot materially affect the general situation, we will 
fail to render the service to the allied cause which future history 
will show to have been necessary. . . . 

". . . Armed merchantmen are being sunk daily off this port. 



404. NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

The success of the convoys so far brought in shows that the 
system will defeat the submarine campaign if applied generally 
and in time. . . . The present campaign is not succeeding. The 
necessity is again presented of sending all destroyers, tugs, 
yachts and other craft which can reach the critical area by them- 
selves or towed part way by reserve battleships. // the situa- 
tion is not made clear, I hope the Department will indicate the 
future information desired. Time is a vital element in any 
measures taken." 

A score of other messages of similar import, all in sub- 
stance a complete condemnation of the " safety first " policy 
then actuating the Navy Department, were quoted by Ad- 
miral Sims in his testimony. His letter reports of June 29, 
and of July 16, 1917, may be singled out as instances of 
letters that constitute in themselves the most striking indict- 
ment imaginable of the delays, inaction and timid prudence 
of the Navy Department in those first and most critical 
months of the war. 

It is very hard to understand either the meaning or in- 
tent of Mr. Daniels' statement, that in 1917 Admiral Sims 
" never came out openly and straightforwardly " and pointed 
out to the department the errors it was committing. 



XII 

In the oratorical peroration with which the Secretary con- 
cluded his statement, he reiterated again his many misrep- 
resentations. He recited his " pride " in the achievements 
of the Navy. He had only done his " solemn duty " to the 
officers and men of the service, in defending them from the 
" charges " which had " shocked " and hurt them. He spoke 
of having attended a memorial service, for some of the men 
who had died in the naval service, and said : 

" If I had been silent when what these dead had done was as- 
sailed, I could not ever have stood with bared head over their 



THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE 405 

graves, without a sense that I had failed them and permitted 
unjust reflections to tarnish their fame." 

If it were not that Daniels, in the heat of his ignorant 
and vindictive resentment at criticism, may have really be- 
lieved that Admiral Sims had " assailed " the war record 
of the men of the Navy with " unjust reflections," this state- 
ment would seem a disgraceful sacrilege ; a deliberate slander 
on the men who died across the seas and on their honoured 
and well beloved commander ; a cowardly attempt to defend 
himself behind the cloak, of the deathless glory, of those who 
had died in their country's cause. 

Mr. Daniels devoted two pages to fulsome praise of the 
Navy, and of the splendid service of its personnel in the war. 
Admiral Sims had done this more graphically — more power- 
fully — because he had done so with that sincerity, which 
forms, by contrast, so refreshing and so distinctive a char- 
acteristic of his personality. 

Mr. Daniels having praised the officers and men of the 
Navy for two pages, revealed his purpose when he said: 

" It lias been a pleasure and a privilege to point out to this 
committee some of the notable deeds of our naval officers, who 
made a record so excellent that no criticisms or accusations have 
been able to leave a stain or even a speck upon that record. . . . 

" To the American people . . . the Navy was their reliance 
when world justice was imperilled. They knew that it was 
ready, fit, efficient, and the history I have been privileged to pre- 
sent to your committee fully justified their faith. Indeed it 
crowns it." 

For three years previous to April 6, 1917, the Secretary 
of the Navy had deceived the country, perhaps unintention- 
ally or through ignorance, in his annual reports, by his pub- 
licity bureau, and through his speeches, as to the condition 
of the Navy. The people, as a result, " knew " nothing of 
the truth about the Navy in 1917, certainly not if they 



406 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

believed the statements made to them at the time by the Secre- 
tary of the Navy. 

Mr. Daniels was quite correct, in concluding his state- 
ment before the Senate Committee in 1920 with the admis- 
sion that his testimony before the committee fully " crowns " 
his long series of previous statements about the Navy ; but the 
implication of his statement doubtless escaped him. 



CHAPTER XXI 

A DANIELS COME TO JUDGMENT 

(The Cross-Examination of the Secretary) 

I 

THE Secretary of the Navy had apparently noticed with 
dismay the admissions made by previous witnesses when they 
had been subjected to the searching and astute cross-examin- 
ation of Senator Hale. 

His own testimony, under cross-examination, reveals his 
obvious and stated intention to avoid at all costs any dam- 
aging admissions. 

He refused throughout to make direct answers, or to ad- 
mit anything. He repeated monotonously the phrases that 
had colored his direct statement. The charges " against the 
Navy," he said, were " preposterous and outrageous," a 
" crime " against the service. The only criticisms of the 
Navy had come from men with a " grievance " ; officers in- 
spired by " wounded vanity," by devious political motives, 
by a desire to *' Prussianize the Navy." The Navy had 
fought magnificently in the war. All possible preparations 
had been made. Full and complete war plans were in ex- 
istence. The Navy had never been so efficient as in April, 
1917. The Department's policy from the beginning was 
whole-hearted co-operation with the Allies. 

When Mr. Daniels was confronted with the evidence dis- 
proving in every case the impression that he was trying to 
convey, he evaded the issue and entered into interminable 
monologues on subjects entirely foreign to the questions 
asked him. When confronted with the proofs of the criti- 

407 



408 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

cisms contained in Admiral Sims' letter and testimony, he as- 
sailed Admiral Sims for attacking the Navy, declared the 
Navy had made a splendid record in the war and that though 
mistakes were made these were of no real consequence, as 
we had won the war. 

In vain, Chairman Hale endeavoured to get the Secretary 
to answer the question asked him. ]Mr. Daniels obviously 
intended to tire out the committee by his evasions and verbose 
diversions and misrepresentations, and so to avoid having to 
make any direct answers. 

For four days the Secretary was under cross-examination. 
It is with difficulty that one can find even a dozen direct 
answers to questions concerned with the issues of the in- 
vestigation. 

II 

The Chairman began the cross-examination by stating 
that the committee deprecated the unfounded personal at- 
tacks upon certain of the witnesses. The committee, he 
said, were not at all concerned with the witnesses' opinions of 
each other, but only with the essential facts concerning our 
preparedness for war in 1917 and the Department's conduct 
of the war during the first six months after April 6, 1917. 

The Chairman also invited the Secretary's attention to the 
fact that Admiral Sims' criticisms were not directed against 
the Navy itself. 

The committee repeatedly felt obliged to protest against 
Mr. Daniels' tactics ; but he defiantly announced that he 
would answer as he chose, that he was the Secretary of the 
Navy, and that if necessary he would remain before the com- 
mittee all summer rather than give the direct answers they 
desired. 

The Chairman repeatedly asked what war plans the Navy 
had in 1917. The Secretary in reply only quoted volu- 
minously from the parts of testimony of Admiral Badger and 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF SECRETARY 409 

Captain Pratt, in which these officers had described the 
memoranda that had been drawn up by the General Board 
and by two or three officers in Operations in 1917, giving 
their own estimates of various problems and their recom- 
mendations. These were not in any sense of the word " war 
plans." 

The " Black " war plan which the Secretary declared was 
a full and complete and up-to-date plan for war with Ger- 
many had not the slightest possible relation to the situation 
existent since 1914. The Black Plan provided only for a 
naval campaign in the Atlantic, by our major naval forces. 
It was based on the assumption that we would be fighting 
single-handed against a European enemy which could use 
its fleet freely in the Atlantic, and that the issue of war 
would centre chiefly in the Caribbean Sea. 

Ill 

Chairman Hale spent the best part of two days trying to 
get some proof from Mr. Daniels, of his repeated assertions 
that " we had plans for war with every nation in the Atlan- 
tic." The Secretary consistently refused to answer. Every 
time the question was raised, he began to read a few more 
pages of testimony that he thought could be construed as 
giving the impression that there had been in 1917 suitable 
war plans, officially approved by the Department, adequate 
to meet the situation that confronted us on April 6, 1917. 

On the afternoon of INIay 21, when Chairman Hale, for 
example, asked the Secretary about the plans, Mr. Daniels, 
as usual, replied: 

" Yes, we had plans for war with every nation in the At- 
lantic." 

" The Chairman: And especially one for war with Germany? 

"Secretary Daniels: Yes. I would like to say, Mr. Chair- 
man that since the morning session I have had a conference with 
Admiral Badger . . . and he will be very happy ... to bring 



410 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

all the plans in executive session of the committee, so that you 
may see the plans (N. B. These were the so-called ' Black ' 
plans, described above). ... I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, 
that this morning ... I referred to a statement of Admiral 
Sims with reference to the fact that he had charged Admiral 
Benson with not having the will to win." 

The Secretary then read a quotation from Admiral Sims 
in support of his own contention of the morning that Sims 
" made the grave and infamous charge that Admiral Benson 
lacked the will to win." In the morning the Chairman had 
pointed out that no such charge was contained in Admiral 
Sims' letter. Daniels then twisted about and said it was in 
his testimony, and that " It is as grave a crime in one place 
as in the other." The only substantiation the Secretary 
could find was a quotation which he now introduced, to divert 
attention from the embarrassing question about lack of plans. 
In this Admiral Sims had said : 

" The spiritual foundation of every war is the will to victory 
and if any man, no matter how honest, has an invincible preju- 
dice against the people we are fighting alongside of, it is very 
probable that it has an unconscious influence upon him; and that 
is the reason, that in submitting this letter for the consideration 
of the Navy Department, I put that — (i. e., Admiral Benson's 
admonition that ' we would as soon fight the British as the Ger- 
mans ') — in there, as one of the most important things in the 
letter, that if we ever go into a war again we want to make sure 
that the spiritual foundation of our organization, the will to 
victory, is sound." 

The Chairman remarked after the Secretary had read this 
quotation : 

" I do not think any one can question that. That is good 
doctrine, is it not? 

" Secretary Daniels: But when you charge the Chief of Oper- 
ations with not having the will to win, you charge him with a 
grave crime. 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF SECRETARY 411 

" The Chairman : I do not think it does charge him. 
" Secretary Daniels : I think that would be the interpretation 
of it. I do not see any other interpretation of it." 

The ChaiiTTian then quoted Admiral Sims' further state- 
ment which Mr. Daniels had omitted; namely that: 

" I have always had the best possible relations with Admiral 
Benson. I regard him as an upstanding and honest man who has 
exceedingly strong convictions, and who is very firm in adherence 
to these convictions. I believe everything he has done, during the 
•war, has been done conscientiously and to get along with the 



IV 

The Chairman, having thus disposed of Mr. Daniels' as- 
sertion about Admiral Sims' " grave and infamous charges " 
— came back to the question of plans. Whereupon Mr. 
Daniels began to read the General Board's recommendations 
of February 4th, 1917. These had never received any of- 
ficial approval from the Navy Department. 

The Chairman therefore interrupted the Secretary, pointed 
out that the recommendations of Admiral Badger were al- 
ready in the testimony and said : 

" You see, you have already made your testimony in your 
direct statement, Mr. Secretary, and now I want to ask you some 
questions. It is no good to me if you do not answer my ques- 
tions. 

"Secretary Daniels: This is an answer to your question, be- 
cause you raised, the question of plans. 

" The Chairman: I am in hopes of getting from you, before 
we get through, a statement of j ust what plans we had at the out- 
break of war, and on February 2 ; and if you are not at liberty to 
give them out because they are confidential, I want the plans, to 
be mentioned as confidential, stated. This that you are reading 
has already been put into the record. 

"Secretary Daniels: This is answering your question, and is 



412 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

exceedingly important. . . . Here is what we did, and this is the 
detailed plan." 

The Chairman said, " I am not asking you what was in 
the plan, but I am asking you about the plan, so that I can 
get it in my mind. ... So far I have been unable to." 

"Secretary Daniels: I am giving you that plan now," 
and he continued with the reading of it. When he had 
finished the Chairman asked : 

" That was approved by you when ? 

"Secretary Daniels: I have not the date here, hut it was 
approved, as soon as it came to me." (i. e., on February 4, 
1917). 

" The Chairman: Does that appear on the plan? 

"Secretary Daniels: It was approved by me, Mr. Chairman. 
I do not see in this testinwny the actual official action. 

" The Chairman: Then what became of it, after it was ap- 
proved by you? 

" Secretary Daniels: It went to Operations to carry it out. 

" The Chairman: It went to Operations? 

"Secretary Daniels: To carry it out." 

Yet Admiral Badger in his testimony noted that in the 
case of this plan there was " no record of action by the De- 
partment." Neither he nor any other naval officer had ever 
heard of the memorandum having been " approved " by Mr. 
Daniels. Nor did any of the officers in Operations know 
anything about this General Board memorandum having been 
sent " to Operations to carry it out ! " 

V 

For two more whole days. Chairman Hale vainly attempted 
to learn something of the plans. The Secretary stated un- 
der oath that the Navy Department had had detailed plans 
" always from the time the General Board was organized, up 
to this moment . . . which would cover a war with the Cen- 
tral Empire, with Germany, Yes, sir. . . . 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF SECRETARY 413 

"... The General Board failed in nothing in the making 
of basic plans and policies recommended to the Department, 
and the department failed in nothing in approving the car- 
rying out of these basic plans which set forth the essential 
policies that governed the Navy." 

The Secretary again quoted Captain Pratt's personal, 
undated, unapproved memoranda as the " operative " plans 
of the Department. But no plans were forthcoming, and 
finally even the courteous patience of Chainnan Hale was 
exhausted, and he insisted on an answer. 

"The Chairman: I asked you, Mr. Secretary, whether in 
your opinion we had any plans for a war with Germany which 
would include the co-operation of the Allies with us, the war 
being the kind of a naval war which existed after 1916? 

"Secretary Daniels: I decline ever to answer Yes or No in 
any investigation, Mr. Chairman. . . . 

" The Chairman : This is a perfectly definite question. 

"Secretary Daniels: Yes, and I will give you a perfectly 
definite answer, but you cannot tell me to answer Yes or no. 

" The Chairman: You can answer whether there were such 
plans, in your opinion. 

"Secretary Daniels: I have a right to answer as I please. 
Ask me questions and I will answer them all definitely and with 
fullness. . . . 

" The CJiairman : You must answer them, Mr. Secretary, in 
a way to give me the information I ask for. 

" Secretary Daniels: I am the Secretary of the Navy and I 
shall answer you in accordance with the duty of my office, and 
fully. ... 

" The Chairman: I ask you questions, and I would not care if 
you would answer them so as to convey information, but that 
you do not do. I would much prefer to have you answer them in 
that way. 

"Secretary Daniels: And I would much prefer not to be told 
how to answer questions." 

Naturally ! for Chairman Hale had assumed that the 



414 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Secretary was trying to aid the committee to learn the 
truth. The Secretary preferred his own methods ! 

VI 

Another half day passed, and still the Secretary evaded 
questions, reading large masses of testimony into the record, 
without being willing himself to do anything more than make 
the general and unsupported assertion that " The General 
Board had perfect and full plans for ' a ' war with the Ger- 
mans." He was careful to state that it was the General 
Board and not the Navy Department, and that, it was a 
" plan " for " a " war with Germany. He knew there was 
no plan for " the war " which we actually fought with Ger- 
many. 

Chairman Hale finally asked the Secretary : 

" Now, from your answers am I to understand we were thor- 
oughly prepared with plans for anti-submarine warfare or not, 
Mr. Secretary? 

"Secretary Daniels: We were entirely prepared with plans 
for any kind of warfare the naval strategists could foresee. 

" Chairman: For anti-submarine warfare? 

"Secretary Daniels: Not specifically. Any kind, or every 
kind. 

" The Chairman: Mr. Secretary, do you not think that as a 
committee we have a right to get information on these matters? 
You have told us they had ample plans. Now I want to know 
what those ample plans were. 

"Secretary Daniels: Admiral Badger will present them 
whenever you send for them. 

" The Chairman: You are the witness on the stand to answer 
this . . . 

"Secretary Daniels: I know what you are asking me, but I 
know what I am answering you. You asked me if we had any 
plans. The dreadnaughts . . . 

" The Chairman: Is it not your purpose to assist the commit- 
tee in this investigation? 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF SECRETARY 415 

"Secretary Daniels: It is my purpose to get the committee 
the fullest possible information. 

" The Chairman: Do you think we get the information, when 
you do not answer the questions ? 

"Secretary Daniels: Absolutely. I tell you we had plans 
for any kind of warfare, in the Black plans. 

" The Chairman: It has been said that there seems to be a 
good deal of a smoke screen to keep from getting information. It 
seems to me that you are not in a position where you want any- 
thing of that sort. . . . You have stated, heretofore, that none 
of these charges against the Navy were substantiated at all; that 
the Navy Department was clear in every respect of any of those 
criticisms. Now that being the case, there can be nothing to hide 
in any way. I am sure you would not want to hide anything. 
You are the very last one to want that. 

" Secretary Daniels : I have shown you this morning we have 
everything open. 

" The Chairman: And it seems to me when we are asking for 
definite answers to questions that you should want to give them. 

"Secretary Daniels: And I have answered them fully and 
given you all the plans. 

" The Chairman: But you do not answer them so we can get 
any information from your answers. 

"Secretary Daniels: If you cannot get any information 
from what I have answered you, I do not know where you will 
get it. It is very full and complete. 

" The Chairman: Your answers have little to do with the 
questions and you put in a lot of additional testimony." 

VII 

For another day the testimony continued, with Mr. Dan- 
iels pursuing the same tactics. Again Senator Hale felt 
compelled to remonstrate. 

The Secretary, in answer to a question as to why forces 
were not sent abroad immediately, in 1917, made a long 
statement, dealing with destroyer construction during the 
war, and with the total number that operated in Europe. 



416 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

As he rambled on in his effort to confuse the minds of the 
committee, Senator Keyes finally asked: 

" Mr. Chairman, I would just like, in order that we may try 
to keep in mind what is taking place before us here, to know 
what question the Secretary is answering now. 

"Secretary Daniels: I am answering as to our destroyers. 

" The Chairman: At the present rate, Mr. S,ecretary, we will 
be here all summer. 

"Secretary Daniels: Well, I have my summer clothes. 

" The Chairman: You answer very few of the questions that 
are asked of you, but you put in a lot of matter into the record 
that is highly irrelevant to the questions asked. 

"Secretary Daniels: I have not put in anything that is not 
relevant. 

" The Chairman: It may not be irrelevant to the investiga- 
tion, but it is irrelevant to the questions. 

" Secretary Daniels: It is absolutely relevant to the ques- 
tions and necessary to give a clear answer. 

" The Chairman: My idea was that when we examined you 
here we would get all the assistance that it was in your power to 
give in clearing up all these matters ... as briefly as possible. 
... It seems to me that if you will bring your answers down to 
reasonable lengths and follow the lines we are trying to find out 
about, it would be very helpful and profitable. . . . Nobody 
wants to hide anything or to suppress any information, but I 
think that you ought to co-operate with us. . . . But every ques- 
tion we ask, you come out with a long statement, taking up all 
sorts of other matters and we never get anywhere." 



VIII 

Any one who has the patience to read the Secretary's 
answers to the questions put to him during the four days' 
cross-examination will appreciate the significance of this 
statement by the chairman of the investigating committee. 

A further example of the Secretary's attitude is afforded 
by one of his answers on the last day of his examination. 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF SECRETARY 417 

Senator Hale had quoted from the testimony of previous 
witnesses proofs that the Navy was unprepared for war in 
1917, that it was very short of men, that its ships were not 
materially fit for war service. The Secretary attempted to 
explain away these admissions. 

"I would say that Admiral Benson's statement was this: — If 
you will bear in mind, Admiral Benson was answering questions 
you put to him. If you will read his testimony in full, in large, 
you will see that its whole bearing does not justify j^our picking 
out one or two questions, in answer to which he said that it was 
not 100 per cent, ready. 

" The Chairman: Do you mean that my questions were im- 
proper questions } 

"Secretary Daniels: Not at all; not at all. But suppose 
you asked me the question. ' Mr. Secretary, was every ship in 
the Navy, on the 6th of April fully manned, fully efficient, . . .' 
and I were to say to you, 'No! ' — I am a little too foxy to be 
caught by such questions — then you would say, ' The Secretary 
of the Navy said the Navy was not read3\' Admiral Benson has 
told you truly that no Navy is ever 100 per cent, efficient, every 
ship is not 100 per cent, efficient; but I said in my statement, and 
it is as true as Holy Writ. ' the Navy from stem to stern had 
been made ready to the fullest possible extent,' and that is the 
truth." 

The Secretary was too " foxy " to be caught answering 
questions directly ! 

IX 

In the course of the Secretary's testimony, as has been 
related in Chapter XII, he was confronted by Senator 
Hale, both with his letter to the Senate of April 21, 1916, 
in which he declared that the General Board letter of August 
1, 1914, did not relate to preparedness, and with the Gen- 
eral Board letter itself. This was found to relate solely to 
preparedness. 

Letters were also introduced explaining the disappear- 



418 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

ance, from the Navy Department files, of Admiral Fislce's 
letter of November 9, 1914. In his letter to the Senate of 
April 21, 1916, the Secretary denied ever having seen the 
letter, and stated that it could not be found in the Depart- 
ment's files, as it had been removed by an officer. 

Letters from Commander J. H. Sypher to Admiral Fiske 
showed that the Fiske letter had been removed from the 
files by the Secretary's aide for material, a man of German 
name, antecedents and sympathies and the officer in whom 
the Secretary reposed the most confidence. He had reported 
later that the letter had been lost. After the letter had 
been brought to light by the Senate request of April, 1916, 
the lost copy was mysteriously returned to the files and was 
later discovered bearing a receiving stamp dated September 
13, 1916. 



Mr. Daniels admitted that in 1913, he had forbidden the 
naval members of the Joint Board to attend meetings. The 
Secretary's explanation of this action was, 

" In the early part of the administration there was a very acute 
situation between a friendly power and the U. S. . . . About 
that time the Joint Army and Navy Board had made certain rec- 
ommendations which, by some subterranean passage, became cir- 
culated upon the hill. , . . Its becoming public might have re- 
sulted in a very serious trouble with a friendly power. The 
recommendations of the Joint Army and Navy Board, which 
were most confidential became whispered about and discussed 
generally. . . . These would have been tantamount in the eyes of 
a friendly nation to our getting ready to go to war with it, and 
the Army and Navy Board held no meetings for a time." 

This is an extraordinary statement for the head of the 
Navy to make. The Army and Navy Joint Board was the 
only agency to co-ordinate the plans and activities of the 
two services. A crisis with another nation had developed. 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF SECRETARY 4*19 

Because the Joint Board took steps that would have contrib- 
uted to our preparedness and military success in the event 
of war, and for fear that the other nation would be displeased, 
the Joint Board was not permitted to meet or to draw up 
plans which would have enabled the two services to act to- 
gether efficiently, in case war had been forced upon us. In 
a time of crisis Mr. Daniels' pacifism would have prevented 
our military forces from being able to co-operate with each 
other and to cope with the situation. 

Mr. Daniels, in fact, added that he " instructed the naval 
members of the Board not to attend any further meetings 
until they were directed to do so, and it was all on account 
of very grave international questions. . . . When that inter- 
national acute situation passed, the Joint Army and Navy 
Board resumed their meeting." 

One is reminded of the old adage about locking the barn 
door, after the horse is stolen ! 

XI 

On the final day of Secretary Daniels' cross-examination, 
the Chairman introduced into the record a copy of statistics, 
furnished officially by the Office of Naval Operations, relat- 
ing to the state of preparedness in 1917. Senator Hale, in 
spite of almost hysterical opposition from the Secretary, 
who said he would have the matter carried to the floor of the 
Senate, also introduced a digest of these official statistics, 
that had been prepared in his own office. In presenting 
these for the record the Chairman said: 

" This shows that on February 2, 1917, 26 per cent, of the fleet 
was reported fit in material, and 74 per cent, of the fleet had 
an average of 60 days of repairs, essential for war service, to be 
made. Only 2 per cent, of the vessels were fully manned and 98 
per cent, of them averaged 50 per cent, manned. 

"On April 6, 1917, that is 63 days later, 33 per cent, were 
reported as fit in material and 67 per cent, of the fleet had an 



420 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

average of 56 days' repairs necessary (for war service) to be 
done. Only 10 per cent, of the vessels were fully manned, and 
90 per cent, of them averaged but 57 per cent. 

'* In short these figures, presented by the Navy Department, 
showed that we went into the war with two-thirds of our fleet 
not in proper condition for instant war service abroad, and re- 
quiring two months of repair on an average, and with but 10 
per cent, of the fleet up to their full war complement and 90 per 
cent, of it with less than 3/5 of its full war complement." 



XII 

It would be but useless repetition to delve further into the 
cross-examination of Mr. Daniels. In spite of all his eva- 
sions, vehement denials, and sweeping generalizations, which 
were in complete contradiction to the facts established from 
the previous testimony, — he confirmed, by inference, every 
single criticism of any importance contained in Admiral Sims' 
letter and in his testimony. 

The Secretary's testimony was the most convincing evi- 
dence one could have for the necessity of a reorganization of 
the Navy Department, and for the adoption of a sound naval 
policy to guide the future development and operations of 
the Navy, our first line of national defence. 

Unless this is done, unless the lessons of the war are 
heeded, we will gravely endanger the national security. Ad- 
mirals Benson, McKean, Pratt, Badger, Sims, Plunkett, 
Mayo, all agreed that we were fortunate in 1917 in being able 
to prepare for war while the Allies protected us and per- 
mitted us to delay and blunder with impunity to ourselves, 
but at great cost to the Allies. If we had been compelled to 
meet Germany singlehanded in 1917, our Navy could not have 
protected us against the German Navy as it was at that time. 
We must have a Navy able to defend us effectively against 
any possible enemy from the moment war is declared. We 
cannot have such a Navy if the Daniels policies and methods 



CROSS-EXAMINATION OF SECRETARY 421 

are continued. Unless the criticisms and suggestions of 
Admiral Sims are made effective, the unpreparedness of our 
Navy on some future day will result in a great national 
disaster. That is the point of the naval investigation ; the 
prevention of such a contingency was the motive inspiring 
Admiral Sims and other critics of the Daniels administra- 
tion. Mr. Daniels, in attempting to obscure this issue by 
sensational irrelevancies, by unfounded personal attacks and 
insinuations, was indulging in pure camouflage, in smoke- 
screen tactics, detrimental to his own reputation, to the 
good of the Navy and to the welfare of the country. 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE FAILURE OF THE DANIELS ADMINISTRA- 
TION; ADMIRAL SIMS' SUMMARY OF THE 
EVIDENCE 



THE Senate Committee recalled Admiral Sims on May 
27, 1920. So much testimony had been introduced, and so 
many misrepresentations had been made that he was asked 
to make a final statement. 

Sweeping aside the smoke-screen of diversions, evasions 
and misrepresentations with which the Secretary of the Navy 
had endeavoured to distract attention and to conceal the 
truth about the Navy, Admiral Sims in this final statement 
proved, — solely from the evidence presented by these wit- 
nesses, called at Mr. Daniels' behest, — that all of the princi- 
pal criticisms contained in his letter of January 7, 1920, and 
in his testimony before the committee in March, had been 
fully substantiated. 

Admiral Sims presented a clear and convincing analysis 
of the conduct of the Navy Department before the war and 
in the early months of the war. He reviewed briefly the ex- 
traordinary character of the testimony of the Secretary of 
the Navy. Finally, he presented constructive suggestions 
for the improvement of the Navy Department's organiza- 
tion. 

II 

Admiral Sims' summary of the testimony of the naval wit- 
nesses called at the request of the Secretary, agrees in gen- 
eral with the analyses given in the preceding chapters. 

422 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 423 

The following was his analysis : 

" A review of the testimony presented by these departmental 
witnesses shows that it divides itself naturally into five main 
categories^ which may be summarized briefly as follows: 

"CONFIRMATION OF THE CRITICISMS 

WHICH LED TO THIS INVESTIGATION: 

" First : The testimony of the Department's witnesses has in 
almost every case completely borne out the conclusions of my 
letter of January 7th, 1920, and the summary of my testimony 
before this committee in March last. 

" TRIBUTES TO THE ACHIEVEMENTS 
OF THE NAVY IN THE WAR: 

" Second: Nearly all of the Department's witnesses have pre- 
sented documents and made statements of opinion with regard 
to the achievements of the Navy in the war. Your attention has 
been repeatedly called to the faithful and efficient service per- 
formed by many officers, both previous to April 6th, 1917, in an 
endeavour to prepare the Navy for war; and, after that date, to 
conduct the war efficiently and successfully. The inevitable 
inference from this testimony is that I have not only failed to 
recognize these services, but have cast aspersions on them. 
Nothing could be farther from the truth. At no place in my tes- 
timony and at no time have I in the slightest degree reflected 
upon these services. On the contrary, in my testimony, in public 
statements, and in articles recently published, I have expressed 
the full measure of my admiration and appreciation of the mag- 
nificent achievements of the American Navy in the war, in spite 
of the handicap under which it worked. 

"CONDUCT OF THE WAR BY THE DEPARTMENT: 

" Third: Much testimony and documentary evidence has been 
introduced by Department witnesses concerning the conduct of 
the war by the Department. The officers who occupied the most 
responsible positions have testified to the long-continued and 
often unavailing eff"orts which they made to get the Navy ready 
for war in the years preceding our entrance into the war. They 



424 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

have told you in detail of the difficulties encountered in the early 
months of the war. Their testimony has revealed a condition 
even more distressing than I could have imagined, and consti- 
tutes a much severer criticism of the deplorable conditions in the 
Navy Department previous to, and during the early months of, 
the war than any evidence which I have myself presented. They 
have shown that the Department failed to prepare for war, and 
in many cases resisted the adoption of plans and measures which 
would have made possible an immediate and effective entrance 
into the war. These witnesses have also disclosed the full 
measure of the hesitation and delays and the disregard of mil- 
itary principles by the Department in the early months of the 



"NECESSITY FOR A REORGANIZATION 
OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT: 

" Fourth: This condition in the Navy Department was tacitly 
recognized by practically all of the Department's own witnesses. 
There was an almost unanimous agreement in their expressions 
as to the necessity for a reorganization of the Department so as 
to make it a military organization able successfully to prepare for 
and conduct war operations. The officers most closely connected 
with the Department's organization during the war were those 
who have testified most strongly with regard to the need for this 
reorganization. Further comment seems superfluous. 

" CAUSES FOR THE CONDITIONS 
BROUGHT TO LIGHT: 

" Fifth: The Department witnesses, testifying with regard to 
the responsibility for the conditions which have been brought to 
light, are in general agreement that these are due primarily to 
three causes : 

1st. The faulty organization of the Navy Department. 

2nd. The policy governing the Department's action previous 
to our entrance into the war and during the early months thereof. 

3rd. The failure of the responsible head of the Department to 
take the action required, both before and after the outbreak of 
war, to meet the urgency of the situation, to prepare the Navy for 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 425 

war, and to strike at once on the fighting front with all available 
forces." 

Ill 

Admiral Sims restated the motives that had inspired his 
letter on " Certain Naval Lessons of the Great War." He 
exposed the absurdity of the charge that he had in any way 
attacked the Navy or belittled its war record, by calling at- 
tention to the handicaps against which the officers and men 
of the service had to struggle. In striking terms he insisted 
on the imperative necessity of paying heed to past mistakes 
that we may avoid them in the future. 

The following passages from his statement will illustrate 
his contentions : 

" It is a very natural and a very human impulse, in the pride of 
one's accomplishments, to desire to forget one's errors ; and, if 
this were merely a matter of personal interests or if it were 
merely a question of national pride, there would be no necessity 
of inviting attention to truths which are necessarily so exceed- 
ingly unpalatable, if one may judge from the tone of the testi- 
mony which has recently been giv^en before this Committee. 
But as a nation we have the national safety to consider. Our 
only guide in facing the unknown events of the future are the 
lessons that we can draw from the past. Our surest means of 
preparing to meet the dangers we may be called upon to face is 
to study carefully the immutable princijoles which underlie war- 
fare ; the application of those principles under war conditions ; 
and to observe, conscientiously and calmly, the result of past vio- 
lation of these principles. Only thus can we make our service 
more effective in the future and prevent the necessity of enduring 
again the dangerous and what might, under less favourable cir- 
cumstances, have been the fatal consequences of such violations 
of these principles in warfare, as I believe this investigation has 
established. 



426 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

"SUCCESS IN WAR DOES NOT PROVE THAT NO 
ERRORS WERE MADE BY VICTORS 

" Closely associated with the point that I have just referred to, 
our disinclination to admit our own mistakes^ — is another con- 
tention which is always raised after a war has been won. The 
proverb that nothing succeeds like success is apt to mislead those 
who are too blindly optimistic and self-confident. Nothing 
would be more dangerous, however, than to assume that because 
we were eventually successful everything we did was necessarily 
right. On many occasions success has been obtained and wars 
have been won, not because no mistakes were committed, but in 
spite of the mistakes. The mere fact that the war was won does 
not prove that we did not commit very dangerous errors. The 
obvious statement that we, in association with the Allies, were 
victorious over Germany in the Great War does not in the slight- 
est degree prove that in a future war, under conditions less 
favourable to us, a repetition of the mistakes which, in 1917, had 
happily no fatal consequences, would not result in a national 
disaster. 

" WHY MISTAKES AND INEFFICIENCY OF THE NAVY 

DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY 

CONSIDERED 

" While not in the least desiritig to imply any criticism of our 
naval efforts which made possible the winning of the war, I 
considered it my duty to invite attention to the mistakes which 
postponed victory and resulted in unnecessary losses of blood 
and treasure. Your attention has been repeatedly called to the 
fact that in warfare time becomes one of the most essential ele- 
ments of strategy. A few months' delay, in times of peace, or 
in a war where we were immune from enemy attack during those 
months, may seem to have no grave consequences. A military 
service, however, which is so constituted that it cannot go to war 
and effectively operate, without a delay of many months, which 
has an organization which must be remade under the stress of 
war conditions in order to handle military operations, is funda- 
mentally wrong. The same delays under other circumstances 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 427 

would be disastrous, as the history of warfare so repeatedly 
demonstrates. 

" If it is possible, therefore, by a study of the causes of those 
delays, and by an analysis of the defects in the organization 
responsible for them, to avoid their repetition in the future, it is, 
obviously, not only wise, but imperative that a careful study of 
these causes should be made. The witnesses who have appeared 
before you, wliile insisting that the Navy fought well in the war, 
which nobody has ever denied, have also insisted that the Navy 
Department's organization is inadequate and that we were not 
able to go to war with our full force within the time that military 
success requires. It is for this reason, that, in spite of the fact 
that we were successful in the war, in spite of the fact that the 
navy added new laurels to its already proud tradition, it seems to 
me, not only wise, but imperative, that we should take into ac- 
count the errors which were committed, and endeavour to provide 
such a remedy for the causes as to prevent their repetition as far 
as it is humanly possible to do so." 

IV 

Admiral Sims, in reviewing the activities of the Navy 
Department from 1913-1919, revealed the full extent of the 
admissions of the naval witnesses, by making clear the signi- 
ficance of these admissions. 

The Secretary of the Navy had consistently opposed all 
efforts to improve the departmental organization. No def- 
inite fundamental policy had been established, by which all 
activities could be guided. No adequate war plans were pre- 
pared or approved, or put into force, to insure prepared- 
ness for war in time of peace and successful operations in 
time of war. As a result of the attitude of the Secretary, 
said Admiral Sims, the improvements in organization ef- 
fected by Secretary Meyer in 1909, instead of being extended, 
were abandoned. 

" Under the present administration, the Secretary himself has 
continued to be the sole co-ordinating agency of the various 



428 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

bureaus and divisions of the Navy Department. The chiefs of 
bureaus still continued to be responsible only to the Secretary. 
No means was provided for co-ordinating their activities in the 
preparation and maintenance of the fleet, except for such spor- 
adic and uncertain co-ordination as the Secretary himself could 
provide. It is, of course, readily apparent that no civilian could 
possibly possess a sufficient technical knowledge of naval and mil- 
itary matters to direct or co-ordinate intelligently the operations 
of the various branches of the naval services, and it must be 
clearly recognized that any Secretary must be guided very 
largely in his decisions and in his co-ordinating activities by the 
advice and assistance of naval officers. The only question at is- 
sue, consequently, is whether this advice shall be responsible ad- 
vice or whether the Secretary shall be forced to depend upon the 
often irresponsible opinions, however sincerely held, of differing 
naval officers." 

This situation resulted inevitably in inefficient and un- 
sound decisions on the part of the Secretary, Admiral 
Sims quoted Captain Pratt's remark concerning the refusal 
of the Secretary in 1914 to ask for the 19,600 men needed 
at that time. " The Secretary," said Captain Pratt, " ac- 
cepted the advice of Admiral Blue, and almost every naval 
man thought that Blue was dead wrong. ... I hold Blue 
very responsible for the advice he gave, . . . but the system 
is wrong, where you can co-operate first with one naval 
officer, then with another and then with a chief of bureau, and 
get just as many different ideas as you talk to men. That 
ought to be co-ordinated under the head who is charged with 
the policy and the plans, so that you do not get this diffu- 
sion of ideas, but do get one concentrated effort." 

V 

Admiral Sims discussed similarly the failure of the Sec- 
retary to prepare the Navy for war : 

" As a result of a peculiar interpretation of the policy of neutral- 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 429 

ity, which the Secretary considered it his duty to enforce in the 
Navy Department^ no adequate steps were taken between 1914 
and 1917 to prepare the Navy for a possible war with Ger- 
many. . . . The Secretary displayed a very great interest in the 
expenditure of funds from tlie point of view of economy alone — 
often without regard to military considerations — . . . and in 
looking out for the welfare of enlisted men, but he consistently re- 
jected or failed to act upon recommendations which were made to 
him to prepare the Navy for war, to draw up adequate and offi- 
cially approved plans, or to provide for the increase of personnel 
necessary for the war complements of the vessels of the Navy. 
. . . There is no record whatever of any action whatever having 
been taken to prepare the Navy especially for such an entrance 
into the war, until after the breach of diplomatic relations. . . . 
So far as the policy of the Secretary was concerned, the European 
war and the possibility of our being drawn into it was officially 
ignored. The result inevitably was, as Admiral McKean, Ad- 
miral Badger, Admiral Benson and Captain Pratt have testified, 
that the Navy as a whole was not in a state of material readiness 
for war in 1917, that it lacked many essential types of ships, and 
that its personnel was hopelessly inadequate, so inadequate, in- 
deed, that Admiral Niblack has stated to you that the chief prob- 
lem of the Navy in the first six months of the war was to train 
men rather than to fight." 

Admiral Sims then discussed the lack of plans in 1917. 
He praised warmly the often vain efforts of the General 
Board, and of Captain Pratt to get action, after war had 
begun, saying that: 

" The more I review the situation as it was in 1917, the more I 
am amazed at the extent of the achievements which the Navy 
accomplished. The fact that the Navy was able to do as well as 
it did, was luidoubtedly due to the efficient and unsparing efforts 
of these officers in the Department. They had recognized the 
conditions long before war broke out and had endeavoured to 
take such steps as they could, to get ready for war. . . . 

". . . The heads of tlie Department, instead of providing the 
effective organization, the enthusiastic leadership and the will to 



430 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

victory which would have made a unit of the Navy Department 
organization, failed to bring about that co-operation and to pro- 
vide that leadership. The individual officers had to do, by their 
own personal efforts and by personal co-operation and confer- 
ence with other officers, what should have been foreseen and pro- 
vided for in the organization of the Department and in its war 
plans." 

Admiral McKean, when asked whether he could give the 
committee the general basic plan on which the Department 
was working in 1917, had completely confirmed this summary 
of Admiral Sims when he said: 

" Impossible. There is no such thing in existence." 

VI 

The results of the lack of preparedness, of the Inefficient 
organization, the absence of policy or plans, of the paci- 
fism of Daniels were clearly shown in the early months of 
the war. Admiral Sims described graphically these results. 

" There could hardly be a greater contradiction than that be- 
tween ^the situation as it actually existed in April, 1917, and that 
which the Secretary has described to you and which he has ex- 
pressed in his reports to the President. Admiral Benson, Ad- 
miral McKean, Admiral Badger, Captain Pratt, all agreed that 
his expression that the Navy was ready from stem to stern on the 
day we declared war was not accurate from the professional 
viewpoint, and explained that it was probably a journalistic 
phrase and that they did not know what the Secretary meant to 
imply by it." 

Yet Mr. Daniels on May 26th had under oath testified 
that the " stem to stern " expression 

" is one of the best statements that I ever made, and one of the 
truest. It is one of my statements that I think is really a good 
epigram and really sums up in a few words the whole story of the 
Navy. If I had written a whole book, I could not have said 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 431 

more truly. . . . The Navy was ready from stem to stern. The 
fleet was ready, for it was mobilized the day war was declared. 
. . . The Navy Department was ready; for every bureau and 
office performed the greatly added duties of war with even greater 
efficiency than they had functioned in time of peace." 

In commenting on this statement of Mr. Daniels, Admiral 
Sims said: 

" The condition of the Navy in 1017 was one of unprepared> 
ness for war. For three years the Department's policy had pre^ 
vented any adequate preparation to meet a situation such as that 
presented on April 6, 1917, when it became necessary for the 
Navy to play its part in the war . . . the only parts of the Navy 
that were at that time in an efficient state as to material and per- 
sonnel were the dreadnaught divisions and some twenty destroy- 
ers which were with these divisions. All the other vessels of 
the Navy were in varying states of material depreciation and 
were all short of crews. In spite of the fact that it should have 
been apparent for at least a year that when the Navy entered 
the war its chief effort must necessarily be directed against com- 
bating submarines, no plans had been prepared for this. The 
types of vessels that were needed were not ready. No effort had 
been made to provide additional vessels of this type or to provide 
the necessary crews. . . . There had not even been any consid- 
eration of the possibility of sending naval craft overseas." 

VII 

One result of the condition of the Navy in 1917, was 
the lack of any aggressive plans, and a long delay before the 
Department could be persuaded to let the Navy fight sub- 
marines in the war zone. 

" In April, 1917," said Admiral Sims, " the whole of the 
plan of the Navy . . . was to mobilize the fleet, to defend 
the Atlantic coast ports, and to provide for an offshore 
patrol by sending out available light forces of the Navy on 
arduous patrol duty along the Atlantic coast, 3,000 miles 
from the nearest submarines." 



432 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

This statement was fully confirmed by the testimony of 
Admirals Benson and Badger and Captain Pratt, as quoted 
by Admiral Sims. Admiral Sims believed this to be due to 
ignorance and inertia. 

" As the Navy Department had no plans for the use of the 
American naval forces in the submarine campaign, and as appar- 
ently no real study had been made of the situation by responsi- 
ble authorities, it is not surprising that the Department did not 
at first hear with enthusiasm the appeal of the Allies for assist- 
ance in the war zone. . . . No policy having been decided upon, 
other than that of meeting each situation as it arose, it became 
necessary to spend long hours on deliberation and discussion of 
each and every individual request for forces. Naturally, too, it 
is only to be expected that it would be somewhat difficult for an 
administration which had been for three years devoting itself in- 
sistently to opposing any effort, looking toward successful war 
operations on the side of the Allies, to change its spots overnight 
and to throw itself suddenly with full vigour into the battle line, 
alongside the Allies. Every suggestion as to the employment of 
forces abroad during the first few months . . . was subjected to 
long deliberations and discussions. ... It was not sufficient to 
say that forces were needed; the Allies must first explain in de- 
tail all their own plans and policies, justify their own conduct 
of the war and explain every conceivable circumstance connected 
with any request for reinforcements. 

". . . In the meantime, the Navy Department, as the Depart- 
ment's witnesses have all testified, were concerned, not primarily 
with defeating the enemy, the German submarines, . . . but 
their chief concern was that of defence. . . . The heads of the 
Department struggled against the greatest difficulties not only in 
getting the Navy ready to fight after war had begun, but also in 
making up their mind as to where the fighting was." 

VIII 

Admiral Sims also effectively demolished Secretary Dan- 
iels' absurd claims that the Navy Department was actuated 
only by the " boldest and most audacious plans " and com- 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 433 

pared the policy actually followed by the Navy in 1917, 
with that insisted upon by the President. 

" It is interesting," remarked the Admiral, " to contrast the 
' bold offensive ' policy which apparently inspired the President 
from the time we entered the war with the policy of inaction, hes- 
itation and delay on the part of the Navy Department. . . . The 
President, as the speech to the officers of the fleet ... in August, 
1917, and his message to me on July 4, 1917, plainly indicate, 
was in favor of acting boldly and disregarding the possibility of 
loss, if the victory might thereby be hastened. . . . Yet at the 
very time that the President was expressing these sentiments, 
the Navy Department was subordinating the sending of assist- 
ance to the Allies to local defensive measures, was considering, 
not the winning of the war, but the saving of the few American 
ships which might have been sunk, if two or three submarines had 
visited the Atlantic coast in 1917. . . •" 

In discussing the President's views on the naval situation 
in 1917, Admiral Sims disclosed the full story of the events 
preceding the President's message of July 4th. 

For three months the Navy Department had refused or 
failed to send its available forces abroad. It had announced 
no policy, formulated no plans. It had refused to adopt or 
assist in the convoy system. It had failed to support Ad- 
miral Sims, to inform him of his activities or even to reply 
to his recommendations. Finallj^, at the end of June, the 
situation appeared so desperate that Admiral Sims felt 
obliged to bring all possible pressure to bear. He appealed 
to Ambassador Page, who cabled the State Department ask- 
ing what the naval war policy was to be. He later sent a 
personal message to the President urging action. 

At the same time Sims suggested to the British Admiralty 
and the French Ministry of Marine that they make represen- 
tations at Washington. So Sims and Jellicoe prepared a 
message that Balfour sent to Lord Northcliffc, then High 
Commissioner at Washington, for transmission to the State 



434 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

Department. The French government also asked greater 
naval co-operation from the United States, especially in the 
convoy system. 

These representations came to the attention of the Presi- 
dent. He was apparently much concerned and much an- 
noyed. He must have taken up the matter with the Navy 
Department. At least two very significant developments are 
to be noted. The President cabled Admiral Sims criticiz- 
ing the British Admiralty for inaction, lack of plans and 
failure to meet the situation aggressively. The Navy De- 
partment suddenly changed its ways, and, in a week. Admiral 
Sims was informed of more favourable action on his rec- 
ommendations than in the previous three months. 

Admiral Sims commented forcibly on these developments. 
" There is a remarkable coincidence," he said, " between the 
time at which the President himself intervened directly in 
naval matters and the time at which the Department began to 
heed the requests from the Allies for reinforcements, and to 
adopt and put into effect measures on which they had long 
been delaying action." 

Of the President's July 4th message. Admiral Sims 
said: 

" I consider this message to be, in effect, not so much a crit- 
icism of the British Admiralty as an indictment of the inaction 
and delays that had characterized the Navy Department's activi- 
ties during the early months of the war." 

In describing the effect of the President's message Admiral 
Sims told of the series of decisions made by the Navy Depart- 
ment almost at the same time. A brief chronological record 
will illustrate his point : 

June 20, 1917: 

Department cables, " In regard to convoy, I consider American 
vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independ- 
ently," and declines further assistance to the Allies. 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 435 

June 21, 1917: 

Admiral Sims appeals to Ambassador Page. 

June 23, 1917: 

State Department writes Navy Department asking statement 
of policy. 

June 24, 1917: 

Department's first cable relating to policy places home defence 
before intervention in war zone. 

June 25, 1917: 

Sims again appeals to Page, also to British and French govern- 
ments. 

June 26, 1917: 

French government cables Washington urging U. S. to assist 
in convoy system. 

June 28, 1917: 

British Foreign Office cables Jellicoe's message to NorthclifFe. 

June 29, 1917: 

Strong cable from Page to State Department. 

July 3, 1917: 

Secretary Daniels signs Captain Pratt's letter announcing pol- 
icy of Navy Department — full co-operation, and willingness 
to send forces abroad subject to home needs, and requirements 
of a possible post-war situation, 

July 4, 1917: 

The President sends a message to Sims. 

July 5, 1917: 

Navy Department adopts convoy system and assigns seven 
cruisers to escort duty. 

July 5-8, 1917: 

Department decides to send thirty additional vessels for duty 
in the war zone, and to send forces to Gibraltar. 

July 7, 1917: 

Department finally grants Sims a staff and announces that 
three officers will be sent ! 



436 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

July 9, 1917: 

Department asks advice as to how troop convoys ought to be 
handled, having learned from first convoy how they should 
not be handled. 

Department cables policy letter of July 3 to Sims, this being 
the first statement of policy he had received. 

July 12, 1917: 

Department takes over German ships to man them in trans- 
port service. 

July 13, 1917: 

Department decides to send forces to Azores region. 

July 20, 1917: 

Department decides to concentrate shipbuilding efforts in a 
destroyer program. 

Admiral Sims was convinced that 

" It was from this time — that is from July 4, approximately — 
that the Navy Department began to act with a certain amount of 
promptness upon the requests from the Allies. ... It is of 
course possible that this sudden change of front in the Navy De- 
partment was due to other causes with which I am not familiar, 
but it is a striking coincidence that this almost unexpected series 
of favourable decisions by the Department should have come in 
the week immediately following the sending of this dispatch by 
the President to me. . . ." 

IX 

Admiral Sims also referred to the impropriety on the part 
of the Secretary in introducing matter reflecting on an allied 
Navy. 

" I regret extremely that the Secretary of the Navy has seen 
fit, in introducing this message of the President, to reflect upon 
the services of the British Admiralty to the Allied cause. It 
was a personal and confidential message, addressed to me, which 
I had guarded with the greatest secrecy. I would have consid- 
ered myself guilty of a grave breach of confidence if I had 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 437 

brought the matter before this Committee. I am also surprised 
that the Secretary of the Navy should introduce this message as 
evidence against me, when the facts which I have just related 
show that the criticisms of the President bear with even greater 
force against the Navy Department, as it was then conducted, 
than against the Admiralty. We can only assume that the Presi- 
dent from the moment that we entered the war was trying to 
carry into effect a vigorous and successful prosecution of the war. 
It seems very probable that the President himself was not fa- 
miliar at the time with the extent to which the Navy Department 
was violating the very principles which he laid down; principles 
which were accepted by the Navy Department almost immedi- 
ately after his message was sent; principles which were in com- 
plete accord with the recommendations which had been made 
by the Department's representative abroad during the previous 
three months; principles which had been insistently but vainly 
urged upon the Department in these months by the General 
Board and by Captain Pratt and other officers in the office of 
Operations, The very fact, that the Department almost imme- 
diately, took favourable action on many matters which had been 
recommended long before, shows how the head of the Depart- 
ment at the time regarded the President's message. It is hardly 
possible that there could have been no connection between the 
President's insistence on boldness and offensive action, and the 
sudden abandonment by the Department of its timid, prudent 
and defensive policy for one of co-operation with the Allies in the 
war zone in the measures which alone could and did meet the 
issue of the submarine campaign. 

X 

The historic character and the unusual phraseology of 
the President's message to Admiral Sims warrant its repro- 
duction. The reply of Admiral Sims to the President is no 
less interesting, as it contains the most excellent description 
of the allied situation at the time, and a full statement of 
what our naval action should be. 

The President's message was : 



438 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" White House, 
" 7 p. m., July 4, 1917. 
" Strictly confidential, for Admiral Sims, from the President. 

" From the beginning of the war I have been greatly surprised 
at the failure of the British Admiralty to use Great Britain's 
naval superiority in an effective way. In the presence of the 
present submarine emergency they are helpless to the point of 
panic. Every plan we suggest they reject for some reason of 
prudence. 

" In my view this is not a time for prudence but for boldness, 
even at the cost of great losses. In most of your dispatches you 
have quite properly advised us of the sort of aid and co-opera- 
tion desired from us by the Admiralty. The trouble is that their 
plans and methods do not seem to us efficacious. 

" I would be very much obliged to you if you would report to 
me, confidentially of course, exactly what the Admiralty has been 
doing and what they have accomplished ; and added to the report 
your own comments and suggestions, based on independent 
thought, as to the whole situation, without regard to the judg- 
ments arrived at on that side of the water. 

" The Admiralty was very slow to adopt the practice of convoy 
and is not now, I judge, protecting convoys on an adequate scale 
within the danger zone, seeming to prefer to keep its small craft 
with the Grand Fleet. The absence of craft for convoy is even 
more apparent on the French coast than on the English coast and 
in the Channel. 

" I do not see how the necessary military supplies and supplies 
of food and fuel oil are to be delivered at British ports in any 
other way within the next few months than under adequate con- 
voy. There will presently not be ships enough and our own ship 
building plans may not begin to yield important results in less 
than eighteen months. 

" I believe that you will keep these instructions absolutely and 
entirely to yourself, and that you will give me such advice as 
you would give if you were handling the situaticn yourself and 
if you were a running a navy of your own." 

Admiral Sims, in reply, sent the following message on 
July 9, 1917 : 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 439 

"July 9, 1917. 

" From : Admiral Sims, American Embassy, London. 
"Via: State Department. 
" To: The President. 

" I have sent by the last mail to the Secretary of the Navy an 
official paper, dated July, and giving the present British naval 
jiolicy, the disposition of the vessels of the fleet and the manner 
and method of their employment. 

" This vi'ill show to what extent the various units of the fleet, 
particularly destroyers, are being used to oppose the submarines, 
to protect shipping and escort convoys. 

" It is hoped and believed that the convoy system will be 
successful. It is being applied as extensively as the number of 
available escort cruisers and destroyers will permit. The paper 
shows also that there remains with the main fleet barely suf- 
ficient destroyers and auxiliary forces to meet on equal terms a 
possible sortie of the German fleet. The opposition to subma- 
rines and the application of the convoy system are rendered pos- 
sible solely by the British main fleet and its continuous readiness 
for action in case the German fleet comes out or attempts any op- 
erations outside the shelter of its fortifications and its minefields. 

" I am also forwarding by next mail copy of a letter, dated 
June 27th, from the Minister of Shipping to the Prime Minister, 
showing the present shipping situation and forecasting the re- 
sults of a continuation of the present rate of destruction. 
Briefly, this shows that this rate is more than three times as great 
as the rate of building. A certain minimum amount of tonnage 
is required to supply the Allied countries and their armies. This 
letter shows that at the present rate of destruction this minimum 
will be reached about next January. This is not an opinion. It 
is a matter of arithmetic. It simply means that if this continues 
the Allies will be forced to an unsatisfactory peace. 

" The North Sea is mined by British and German mines for 
more than a hundred miles north and west of Heligoland up to 
the three-mile limits of Denmark and Holland. Over thirty 
tliousand mines have been laid and additional mines are being 
laid. 



440 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

" It is through these neutral waters that almost all subma- 
rines have been passing. 

" A sea attack alone upon German ports or any heavily forti- 
fied ports could not succeed against the concealed guns of mod- 
ern defences. 

" I have just been informed that preparations are now being 
made by a combined sea and land attack to force back the Ger- 
man right flank and deny the use of Zeebrugge as a destroyer 
base, though not yet definitely decided by the War Council; that 
this would have been done long ago but for disagreements be- 
tween the Allies. 

" The German fleet has not left the neighbourhood of Heligo- 
land for about a year. 

" I am aware of but two plans suggested by our government 
for preventing the egress of German submarines. These were 
contained in the Department's dispatches of April 17th and May 
llih, and were answered in my dispatches of April 18th and May 
14th, respectively. 

" These same suggestions and many similar ones have been and 
continue to be made by people of all classes since the beginning 
of the war. I have been shown the studies of the proposed 
plans, and consider them impractical. 

" It is my opinion that the war will be decided by the success 
or failure of the submarine campaign. Unless the allied lines of 
communication can be adequately protected, all operations on 
shore must eventually fail. For this reason and as further de- 
scribed in my various dispatches, the sea war must remain here 
in the waters surrounding the United Kingdom. The latest in- 
formation is available here and can be met only by prompt 
action here. It is wholly impossible to attempt to direct or to 
properly co-ordinate operations through the medium of com- 
munications, by letter or cable. 

" Therefore, as requested by you, if I had complete control of 
our sea forces with the success of the allied cause solely in view, 
I would immediately take the following steps : 

" 1st. Make immediate preparations to throw into the war 
area our maximum force; prepare the fleet immediately for dis- 
tant service. As the fleet, in case it does move, would require a 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 441 

large force of protective light craft, and as such craft would 
delay the fleet's movements, we should advance to European 
waters all possible craft of such description, either in service or 
which can be immediately commandeered and put into service; 
that is, destroyers, armed tugs, yachts, light cruisers, revenue 
cutters, minelayers, minesweepers, trawlers, gunboats and similar 
craft. 

" 2nd. Such a force, while waiting for the fleet to move, 
should be employed to the maximum degree in putting down the 
enemy submarine campaign and in escorting convoys of mer- 
chant ships and troops, and would be in position at all times to 
fall back on our main fleet if it approached these waters. 

" 3rd. Prepare the maximum number of supply and fuel 
ships and be prepared to support our heavy forces in case they 
are needed. 

" 4th. Concentrate all naval construction on destroyers and 
light craft. Postpone construction of heavy craft and depend 
upon the fact, which I believe to be true, that regardless of any 
future developments we can always count upon the support of 
the British Navy. I have been assured of this by important gov- 
ernment officials. 

" 5th. As far as consistent with the above building program 
of light craft, particularly destroyers, concentrate all other ship 
building on merchant tonnage. Divert all possible shipping to 
supplying the Allies. 

" 6th. As the convoy system for merchant shipping at present 
aff'ords better promise than any other means for insuring the 
safety of lines of communication to all military and naval forces 
on all fronts, we should lend every support possible to insure suc- 
cess to this, and we should co-operate with the British authorities 
in the United States, and here, who are attempting to carry out 
the convoy system. 

" I believe the above advice to be in accordance with the funda- 
mental principles of military warfare. The first step is to estab- 
lish here in London a branch of our War Council, upon whose 
advice you can thoroughly depend. Until this is done, it will be 
impossible to insure that the part which the United States takes 
in this war, v/hcther it is won or lost, will be that which the fu- 



442 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

ture will prove to have been the maximum possible. It is quite 
impracticable for me, nearly single-handed, to accumulate all the 
necessary information, and it is not only impracticable but unsafe 
to depend upon decisions made in Washington, which must neces- 
sarily be based upon incomplete information since such informa- 
tion cannot be efficiently communicated by letter or cable. 

" This can be assured if I be given adequate staff or competent 
officers of the required training and experience. 

" I urgently recommend that they be selected from the younger 
and most progressive types, preferably War College graduate 
men, of the type of Twining, Pratt, Knox, McNamee, Stirling, 
Cone, Coffee, Cotton, King, Pye. 

" I wish to make it perfectly clear that my reports and dis- 
patches have been in all cases an independent opinion, based 
uj)on specific and official facts and data which I have collected in 
the various Admiralty and other government departments. They 
constitute my own conviction and hence comply with your request 
for an independent opinion." 



XI 

In his statement Admiral Sims emphasized the significance 
of this message. It was far from being filled with the 
" vague generalities," of which Mr. Daniels had spoken in 
describing it. It was, in effect, a restatement of all of Ad- 
miral Sims' previous recommendations, the outline of a 
policy and of plans that should have been adopted three 
months previously, but which, in point of fact, were in many 
cases not adopted until at least three months later. 

" I think it hardly necessary to comment further upon this 
message. Every one of the six steps which I recommended to 
the President in this dispatch could have been, and should have 
been, part of the primary plan which should have been, and could 
have been, put into effect on the day we declared war. With the 
information then available every one of these steps could have 
been and should have been foreseen; and if there had been an 
adequate planning section in the Department, and if the head of 






SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 443 

the Department had approved the action of such a planning sec- 
tion, some such plan would have been formulated and would have 
been put into effect at once. 

" The Department's witnesses, especially Admiral Badger and 
Captain Pratt, have testified that they recommended practically 
the same measures in ]\Iarch, April and May, but without success. 
I had been recommending these very same measures since April 
14th, 1917, equally without success. 

" Within a very short time after the President had sent this 
message to me and I had replied, the Department had acted in 
the manner recommended in my reply to him, and had adopted 
the various recommendations as being essential to a successful 
prosecution of the war against the submarines. 

" It is frankly absurd to claim that I have been contending 
that I was the only officer in the Navy whose judgment should 
have been accepted ; but it so happened that I was the officer sent 
abroad to represent the Department and to obtain from the 
Allied Admiralties, and from the British Admiralty, principally, 
tlie information upon which the Department could base its ac- 
tion. It was, therefore, inevitable that the information which 
I sent should come from British or Allied sources. 

" It was, therefore, equally inevitable that the recommenda- 
tions which I made, and which were in complete agreement with 
the war experience of the Allies, should be more sound than those 
made by any officer, no matter how intelligent or how highly 
trained, who did not possess this same information, and who did 
not have this same opportunity of discussmg the situation with 
the responsible heads of the Allied Navies. No plan based on 
insufficient information and incorrect premises can ever be suc- 
cessful, no matter how logically based upon false premises, how 
striking, how bold, or how spectacularly attractive it may seem. 

" I am not contending that the officers of the Department were 
inefficient, or that they failed in any respect to do their duty 
according to their lights. I am trying simply to make clear tliat 
they necessarily could not have had the information that was 
wholly essential to make decisions involving the details of opera- 
tions in the war zone and, for the same reasons, they could not 
intelligently review such decisions. My criticisms are not di- 



444 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

reeled against these officers, who I am confident in every instance 
were putting forth their best efforts, but against the condition in 
the Department which made it impossible for them to work as 
efficiently as would otherwise have been possibly the case." 



XII 

The part of Admiral Sims' final statement devoted to the 
analysis of the testimony of the Secretary has already been 
quoted in the chapters dealing with that testimony. It may 
be of interest at this time, however, in view of Mr. Daniels' 
violent personal attacks, to include for the sake of contrast 
Admiral Sims' summary of the responsibility of Secretary 
Daniels for the condition of the Navy in 1917. 

The Admiral, after reviewing the various causes for our 
unpreparedness, and for our comparative ineffectiveness in 
the early months of the war, said : 

" If there had been in the Navy Department a true apprecia- 
tion of the mission for which the Navy exists, every effort would 
have been made during 1916, and perhaps during 1915, to man 
and prepare for war the existing light craft, and to hasten the 
construction of as many additional craft as possible of the type 
which, in the opinion of the professional observers, would be 
needed, if war became necessary. 

" The witnesses have agreed that for reasons which seemed 
mysterious to most of them, the navy was directed by a pacifistic 
inteivpretation of the policy of neutrality, and that the policy of 
the Department was largely responsible for the unpreparedness 
which existed in 1917. 

" All of the witnesses in referring' to the conditions prevailing 
between 1915 and 1917, and in the early months of the war, have 
also agreed that, under the existing organization of the Navy 
Department, the only responsible authority is the head of that 
Department. Inasmuch as no naval officer was given responsi- 
bility under his direction for the co-ordination of the military ac- 
tivities of the navy, no single naval officer can be held responsible 
for what happened. The responsibility must rest where the au- 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 445 

thority rests, that is, with the head of the Department. All of 
the officers have testified that such is the case. 

" These same officers, in commenting upon the Department's 
methods, have pointed out many instances in which the Secretary 
followed, in many cases, a variety of advice given him by bureau 
chiefs, or by other officials who were not concerned with any sub- 
jects other than those of their own division or bureau, and whose 
recommendations, in many cases, were not based upon the general 
needs of the navy, but upon the conceptions of those individual 
officers as to what those needs might be, or as to the wishes and 
needs of their own divisions. 

" The witnesses have testified, as did Admiral Benson, Admiral 
McKean and Captain Pratt, that, in their conferences with the 
Secretary of the Navy, the term ' war ' was practically never 
used. In substance, they substantiated the testimony of other 
witnesses, such as Captain Laning and Admiral Plunkett, who 
called attention to the Secretary's unwillingness even to consider 
the idea of war having anything to do with the administration of 
the navy. These officers pointed out repeated cases in which 
action was held up for long periods by the failure of the Secre- 
tary of the Navy to take action himself or permit the Chief of 
Naval Operations to take action which seemed, in the opinion of 
that officer, to be necessary. 

" Tliere has never been any disposition to question the good in- 
tentions of the Secretary of the Navy. It could hardly be 
doubted that he has the welfare of the service keenly at heart. 
But it also seems perfectly clear and perfectly well established, by 
the testimony of the Department's witnesses, which has already 
been quoted, that, in the very essential matter of preparing the 
navy for war by drawing up war plans, by insuring material 
readiness and by providing and training adequate personnel, 
the Secretary either failed, or refused, to consider or act upon 
the conception that the chief function of the navy is to be pre- 
pared to carry out the national policies in time of war. Sufficient 
testimony has been introduced on this point to place it beyond the 
possibility of reasonable doubt. Our navy was not ready in 
April, 1917, to enter immediately the campaign against the Ger- 
man submarine, and to exert its full force in protecting the over- 



446 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

seas communications of the allied forces, or in transporting and 
supplying our own forces to be sent overseas. No adequate steps 
had been taken to meet the particular situation which we faced 
when war began and it took many months after the actual declar- 
ation of war before the navy was permitted to act effectively in 
this campaign." 

XIII 

The part of Admiral Sims' first statement which had been 
most severely condemned, not only by the Secretary but by 
half a dozen of the departmental naval witnesses, was the 
Admiral's estimate of the probable results of the conditions 
he had criticized. Few of the officers had really questioned 
the validity of the criticisms, or the existence in 1917, of the 
conditions described by Sims. Many of them took issue with 
his estimate that these resulted in prolonging the war four 
months, by the unnecessary sinking of 2,500,000 tons of ship- 
ping, and that 500,000 lives and $15,000,000,000 had been 
needlessly sacrificed by this postponement of victory. 

Few officers, however, really disagreed with Admiral Sims. 
They accepted his premises, but refused to draw the logical 
conclusion. This Admiral Sims proved by quotations from 
nearly all of the departmental witnesses. 

In summarizing the testimony, he said: 

" Practically all of these witnesses, while stating firmly per- 
sonal opinions in contradiction to the results of my estimate, in 
their testimony confirmed in fact the premises upon which my 
estimate was based. 

" Manifestly their inability to draw a logical conclusion from 
these premises has no bearing upon the chief contention which I 
made, that is, that the Navy Department's delays and lack of 
preparedness did result in postponing the active intervention of 
our full naval force for many months ; that this naval force, 
when it did exert its power, contributed out of all proportion to 
its numbers to the victory, and consequently resulted in shorten- 
ing tlie war. The Secretary of the Navy, Admiral McKcan, and 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 447 

other witnesses, have themselves told you that the war was short- 
ened from six to nine months by our activities when once we did 
begin fighting wholeheartedly. If our naval force, after it got 
into action, by assisting very materially in combating the sub- 
marine menace, by making possible the safe transport of an army 
(principally after March, 1918) shortened the war, it must be 
equally apparent that if this naval force had been in the field 
from April, 1917, on, the submarine menace would have been 
checked and gotten in hand much sooner; the transport of troops 
overseas could have been expedited, and the war could have been 
shortened still further. 

" In my previous estimate before you, I merely assumed that, 
if our intervention had been effective from four to six months 
earlier than it actually was, we would have shortened the total 
duration of the war, not only the six or nine months mentioned 
by these witnesses, but ten months or a year. The Secretary 
and Admiral McKean have told you that in 1917, and even in 
1918, it was believed that the war would not be ended until the 
summer or fall of 1919. They ascribed the victory of 1918 to 
two causes, which are very intimately connected ; first, to the 
breakdown of the morale of German population; and, second, to 
the effectiveness of the American intervention. They have all 
admitted that the American intervention had a tremendous effect 
in depressing the morale of the Germans, and convincing them of 
the futility of further prolongation of the war. From their 
own arguments, therefore, it appears that, if our intervention had 
been effective earlier, the German morale would have similarly 
broken down earlier; that, therefore, the victory of the Allies 
would inevitably have been accomplished earlier than it actually 
was. 

" It should be clearly understood in all this discussion that I 
have not at any time condemned the navy for prolonging the war. 
I have not insisted that the sacrifices of blood and treasure, to 
which I referred, could be rightly charged to the navy itself, or 
indeed that the responsibility rested upon any individual in or out 
of the navy. I merely stated an obvious military' conclusion — 
that mistakes and delays in warfare are detrimental; that even if 
they do not bring defeat they cause unnecessary losses and un- 



448 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

necessary prolongation of the warfare. Every student of mili- 
tary history, however amateur he may be, is, of course, thor- 
oughly familiar with this fact. He knows as well as I that the 
price one j^ays for unpreparedness for war, and incompetence in 
the conduct of war, for delays and military mistakes in the face 
of the enemy, is either military disaster or unnecessary losses. 

" Fortunately, conditions were such in the Great War that we 
escaped military disaster. We escaped any very great losses of 
men. But it does not follow at all that our sacrifices in bringing 
about the victory were not unnecessarily great, because of the de- 
lays and errors which marked the early months of tlie war in 
1917. There is, of course, ample room for very great differences 
of opinion as to the extent of these delays and the resulting sac- 
rifices. So far as the investigation is concerned it seems to me 
that the size of the estimate is a matter of no consequence. If, 
as a result of mistakes and delaj^s, the war was delayed a single 
day or a single thousand of lives were lost unnecessarily, I should 
consider my criticisms more than justified, if they had as their 
result such a careful analysis of the causes as to make impos- 
sible the repetition in the future of similar mistakes and the con- 
sequent danger of disaster. 

". . . The Department's witnesses ... all admitted that the 
American forces, once they entered the war, did very effective 
work, and that it would have bee-n very much better, and greater 
results would have been accomplished, if we could have gotten our 
forces over sooner. These officers have also testified that, in 
their belief the navy, when it did get into the war, shortened the 
duration of the war from six to nine months. In view of this 
fact, it seems that my own estimate, that if we could have been 
in the field in the first month in adequate numbers, instead of 
six months later, we would have still further shortened the war, 
has been abundantly confirmed. Therefore, in order that my es- 
timate may be less distasteful to some of my critics, let me state 
it this way. The navy in the war performed splendid and mag- 
nificent services to the cause of the Allies. By their efficiency 
and because of the ability, initiative and enthusiasm with which 
their personnel performed their duties, they contributed to the 



SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 449 

victory out of all proportion to their actual numbers. As a re- 
sult of their efforts, the war ended in November, 1918, instead of 
running until the following summer. The navy, therefore, was 
to a great degree responsible for shortening the war from six to 
nine months. 

" If the navy had been permitted to get into action from the 
first month of the war, if the Navy Department had been ade- 
quately prepared for war, if it had had plans for the kind of 
war that the navy had to fight in 1917, if it had co-operated 
wholeheartedly with the Allies from the very beginning, our 
navy's achievements would have been even greater. Having 
gotten into the war earlier it would in that earlier period have 
done just as much and just as splendid service as it actually did 
do later. The navy, therefore, instead of having the credit for 
shortening the war six to nine months would have had the credit 
of shortening it from ten months to a year. This estimate is in 
effect the same as my original one, but I imagine that, stated in 
this way it may be more agreeable to those who are apparently 
concerned more with the form than with the substance of the 
criticism." 



CHAPTER XXIII 
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 



THE hearings in the naval investigation came to an end 
on May 28, 1920. Chairman Hale in the last session read 
letters from Rear Admirals Fiske and Fullam replying to 
the personal attacks made upon them by Mr. Daniels, and 
completely refuting his charges. Admiral Fiske emphasized 
a point that is worth noting. The preparedness measures 
put into effect before war began, the ajjproval of the admin- 
istrative plan, in 1915 ; the creation of the Office of Naval 
Operations in 1915, the establishment of the Naval Consult- 
ing Board in 1915 ; were all measures Fiske had advocated 
for two years before the Secretary finally approved or ac- 
cepted them. As a result of Admiral Fiske's fight for pre- 
paredness these measures were put into effect. They pro- 
vided at least an initial step toward preparedness and made 
it possible in 1917 to get the Navy ready for war and into 
the war, with a delay of only six months. Without these 
measures, which Secretary Daniels had long opposed, the 
Navy Department, as Admirals Benson and McKean and 
Captain Pratt admitted, would have been in worse chaos, 
than that which Captain Pratt described as existing in April, 
1917. 

II 

The evidence presented to the committee has been fully 

reviewed. The conclusions to be drawn with regard to the 

correctness of Admiral Sims' criticisms are too obvious to re- 

450 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 451 

quire statement. Every essential point was fully proven 
not by assertion, by personal opinions however authoritative, 
but by the evidence of the official records and the admissions 
of the naval officers who served in the most responsible posi- 
tions in the Navy Department before and during the war. 



Ill 

The causes of our unpreparedness for war, of the De- 
partment's delays in getting the Navy into the war, of the 
errors that were made, were made equally clear by nearly 
every officer who testified. 

These can be stated briefly in the order of their im- 
portance. 

1. The Navy Department imposed on the Navy a pacifistic 
interpretation of neutrality which made any real prepared- 
ness measures for our war with Germany impossible before 
March, 1917. The Secretary of the Navy himself was re- 
sponsible for this situation. 

2. The Navy Department lacked a sound consistent policy, 
based upon our national policies and upon a consideration 
of our interests. As a result there was no general unity 
of purpose or action in the activities of the Department. 

3. The Navy Department lacked entirely officially ap- 
proved plans to insure adequate preparedness before war 
began or to make possible quick and successful operations 
after a declaration of war. The lack of plans was due 
partly to the pacifism of the Secretary, partly to the lack 
of a general naval polic}', partly to the inefficient organiza- 
tion of the Department. 

4. The Navy Department organization was inefficient and 
" unfit to conduct \var." It consisted in reality of at least 
thirteen independent organizations. Each of these had its 
own policies, its own plans, its own interests, and there was 
no common polic}', no unity of purpose, such as could only 



452 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

have been brought about by the establishment of a unified 
departmental policy and of departmental plans based on this 
policy. As a result the activities were poorly co-ordinated. 
Naval considerations and needs were subordinated to a 
great variety of other motives. During the war the De- 
partment became after a year a fairly well unified organi- 
zation, but only because the individual parts voluntarily 
recognized the authority of the office of operations. 

5. The inefficient organization of the Department was due 
largely to Mr. Daniels himself. Probably through fear that 
his autocratic and irresponsible control of funds and of pat- 
ronage might be hampered or made a matter of official record, 
the Secretary consistently opposed any effort to improve the 
organization, so as to make it fit to handle naval matters 
and to function efficiently in making the Navy ready for war 
and in directing its operations successfully in war. Even 
when the office of Naval Operations was created, he limited 
its activities with a jealous eye. He failed even to order 
to the Office of Operations, the number of officers provided for 
by Congress. 

6. The Secretary refused to listen to talk of war or of 
preparedness. All of his naval advisers admitted this. He 
was concerned solely with the purely peace activities ; with 
economy in expenditure, with semi-socialistic enterprises such 
as the establishment of industrial plants to manufacture 
armour, guns, clothing, etc. ; with measures advertised as in- 
spired by a desire to improve the lot of the enlisted men, 
which were either totally impracticable and had to be aban- 
doned, or were detrimental and demorahzing in their effect on 
the Navy, in creating discontent and insubordination, and 
in destroying discipline and morale. 

7. In his selection of officers to serve in important posi- 
tions in the Department and in the fleet, the Secretary 
usually acted on his own initiative without even consulting 
his chief naval advisers. His selections sometimes amazed 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 453 

and dismayed the service. Officers whose previous careers 
indicated no outstanding quality except a degree of subordi- 
nation to authority, amounting to subser\aency, were often 
selected to the most responsible positions, to be Chief of 
Naval Operations, Chiefs of Bureaus, Commanders-in-Chief 
of the Fleets. Officers who fought for sound organization, 
for naval preparedness, for the placing of the primary em- 
phasis on the naval rather than the civil aspects of the Navy, 
were forced out of responsible positions. Officers who wanted 
to serve in the Department had to sacrifice the good of the 
Navy to their own ambitions. The result was fatal to the 
spirit and morale of the whole service. Stagnation, cynical 
despair, often took the place of the old splendid spirit of the 
Navy. 

IV 

The statement of the condition that prevailed in the Navy 
from 1913 to 1917, and the analysis of the causes of these 
conditions suffice to make clear the naval lessons of the war. 
The mere statement of the conditions is in itself a suggestion 
of the lesons to be derived from our naval experiences in the 
Great War. The testimony presented to the Senate com- 
mittee deserves to become a classic document in the study of 
war. A careful analysis of the evidence and a real applica- 
tion of the results of such an analysis will prevent any re- 
currence in future of the situation that confronted the Navy 
and the country in 1917. 

Any final statement of war experience and its significance is 
not 3'et possible. The summary that is given below is there- 
fore only intended as a tentative suggestion of conclusions 
to be drawn from the evidence now available. 



454 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 



CONCLUSIONS 

The chief naval lessons that we can draw from our experi- 
ence in the great war would appear to be the following: 

1. Naval policy must depend upon national policies. The 
Navy is only the agency for carrying out national policies 
when diplomacy fails and the test of war comes. 

2. The size and strength of the Navy, the types of ships 
and other craft to compose the fighting fleets, the strategical 
plans for the use of the Navy in war, must be determined by 
a careful analysis of the kind and extent of naval power nec- 
essary to assure national defence and the maintenance of 
national policies. 

3. The naval policy must be modified from time to time 
to meet world developments, especially progress in materiel 
inventions and changes in world politics. It is absurd and 
useless to build war ships except for definite purposes. 
These purposes can only be determined by a consideration 
of the use to which the navy would be put. This, in turn, 
depends upon international relations. 

4. From 1913 to 1917, these principles were consistently 
ignored and violated. Naval policy was not formulated to 
suit the world conditions and our own national policies. As 
a result, when our intervention in the war became necessary, 
the Navy was unable for a long period to support by suc- 
cessful operations our national policies. 

5. The Navy Department must be reorganized. It must 
be given an organization adapted to war purposes and pri- 
marily intended to conduct war successfully. The Navy 
exists in time of peace only that we may depend upon its 
fighting effectiveness in time of war. The Department should 
be so organized as to provide a definite delegation of au- 
thority and to place the making of purely naval decisions in 
the hands of properly qualified men, while leaving the de- 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 455 

termination of general policy in the hands of the representa- 
tive of the national Administration, the Secretary of the 
Navy. 

6. The Navy Department, in order to be fit to prepare 
for and conduct war, must have a single highly developed 
thinking and planning body, to provide a systematic, or- 
ganized and intelligent direction like that possessed by all 
large business concerns, but heretofore lacking in the Navy 
Department. The planning body must provide methods for 
carrying out the naval policy determined upon by the admin- 
istration, to insure the effective enforcement of our national 
policies, 

7. The Navy Department must be so organized that its 
executive head shall receive responsible advice on purely naval 
questions, based upon a systematic and thorough study of 
naval conditions and in accord with the naval policy deter- 
mined upon. Responsibility and authority must be defined 
and determined and must go hand in hand. 

8. The Navy Department must have its various bureaus 
and subdivisions so co-ordinated, preferably by the Chief of 
Naval Operations instead of by the Civilian Secretary as at 
present, as to make sure that every activity of the Navy, and 
every penny spent on the Navy shall be devoted exclusively 
to carr3'ing into effect the detailed departmental plans based 
on the naval policy decided upon. 

9. The Chief of Naval Operations should be the officer 
whom the leading minds of the Navy judge to be the best 
qualified in strategy, tactics, logistics and administration to 
prepare the Navy for war. To him should be delegated the 
task of so preparing it ; on him should be placed the re- 
sponsibility ; to him should be given the necessary authority. 
His work must of course be carried on under the general di- 
rection of the Secretary, who should always have the power 
to enter as much or as little into the details of his sub- 
ordinates' work as he wish. In order, however, to fix re- 



456 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

sponsbiility and to prevent careless or irresponsible inter- 
ference, it ought to be distinctly and definitely provided that 
all orders issued by the Secretary, that involve the move- 
ments of fighting forces or deal with matters of strategy, 
tactics, logistics or administration, should be given to the 
Chief of Naval Operations in writing. There should be a 
definite and unmistakable record of every official action of 
the Secretary. Only in this way can a genuine accounting be 
had from him for the exercise of the very great and despotic 
powers over the naval service which pertain to his office. 

10. Congress should not attempt itself to determine naval 
plans or to make naval technical decisions as to the best way 
of carrying out that policy. Congress, in conjunction with 
the Administration, should determine our national policy, 
and thus our basic naval policy. It should leave the carry- 
ing out of this naval policy in the hands of the men educated 
by the government for the naval service. It should decide the 
amount of money the nation can afford to spend on the Navy, 
and require strict accountability for all expenditures. It 
should not decide by Act of Congress how the money should 
be spent in detail. In other words, there should be a naval 
budget. The Department should have power to use the bud- 
get in the way that will best fit the Navy for its mission. 

11. The fleet should be limited to such vessels and other 
craft as we would actually use in case of war. They should 
have on board in time of peace sufficient men to make pos- 
sible immediate offensive action in case of war. The fleet 
should be constantly maintained, and trained, as a unit to 
obtain command of the sea by winning naval victories and 
so exercise the command effectively when obtained. In the 
interest of economy in time of peace and of efficiency in time 
of war, every useless ship should be scrapped. From a mil- 
itary point of view, these old and useless ships must be con- 
sidered so much junk: in time of peace they require excessive 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 457 

and disproportionate expenditures of money and dock yard 
services and they require crews that could be better employed 
on effective ships ; in time of war they will be an encumbrance 
to the fleet and a death-trap to their crews. Furthermore, 
their retention on the Navy list gives an utterly exaggerated 
impression, at least to the uninitiated, of our naval strength, 
for such impressions are normally based on the total quan- 
tities, on the number and gross tonnage of the ships of the 
Navy, without regard to the absence of fighting value in the 
case of these obsolete ships — ships that, as Lord Fisher ex- 
pressed it, " can neither fight nor run away " from modern 
ships. No vessels should be kept in the navy unless required 
for its war efficiency. Emphasis should be placed on fighting 
qualities rather than on mere size. Numbers are ineffective 
against efficiency, training and wise leadership. 

12. The personnel should be sufficient to man the fighting 
fleet of the power required for our national defence and for 
the maintenance of those national policies imposed upon us 
by the policies of other nations. Our personnel should be 
trained not for peace time drills, alone, but for war opera- 
tions. The officers especially should be taught, not alone how 
to command the naval forces, but particularly how to com- 
mand them in war. Their real study of strategy and tactics 
should begin, not toward the end of their career, as at pres- 
ent, but at the start. They should keep abreast of their ad- 
vancement in rank and responsibility by periodic instruction 
throughout their careers. 

13. The Navy should be so organized and conducted that 
naval progress will be continuous. It should have ample pro- 
vision for the study and development of new methods and 
new weapons. Advancement should be based upon ability, 
achievement and leadership, and should not be an automatic 
progression by mere seniority. 

14. No officer should hold a high command who has not 



458 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

successfully completed the Naval War College course. The 
ability shown by officers in the work at the Naval War Col- 
lege should be largely considered in determining their pro- 
motions and assignments. Appointments to high commands 
at the initiative of the civilian Secretary alone is fatal to 
efficiency. The Secretary should be obliged to select officers 
recommended or approved by his senior naval advisers. 
They alone are in a position to judge of the professional as 
distinguished from the political and social accomplishments 
of an officer. 

15. The Navy itself must clarify its thought, unify its 
efforts. It must stand out for the efficiency of the Navy 
and the good of the country. It must resist any tendency to 
disregard military needs and to use the Navy as a political 
tool. The officers of the Navy must maintain the spirit of 
their service and unite against such mistaken policies and 
such ignoring of real necessities as have occurred during 
the last administration. The Navy must clean house, erad- 
icate sycophancy, and brand the time servers in its own ranks 
who betray the Navy for their personal advancement. 

16. The country must take a more active interest in the 
welfare of its first line of defence. It must insist on having 
full and correct reports of the condition of the Navy. It 
must demand and exact a full responsibility from the officials 
entrusted with the direction and administration of the Navy. 
Naval officers should be permitted a greater liberty of ex- 
pression in order that the repetition of such a demoralizing 
tyranny as that of Mr. Daniels may be prevented. 

VI 

Theodore Roosevelt stated the fundamental principles un- 
derlying naval administration and policy, in his letter to the 
Senate in February, 1909, transmitting the report of the 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 459 

]Mahan-Moody commission on naval reorganization. After 
referring to the principles laid down by Admiral Mahan, 
Roosevelt said: 

" In their essence these principles amount to a declaration that 
the Navy should be treated, not witli a view to any special or lo- 
cal interest, but from the standpoint of the interests of the whole 
country, and that all other considerations should be suboidinated, 
to keeping it in the highest condition of military efficiency, for it 
must be prepared for war, or else it is useless, and it cannot be 
prepared for war unless always in the highest state of military 
efficiency. The whole object of the organization of the Navy 
Department is to create machinery which will, in time of peace, 
prepare for war. ..." 

The organization should be " based upon the fundamental 
and all-essential proposition that a navy exists and ought 
only to exist for war and for war alone: for the efficacy of 
the Navy in securing and guaranteeing peace depends ab- 
solutely upon its evident efficiency for war. Preparation 
for war can only be thorough and complete if the Secre- 
tary has the same expert military assistance and the same 
advisers in time of peace as in time of war. . . . 

" Perfection of organization and training and perfect pre- 
paredness cost no more than slip-shod inefficiency in so 
spending money as to disregard, or even prevent or impede, 
proper training and preparedness. . . . Money should be 
spent wisely instead of, as at present, spending it so that a 
certain proportion is wasted in friction or useless work. 
Training and preparation are essential elements of suc- 
cess in war. It is necessary to have the best ships and to 
have a sufficient number of them ; but the number and charac- 
ter of ships will not necessarily bring victory. Efficiency in 
organization and personnel must be the main dependence in 
securing victory where there is even an approximate equality 
in material." 



460 NAVAL LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR 

The disregard of the fundamental principles from 1913 to 
1917 was fully established in the naval investigation. The 
naval lessons of the war are nothing more than their reasser- 
tion. In the face of the present world situation to the West 
of us as well as to the East of us, they cannot longer be 
ignored with impunity. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



•' Administration of the Navy Department. 

Memorandum by Admiral Fiske 212 
Admiralty, Board of. See, Board of Ad 

miralty 
Aftermath of war, 26 
Aid for operations, 210 
Aid system, 21, 233 
Air service in 1913, 240 
Allied conferences, 105 j„^„ra 

Allied decorations. See, Foreign decora- 
tions 
Allied fleets. Effect of, 314 „ ^„ 

Allied lines of communication 117. 44U 
Allied Naval Council. 105. 107, Ibb-iao, 

158. 378 
Allied policy 
Influence of Sims on, 382 
Daniels criticizes. 372-3/^ 

^^cSiperation with. 87. 107. 123-125. 195- 
196, 293, 331-332 

Plans of, 87 

Prejudice agamst, 343-344 
American coast. See. Atlantic coast 
American Defence Society, 227 
American forces. Work of, 448 
American interests. Protection of (Ben- 

Amedc^iti intervention defeated Germany. 

152 
American policy. See, National policies 
American troops _„. ,^ ,.„ 

Brigading with Allied troops, 148 
Misleading reports regardmg, 30 
Numbers transr»rted overseas. 394 
Protection of, 368, 383-388 
Sims's statements regarding, 147-1^ 
Transport routes determined by bims, 

Tr^Wtation of. 115. 150 152. 202. 306 
AmericaWaters, Attacks in. not probable. 

Anti'slbmarinecraft.118-119 150 338^^^^^ 

also, Destroyers. Light Craft. Yacnts 
Anti-submarine methods, 382 
"^ti submarine warfare." Mernorandum 

from Bureau of Ordnance. 372-3/3 
Arctic coast, 131 .„. 

Armed merchantmen, 134. 185. 3/y. 4cii 
Armistice, 34. 38, 45 
Armistic- Day, '2-73 
Armored cruisers, 164, 242 
Army and Navy cooperation, 24b. c^ee 

also. Joint Board , _^ ^^ 
Army and Navy Journal. 54-55 . .^. „, 
A^y, Criticism of, ascribed to Admiral 

Sims, 142 



Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Office 

created. 15 
Associated Press. 96 
Atlantic coast. 84 131-132, 187 
Atlantic Fleet. 105, 190-195 
AulStlc. Protected steamship. lane across, 

134 
Aviation r o^c 

Fiske on needs of, 24fa 

Forces sent to France, 129 

Naval, 31, 246 . 

New problems arising from, 89 

Unnreparedness in (FuUam), 24t. 
Azores, 125, 12&-132, 189 



Babcock, Comdr. J. V . 99, 126 

iSer.%^ra^-c' J-. Testimony of. 

281-282. 295-304 
Bainbridge, Captain William. 13 
Baker, Newton D., Secretary of War, 32 
Balfour, Hon. Arthur J.. 148, 433 
Baltimore, U.S.S., 17 
Bamett. Gen. George. 53 
Barron. Captain Samuel, 15 
Bases in France established, 128 
Battle-cruiser raid on convoys. 134 
Battle of Jutland. 186. 330 

^^Clrk^. requested by British Navy. 
124. 310-311 ^ , Q^ «o9 ooo 
Delay in sending abroad, 85, 332-^33 
Condition of, in 1917, 164, Ibb. ^u/. 

264-267. 365 
Misleading reports regardmg, 30 
Reserve Force fleet 189 ^-^.0^0 

Bayley. Admiral Sir Lewis 147. 156. 358 
Beatty. Admiral David. 124 
^'Awarded Slsfi^Sished Service Medal. 72 
Authorizes sending battleships abroad 85 
Considered Germany a possible foe, Slii 
Fullam writes to. 241 
Hostility to ideas from abroad, 34.J 
Ignorant of the Secretary's attitude, 335 
Not a graduate of the Naval War College, 

Op^n?on of Admiral Sims's jud^ent 334 
Relations with the Secretary, 327-329 
Reserve Force authorized by. 172 
Sims's contentions admitted by. 344 
<;im<;'s statement regardmg, 4iu-4ii 
Statement Regarding naval conditions 

in 1917, 336 
Testimony of, 281, 3^J -s-^J 
Testimony regarding war pans, 284-29-5 
Visit abroad, 117-118, 123-126 



463 



464 



INDEX 



Benson. Admiral W. S.~cont. 
War plans approved by, 167 

s^L?",'!.'?^.",^'"**-™<^*^'ons to Sims. 

o2, 143-144, 410 
Berehaven, 125 

"Black" war plan. See, War plans 
B iss. Gen. Tasker H., 148, 152 
Blue, Rear Admiral Victor. 176-177 221 

240,282,320 '"-i". ^^i. 

Board of Admiralty, Effort to create, 15 
Board of Admiralty, British. See, British 

Board of Admiralty 
Board of Inspection, 326 

Bo^d ^^^^ Awards. See, Knight 
Board of Navy Commissioners, 13-14 

^yfP'i^n.^JP^^ policy," 349, 367, 36&- 

•i/U, 432-433 
Bordeaux, 396 
Breckinridge, Ck)l. Henry, 28 
Brest, France, 129, 396 
Bristol, Captain M. L., 246 
British Admiralty, 108 

Asks for naval war policy, 433 

.i^'^^<, ^y President Wilson, 434. 
436-438 

^^120 ^^'^ '^°"^''y system submitted by. 
Sims accused of relying on, 155-156, 343 
o^o oir*^^ honorary membership on, 

«j/o, Ool 

British Board of Admiralty, 223-224. 381 
British Fleet, 272-273 o ^^i, ^oi 

America protected by, 284 314 
British Navy, 24, 350 
British policy, 156 

Browning Vice Admiral Sir M. E., 195-197 
Bryan, William Jennings, 11 
Building program, 28, 308, 314, 398 401 
441 ' 

Bureau of Detail. See, Office of Detail 
Bureau of Navigation, 164-165, 167. 175 
Bureau of Ordnance, 167, 372-373 
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, 167 

Canary Islands, 131 
Caperton, Admiral W. B.. 51, 243 
Capitol, Burning of, 13 
Cecil, Lord Robert, 148 
Censorship in Navy Department, 28, 195 
Certain Naval Lessons of the Great War " 

75 et seq., 425 
Charleston, S. C, 15-16 
Chase, Captain V.O., 167 
Chief of Naval Operations, 21, 28, 445, 455- 

456. See also, Benson, Admiral W S • 

Office of Naval Operations 
Chiefs of Bureaus. 258 
Chile. 17 
Civil War, 8, 14 
Civilian control of the Navy, 5, 13 14 23 

215, 316, 428, 455 ' ' 

Coffee, Comdr. R. B., 442 
Coffman. Admiral DeWitt, Testimony of. 

Committee on Conference, 15 
Concentration, Principle of, 81, 131 
Conduct of the War. Review of, 292-294 
Cone, Captain Hutch I., 99 
Confidential papers, 66-68 
Congress, Building program adopted, 28 



Congress, Criticism not directed at, 154 
i-ails to provide efficient naval organiza- 
tion, 315 
Foreign decorations approved by, 45 
Increase in personnel authorized by, 172 
Naval plans and technique not within 

the sphere of, 456 
National policy determined by, 456 
Refuses to create naval staff, 20 
Secretary Daniels's medal awards arouses 
53 ' 

Secretary Daniels criticized in, 27 
Willingness to provide funds, 1 19 
Congressional Medal of Honor. 44 
Convoy System, 31 
Adopted, 435 

Arrival of first convoys, 120 
British Admiralty influenced by Sims, 344 
British Admiralty submits plans, 120 
395 '" af^opting, 90. 119-121, 339, 

Jellicoe on, 120 

Losses reduced by, 1 13 

Navy Department ignorant of, 133-134 

President Wilson on, 438 

Sims's advocacy of, 382 

Success of, 404 

Vessels to be supplied by America, 120 
Convoys, Attacks on, 386 
Convoys 

Battle cruiser raid against, 134 

Opposed by the Department (Pratt.), 287 
Corbett, Sir Julian, 24 
Gotten, Captain Lyman A.. 442 
Council of National Defense, 111-112 
Cowles, Rear Admiral W. S , 21 
Creel Bureau, 32 

" The Crisis of the Naval War," by Admiral 
Jellicoe, 382-383 y ^uuuidj 

Cronan, Captain W. P., 221 
Cruisers, 435 
Cuban waters, Fleet detained in, 166, 191 

Daniels, Josephus, Secretary of the Navy 
See also. Navy Department 

Address at Naval War College, 4-5 

Admiral. Sims's sea service questioned by, 
d9 

Adniiral Sims's letter pigeon-holed, 75 

Advice of naval officers disregarded, 248 

Aid system ignored by, 22 

A pacifist, 211 

Apparently vindicated by reports sent out 
from Department, 31 

Appointment of, 211 

Attempts to divert attack, 364 

Beclouds issues, 66 
Benson's relation with, 327 
Censorship established by, 28 
Changes lists of medal awards, 57-58 
Character, 211, 215, 248 
Compared with Pelletan, 251 
Criticized by press and in Congress, 27 
Cross-examination of, 407 
Deceived the country through his re- 
ports, 405 
Effort to discredit Sims, 359-360 
Endeavors to defend administration, 94 
Enlistments stopped by, 172-173 
Favoritism shown by, 64 
Fiske attacked by, 225-226 



INDEX 



465 



Daniels, Josephus — cont. 

Foreign decorations opposed by, 45 

Good intentions of, 445 

Letter describing services of Sims, 360 

Letter to Senator Page, 65 

List of awards characterized, 56 

List of documents presented as evidence 

by, 351-352 
List of medal awards, 48, 72-73 
Medal awards at variance with an- 

noimced policies of, 64 
Methods of defence, 255-261 
Military principles violated by, 10-11 
Misleading information given out by, 29 
Mismanagement of Department, 26 
Misrepresentations of, 363 et seq. 
Misuse of power by, 65 
Naval ofiicers ignored by, 296 
Pacifism of, 23, 247, 451-452 
Peace activities, main interest of, 452 
Personalities in testimony of, 354-359 
Policies, 4, 11,33, 76 
Procrastination of, 168-169, 173, 176, 

203, 328-329 
Requests commanding officers to make 

recommendations on medal awards, 

46-47 
Responsibility for conditions, 64, 204, 

260, 319 
Sims attacked by, 66, 354-355 
Sims commended by, 128, 378-380 
Sims's interview with, before departure 

abroad, 143 
Sims recommended as Admiral for life 

by, 360 
Speeches of, 35 

Statement regarding Admiral Sims, 97-98 
Statement regarding Fiske, 227-228, 

236 
Statement regarding General Board's 

letter, 228-229 
Statistics of medal awards, 58-63 
Tactics of the defenders of, 141 et seq. 
Tactics of, 346 et seq., 408, 416 
Testimony of, 346-419 
Testimony of, reviewed by Sims, 348-350 
Testimony on publication of confidential 

papers, 68 
Violated trust as a public official, 7 
Violated principles of organization, 213 
Visits Naval War College, 212 
War plans of Office of Operations not 

approved by, 167 
War speeches, "The Navy and the Na- 
tion," quoted, 32 
Welfare of the service at heart, 445 
Witnesses for, 255-261, 279-280, 347 
Davis, Comdr. C. H., 15 
Davison, H. P., 146 
Dayton, A. G., 21 
Declaration of London, 211 
Defeat, The Navy our insurance against, 

24 
Defeat on sea narrowly averted, 102 
Defeatist policy, 50, 56 
Defences. See, National defence. 
Delay. See also. Navy Department — 

Delays. 
Delay, Dangers of, 447-448 
Demobilization, Secretary Daniels on, 38 
Depth charges, 382 



Destroyers 

Building program, 170, 308, 398, 436 

Delay in sending to the war zone, 394 

Forces sent abroad, 85, 155, 198, 394 

Kept on patrol service, 192 

Misleading reports regarding, 30 

Need of, abroad, 441 

New vessels not equipped, 182 

Not ready in 1917, 306 

Patrolling the Atlantic coast, 394 

Personnel inadequate, 164 

Sims's letter to President Wilson, 439 

Dewey, Admiral George, 18-20, 216, 228, 
231, 236-237 

Discipline, Effect on, of publishing con- 
fidential papers, 67 

Distinguished Service Medal, 47, 49, 57, 72 

Division of the Fleet, 39-40, 261 

Dixie. U.S.S., 129, 198 

"Don't let the British pull the wool over 
your eyes," 82, 143-144, 410 

Dreadnaughts. See, Battleships 

Du Pont, Captain S. F., 15, 16. 

Edison, Thomas A., 368 
Edwards, Lieut. Comdr. W. A., 99 
Efficiency, Naval, 11-12 
Egan, Martin, 150 
Europe, Situation in 1917, 104 
European War 

After-war effects, 5 

Allies in danger of losing, 112-113 

Effect of tonnage losses, 117 

German defeat due to American inter- 
vention, 152 

Ignored by the Secretary, 429 

Losses, 101, 113-116, 153-154, 286-287 

Memorandum of General Board on, 
218-219 

Naval lessons of, simimarized, 454-458 

Outbreak of, 217 

Prolonged by American delay, 113-116, 
446-448 

Situation not understood by American 
officers, 133 
Evans, Rear Admiral R. D., 21 
Fisher, Lord, 457 
Fiske, Rear Admiral Bradley A. 

Aid for Operations in 1913, 211 

Administrative plan prepared by, 366 

Attacked by Secretary Daniels, 225 

Chief adviser to the Secretary, 211 

Fight for preparedness, 450 

Inventions of, 209 

Memorandum on administration of Navy 
Department, 212, 222-225 

Memorandum, Loss of, 418 

On aviation needs of the Navy, 246 

On naval unpreparedness, 27 

On preparedness, 12 

Recommends establishment of Chief of 
Naval Operations, 28 

Reply to Secretary Daniels, 450 

Services to the Navy, 210 

Suppression of, 236, 325-326 

Testimony of, 209-236 
Flag officers, Selection of, 399-400 
Fletcher, Admiral F. F. 

Member of General Board, 261 

Testimony of, 263, 277 
Fleet, At Guantanamo Bay, 191 



466 



INDEX 



Fleet 

Battleships, Only efficient units to be kept 
in commission, 456 

Division of, 39-40, 261 

Kept in Cuban waters, 191 

Kept in Mexican waters, 191 

Organization of, 326 

Personnel shortage 185 

Strength of, at outbreak of war, 191 

Units dispersed at outbreak of war, 81 

Unpreparedness of, 183 et seq. 
Fletcher, Captain W. B., 104 
Foch, General Ferdinand, 381 
Folger, Rear Admiral. W. M.. 21 
Ford, Henry, 368 

Foreign decorations, 44-45, 355, 380-381 
Fox, Albert W., 76 
Fox, Captain Gustavus V., 15-16 
France 

Bases established on French coast, 128 

Forces sent to, 129 

Ministry of Marine, 108, 128, 433 

Policy, 156 
Front. See, War Zone 
Fullam, Admiral W. F. 

Career of. 238-239 

Commander in Chief of Pacific Reserve 
Fleet, 239 

Letter to Admiral Benson, 241 

Reply to Secretary Daniels, 450 

Testimony of, 92, 238-254 
Fullinwider, Commander, 372-373, 376 

Gardner, Hon. A. P., 22 
General Board 

Advisory only, 21, 210, 224 

Establishment of, 21 

Letter of August 1, 1914, 417-418 

Memoranda presented by, 300 

Recommendations of, 177, 218, 300-302, 
314 

Secretary Daniels statement regarding, 
228-232 

The "Black" war plan, 397 

War plans of, disapproved, 411 

War plans formulated by, 414 

Work of, 296 
General Staff, 214 

Secretary Daniels on, 37 

Value of, 223-224 
German coast. Blockade of, 373-374 
German Fleet, 234 
German High Seas Fleet, 34, 267 
German merchant vessels, 170, 436 
German Navy, Prepared in 1914, 24 
German ports, 133, 440 
Germany 

Defeat of, due to American intervention, 
152 

Possibility of war with, 325, 429 
Gibraltar, 129, 131 
Gleaves, Rear Admiral Albert, 206 
Goethals, General G. W., 314 
Grand Fleet. See also, British Fleet 

Reinforcement by American battle- 
ships requested, 124 
Grant, Rear Admiral A. W., Testimony of, 

53, 93, 187-190 
Grasset, Rear Admiral, 195-196 
Guacanayabo, Gulf of, 191 
Guantanamo Bay, 191 



Guildhall speech, 143 
Gunboats, 338 
Gunnery, 209, 365 
Gunnery exercises, 184 

Hale, Senator Frederick, Chairman of 
Senate sub-committee, 42, 53-54, 77, 
95. 157, 160 

Hampton Roads, 192 

Harvey, Col. George, 27 

Hasbrouck, Capt. R. D., 54 

" He kept us out of war," 330 

Heligoland, 439 

Historical Section, 149 

History, Teachings of, ignored, 9 

Hobson, Hon. R. P., 234 

Holland. 439 

Hong Kong. Dewey at. 18-19 

Hoover. Herbert, 111, 335 

House Mission, 118 

House Naval Committee, 31, 225, 234 

Irish. coast. Submarines for, 125 

Irish question, 98 

Italian Navy Department, 108 

Jellicoe, Admiral J. J. 

American battleships requested by, 124 

Naval war plans requested by, 433, 435 

On the convoy system, 120 

Sims commended by, 382-383 
Jenkins, J. W., 32 

Joint Army and Navy Board, 418-419 
Jones, Admiral H. A., 51 

Kittredge, Lt. T. B., 99 
Knight, Rear Admiral Austin M. 

Appointed on Board of Medal Awards, 
46 

Calls meeting of General Board, 217, 219 

Distinguished Service Medal awarded to, 
51 

On naval unpreparedness, 27 

Testimony of, 53 
Knight Board on Medal awards, 45-48, 52 

Reconvened, 64 
' Scope and powers of, 65 

Secretary Daniels's medal awards ignored 
by, 72 
Knox, Captain D. W., 99, 149 

Laning, Captain Harris 
Testimony of, 93, 161-170 
Services of, 315 

Le Breton, Comdr. D. B., 237 

Liberia, 131 

Light craft. 118-119.441 

Lincoln. President. 15 

Listening devices. 382 

Lodge. Senator H. C, 227 

Long, Captain B. A., 99 

Luce, Rear Admiral S. B. 

Appointed on Moody Board, 21 
Comment on Valparaiso affair, 17 
Comment on orders to Dewey at Hong 

Kong. 19 
On the lessons of the Civil War, 16-17 
On civilian control of the Navy, 14 
On preparedness, 12 
War College founded by, 18 

Lusitania, 225, 325 



INDEX 



467 



Madeira Islands, 131 
Mahan, Rear Admiral A. T. 

Appointed on Moody Board, Zl 
Influence of writings of, 18 „ 

"Influence of Sea Power upon History 

quoted, 82 ^ , r,r> 

Member of Naval War Board, 20 
On defensive warfare, 332 
On preparedness, 12 
Maiw, U.S. S.,18, 222 
Manila Bay, Battle of, 10, 19-20 
Mann, Hon. J. R., 235 
Marine Corp)s, 57 
Material Division, 242-243, 318 
Material, Not ready, 321 
Maurice, General Sir Frederick, 157 
Mayo, Admiral H. T. 

Disagrees with Sims, 98 ., ^^.^ r,r.r. 
Report of, on Naval Council, 20z--iU^ 
Sims confirmed by, 207 
Sims subordinate to, 97, 341 
Testimony of, 53, 93. 190-208 ,^ , ._ 
Visit abroad. 117-118, 123-125, 190-195 
McCormick, Senator MediU, 53, 92 
McGowan, Admiral S., 167 
McKean, Rear Admiral J. S. 

Hostile to Sims and the Secretary, 318 
Memorandum on construction of light 
craft, 322 

Quoted, 96 „ 

Testimony of, 282-292, 318-323 
McKinley, President, 19 
McNamee, Captain Luke, 442 
Medal awards, 41 et seq. 

Defeatist policy adopted, 50 

Findings of Senate sub-committee, 56-57 

Knight Board appointed, 46 

Knight Board ignores the Secretary s 

awards, 72 
Officers protest against, 63-64 
Purpose of investigation, 53-54 
Recommendations from commanding 

officers called for, 46 
Report of sub-committee of Senate Naval 

Affairs Committee. 70-72 
Secretary Daniels's list, 42, 48-49, 56 
Secretary Daniels changes the lists, 5/ 
Senate hearings, 3, 41, et seq. _ 

Sims's Comment on the Secretary s list, 

43 
Sims protests against, 49 . , , „ 
Sims refuses the Distinguished Service 

Medal, 49 
Statistical analysis, 58-^ 
Testimony of Secretary Daniels, ba 
Unsuccessful actions rewarded, 50 
Medals. See also. Foreign decorations 

Merchant vessels, 355-356 388-389 
Mexican waters. Fleet in, 191, 21/, 2JU 
Mever, George V. L., Secretary of the 

Navy, 21, 247, 427 
Militarism, 103 
Military policy of the U.S., 11 
Militant principles violated, 101, V6^, ,391 
Mine, New type of, 374-376 
Mine barrage. See. North Sea barrage 
Minister of Shipping, 439 
Monitors, 16 
Monroe Doctrine, 219 
Moody, W. H., Secretary of the Navy, 21 



Moody Board on Reorganization of the 

Navy, 21, 225, 238 
Morale _ . . „„ ,, 

Decline of, after the Armistice, 38, 41 
Effect of conditions in the Department, 

453 , . J , 

Effect of injudicious bestowal of medals, 

43 
Effect of medal awards, 63-64 
Effect of publishing confidential papers, 

67 
Importance of, 41 
Influences tending to lower, 213 
Moral unpreparedness, 108, 110, 111 
Sims, on the effect of the Secretary's 

medal awards, 49 ,77-78 
Morton, Paul, Secretary of the Navy 21 

National defence, 425. See also, Unpre- 
paredness 
Elements of, 10 

Navy, the first line of, 102, 458 
Past good fortune, 22 
National policies, 156, 283 _ 

National policy. Should be determined by 

Congress, 456 
Naval Affairs Committee 

Hearings on medal awards, 3, 27 et seq. 
Results of testimony before, 10 
Naval aviation. See Aviation. 
Naval bases abroad, 396 
Naval Conference, 1917, 190 
Naval Conference at Old Point Comfort, 

196-197 
Naval Consulting Board, 366, 450 
Naval Council of the Allies 
Mayo's report, 202 

Sims represents Navy Department, 80 
Subjects presented. 201-203 
Naval Guns in France, 31, 140 
Naval Institute Proceedings, Quoted, 178 
Naval lessons of the War, Summary of, 

454-458 
Naval Militia, 139 
Naval Mission of the Allies, 312 
Naval officers not responsible for condi- 
tion of the Navy, 204, 329 
Naval organization, 8 et seq. 
Naval Overseas Transportation Service, 

394 
Naval policy. See also. Navy Depart- 
ment—Policy 
Dependent upon national policy, 454 
Errors of, 11 
First statement of, 109 
General Board to make recommenda- 
tions regarding. 21 , 
Necessity for modifications m, 454 
Principles of (Roosevelt), 458-459 
Sims's recommendations adopted, llJ-llcS 
Naval Reserve Force, 139, 401 
Naval Staff, 22 

Necessity for, 214, 221 
Type of officers required for, 442 
Naval strategy. Principles of, violated, 131 
Naval War Board, 20 
Naval War College, 210, 212, 216 
Benson not a graduate of, 340 
Command officers should complete 

courses at, 457-458 
Foundation of, 18 



468 



INDEX 



Naval War College — cont. 

Graduates of, for staff officers, 442 

Sims the President of, 383 

War plans formulated by, 20 
Navy. See also, Daniels, Josephus, Secre- 
tary of the Navy; Navy Department 

Achievements of, 135-136, 348, 393-395, 
400-402, 423 

Civilian control of. See Civilian control 

Condition of, in 1917, 6 

Defensive policy adopted, 403 

Delay in sending forces abroad, 416 

Disintegration after the armistice, 38 

Effect of a weak navy, 11 

Efficiency of, according to the Secretary, 
4-5 

Elements of efficiency, 11 

Failure of, during War of 1812, 13 

First line of national defence, 102, 458 

Importance of, 6 

Inefficient units should be discarded, 456 

Mission of, 213 

Need for greater public interest in, 
458 

Officers of, not criticized by Sims, 443- 
444 

Organization, Object of, 459 

Personnel. See, Personnel. 

Secretary Daniels on, 35-37 

Sims's attacks not directed at the, 353, 408 

Sound policies should be pursued, 458 

State of, in 1917, 419-420 

Strength required, 454 

Strength not based on numbers of ves- 
sels, 457 

Summary of war activities (Daniels), 
401-402 

The Secretary, the official voice of, 65 

Unpreparedness of, 22, 95, 101, 108, 183 
€tseq.,2X&, 260, 264-267, 292, 391- 
392, 444-449 
Badger's testimony, 297 
Benson's testimony, 281, 324, 329 
Daniels responsible for conditions, 284 
Daniels's testimony, 346-421 
Department's witnesses corroborate 

Sims, 280-294 
Fiske's testimony, 210-237 
Laning's testimony, 161-170 
McKean's testimony, 282-283, 317- 

321 
Mayo's testimony, 203-206 
Plunkett's testimony, 186 
Pratt's testimony, 283-284, 306-307 
Sims's testimony, 422-432 
Situation in the Pacific, 243-246 
Statistics, 419-420 
Washington's testimony, 233 
Vessels not equipped, 108 
Navy and Army cooperation, 245 
"The Navy and the Nation," by Secre- 
tary Daniels, 32 
Navy Commissioners. See, Board of Navy 

Commissioners 
Navy Cross, 47, 73 

Navy Department. See also, Daniels, 
Josephus, Secretary of the Navy; 
Navy 

Administration, Faults of, 161 

Authority vested in the Secretary, 206, 
295, 427-428, 444-445 



Navy Department — cont. 

Bureaus should be coordinated, 455 
Civil War, Unprepared during 8, 14 

el seq. 
Commander-in-Chief of Fleet ignored 

by, 199 
Commanding officers interfered with, 82 
Conditions, 112, 306-307 
Convoy system opposed, 120 
Cooperation with the Allies, 80-81, 

87, 110, 122-125, 158, 162, 195-196, 

293, 331-332 
Decisions made without adequate in- 
formation, 81, 89 
Delays in, 85, 101, 109-113, 117 et sea., 

162, 168, 286-287, 311, 391, 433, 44&- 

448 
Destroyers not hastened to the front, 81 
Division of authority in, 205, 295 
Documents presented as evidence by, 

351-352 
Establishment of, 13 
Fleet dispersed at outbreak of war, 81 
Forces dispersed by, 131-132 
Forces held back from War Zone, 276 
Gravity of the situation not realized by, 

83, 90 
History of, 13-19 
Medals for heroism, 45 
Military principles violated by, 101, 

289-292 
Misleading information given out by, 29 
Misled by enemy propaganda, 131 
Mission of, 213, 444 
Mistakes of, 74, 80 

Office of Assistant Secretary created, 15 
Officers lose confidence in, 41 
Orders issued to subordinates, 199 
Organization of, 210, 213-215, 223, 245- 

246, 293, 315, 401, 427, 455 
Daniels responsible for conditions, 293, 

319 
Personnel. See, Personnel. 
Prejudice against the Allies, 344 
Policy, 197, 201 

"Audacious" policy, 349 

Defensive at first, 330-331 

Delay in announcing, 86-87, 109, 433 

Lack of, 108, 293, 451 

Mayo's testimony, 194 

Messages relating to, 435 

Pratt's testimony, 42, 308, 312-313, 435 

Sims's testimony, 85, 424 

Vacillating, 392, 428 

Wilson's testimony, 276 
Reforms necessary, 205-206, 424 
Refusal to send battleships abroad, 85 
Reorganization necessary, 454-455 
Responsibility assumed by officers with- 
out Secretary's authorization, 169 
Roosevelt urges reform of, 20 
Scope of investigation, 92 et seq. 
Senate Committee votes to investigate, 

90-91 
Shipping lost by delays in, 114 
Sims's criticisms of, summarized, 80-82 
Sims ignorant of plans of, 86, 128-130 
Sims not suppprted by, 81 
Sims's instructions on departure abroad, 

82 
Sims's relations with, 112 



INDEX 



469 



Navy Department — cont. 

Sims, the representative of, 104-105 
Uncertain channels of information re- 

Hed upon, 127 
War of 1812, 13 
War plans. See, War plans 
Navy League, 20-21, 27-28, 225-226 

233, 235 
Navy Yards, 321 

Neutrality. 219, 267, 298, 302, 444, 451 
New York Herald, 55 
Newberry, Senator T. H., 53 
Newport, R. I., 217 
News associations, 96 
Niblack, Admiral Albert, Testimony of, 

261. 263, 277 
North American Review, 4 
North Sea, 24 

Mines in, 439 
North Sea Barrage, 31, 98, 133, 140, 311- 

312, 368-369, 371-377 
Northcliffe, Lord, 433, 435 
Norway, 202 

Office of Detail, 14 

Office of Naval Operations, 450. See also, 
Benson, Admiral W. S., Chief of Naval 

Operations 
Establishment of, 233-236, 366 
Responsibility of, for conditions, 317, 

et seq. 
Work of, 296,321 
War plans drawn up by, 167 
Officers. See also. Flag Officers 

Secretary Daniels' selection of, 452-453, 
458 
Officers lose confidence in the Navy Dept., 

41 
Oilers, 202 
Operations, Chief of. See, Chief of Naval 

Operations 
Organization. See also. Navy Department 
Organization 
Efficiency in, 451, 459 
Principles of, 213 
Ostend, 371 

Pacific Fleet, 243 

Pacific, Navy's activities in, 86 

Pacific Reserve Fleet, 242 

Pacifism in the Navy Department, 159, 

et. seq., 298, 304, 317, 444, 451 
Page, Senator C. S., 52, 65 
Page, Walter H., U.S. Ambassador to Great 
Britain 
Admiral Sims's mission inspired by, 103, 

143 
Asks for statement of naval policy, 433- 

435 
On menace of submarine campaign, 335 
Recommends sending more ships abroad, 
85 
Palmer, Captain Leigh C. 

Called before investigating committee, 

93 
Corroborates evidence on personnel, 

170-171 
Personnel built up by. 241 
Present at interview of Admirals Benson 

and Sims, 143-144 
Testimony of, 171-176 



Patrol force, 187, 194, 276, 403 
Pelletan, Camille. 251 
Pennsylvania, U. S. S., 369 
Penrose, Senator Boies, 359 
Perry, Commodore Oliver Hazard, 13 
Personnel 

Bureau of Navigation's statement on, 

suppressed, 165 
Decline of, after the armistice, 38 
Enlisted men, 401 
Enlistments made without authority, 

169 
Enlistments stopp)ed by the Secretary, 

172-173 
Forces necessary for efficiency, 457 
General Board recommends increase of, 

177 
Increase of, 220, 398 
Necessity for trained men, 12 
Palmer's efforts, 241 
Secretary Daniels's selection of officers, 

452-453, 458 
Shortage, 108, 110 

At outbreak of war, 217, 221 
Department responsible for, 293 
Estimates, 171-172, 179-181 
Testimony of Admiral Badger, 281-282 
Testimony of Admiral Fiske, 223 
Testimony of Admiral Plunkett, 184 
Testimony of Captain Laning, 161-170 
Testimony of Admiral McKean, 320 
Testimony of Captain Taussig, 176-182 
Training of, 307 
Pershing. Gen. John J., 150-151, 156-157 
Philippine insurrection, 20 
Pittman, Senator Key, 53-54, 78, 94, 141, 

153, 336 
Plunkett, Rear Admiral C. P., 93 

Testimony of, 183-187 
Policy. See, National Policy; Navy De- 
partment — Policy 
Poindexter. Senator Miles, 53, 92 
Port Arthur. 24 
Porter, Admiral David, 8, 17 
Pratt, Captain W. V., 167, 442 
Letter to Senator Hale. 42 
Memorandum on policy. 312 
Sims criticized by. 304. 310-311 
Testimony of, 283-292, 304-316 
Work of, 309, 315 
Preparedness, 8 et seq. See also. National 
defence; Navy — Unpreparedness of; 
Unpreparedness 
Press, The Secretary's use of the. 94-96 
Procrastination in the Navy Department, 

159 et seq. 
Projectiles, 401 
Promotion, Based on merit, 457 
Pye, Comdr. W. S.,442 

Quarters for the men. 173 
Queenstown, 44. 130. 384 

Reading. Lord, 148 
Reserve Fleet, 189 
Reserve Force. 169-170, 172 
Retired officers, 247 
Rodman, Admiral Hugh 

Commands battleships sent abroad, 271- 
273 

Lack of information shown by, 273-275 



470 



INDEX 



Rodman, Admiral Hugh — cont. 
Reported to Sims, 272 
Sims corroborated by, 270-275 
Sims criticized by, 95, 268-270 
Testimony of, 262, 264-265, 267-275 
Roosevelt, F. D., Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy. 221 
Roosevelt, President, Moody Board ap- 
pointed by, 21 
Roosevelt, President 
On preparedness, 12 
On principles of naval administration and 

policy, 458-459 
Urges reform of Navy Department, 20 
Routing ships. Navy Department plan of, 

134 
"Royal road to victory," 133, 376 
Russia, Submarines operating off, 131 
Russian ships, 202 
"Safety first" policy, 84, 196, 332, 371, 

431-432 
Sampson, Admiral W. T., 20 
Sampson-Schley controversy, 98, 270 
San Diego, Cal., 244 
San Francisco, Cal., 19 
Schofield, Captain F. H., 167, 315 
Science, Application to life, 9 
Scott, Sir Percy, 383 
Senate Naval Affairs Committee, 52-53, 

70-72, 77, 90 et seq. 
Shaffer, Gen. W. R., 20 
Shipping. See also. Tonnage question 
Losses, 113-116 
Percentage of American, 122 
Sims accused of favoring foreign, 121 
Shipping Board, 124-125 
Sims, Rear Admiral W. S. 

Accused of British sympathies, 98, 142- 
143, 146-147, 155-156, 343, 355, 368, 
377, 381 
Accused of disloyalty, 149-150, 356-357 
Accused of having a grievance, 94, 97- 

98 
Accused of Prussianizing the Navy, 359 
Allied conferences attended by, 105 
Anti-submarine craft requested by, 118- 

119 
Appears before Senate Committee, 77, 91 
Appointed Commander U. S. Naval 

Forces, 104 
Attacks on. 66. 94, 96-98, 142-143, 146- 
147, 149-150, 155-156, 268-270, 343, 
354-359, 377-381 
Authority of Navy Department never 

questioned by, 135 
"Certain naval lessons of the War," 
Letter to the Department, 74 el seq. 79, 
97, 100-103 
Charges of, summarized, 391-392 
Comment on policy of Navy Depart- 
ment, 85 
Comment on the Secretary's list of medal 

awards, 43 
Comment on war losses, 153-154 
Congress not criticized by, 154 
Confidential reports of, made public by 

the Secretary, 66-68 
Corroborated by Secretary's witnesses, 

270-294, 
Criticisms constructive, 80, 102 
Criticisms summarized, 80-82 



Sims, Rear Admiral W. S. — cont. 

Criticisms supported by other officers, 54 
Cross-examination of, 141 et seq. 
Daniels attacks, 66, 354-355 
Daniels commends, 128, 378-380 
Daniels confirms Sims's charges, 420-421. 

422 
Difficulties of Sims's position, 106-107 
Distinguished Service Medal declined by, 

49, 52 
Effect of Sims's comment on naval situa- 
tion, 27 
Foreign decorations recommended by, 44 
Foreign shipping not favored by, 121 
Ignorant of Department's plans, 86 
Influence of, upon Allied pwlicies, 382 
Instructions not forwarded to, 104 
Instructions given on departure over- 
seas, 82, 103, 143 
Letter to President Wilson, 439-442 
Liaison officer only, 97, 269 
Mission of, 83 
Mistakes of the Navy Department 

pointed out by, 74 
Navy not attacked by, 136, 138-139 
Not informed regarding Department's 

sources of information, 127 
Offered honorary membership on Admir- 
alty Board, 378, 381 
On naval unpreparedness, 27 
On the menace of the submarine cam- 
paign, 335 
Opinions regarding European War 

changed, 133 
Opposed to decorations, 380 
Policy finally adopted, 117, 119, 128 
Pratt takes issue with, 304 
Protests against the Secretary's list of 

medal awards, 49 
Recommended for permanent Admiral, 

98, 360 
Recommendations of, 84, 98, 117, 128, 

134, 293, 310, 313 
Record as a. naval officer, 69-70, 360 
Relations with General Pershing, 150- 

151, 156-157 
Relations with the Navy Department, 
81-82, 86,97. 103-106, 112, 143,288- 
289 
Reply to personal attacks, 361-362 
Review of the Secretary's testimony, 

348-350 
Rodman criticizes, 268-270 
Sea service questioned, 69 
Services abroad, 308-309, 360 
Staff inadequate, 88, 125 
Statement of a war policy, 440-442 
Status of, abroad, 81, 86, 97, 104-105, 

269, 310, 338, 340-342, 399-400 
Summary of evidence, 136-140, 322- 

449 
Summary of corroborative evidence, 

280-294 
Testimony before Senate committee, 97 

et seq. 
Transport routes determined by, 384-385 
Unity of command advocated by, 395 
Urges adoption of a naval policy, 104 
Slaves, Freed by war, 10 
Soley, Prof. J. R., 8 
South Atlantic, Navy's activities in, 86 



INDEX 



471 



Spanish-American War, 18-20, 222 

Spanish Fleet, 10 
Staff onicers, 5(i, 125-127 
Statistics of recommendation of medal 

awards, 58-63 
Steamship lane across Atlantic, 134 
Stewart, Captain Charles, 13 
Stirling, Captain Yates, 442 
St. Nazaire, 396 

Strategy Board. See. Naval War Board. 
Strategy, Study of, 457 
Strategical principles violated, 81, 84 
Strauss, Admiral Joseph, Testimony of, 

263 
Stringham, Captain S. H., 14 
Submarine campaign 

Benson on, 334-335 

Cutting Allied lines of communication,! 17 

Department's apathy regaiding, 83, 
334-335, 432 

Effect of early defeat of, 115 

Germany's reliance on, 330 

Menaceof, 11,335, 440 

Necessity for defeat of, 311 

Phases of, 114 

President Wilson on, 438 

Relation to tonnage question, 147, 151- 
152. 388-389 

Sims's letter to President Wilson, 439-442 

Success of , 113-116 

Transports went across unharmed, 132, 
387-388 
Submarine operations off the Atlantic 

coast, not to be feared, 84 
Submarines 

American submarines asked for, 125 

American submarines inefficient, 189 

German building program known to 
Navy Department, 165-166 

Mythical battles with, 30 

Plans of defence against, 191-192, 440 
Supply and fuel ships, 441 
Supplies, Transport of. See, Tonnage 

question 
Swift Board, 225 
Sypher, Commander J. H., 418 
Tactics, Study of, 457 

Taussig, Captain J. K. 

Appears before Senate Committee, 93 
Censorship of an article by, 178-179 
Sims corroborated by, 171, 207-208 
Testimony of, 176-182 

"Teamwork" Speech of Secretary Daniels, 
35 

Tennessee, v. S.S., 230 

Thompson, Col. R. M., 20, 28, 226 

Thucydides, 9 

Tillman, Senator B. R., 227 

Times, 379 

Tirpitz, Sims called disciple of, 359 

Tonnage question, 147, 151-152, 388-389 

Torpedoed ships. Medals awarded com- 
manders of, 56 

Torpedoes, 401 

Tracy, Benjamin F., Secretary of the Navy, 
17 

Trade during war, 219 

Traditions of the Navy, 4, 23, 25 

Training, 224, 459 

Trammel, Senator Park, 53, 141, 153 



Transports 

German shir)s taken over for, 306 
Unharmed by submarines, 132, 387-388 

Troops. See, American troops. 

Troop convoys, 132, 436 

Tugs, 85, 124-125, 306, 338-339, 396 

Turnbull, Comdr. A. J., 4 

Twining, Rear Admiral N. C, 99, 442 

United States, Product of warfare, 10 
Unity of command, 146, 395 
Unpreparedness. See also. National de- 
fence; Navy, Unpreparedness of 
Results of, 24 
Upton, Gen. Emory, 12 
U. S. Navy. See, Navy, 

Vacillation in Navy Department, 392, 428 

Valparaiso, Chile, 17 

Vera Cruz incident, 217 

Vessels, Numbers abroad, 155 

"Victory at Sea" by Admiral Sims, 259, 

350 
Vir^inius affair, 17 

War, Success in, factors determining, 10 
War, Ultimate test of a stale, 9 
War Council, Branch of, at Lx)ndon, 441 
War Industries Board, 263 
War of 1812, 13 

War losses. Unnecessary losses due to 
delays, 101, 113, 116, 153-154,286-287 
War plans 

Anti-submarine warfare. No plans for, 

414-415 
Approval withheld by the Department, 

397 
Badger's testimony, 299-302 
Benson's testimony, 284-285 
"Black" war plan, 397-398, 409-415 
"Bold and Audacious" plans, 349, 36'7, 

369-370, 432, 433 
Bureau of Navigation hampered by lack 

of, 167 
Bureau of Ordnance hampered by lack of, 

167 
Daniels's testimony, 365-366, 408-415 
Defensive only, 191-192, 431-432 
Details, only, considered by the Depart- 
ment, 132-133 
Disappearance of, 397 
Efforts to discover new plans, 89 
First statement of, 200 
Full information necessary in devising, 

135 
General basic plan neglected, 133 
General Board's recommendations, 21, 

411,414 
Grant's testimony, 188-189 
Lack of, 80, 108-109. 133, 162, 166-170, 

175, 293. 391-392, 424, 429-430, 451 
Laning's testimony, 167 
Mayo's testimony, 193-195, 198-200, 

204-205 
Memoranda offered by Captain Pratt, 

309 
Mobilization plan only. 187 
Necessity for. 206. 210-212 
Office of Operations draws up, 167 
Palmer's testimony, 174-175 
Planning Dept. needed, 223-224, 455 
Plunkett's testimony, 187 



472 



INDEX 



War plans — cont. 

Rodman asserts their existence, 271-272 
Sims not informed regarding, 128-130 
Value of, 210-212 
Wilson's testimony, 276-277 
War prolonged by delays, 101, 113-116, 

153-154, 286-287 
War Zone 
Attention of Department not concen- 
trated on, 87 
Decisions regarding, made upon inade- 
quate information, 81, 89 
Forces held back from, 276 
Operations in, 128 
Proportion of vessels in, 150-151 
Wars not yet at an end, 9 
Washington, Rear Admiral Thomas, Tes- 
timony of, 233 
Washington Post, 76, 146 
"We Are Ready Now," 29, 208 
Welles, Gideon, Secretary of the Navy, 16 
Whales mistaken for submarines, 244 
Whitney, William C, Secretary of the Navy, 
17 



Will to victory. 110, 145, 410-411 
Wilson, Admiral H. B. 
Confidential report regarding, made 

public, 66-68 
Testimony of, 263, 265-266, 275-277 
Troop convoys directed by, 387 
Wilson, President 
Criticizes the British Admiralty, 434, 

437-438 
Hoover submits report on European situ- 
ation, 111-112 
Instructions to Admiral Mayo, 201 
Letter to Admiral Sims, 438 
Reply to American Defence Society, 227 
Speech on the Pennsylvania, 369-370 
Winslow, Rear Admiral Herbert, 27 
"Wool pulling" instructions, 82, 143-144, 

410 
World's Work, 100, 259 

Yachts, 118, 132, 199, 306 
York River, 194 

Zeebrugge, 371, 440 



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